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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian state apparatus consists of a patchwork built upon a cascade of reform 
attempts over a span of sixty years. Multiple layers of legislation have produced a 
complex and inconsistent institutional landscape that has made policy change a difficult 
task. Four major public management policy reforms resulted in significant constitutional 
changes in the form of constitutional provisions, and they reshaped the modus operandi 
of the federal administration.
The approach adopted here is comparative because it is oriented towards identifying 
similarities and differences among four different cases that occurred in Brazil during the 
20th century. The pattern of these cases is intriguing because the frequency, variety, and 
speed of the reforms followed a zigzag course, and thus do not correspond to the 
gradual long-term and cumulative transformations that took place in many developed 
countries.
Each case study corresponds to a specific historical episode. The material is organised 
and analytically narrated around interconnected events that took place within the 
episode. The events were significant in themselves and they clearly highlighted aspects 
of the means-ends chains.
The framework adopted for the analysis was developed by Kingdon to explain pre- 
decisional and decisional stages of the policy-making process. The reason for this is the 
Brazilian context, characterised by fluidity, unclear technologies, chance, temporal 
sorting, and attention allocation. Policy change effectively took place when events in the 
political, problematic and policy streams converged to generate windows of 
opportunity, during which times public entrepreneurs pushed their policy solutions 
through the upper echelons of decision-making arenas.
The investigation is centred on the dynamics o f policy processes. The main conclusion 
of the thesis refers to the essential role played by entrepreneurs in getting the reforms 
approved. The reformers’ influence in establishing the default implementation model 
varied in the four cases because of problems of political feasibility, rotation of 
reformers, policy discontinuities, inconsistencies in transitory legislation, and lack of 
top-down political support.
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EP (SOE) Empresa Publica (State-Owned Enterprise)
SRH Secretaria de Recursos Humanos (Human Resources Department)
SUCAD Superintendencia de Constru9ao e Administra^o Imobiliaria
(Supervisory Department for Real-Estate Construction and 
Administration)
TCU Tribunal de Contas da Uniao (Supreme Audit Agency)
UDN Uniao Democratica Nacional (National Democratic Union)
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
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GLOSSARY
Direct Administration Includes all ministries and the Presidency (all function 
under Public Law)
Indirect Administration According to Decree-law 200, Indirect Administration 
includes all Autonomous Government Agencies, 
Foundations and State-Owned
Autonomous Government Agencies are characterised as Legal Personalities of Public
Law with exclusively administrative capacity, under the 
guardianship of the Ministry related to the issues handled 
by the respective agency. The hiring regime for their civil 
servants has been statutory since 1988, when the 
Constitution prohibited such servants to be hired under the 
CLT.
Regulatory Agencies Considered autonomous government agencies in special 
regimes, for they were set up with the purpose of 
regulating and disciplining certain activities.
Foundations Institutions of indirect administration characterised as a 
non-profit legal entities of private law, established by 
legislative authorisation for carrying out activities that 
need not be conducted by organs of the direct 
administration. In 1987, Decree-law 200 established the 
figure of Public Foundations, as part of the 1988 
Constitution. Foundations have administrative autonomy 
and the Federal Government is responsible for their costs. 
They are subject to public accountancy and under the 
Statutory Personnel Regime.
Executive Agencies Such Agencies are set up by acts of the President 
regarding Autonomous Government Agencies or Public 
Foundations that have working plans for institutional 
restructuring and development, and that have signed some 
partnership contract with the related ministry.
State-Owned Enterprise An organisation of the indirect administration 
characterised as a legal entity of private law, supported 
exclusively by federal funds in order to explore an 
economic activity for the needs of public administration. 
Their employees are short-listed through public 
competitive selection process and their labour contracts 
follow the rules o f the CLT.
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Social Organisation Private organisation qualified by the ministry of its
respective field and by the Planning, Budgeting and 
Management Ministry. They are public, but not profit- 
oriented organisations. Their relationships with the 
parental ministries are regulated by performance 
agreements.
Civil Public-Interest Organisation A privately controlled non-profit organisation
having legal personality under private law. This figure was 
introduced in 1999 and may carry out only social 
activities. After establishing a partnership with some 
governmental organ, a Civil Public-Interest Organisations 
is entitled to receive public resources.
Consolidated Labour Legislation (Labour Code) This code was enacted by
decree-law in 1943. It regulates individual and collective 
labour relations and ensures the rights of workers and 
labour unions.
Single Juridical Regime By means of statutes, the Single Juridical Regime
established a single regime for the civil servants of the 
Federal Government, the autonomous agencies, including 
those under special regimes, and federal public 
foundations, through which public positions are set up by 
law, with their own specific names. Salaries are paid from 
the public coffers, either as registered employees, or as 
commissioned personnel.
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CHAPTER 1
Public management policy change 
Comparing cases of constitutional reform in Brazil
1.1. Introduction
The Brazilian state apparatus today is a patchwork quilt with layers of regulations built 
over a cascade of attempts at reform over a span of sixty years. Nine major reform 
attempts have been made since the 1930s. This list includes: the Readjustment Law and 
the New State Reform in 1937, the attempt to promote an Administrative Reform in 
1952-1953, the proposals of the Commissions for the Simplification of Bureaucracy and 
the Administrative Reform of 1956, the proposals of the Peixoto Report in 1963, the 
reforms contained Decree-law 200 in 1967, the De-bureaucratisation Crusade o f 1979- 
1982, the Democratising Reform of 1988, the Downsizing Reform in the early 1990s, 
and the so-called Managerial Reform of 1995-1998.
Reforms, however, cannot be considered routine. Comprehensive administrative 
reorganisation has been a recurrent phenomenon (March and Olsen, 1983) and virtually 
all Brazilian presidents engaged in major reform initiatives as soon as they took office. 
The theme moved up and down the national agenda during two dictatorships (1937- 
1945 and 1964-1984), during the democratic interval between them, and even 
afterwards, and is still alive today. Some proposals never reached the decisional agenda 
but a few initiatives got to the implementation stage, but with different results. 
Initiatives have moved in different directions and expressed an intriguing variety of
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scopes and orientations. Four major public management policy reforms resulted in 
constitutional changes3 and these are the objects of this thesis.
The first case -  1937: a case of construction of a National State -  included civil service, 
organisational design, budgeting, and procurement. These reforms occurred during the 
Vargas Constitutional Government (1934-1937), between the period when he was 
President-in-Chief of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (1930-1934), and 
when he became Dictator of the “New State” (1937-1945). The reforms came in two 
waves. During the first wave (1934-1936) the main policy resulted in the establishment 
of a Federal Civil Service Commission -  inspired on the American model -  and 
legislation for public employees. The result was The Readjustment Law -  which paved 
the way for the organisation of the Brazilian Civil Service. In the second wave (1936- 
1937) an overall central department with extraordinary executive powers was set up and 
placed under the Presidency in order to implement the “New State” reforms.
The second case -  1967: launching the bases for a developmental State -  was the only 
case that presented policy change across the entire range of public management policies, 
including organisational design, planning and budgeting, control and auditing, civil 
service, and procurement. This reform took place during the first administration of the 
authoritarian military regime (1964-1984), when General Castelo Branco was president 
(1964-1967). The new legislation established new planning, programming, budgeting, 
financial, and control systems in the Executive. A dual administrative structure -  direct 
and indirect -  was set up. The competencies and modus operandi of the Supreme Audit 
Agency were redefined, as their control activities became external and ex-post. The 
Presidency was restructured, the functions of planning, administration, and control were
3 However, the Brazilian law-making system requires the enactment o f ordinary legislation to detail 
general constitutional provisions. The decision-making process therefore includes the drafting of  
legislation -  not necessarily consistent -  in two stages.
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transferred to the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, and the procurement 
legislation was updated. Two proposals were left open -  the institutionalisation of a 
Ministry of Administration and the setting up of a Senior Executive Corps in the Direct 
Administration -  but neither was pursued in the aftermath of the enactment of the new 
legal framework.
The third case -  1988: the reestablishment of a standard public bureaucracy -  involved 
changes in organisational design and civil service. The reforms occurred in the context 
of the transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy, during the Samey 
Administration (1985-1990).4 They resulted in the empowerment of the direct 
administration and the adoption of a classic public bureaucracy based on the 
constitutional provisions enacted by the National Constituent Assembly (1987-1988). 
These reforms also aimed at establishing a career structure inspired on the French 
model, which included the training of a civil service elite to keep the federal 
administration operating. These professionals were to be trained at a National Public 
Administration School.
The fourth case -  1998: the so-called managerial reform -  also brought about changes 
only in civil service relationships and in the forms of organising the public sector. The 
process took place during President Cardoso’s first term of office (1995-1998), in a 
democratic context and after the successful implementation o f a macro-economic 
stabilisation plan that put an end to the hyperinflationary process that had characterised 
the previous decade. These reforms abolished the Single Juridical Regime established 
by the 1988 Constitution and enabled the new forms of public-sector organisations to be 
set down, such as executive agencies and social organisations (public but not state- 
owned institutions).
4 Fernando Collor took office only in March 1990.
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The four cases have two distinctive features in common: they all produced outcomes in 
the form of Constitutional provisions and they reshaped the modus operandi of the 
federal administrative apparatus in subsequent years, although they did not necessarily 
‘^ update” former institutional arrangements and practices. The result was a juxtaposition 
of layers of distinct institutional frameworks. The ambitions of reformers was usually 
aimed directly at redefining the constitution according to their view5 in the hopes that 
implementation would somehow follow.6
Therefore, three of the four cases occurred within the context of changes in regime. The 
1937 case occurred during Vargas’s precarious constitutional administration of 1934- 
1937, sandwiched between two dictatorial periods (Levine, 1970). The 1967 case took 
place during the authoritarian military regime that lasted from 1964 to 1984. The 1988 
case occurred during the transition to democracy that followed the military rule. The 
contexts of these three cases were inevitably and dramatically influenced by 
contemporaneous events at the political level -  to be explored in greater detail as the 
cases are discussed, one by one.
This present chapter is divided into 12 sections. The first section is this introduction. 
The second section focuses on the object of the thesis, namely, processes of public 
management policy change that produced constitutional change. The third section refers 
to the justification of the thesis: why it was written. The fourth section explores the 
reasons why the thesis was organised the way it was. The fifth section details the 
empirical evidence used in the thesis. The sixth section explains how the empirical 
evidence was treated and modelled. The seventh section summarises the substantive
5 A sole exception was the experiment carried out by the Ministry o f De-bureaucratisation in 1979-1982, 
which goes beyond the scope of this investigation. That reform attempted to promote a behavioural 
revolution in the public sector with minimal interference through legislation (Oliveira, 1984).
6 Brazilian political culture follows the American tradition “Politics becomes the struggle to translate 
social and economic interests in law ( ...)  Dissatisfaction most frequently takes the form o f trying to force 
a new and more favourable interpretation o f the Constitution” (Katznelson and Prewitt, 1979: 38).
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historical claims underlying the Brazilian experiences investigated. The eighth section 
explores plausible alternative approaches for investigating the same object. The ninth 
section clarifies themes that are not dealt with in the thesis, even though potentially 
related to the investigation. The tenth section identifies the limits of the thesis. Finally, 
the eleventh section summarises the key issues raised by the comparative case studies 
discussed in the thesis. The chapter ends with the twelfth section, which describes the 
structure of the thesis.
1.2. What this thesis is about: four cases of public management policy processes 
that led to changes in the Brazilian Constitution
The main purpose of this investigation is to analyse and explain public management 
policy change in modem Brazil over the last six decades. The research was carried out 
in the field of public management,7 a sub-discipline of political science. The central 
subject addressed is the description of the policy process that led to reforms in public 
management reform. It includes analysis of the dynamics of the issue, the rise of the 
issue to the governmental and decisional agenda, the way problems were defined, the 
specification of policy outcomes, the decisional processes, and the role played by 
entrepreneurs in these processes. Contiguous and background stories related to regime
o
change and other policy sub-systems, such as planning, are also relevant to this 
analysis, but they are incorporated into the investigation insofar as they intersect with 
the main narrative.
7 Public management is conceived o f as a “process through which policies are formulated, resources 
allocated, and programs implemented, rather than a policy issue in its own right” (Barzelay, 2000: 7).
8 Baumgartner and Jones (1993) used the term policy subsystem to designate a “definable institutional 
structure responsible for policymaking, together with formal arrangements and informal relations that 
influence participation in the venues where decisions are made” (Barzelay, 2000: 57).
24
The objects of analysis are four Brazilian historical experiences of public management 
reforms, all of which resulted in broad constitutional changes affecting substantive 
aspects of organisation in the public sector. Descriptive explanatory methods (Barzelay 
et al., 2002) are adopted, as well as a process-oriented framework (Kingdon, 1994), to 
analyse the four cases. The former type of method presents empirical evidence of the 
central story in the form of an ordinary narrative that provides grounds for the latter by 
offering coherent analytical explanations for the phenomena observed.
For the purpose of this investigation, administrative reform9 is understood as a 
comprehensive effort toward public management policy change at the constitutional 
level including such areas as organisational design, employment relationships, 
budgeting and public expenditures, control and auditing, and procurement. “Public 
management policies are constituted by a cumulative flow of authoritative decisions and 
means intended to guide, constrain, and motivate the public service as a whole” 
(Barzelay, 2000a: 10; and Barzelay, 2000b: 16). At least three cases took place before 
the expression “public management”10 had been disseminated. The earlier expression 
was administrative reform,11 and it is still often used today.
Historical understanding is a preliminary concern regarding all four cases. It is a 
requirement for analytically grounded analysis, and is also essential for the development 
of “an ability to envision the future course of action based on an understanding of the 
past” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995:156). Chapters three, four, five, and six focus on the
9 Administrative reforms have been defined in several different ways, such as “the induced systemic 
improvement o f public sector operational performance” (Caiden, 1991: 1), “a directed change o f main 
features o f an administrative system” (Dror, 1970: 4), and “an organisational, instrumental, or program- 
related change o f government and the public sector to meet environmental demands and requirements” 
(Siedenporf, 1982: xi).
10 See Lynn (1996) and Kelman at al. (2003) for an up-to-date discussion o f the definition o f  the field o f  
public management.
11 Although the Oxford English Dictionary makes no a distinction between the terms “management” and 
“administration” (Lynn, 2003: 22), there are more than nuances involved. Lynn (1996) provided a rich 
analysis o f  the evolution o f the public administration, policy sciences, and public management 
communities.
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historical accounts required for an understanding of what happened during the four 
episodes. They provide the elements and links for modelled explanations. The 
misunderstandings, insufficiencies, and instability of interpretations made in the past 
must be addressed to enable scholars, practitioners, politicians, and society in general to 
understand what happened, how it happened, and why things happened in a given way. 
“Issue history can help to define the future” because it highlights previous experiences 
that map “limitations on some future possibilities” (Neusdadt and May, 1986: 236).
This dissertation focuses on the explanations that account for the policy process which 
culminated in public management change in each of the four cases. “Reform is about 
content and process” (Toonen, 2003a: 466). The thesis focuses on process, and the 
analytical foundations used in order to explain all policy processes were drawn from 
Kingdon’s framework regarding agenda setting, policy specification, and decision­
making processes.
1.3. Why this thesis was written
The long history of Brazilian public management reforms is unknown partly because the 
10critical junctures during which the most important institutional changes occurred have 
not been studied, and partly because the dilemmas involved in the public management 
policy process in question were not fully explored.
The four cases in question have never undergone analytical treatment or systematic 
comparisons. Some have never even been adequately described. Few cases have been
12 Critical junctures are brief moments characterized by the appearance o f opportunities for institutional 
change. The “critical” dimension derives from the fact that at the respective moments new institutional 
arrangements took different paths with a certain degree o f stability (Pierson, 2004: 134-5).
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the object of any sort of analytically grounded approach -  especially those of 1937 and 
1998. Two cases -  1967 and 1988 -  have been neglected in terms of the study of their 
causes, significance, and consequences, even in descriptive terms.
The scope of the reforms is not the same in all four cases, referred to hereinafter by the 
year of the constitutional change. The cases present different geometries in terms of the 
scope of the proposals involved. Only organisational design and civil service policies 
are present in all four.
The initiatives moved in different directions and expressed an intriguing diversity of 
orientations. Some of the reforms provided a variety of innovative approaches -  in 
terms of originality, scope, and context, and the political circumstances and external 
influences were intriguing and original. The role played by individuals was decisive and 
particularly surprising given the broad character o f these reforms.
The path taken by the reforms did not follow a linear pattern typical of western 
democracies, which evolved from patronage to professional bureaucracies and then to 
new public-management types of arrangements. This problematic premise was adopted 
by the last reform analysed (Mare, 1995). The reforms of 1937 and 1988 can be 
generically referred to as bureaucratic while the reforms of 1967 and 1998 can be 
labelled as managerial.
The frequency of the reforms is also impressive, especially when more structural types 
of transformations usually take decades or even centuries to occur, as was the case with 
the developed Western democracies. Moreover, the pace of the reforms was hectic, a 
symptom of the relentless general dissatisfaction with the solutions presented over time 
or of the problems involved in the proposals presented.
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The thesis explains what happened at the critical junctures of public management policy 
changes, and why and how these changes occurred. The thesis thus dissected the turning 
points in public management policies over six decades, an approach that was necessary 
in order to provide a broad investigative project.
1.4. Why the thesis was set up the way it was
The questions addressed by this study are: why the four sets of reforms occurred, what 
explains the variety of proposals in the cases in question, how they reached the 
decisional agenda, and what role public entrepreneurs played in making them feasible.
In spite of the frequency of attempts at reform, they cannot be considered routine 
matters, each reform having had its own specific evolution.
The investigation includes an analysis of the issue definition, the projection of an issue 
image, the issue’s career, the rising of the issue to the governmental and decisional 
agenda, the status of the issue over time, the way problems were defined, the 
specification of policy alternatives, the decisional processes, the establishment of a 
default implementation solution, and the role played by entrepreneurs in these 
processes.
The choice of the above-mentioned research questions led to the adoption of Kingdon’s 
framework to model the answers to these questions and to the specific research 
questions in each chapter. Each policy change is investigated in four different ways: a) 
as a critical juncture of problems, solutions, and cognitive aspects, b) as an issue career 
through institutional settings, and special political and economic circumstances, c) as a 
policy construct and a reaction against the previously established constitutional
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provisions in place for organising the public sector, and d) as an issue pushed through 
by entrepreneurial action by both individuals and the institutions that provided the locus 
for their activity.
The strategy adopted in this thesis -  the focus on comparative case studies in order to 
solve puzzles and answer research questions formulated at the meso- and micro-levels -  
meant that the investigation be developed according to previously defined time- 
intervals. Comparative analyses intensively grounded in given historical periods imply 
the risk of being pushed into another sort of theoretical framework: historical 
institutionalism (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer, 2003). But this would be the case only if 
the major focus of the thesis were policy contents -  seen from a long-term perspective -  
and if the comparisons were not based on a specific theoretical model.
The design of the research and the theoretical frameworks allowed comparability over 
time. The methodological orientation follows Ragin’s (1987) concern with the search 
for multiple overlapping conditions capable of relating specific contexts and processes 
to policy outcomes. The international literature on public management increasingly 
encourages cross-country comparisons regarding such themes as governance (OECD, 
1993), political traditions (Knill, 1998 and 1999), and public management reforms 
(Peters and Pierre, 2001; Pollitt, 1990). But comparisons between public management 
policy changes must be limited to the present time, for two reasons. First, plausible 
comparisons of processes are not necessarily carried out during the same historical 
period. Second, longitudinal comparisons do not necessarily become obsolete, simply 
because many public-management problems do not change substantively over time:
13they come and go.
13 This statement should be taken in relative terms for policies affected by radical technological change, 
severe shocks, or slow cumulative transformations that lead to “irreversible” outcomes. (Pierson, 2003).
29
The research design was based on a comparative case-study approach in order to afford 
an effective dialogue between ideas and evidence. The methodology used was 
qualitative, case-oriented and comparative (Ragin, 1987). It was qualitative because it 
makes use of primary sources -  such as interviews, files written by unknown authors, 
and unpublished historical documents -  that are not based on quantitative data, which 
are usually not available for this sort of investigation. The design was case-oriented 
because it focused on selected critical cases.14 It was comparative because it dealt with a 
few critical cases that occurred at different historical moments, and seeks to provide an 
account of similarities and differences among them. The intention was not to provide 
universal generalisations, but coherent structured narratives capable of capturing the 
essence of the phenomena investigated.
The aim was to improve understanding and limit historical generalisations (Ragin, 
1987)15 related to the topic of public management reforms. Studies based on very few 
case studies can provide good explanations even if  they are not designed to forecast 
what will happen and under what circumstances (Rueshmeyer, 2003).
1.5. How the thesis was developed in empirical terms
This thesis makes use of primary sources, such as interviews, files written by unknown 
authors, and unpublished historical documents. The information regarding the different 
historical periods of the cases was recorded in different formats. Microfilms were 
checked to recover information from the Vargas period. Personal files were consulted to
14 By using the term case studies to address public management reform processes I am adopting a 
different approach from Stake’s (1995), who suggests that case studies should be employed only for the 
study o f entities (Barzelay, 2000b: 14).
15 Ragin (1987: 31) refers to “modest empirical generalisations about historically-defined categories o f  
social phenomena.”
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recover intermediate discussions related to all cases, but especially those of 1967 and 
1988. Recourse to newspapers and magazines was reduced to a minimum because of 
their low levels of reliability. Government documents -  drafts of proposals, internal 
memos, classified documents, unpublished studies, suggestions for legislation and 
excerpts from proposals for legislation, because they contain the justifications for the 
laws in question -  were intensively explored, specially in order to allow the 
reconstitution of the processes that culminated in the decisions made in each case.
Most of the historical evidence explored in this investigation consists of the contents of 
interviews held in 2000. Sixty-one interviews were conducted with participants, 
observers, and analysts of the four cases. Interviewees included civil servants, 
politicians, scholars, consultants, judges, and ministers. A coded list o f them can be 
found in Annex 1 to this document.
The longitudinal character of the comparisons allowed some interviewees to be heard 
regarding two different episodes. In these cases the interviews were divided in order to 
clarify the participation of the interviewee in each episode. Given the sensitivities 
involved in most of the situations, the interviewees’ names are not mentioned regarding 
specific quotations.
Triangulation was frequently explored -  especially regarding the establishment of the 
facts -  in order to clarify the sequence of the events. Most of the interviews were 
relevant for indirect reasons: they reproduced the atmosphere of the context, provided 
information about the unwritten alignment of actors and positions, and introduced 
information about personalities, beliefs, and premises beyond straightforward rational 
approaches. But they were especially important in orienting the investigation.
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The fundamental criterion governing the choice of interviewees was their involvement 
in the public management policy-making processes related to one or more of the four 
cases. Some interviewees were at the political, juridical, and economic periphery of the 
main events, but nevertheless played some role in the process as a whole. In three cases 
it was possible to directly interview the entrepreneurs involved in the public 
management policy-making process. In the first case, these were persons who were 
contemporary to the main policy entrepreneur. Information from his personal archives 
complemented the data. The annotations and recorded tapes of the interviews, when 
authorised, are available for consultation in special cases. Transcriptions of interviews 
from other archives were also consulted for one case because of the rich material made 
available by the Getulio Vargas Foundation.
Interviews were conducted with a semi-structured format. A general list o f questions 
was read to the interviewees, and they usually commanded the conversations, except 
when the researcher felt the need to reiterate questions or bridge gaps. The greatest 
difficulty in this sort of procedure was to have the respondents answer the questions and 
-  especially -  to avoid distortion of the facts while retaining the benefit o f hindsight. 
But, fortunately enough, this problem was more frequent regarding only the last case, 
which enabled further confrontations of views and corrections of information on the 
basis of secondary sources. The use of semi-structured interviews also enabled the 
interviewees to talk about important issues that the researcher was not aware of. Most of 
the “surprises” of the interviews came to the surface without being part of the 
previously defined script.
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1.6. How the evidence was modelled and presented
The approach taken in this thesis was processual. This term16 means that time, history, 
contexts in motion, and the mechanisms17 that shaped the dynamics of the processes are 
in the centre of the cases studied. A processual analysis aims at “accounting for and 
explaining the what, why, and how of the relationships among context, processes and 
outcomes” (Pettigrew, 1997: 340). The interplay between actors, problems, ideas, 
solutions, events and contexts give the thrust that makes processual dynamics move 
forth. Processes are embedded in contexts and related to outcomes within temporal 
dimensions in which other potentially related events are also occurring.
The processual approach (Pettigrew, 1997; Barzelay, 2004) has its roots in classical 
papers by political scientists such as Kingdon (1994), Lindblom (1990), March (1994), 
and March and Olsen (1989). A processual approach is compatible with the three 
variants of “new institutionalism” (Hall and Taylor, 1996) as Barzelay and Gallego
|  O
(2004) argued. This thesis takes the strong affinities with its sociological variant as a 
starting point, although it recognises the potential benefits of complementary 
contributions from historical institutionalism.
Barzelay (2003) developed a systematic comparative analysis of the processes of 
policy-making and public-management policy change in selected cases of public sector 
reforms. He integrated three frameworks19 in order to account for the occurrence,
16 Process is defined “as a sequence o f events that describe how things change over time.” (Pettigrew, 
1997: 338).
17 Elster (1999) defined mechanisms as “frequently recurrent ways in which things happen”. Hall (2003: 
388) suggested that social mechanisms were “constructed as basic forms o f human behaviour or recurrent 
forms o f collective action that are constitutive components o f the causal chains leading to broader 
political outcomes”.
18 Barzelay and Gallego (2004: 18-20) argued that “institutional processualism” seeks to understand 
“how change happens,” while new institutionalism focuses on structural opportunities for change. They 
also state that sociological institutionalism did not focus “on beliefs, values and identity”.
19 The three theoretical frameworks are multiple streams (Kingdon, 1994), punctuated equilibrium 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and organisational learning (Levitt and March, 1990).
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direction, and stability of public management reforms. In a more recent piece of work, 
Barzelay (2004) identified the concepts of social mechanisms and contextual factors as 
key ingredients of the theoretical framework he developed to analyse processes of 
change. Interactions are contextual, temporally constrained, subject to the 
appropriateness of logics (March and Olsen, 1989) and pervaded by the operation of 
social mechanisms. The contextual factors -  frequently responsible for the activation of 
social mechanisms as well as for their modus operandi - are described in the initial 
sections of the chapters referring to the case studies. Social mechanisms connect 
context, actions and beliefs. Kingdon’s framework includes several mechanisms within 
the context of agenda setting, policy specification and decision-making processes.
The unit of analysis of the case studies is a stream of activities related to public 
management reform policy changes that occur within a given context -  historical, 
political, economic, social, cultural, and technological. Each reform occurred in a given 
conjuncture comprised of “interactional effects between distinct causal sequences that 
become joined at particular points in time” (Pierson, 12).
The study of the four cases seeks to pinpoint patterns and mechanisms that impel the 
processes related to the episodes studied. The reforms gravitate around public 
bureaucracies, according to the meaning given by the terminology coined by Evans 
(1979, 1992, and 1995) that assumed as Weberian types of public bureaucracy those 
based on public competitive selection processes, promotion by merit (not seniority), 
career systems, competitive remuneration, and public respect and prestige. The adopted 
method reduces complexity through the research design of a phenomenon derived from 
multiple causes. As Tilly (1984) emphasised, “the pursuit is for proximate, not final 
causes” (Pettigrew, 1997: 341).
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Description in this investigation was defined as “a set of logically consistent 
propositions that describes the causes and consequences o f policy actions” (Dunn, 1981: 
84). Hence, there was an assumption that by means of description it would be possible 
to narrate, understand and explain the four cases in a consistent and comparable way.
“For whatever else a science may be, it is also a practice which must be 
as critical about the way it describes its objects of study as it is about the 
way it explains their structures and process” (White, 1984: 1).
In the present investigation, explanations were given through historical accounts, and 
later systematised through comparative analyses.
Theoretical reduction was pursued through historical and analytical narratives. 
Essentially, historical narratives should be capable of improving the historical 
understanding of past phenomena, while analytic narratives should account for 
mechanisms capable of explaining the specific episodes investigated. Historical 
narratives (White, 1984) were used to register relevant past events and to trace 
meaningful processes for the purpose of the analysis. They “aim to provide a chronicled 
account of an historical experience” (Barzelay, 2000b: 10).
The process of policies leading to public management reform is the central subject of
9 1both the historical and the analytical narratives, although some contiguous stories, 
usually related to the political and economic domains, are incorporated into the 
investigation.22 Analytic narratives are built on historical evidence in order to explain23
20 Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 were written in terms of historical narratives enriched by evidence provided by 
interviews and primary research sources.
21 There are at least three other stories, referred to from time to time, that deserve special attention: 
regime change, economic development, and planning policy domain organisation.
22 Chapter 7 provides a comparison o f the four cases modelled in terms o f Kingdon’s theoretical 
framework, plus secondary theoretical angles such as policy reversals and policy transfer.
23 “The primary aim o f the analysis is to understand a policy problem rather than solve it” (Dunn, 1981: 
80).
35
relevant actions and activities through theoretical models (Barzelay, 2000b), while 
analytic narratives provide the explanation. They enable comparability and 
differentiation between the ideograph and relevant theoretical aspects of the 
investigation.
Each case study24 was organised on the basis of narratives that assembled and gave 
shape to the empirical evidence related to the research questions used in the 
investigation. Diagrams with the narrative structure of each case study can be found at 
the end of the introductions to Chapters 3-6. These narrative structures are constructs of 
events that configure the experience studied. Since “policy processes are composed of 
parallel and serial events” (Barzelay et al., 2002: 24), the modelling must address events 
along a time line.
Each event can be broken down into component events or sub-events in order to better 
clarify their dynamics. There are several types of events to be considered: prior, 
contemporaneous, related, later, and simple events, which are the constitutive elements 
of the episodes studied. The origin of the events studied is located in their relationships 
with prior and contemporaneous events that contain the causal sources for their 
occurrence.
The events included in the cases were selected on the basis of their analytical 
significance. The research questions related to specific events within a case were 
formulated and answered in the corpus of the corresponding chapters, and required 
intra-event or cross-event analysis in order to be answered. Intra-event analysis 
concentrated on how individual events evolved. Cross-event analysis concentrated on 
how events were affected by one another and their causal relationships. Some questions
24 “A successful case study provides answers to research questions about the experience studied and 
insightful statements about types o f phenomena o f scientific or practical interest” (Barzelay et al, 2002: 
21).
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are keyed to more than one event. The questions regarding broader policy debates were 
answered in the corresponding chapter. Intra- and cross-event analysis constitutes 
intermediate steps that link historical evidence to causality chains. They provide the 
intermediate steps required for generating broader explanations for the outcome of the 
policy involved in the case.
Behind the structure of an analytic narrative there is a scheme by which the different 
types of events are listed and de-aggregated. Research questions are keyed to events or 
to connections between events. The schemes constitute the algorithm o f the narrative 
structures, and are shown in Annex IV for each of the cases studied.
1.7. The substantive historical claims underlying the Brazilian experience
This thesis analyses and broadens the understanding o f the historical development of 
public management policy change in Brazil. It deals with a field dominated by linear 
long-run narratives of public management policy change, as was the case in the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. It is also meant to be a 
contribution to the general debate on reform processes while focusing on a new 
interpretation of four Brazilian cases. In this sense, it fills in a gap in the academic 
literature, which is poorly developed and predominantly descriptive, regarding the four
*yc
episodes referred to above. It applies recently developed research methods such as 
analytic narratives and well-known frameworks such as multiple streams. It also 
amplifies the literature on the Kingdon model at the same time as it reveals some of its 
shortcomings. Finally, this dissertation provides an account of an important set of
25 The main exceptions related to the field o f public management are the works o f Rezende (2000), Rinne, 
2001), Siegel (1966, 1967), Graham (1968), Evans (1992, 1993, 1995), Schneider (1987, 1991, 1995, and 
1997), Barzelay (1986), Geddes (1994), Hagopian (1996) and Schmitter (1971).
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factors to be taken into consideration in any attempt to renew reform initiatives. Peters 
(1992: 220) argued that, given the features of public administration, “analysts postdict, 
rather than predict, outcomes in the public sector”, a statement that is particularly 
germane to the purposes of this investigation.
In spite of the frequency of reform attempts, they cannot be considered routine, and 
each one had its own specific evolution. Brunsson and Olsen (1993) present a different 
argument. They suggest that administrative reforms acquire the status of governmental 
routine. This cannot be said of Brazil, however, since the frequency o f attempts at 
reform can be seen as a symptom of the lack of social stability regarding the problem.
“The political history of institutional reform is not a history of sustained political 
attention or concern” (March and Olsen, 1989: 83). Contingent fluctuations, 
problematic access, and degrees of attention were intrinsic destabilising factors in all 
cases. Therefore the dynamics of the reforms “were like garbage cans, highly contextual 
combinations of people, choices, opportunities, problems and solutions” and the 
ambiguity of these notions only reinforced the difficulties.
Public management reforms involve bargains over issues related to reorganisation that 
are “sensitive to contextual fluctuations as well as to short-term changes in political 
attention” (Zahariadis, 1999). Circumstantial combinations of actors, choices of 
opportunities, problems, solutions and forgetfulness are re-created from time to time. 
The occurrence of policy change depends on the synchronicity of factors that include, 
but also transcend, the design of the policy proposal in question.
The approach adopted in this thesis is closer to the variant presented by March and 
Olsen (1981, 1983, 1989) and by Kingdon (1994), given its suitability to the Brazilian 
context: unstable, fluid, complex, and subject to different sorts of shocks. This
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investigation, however, is more sensitive (and attributes more analytical importance) to 
the role played by reform entrepreneurs, without whose presence it would be difficult to 
m it is difficult to imagine the occurrence of these episodes. “Different participants act 
on the basis of different definitions of the situation” (March and Olsen, 1989: 81).
The four reforms occurred thanks to the convergence of political problems and policy 
factors catalysed by the action of public entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1994). The issue 
career extended to the decisional agenda thanks to a combination of contextual factors 
and the entrepreneurial activities of a handful of individuals committed to the policy 
solutions. The variety of these reforms can be understood from different angles. The 
first angle consists of an examination of the specificity of the definition o f the problem 
and alternative specification processes. This investigation revealed that each reform 
took the former one as the starting point for the process of defining its issues, including 
the perception of the problems and the failures attributed to the previous attempt. A 
complementary angle comes in via the assumption that the reforms constituted policy 
reversals (Hood, 1994), each one seen as a distinct, asymmetrical, and opposing answer 
to the legacy and the perception of the problems and failures attributed to the previous 
one.
The thesis also argues that public entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 1994; Roberts and King, 
1996) was a key explanatory element in all of them. A surprisingly small number of 
entrepreneurial individuals -  not political parties or professional bureaucracies played 
decisive roles in all the changes made. This is an intriguing point, in view of the 
proportions o f the transformations. Individuals strategically located in reform-driven 
institutions and motivated by different reasons played key roles in making these reforms 
feasible.
26 This investigation does not adopt an exclusive actor-driven approach but it recognizes their decisive 
role in catalysing policy change under a variety o f forms.
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Entrepreneurs proved to be decisive in three cases where it would have been impossible 
to analyse the reforms without their individual participation. Like the others, the 1988 
case required the influence of policy entrepreneurs, but their entrepreneurial functions 
were fulfilled in an unusual and heterodox way. Other entrepreneurs -  working in 
different streams and policy sub-systems -  complemented the role of the main policy 
entrepreneur, even after this latter had left centre stage.
During these processes different sorts of social mechanisms were activated (Barzelay, 
2004). Agenda congestion, focus events, policy entrepreneurship and policy-spillovers 
are examples of social mechanisms inherent to the multiple-stream model. Other social 
mechanisms -  belief formation (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998), actor certification 
(McAdam et al., 2001), bandwagoning (Scheling, 1978), and the effects of policy 
interference (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) -  will be included in the comparative 
analyses farther below.
Policy transfer27 also took place, but in different forms, in all four episodes. Reformers 
were engaged in policy dialogue with the United States (the first and second cases), 
France (second and third cases), and the United Kingdom (second and fourth cases). All 
four reforms were informed by the Zeitgeist of their times (Peters, 2004: 1). The 1937 
case was strongly influenced by the Brownlow Report, the Budgeting and Accounting 
Act of 1921, and the Pendleton Act of 1893, all of the U.S.A. The 1967 case was 
influenced by the dissemination of ideas regarding Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and System (PPBS), by debates that later resulted in the Fulton Report, as well as by the 
modus operandi of the French function publique. The 1998 case benefited from a 
structured international dialogue with practitioners involved in the implementation of
27 The proper expression should be “policy dialogue” considering that there were no institutional 
processes o f policy transplant in any o f the cases. But the dynamics, the intensity, and the quality o f the 
dialogue varied because of the different forms they took and because o f the way foreign ideas influenced 
each o f the reforms. The comparisons are related to policy learning and the lessons drawn are organized 
according to the frameworks suggested by Levitt and March (1990) and Rose (1993).
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the Next-Step agencies in the UK and from the dissemination of new public 
management ideas around the world. Only the 1988 case was dissociated from 
international trends, although it was in tune with efforts carried out by a supranational 
institution -  the World Bank -  in an important neighbouring country (Argentina) to 
overcome long-standing problems.
1.8. Plausible alternative approaches
Brazilian public management policies have been the object of analysis from different
•  90theoretical approaches, alternative analyses having focused on specific cases. 
However, none has produced sufficient evidence to refute the arguments presented in 
this thesis, in spite of undeniable compatible complementary elements. Common 
explanations for the reforms have been based on functionalist30 arguments (Piquet 
Cameiro, 1988, 1990, and 1991) as to its essentiality and adequacy. But several more 
sophisticated analyses also deserve mention.
One interesting approach was developed by Nunes (1997) in his formulations of the 
four political grammars that shaped Brazilian administrative culture. Nunes (1997: 105) 
suggests that the original characteristic of Brazilian
“bureaucracy is not the pervasiveness of clientelism, but the effectiveness 
of attempts to insulate a few techno-bureaucratic agencies of the 
economy from clientelism.’”
28 There are indications that could classify the 1988 case as similar to that carried out by countries that 
created Senior Executive Services in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Halligan, 2003), but the evidence for 
a broader connection is scanty.
29 See, for example, Siegbel (1967), Dias (1968), Piquet Cameiro (1988), Marcelino (1988), Martins 
(2003), Santos (1997 and 2000), Bresser Pereira (1997 and 1998), and Rezende (2000).
30 A functionalist view presumes that the presence o f a phenomenon can be explained by its 
consequences, as a sort o f “requirement” (Hall, 2003: 377).
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By insulation he was not referring to achievements that were free from political
pressure, but to the fact of giving the organisation the capability of maintaining a certain
level of integrity and policy delivery capacity. Insulation means a condition that is able
1
to mobilise resources in response to top executive command. Nunes’ work, however, 
failed to explain the processes of policy change, despite the adequacy of his analysis.
Although this thesis takes culture seriously, it does not take a cultural-deterministic 
approach. Culture-driven typologies are useful to highlight certain developments in 
the Brazilian State during certain periods but, in the way they are formulated, they 
cannot account for policy change. Aspects of Brazilian culture are important to 
explain how mechanisms of social choice operate, but there are no claims to support the 
idea of any exceptional character of the unique context in Brazil, or mono-cultural 
explanations, despite their important contribution to the understanding of path- 
dependent elements of the analysis. But neither does this dissertation share the context- 
free approaches of supranational institutions as the most adequate explanations for 
policy change.34
Punctuated equilibrium is used to analyse long-term process as characterised by turning 
points, at different moments, which modify the direction that policy change takes. The 
framework combines the analysis of both change processes and moments of “policy 
stability”. The problem in the Brazilian cases is to associate the idea of stability with
31 Insulated agencies and SOEs -  which acquired a reputation as policy and economic performers -  were 
directed by appointed officials closely connected to the authoritarian regime during this entire period. 
Some o f these organisations became known as “pockets o f  efficiency” or “islands o f  excellence”. At the 
same time, one o f their most revealing characteristics was that, given “their economic success, until 
recently at any rate, they tended to legitimate the notion that government actors need not, and perhaps 
even should not, be publicly accountable” (Nunes, 1987: 105).
32 Almost all those persons interviewed for this dissertation revealed a serious concern for the context o f  
their actions as if  they could not be understood out o f those circumstances. However, historical 
generalisation, albeit limited, is pursued exactly to transcend these specificities and particularities.
33 Meachan (2000: 133) suggested that a structural-functional approach was the most adequate do address 
Latin-American reality because it took into account “national cultural peculiarities and the changing 
nature o f political power on policy-making and policy implementation.”
34 For an interesting discussion regarding the topic see Dimitrakopoulos and Passas (2003).
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intervals of policy change. A better understanding of implementation during the 
intervals between reforms is required. There were many attempts at affecting change, 
and stability frequently represented a merely failed or partial implementation process, 
rather than a situation of equilibrium.
Rational explanations for the choices made help highlight the dimensions of one case -  
1988 -  but fall short in explaining the three other cases under examination because they 
attribute excessive protagonist powers to the actors’ self-interest and to the (economic) 
efficiency principle. The institutional analysis made by Geddes (1994), and Haggard 
and Kaufman (1995), have helped bring to the surface neglected dimensions of State- 
reform studies. Geddes (1994) developed a rational choice argument to explain the 
evolution of the political-bureaucratic relationships37 in Brazil in the post-World-War-II 
period. Democratic competition should make it possible to implement rational decisions
-JO
in favour of the adoption of a merit system. Geddes (1990) argued that authoritarian 
regimes may play a decisive role in building Weberian bureaucracies and that 
competitive clientelism might also sometimes play an important role in building benign
35 The multiple streams model does not deny the importance o f self-interest, even in the entrepreneurs’ 
actions, but avoids its reductionism.
36 Johnson and Libecap (1994) adopted a rational choice approach based on a transaction cost analysis to 
explain the evolution o f civil service in the United States during the last century. They argued that the 
expansion o f bureaucracy was a “result o f  conscious decisions by successive politicians” and that “the 
system was put into place incrementally” (1994: 3). They recognize, nevertheless, that in a context 
marked by interest-group politics and weak hierarchy, economical and efficient civil- service reforms are 
difficult. The adoption o f market-type incentive structures would demand stronger hierarchical control in 
order to allow more discretionary powers to reward and punish. They identified attempts in this direction 
from time to time, such as financial incentives for better performance. However, circumstantial interest 
coalitions involving civil servant’s labour unions, congressional suspicion o f executive strengthening, and 
reluctant politicians all successfully blocked such steps (Johnson and Libecap, 1994: 185-186).
37 “Civil Service reforms generally include two kinds o f provision: requirements for merit-based hiring 
and promotion, and guaranteed job security for employees, fair treatment, union representation, and so on. 
In unequal or fragmented party systems, elected officials have been reluctant to increase the number of 
jobs included in the merit system since each new inclusion reduces the resources available to politicians 
in their struggle with other politicians” (Geddes, 1993: 126).
38 According to Geddes (1993: 46), “The competence of bureaucratic personnel depends on two factors: 
the availability o f trained people in the society from which to recruit, and a recruitment process that 
selects among potential employees on the basis o f merit rather than partisan or personal loyalty. Political 
activists accustomed to distributing jobs in return for political support, and employees who got their jobs 
that way, and whose status is threatened by the change to a merit-based system, can prevent the upgrading 
o f human inputs even where an adequate pool o f competence and expertise exists (...) . Insulating the 
agency from that traditional exchange o f favours for political support that may be necessary in order to 
improve the quality o f agency personnel.”
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state-business collaboration. In the first case, not even Vargas implemented successful 
and enduring PPA reforms. With respect to the second argument, Hagopian (1996) 
argues convincingly that instead of competitive clientelism, Brazil is a case of
' i Q
“transformism” of the traditional political elite.
Haggard (1995: 12) centred his attention on the balance o f power between the Executive 
Sphere and the Legislature, and saw administrative reform as "a process of re-writing 
the contract between elected politicians and bureaucratic officials". Enduring 
equilibrium can be taken as a synonym for “consolidation”. Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995: 2) see it as “processes through which acceptance of a given set of constitutional 
rules becomes increasingly widespread, valued, and routinised.” The reform of the civil 
service and the setting up of economic decision-making agencies resistant to 
particularistic demands have constituted a problematic historical imperative regardless 
of the developmental strategies pursued.
“If both economic reforms and democracies are to be consolidated, 
executive authority must eventually be depersonalised and integrated into 
a broader framework of contestation and accountability” (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995: 9).
In spite of their relevance, the explanatory power of these frameworks is not particularly 
suitable for addressing the four cases in question. According to Geddes (1994) the 
dynamics o f clientelism can also function differently as the different sorts of Brazilian 
governments have shown since the 1930s.40 At least two of the cases studied (1937 and
39 By transformism I mean the process o f metamorphosis required for the maintenance o f the existing 
structure o f power relationships.
40 The more politicians installed their proteges in the public sector apparatus through a variety of 
appointment mechanisms, the better were the chances for temporary public employees to be incorporated 
through administrative or political measures. The more they became civil servants, the more grateful and 
loyal they were to those who provided them with this chance. Since the major political parties played by 
these rules, there were no endogenous vectors in the political system to push merit-based bureaucracy.
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1967) do not fit in with the permanent failure model in Kaufman’s terms. To enable 
proper comparisons, however, a more detailed analysis of the implementation processes 
would be required.
1.9. Brazil today: a brief for beginners
Brazilian politics is currently characterized by weak parties and fragile political 
institutions because o f the combination of proportional representation and open-list 
candidate selection. The political competition is personal, especially within the same 
party, what makes individuals attributes and patronage capabilities key political assets. 
(Hunter, 1997:17). Presidents in a fragmented multi-party system outmanoeuvre parties 
thanks to the executive power and resources basis and to govern above parties, even at 
expense of splitting them in case of necessity. Short term political expediency is the 
norm, what makes long-term collective solutions a permanent challenge.
Although the focus o f this thesis is not on Brazilian regime change, the events on the 
political domain were decisive to trigger the reforms that resulted in Constitutional 
Change of public management issues, except in the 1998 case which can also be 
considered as a further development of the Constitutional Review process that did not 
occur as scheduled.
Four conventional spheres of democratic institutional building like the system of 
government, the party system, the electoral rules, and the Congress dynamic remain 
controversial. First, in spite of the political debate being sealed with the 1993 plebiscite, 
critics of Brazilian presidentialism had their arguments strengthened by a decade 
marked by instability and crisis during Samey, Collor, and Franco mandates, presidents 
who tried to outmanoeuvre and to govern above parties. Mainwaring (1993) suggested
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that Brazilian presidentialist instability derives from the executive difficulties in 
building enduring coalitions in the government. O’Donnel (1994) labelled Latin 
American neo-patrimonial unaccountable presidential systems “delegative democracies” 
because these countries became “a type of democracy which rests on the premise that 
whoever wins the election for the presidency is entitled to govern as he or she fit.” Linz 
(1990) argued that presidentialism could increase the likelihood democratic reversals 
because of the rigidity of fixed terms and the plebiscitarian and winner-takes-all nature 
of presidentialism.
These interpretations were challenged by Figueiredo e Limongi (1996: 19) studies that 
revealed that presidents had successfully articulated party support for their coalitions. 
By the same token they demonstrated that “minority presidents possess the means to 
obtain legislative support through negotiations within the parties” (1996, 33). However, 
further empirical research revealed the existence of three other processes that operate 
simultaneously within the relationships between the executive and legislative that 
challenged Figueiredo and Limongi’s conclusions based on roll-call votes: the decree 
game (Power, 1998), the appointment game (Amorim Neto, 1995), and the patronage 
game (Ames, 1995). Therefore, there is not a clear cut unique pattern of executive- 
legislative relationships that could be generalized but multiple on going simultaneous 
processes.
Second, the electoral system based on open-list proportional representation incentives 
political competition within the party as well as inter-parties at the same time that 
exacerbates individual personalities (Mainwaring, 1991). Politicians are not bounded by 
party programs and move freely from one party to another accordingly to their personal 
conveniences and a loose electoral legislation facilitates transient coalitions at the time 
of the elections that provoke even more distortions in the system because the 
implications they produce over media access before the polls. Few barriers to entrance
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allow the emergence of expedient small parties (parties for rent, usually) and encourage 
personal politics. In spite of all the problems related to the present system, politicians 
hesitate in changing it because o f the uncertainty aspects related to political reform, 
collective actions difficulties, low position in executive priorities, and imposing losses 
problems over those who benefited from the system . The problem is aggravated by the 
artificial and disproportional distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies that 
downplays absurdly Sao Paulo quota (misrepresented in almost fifty deputies) while 
over-represents small states of the North .
Third, the political party system is marked by extreme party weakness as Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995) argued when they ranked Brazil as the lowest case of party system 
institutionalization in Latin America. The rank criteria combined stability of 
competition rules, depth of party embeddedness in society, perception of the 
government legitimacy by the parties, and cohesiveness of party organizations. The 
permissive electoral system favours the emergence of a fragmented party system, weak 
party organizations, and parties based on parochial and particular interests. Hence, the 
combined and mutually reinforcing features of the electoral and party systems 
contribute to generate a “pervasive personalism and segmentalism ” and to “impede the 
emergence of universal parties” (Weyland, 1996: 44). The fragmentation of society and 
state systems favours entrenched elite interests and makes imposing losses harder. 
Potential beneficiaries of equity-enhancing policies face difficulties in overcoming 
vetoes derived from established patterns of organizational fragmentation within a 
separation of powers regime. Therefore, there are not adequate conditions for “the 
emergence of encompassing interest associations, broad-based social movements, and 
minimally program-oriented catch-all parties that could effectively press for equity- 
enhancing reform” (Weyland, 1996: 17-18).
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Fourth, Congress dynamics -  a product of the three institutional features previously 
mentioned - remained perceived as inefficient as well as an unpredictable source of 
permanent dissatisfaction between politicians, voters, and the executive. While the 
executive had focused on macro economic stabilization, the legislative favoured 
enacting social issues but had to decide about both. The executive priorities had taken 
precedent in the agenda conflict (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1995a) except during the 
NCA period when a power duality was evident. Congress needs to face three challenges 
to recover its importance: overcome collective actions problems within Congressmen 
(Ames, 1995b) and counter balance the executive capacity of influence the legislative 
calendar (Power, 1998) as well as the president capacity in getting what he wants to 
(Figueiredo and Limongi, 1995b)
Brazilian democracy is considered to be a consolidated democracy today but also an 
informally institutionalised one. It is consolidated because the regime internalized 
democratic routines that are already internalized and embedded behaviourally , 
attitudinally , and constitutionally , in the country political culture. But it does not have 
yet fulfilled the fourth of the five interdependent conditions listed by Linz and Stepan 
(1996): a usable bureaucracy adequate to the consolidation of a new democratic regime 
and a functional state. If democracy is not just a classification of regime but an 
“interacting system” as Linz and Stepan (1996: 21) state, the functioning o f the system 
cannot not prescient from the adequate support o f all five previously mentioned arenas.
Public management reforms are just one condition -  and a not very popular one -  of 
many questions that the country has revolved around in his recent democratic period. 
Institutional building between 1985 and 1998 did not produce enduring solutions for the 
bureaucracy’s dysfunctional problems of most government institutions because of 
reasons that include over-reaction against institutions established in the authoritarian 
period, dismal macroeconomic performance (Power, 2000: 32). The institutional
48
package of polyarchy takes for granted professional merit based bureaucracies as well 
as formally institutionalized public sector governing rules. It is difficult to believe that 
Brazil can overcome its heritage formed by inequality, clientelism, and corruption 
problems without solving its public reform challenges in an enduring and democratizing 
way.
1.10. What this thesis is not about
This thesis is located on the fringe of the literature on state autonomy (Heclo, 1974; 
Krasner, 1978; Nordingler, 1981; Evans, 1995) extensively developed in recent decades. 
Authors such as Stepan (1978), Schneider (1991) and Trimberger (1978)41 have focused 
on the role played by leading cadres -  military and civil -  on state development. The 
focus of this thesis is on a particular policy: public management. As Krasner (1978: 58) 
stated, “There is no reason to assume a priori that the pattern of strengths and weakness 
will be the same for all policies.” Other previously mentioned studies revealed how the 
country achieved success in several policy areas at different periods in time. The causes 
o f the variations in policy areas and the unevenness of capacities across different areas 
are not analysed in this thesis, except in the investigation into how public management 
policies were initiated during the four episodes.
This thesis focuses on the process of policy change in the State apparatus, understood as 
the federal Executive Branch. It does not go into other complex debates frequently 
associated with the object of investigation such as changes of regime, federalism, 
political system, models of development, or patronage.
41 The concept o f autonomy in Trimberger (1978) implies a sort o f  merit-based recruitment for 
constituting the vanguard cadre and establishing independence from the interest groups usually connected 
to power structures.
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The first debate mentioned above refers to change of regime (O’Donnell, 1973; Linz 
Stepan, 1978). Three of the four cases occur within the context of regime changes. The 
1937 case occurred during Vargas’s feeble constitutional administration o f 1934-1937, 
which occurred between two periods of dictatorship (Levine, 1970). The 1967 case took 
place during the first administration of the authoritarian military regime that lasted from 
1964 to 1984. The 1988 case took place during the long transition to democracy that 
followed the military rule. Therefore, the contexts of these three cases were inevitably 
and dramatically influenced by contemporary events at the political level.
The second debate, on Federalism, is an issue that has pervaded Brazilian history since 
the days of Independence almost two centuries ago. The debate was marked in the past 
by traditional views such as those propounded by Couto e Silva (2003) who made use of 
the systole- diastole metaphor, and by Camargo (1999), but it has also been the subject 
of more contemporaneous analysis by Brazilian scholars such as Abruccio (1998) and 
Souza (1997). Public management reforms at the federal level affected the states and 
municipalities on a top-down basis. There were also bottom-up influences -  although 
marginal -  in the cases analysed, such as in 1967, but they were only indirect.
The third debate, the political system, refers to the role played by the relationships 
between the Federal Executive Branch and the remaining two branches of government, 
the Legislative and the Judiciary. This angle is important, especially in the aftermath of 
the 1988 reform, early in the Collor Administration (Rinne, 2001), and in the decision­
making process of the 1998 reform, when the proposal transited in Congress for almost 
three years (Melo, 2002).
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The fourth debate is about the broader role of the State in the economy, intimately 
associated with discussions on planning.42 The literature regarding Brazilian models of 
development and the planning process in Brazilian development goes beyond the scope 
of this investigation. The only literature related to the issue taken into account here 
refers to those authors that discussed the Brazilian economy with an eye to the issues of 
state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy (Evans, 1995; Schneider, 1991).
Last but not least, the thesis does not focus on the persistent problem of clientelism and 
patronage. There is no doubt as to the weight and persistence of these phenomena in 
Brazilian politics, as demonstrated by Carvalho (2000), Martins (1995), Santos (1997), 
Guerzoni (1995, 1996) and Gaetani (1998). However, the incapacity of Brazilian 
scholars to anticipate and analyse the public management policy changes that took place 
in multiple windows of opportunity over time has contributed to the reification of the 
object of analysis, rather than untangle it. To a certain extent, some of the progressive 
attempts in public administration to promote traditional administrative reforms have 
been self-defeating, exactly because, of their incapacity to deal with a phenomenon that 
the reformers were perfectly aware of but not necessarily capable of avoiding.
The above caveats are necessary for two reasons. First, the relationships between these 
five above-mentioned debates and this investigation are fragile -  with the exception of 
the last, regarding patronage, which will be dealt with at the end of the thesis. In 
addition, they do not warrant special treatment among the case studies. This does not 
mean that these questions did not exist or did not demand attention during those periods. 
It simply means that they will receive no special attention here. Second, the focus on the 
process of public management policy change requires some delimitation of borders.
42 Regarding planning, a further clarification is necessary. Planning and budgeting are public management 
sub-policies. Therefore they are eventually incorporated into the analysis o f the cases -  as in the 1937 and 
1967 episodes -  but within the context o f the package o f public management policies in question, rather 
than as detached objects of analysis.
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Scoping the cases demanded selective treatment of the events to be analysed, as 
described in the research design section.
1.11. Limitations of the thesis
Four snapshots, i.e., four episodes of history, cannot account for a long-term process.
The investigation opted for a systematic examination of processes that unfolded over 
limited periods in a long-term process: the evolution of the federal public apparatus. The 
deliberate choice of treating the four episodes as comparative cases means that 
questions related to long-standing issues are not addressed in this thesis.
The possibility of adopting other theoretical frameworks should not be set aside, 
however. Historical institutionalism, in particular, provides an interesting line of 
investigation to analyse why some things in fact were so hard to change over this period 
(Hagopian, 1996) and how they changed in a more subtle way than perceived (Evans, 
1992 and 1995).
Hagopian (1996) argued against Piquet Cameiro’s (1988 and 1991) assumption that 
clientelism tends to expand under democratic regimes and retract under authoritarian 
cycles. Clientelistic mediation played a key role at both regional and local levels43 
during the authoritarian regime when the State faced unprecedented expansion. 
Hagopian shows in her analysis how the traditional elite survived and participated in 
regime changes in Brazil -  to and from authoritarian regimes.44 The thrust o f her 
argument -  referring to the 1964-1984 period -  is that, in the absence of a democratic
43 “Politics everywhere entails patronage, but in the Brazilian interior it involves little else” (Maybury- 
Lewis, 1968: 161) quoted by Hagopian (1996: 14).
44 According to Hagopian’s conceptualisation (1996: 16) “traditional politics implies a system o f political 
organisation that is authoritarian in the sense that political power is narrowly concentrated, access to 
decision making is restricted, channels o f political representation are arranged hierarchically, and political 
competition is strictly regulated”. Clientelism, regionalism, and personalism were combined in different 
variants in different regions during the authoritarian regime to provide it with political support.
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regime, the military found political legitimation via the co-optation of regional and 
traditional political elites. Given the competence of traditional politicians to operate 
State clientelism on a large scale in Brazil, they were the natural allies of the military in 
the process of pursuing electoral victories in partially controlled elections around the 
country, thanks to their “amalgam of private networks of local bosses, state oligarchs”, 
and political machines. Thus, clientelism needed to adapt to the regime change at the 
same time as the military had to abandon their anti-patronage discourse in order to 
guarantee a legitimate basis for their national role.
Evans (1992 and 1995) pointed out that "embedded autonomy" was a key explanation 
for the emergence of the developmental State in Brazil. The embedded features of 
Brazilian technocracy provided "institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation 
and re-negotiation of goals and polices" (Evans, 1992: 164) between the State and its 
private partners. It provided a different solution to the shortage o f capacities. However, 
the concentration of expertise in the State elite did not occur through a merit-based 
bureaucratic structure but via career patterns based on a system of appointees taking on 
executive positions. According to Evans (1995: 179):
"Embeddedness is assumed to have value only in the context of 
autonomy. In the absence of a coherent, self-orienting, Weberian sort of 
administrative structure, embeddedness will almost certainly have 
deleterious effects. (....) It is the combination of embeddedness and 
autonomy that works, not either on its own (Evans, 1995: 179).”
Evans’ argument is plausible regarding Brazil because when the economic crisis 
effectively hit the country in the early 1980s, collusion as well as rent-seeking
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behaviour began to spread at the same time that the power o f dictatorship was 
weakened.
Both cases dealt with specific time periods -  the 1960s in Hagopian’s case and the 
decades between the 1950s and the 1980s in Evans’ case.45 But they brought up causal 
explanations that went beyond the time frame they focused on. In order to pursue the 
analysis o f a longer historical period they would have to build upon empirical material 
related to other periods, that is not yet available.
Another alternative is to take the infant route of institutional "processualism" (Barzelay 
and Gallego, 2004) but with a deeper look into the “institutional”’ side of the 
expression. The approach adopted in the thesis shares a concern with “institutional 
construction of change in time” in a way that is “less random than the garbage can 
models o f James March and others” (Orren and Skowroneck, 1994: 313). As the 
compatibility analysis developed by Barzelay and Gallego suggested, a pertinent 
theoretical and methodological dialogue could be pursued with Hood’s public service 
bargains regarding the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. Hood had 
provided a rich framework for analysing public sector reforms through the concept of 
public service bargains (Hood, 2000, 2001 )46 among senior civil servants and other 
relevant actors engaged in establishing the rules o f the game in the public sector. He 
argued that different public service bargains marked the starting point for the evolving 
patterns of distinct historical bureaucracies. He focused particularly on dual bargains
45 A major problem in the Brazilian case has historically been the embeddedness o f informal power 
mechanisms, which operate in the grey areas o f  formal institutions. These mechanisms are not 
immediately visible to scholars or analysts, in spite o f  their being deeply embedded in the political culture 
o f the country. Evans discerned the weakness o f  the embeddedness of Weberian type o f structures in the 
Brazilian public sector, with few exceptions in the pockets o f excellence in the indirect administration. 
Hagopian discerned the embeddedness o f the clientelist practices in a context where they were explicitly 
denied.
46 The concept o f  public service bargains was borrowed by Schaffer (1973: 252) but expanded and 
defined as “any explicit or implicit understanding between (senior) public servants and other actors in a 
political system over their duties and entitlements relating to responsibility, autonomy, and political 
identity, and expressed in convention or formal law or a mixture o f both.” (Hood, 2000: 8)
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between principals and agents, and the possibilities for triangulation that incorporate the 
legislative (like Congress in the USA) or contractual executive arrangements (as in the 
UK after 1989).
In the Brazilian case Hood’s framework would have to incorporate a further player: 
political appointees -  invisible actors in the literature of public management reforms 
with few exceptions (Pffeiner, 1987; Heclo, 1977). Appointees have been the key factor 
to explain power relationships inside the Brazilian bureaucracy, and were the thrust of 
the informal system (Schmitter, 1971) that shaped the elite’s behaviour during that 
period.47 In fact, “appointments [are more important] than organisations, structure 
power and incentives within the State” (Schneider, 1991: 8). But the framework could 
help one understand the complex institutional arrangements that deeply affect Brazilian 
public policies.
This thesis presents an underlying issue: cumulativeness, also known as institutional 
layering (Orren and Skowroneck, 2000: 20). New institutional arrangements did not 
replace pre-existent ones. They were juxtaposed alongside the old ones to the extent that 
greater numbers of public functionaries were absorbed into the civil service and new 
forms of public sector organisations were set up without the suppression or phasing out 
of those already in existence. The Brazilian case showed how a country operates with 
organisational structures in different historical periods, each one within the context of a 
legal framework. The intriguing puzzle is how the legal system made possible the 
coexistence of different public institutions belonging to distinct policy cycles. Because 
the content and the direction of the public management reforms are not the major focus
47 Political appointments set up the informal coalitions that operated among the direct and indirect 
administration. A dense network o f collaborative and collusive relationships was built on a facilitating 
basis o f discretion, flexibility, lack o f  accountability, and impunity. “Bureaucratic rings” (Cardoso, 1975) 
around key appointed officials became the dominant form o f articulation o f  interests (Schneider, 1987).
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of this thesis the aforementioned shortcomings in the research are hopefully 
understandable.
The thesis does not provide an analysis of the implementation processes that followed 
each reform. The investigation is restricted to aftermath events that to a certain extent 
“belong” to the main episode. The cases usually included the period following the 
decision-making processes and the default situation after the reform, although in some 
cases it took more than a year for its definition to be reached. The investigation offset 
this deficit by offering an in-depth exploration into the initial situation of each case 
study and the corresponding problem definition process. But by no means does the 
author intend to suggest that the narrative replaces the need for empirical investigation 
into reform implementation processes.
A similar argument is valid for the absence of evaluations regarding the four cases.
“The evaluation of the reforms is by far the weakest developed step of all 
the public sector and administrative reform programs both from a Policy 
Analysis and a Public Administration perspective” (Toonen, 2003b:
473).
The investigation bypassed normative and prescriptive judgments regarding the reforms 
because they do not belong to this analysis. The quality and the success of the designs 
and decisions are not the focal points of this investigation.
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1.12. Key issues raised by this comparative historical analysis of the Brazilian 
experience
This thesis shows that while many attempts at promoting changes were made, little was 
done about a number o f issues. Five such issues emerged from the investigation: 1) the 
difficulties Brazilian society faced in defining its public administration problems and 
generating adequate policy solutions, 2) the decisive but insufficient role played by 
entrepreneurs in the decision-making processes and in the default implementation 
processes, 3) the resilience of clientelism despite all attempts to curb it, 4) the challenge 
of building the State’s capacities, and 5) the propensity to adopt hybrid policy solutions.
First, unless a society comes to terms with the previous experiences of its history, the 
past of a policy keeps returning, and generates ambiguities as to its status. It remains 
alive in the present and gradually shapes the emerging future (Pettigrew, 1997: 341). 
Regarding public management reforms, Brazilian society has not yet come to terms with 
its beliefs and preferences with respect to the theme.
“Public administration merely reflects the many contradictions and 
dilemmas which are inevitably [related to] the interactions of market,
State, and society” (Wright, 1997: 12).
Fads change without necessarily being followed by solutions of old problems or by the 
exhaustion of previous solutions.48
The case for public management reform is yet to be built within Brazilian society.
48 Incidentally, the malleability o f Brazilian organisational structures deserves mention. It is a sign o f  the 
weaknesses o f the institutional arrangements set up, especially during democratic periods (Andrade and 
Jaccoud, 1993).
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“Policy making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it 
entails both deciding and knowing.” (Heclo, 1974).
The last two cases took place under democracy, over a span of ten years. But the 
political appeal of the theme has never been so low, despite the persistence of the 
problems that demand combinations of old and new policy solutions. There has been a 
process of reform fatigue.
Second, the role played by entrepreneurs in effecting changes in public management 
policy in the four cases should be clarified and differentiated. Public management 
reforms did not occur without the engagement of entrepreneurs. But the overwhelming 
problems and complexities faced by them suggest that the reforms demanded more 
political capital than the entrepreneurs were able to mobilise. It is hard to envisage how 
reforms will be sustainable without political support capable of transcending the 
impetus provided by their champions. Public management reforms can be fought on a 
politicised or a more technical basis but the choices embodied in this dilemma should be 
carefully considered.
The analysis of the four cases also revealed that entrepreneurs were not equally 
successful in the various stages of the episodes. They were all successful in different 
scales in setting agendas and promoting alternative specification processes. However, 
their capacity to influence the decision-making process oscillated significantly. Policy 
entrepreneurship and political entrepreneurship emerged as distinct roles. Another 
relevant difference refers to the role of entrepreneurs in the default implementation 
stage. Only in the first case was the entrepreneur kept in the process. The main 
consequences of the replacement of the entrepreneurs within the context of the 
aftermath of the decision-making process were the change in direction of the reform
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(1967 and 1998), the introduction of new ingredients into the transitory legislation 
(1988), and the shift in emphasis from the main elements of the reform (1967, 1988, and 
1998) to other directions.
Third, there is no doubt as to the importance and persistence of clientelism and 
patronage in Brazilian politics. Evans (1993) mentioned that a distinctive point of the 
developmental State was the establishment of merit-based civil services capable of 
rewarding long-term perspectives and, therefore, establishing commitments and 
alliances oriented towards developmental projects supported by the State.
“The distinguishing feature of the merit system is that it restricts the 
ability of legislators to hire, fire, pay for, and promote their 
administrative systems” (Horn, 1995: 97).
These statutes and norms in Brazil had not been consolidated in a merit-based way. 
Instead, patronage systematically returned in a variety of forms that were not correctly 
identified or taken into account.
The literature on mainstream Brazilian political science regarding this topic is marginal 
and weakly grounded. This thesis has sought to avoid the self-defeating normative 
approaches to public management reforms based on literature that focuses its analysis 
on the patronage aspects of Brazilian political culture. Most of the literature based on 
processes involving cultural theory (Martins, 1985), history (Carvalho, 2000), old 
institutionalism (Santos, 1997, 2000), and new institutionalism (Santos, 1997) has been 
so obsessed with the persistence of clientelism and patronage in Brazilian administrative 
practices that it has ignored several significant attempts to overcome and circumvent the 
problem. These approaches were conducive to fatalistic and deterministic attitudes
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towards the phenomenon. The exception is the literature on bureaucratic autonomy and 
embeddedness (Evans, 1992, 1993,1995; Ross-Schneider, 1991, 1997, and 2003).
Symptomatically, Brazil has not been the object of systematic analytical research as 
have other regions in the world.49 Only in recent years did the Inter-American 
Development Bank take the initiative of commissioning a series of studies in other 
countries50 but without a common theoretical approach, such as that adopted in 
investigations into reward structures in Western industrialised democracies (Hood and 
Peters, 1994) and in Asian countries (Hood and Peters, 2003). The advantages of the 
approach towards top echelons seem promising because they are more focused, more 
policy promising and less risky politically (Nuremberg and Welcoltt, 2003). Not 
surprisingly, the same approach was intuitively pursued in 1967, 1988, 1998 and, more 
recently, in 2000 (Heredia and Gaetani, 2002).
The fourth theme raised in this investigation refers to the seductive but elusive debate 
on State capacities, always returning to the international academic literature on public 
management (Schick, 2002; Peters, 2004) and development studies (Fukuda-Paar at al., 
2002; Lopes and Theishon, 2003). International indicators on Brazil are usually 
presented as entirely independent from issues related to the capacity of the State. After 
over a decade of structural adjustment, Evans’ propositions51 are still disturbing, but 
have been neglected. The predictable consequence is a tendency to what Luhmann 
(1982: xxvii) calls the “institutionalisation of precariousness”.
49 See for instance the research program derived from Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996) that led to 
publications regarding Central and Eastern Europe (Verheijen, 1999), Western Europe (Bekke And Meer, 
2000), Asia (Bums and Bowomwathana), and Anglo-American (Halligan) countries.
50 http: //www.iadb.org/int/DRP/esp/Red5/transparenciadocs.htm#ReformaServicio
51 “Capacity implies organisations capable o f sustained collective action. ( .. .)  Enhanced state capacity 
remains a requirement o f effective economic policy, including sustained structural adjustment” (Evans, 
1992: 176 and 181),
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Public management reforms can be analysed, for instance, according to three key 
capacities, as suggested by Weaver and Rockman (1993: 6): “to innovate when old 
policies have failed”, “to be able to impose losses on powerful groups” and “to ensure 
policy stability so that policies have time to work”. While Weaver and Rockman 
concentrate their analysis on first- and second-tier52 influences on governmental 
capabilities and policies, an alternative possibility is to focus on third-tier influences, 
which consist of the public management domain, namely bureaucratic strength and 
autonomy. This is a more pertinent approach to the discussion on reform capabilities in 
Brazil than that recently adopted by Knill (1998, 1999, and 2001) when analysing 
Britain's and Germany's administrative reform capacities in the European context.
Knill (1999: 116-119) contrasted high reform capacities with countries dominated by 
instrumental bureaucracies, and low reform capacities with countries where autonomous 
bureaucracies prevail. The starting point of his analysis, however, is the comparability 
of the British and German bureaucracies -  both professionally merit-based but with 
important differentiations. The public management reforms in Brazil did not begin from 
the same position and did not present similar result patterns. The comment obviously 
does not invalidate Knill’s analysis but exemplifies the difficulties in comparing 
countries with very different developmental parameters, institutional settings, and 
political cultures.
52 The first tier consists o f the potential influences derived from the distinction between parliamentarism 
and the U.S.A. presidential system. The second tier includes electoral rules and party systems that 
respond for different government configurations. The third tier consists o f institutional (federalism, 
judicial review and autonomy o f bureaucracy) and non-institutional factors (civic culture and political 
cleavages) (Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 445-6).
53 According to Knill (1999, 116) “The capacity for fundamental administrative reforms can be expected 
to increase to the extent to which the political and administrative spheres reflect separate areas which are 
characterized by distinctive interests and rationalities. If the distinction between both spheres is less 
pronounced, given a broad overlap o f both areas, it seems rather unlikely that political leaders will either 
be motivated or able to push through fundamental administrative reforms against the bureaucracy.”
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The fifth theme that this thesis deals with is hybridism, especially regarding 
employment relationships. The Brazilian bureaucracy simultaneously developed under- 
bureaucratisation and over-bureaucratisation pathologies in both the direct and the 
indirect administrations. In the direct administration the same law that regulated the 
merit system in federal service determined its demise -  via provisional contracts -  due 
to political pressure, the fear of unemployment, and because the Executive Branch itself 
needed greater flexibility in eliminating and creating public jobs.
The hybrid arrangements, originated in the 1936 Re-Adjustment Law,54 combined with 
inadequate data, made it very difficult to interpret the problems and the history (and the 
corresponding causality chain) in subsequent years. Brazil never had a perfect “spoil 
system” because each new administration replaced some appointed positions -  usually 
at the top -  while it “padded” public administration with a new wave of political 
appointees and provisional employees.55 From time to time they were all reclassified as 
civil servants. Therefore, there was a paradox in all the reform attempts that took place 
until the 1990s. These occurred at the same time as contradictory practices were 
demoralising reform efforts, especially in the area of civil-service employment relations. 
From time to time constitutional or ordinary legislation56 recategorized public sector 
employees recruited in different ways into permanent civil servants.
In the indirect administration the problem of hybridism took place with respect to the 
theme of human resources and, specially, agencification. Regarding human resources,
54 Since the 1930s the law created a new juridical figure, the “function”. “Positions were created by the 
Legislation, while “functions” might be created by Executive decree. In consequence, occupants o f  
“functions” (called supernumeraries) were not subject to the same set o f rules applicable to occupants of 
“positions” (called “functionaries”). In short, supernumeraries were not subject to entry examinations by 
the constitution. An entirely different terminology was then invented for the new category, so as to set up 
a parallel, independent group o f  employees.” (Nascimento, 1966:429-30).
55 The Constitution did not require entry examinations for employees hired on a provisional basis, the 
“supernumeraries”. An entirely different terminology was then invented for this new category, creating a 
parallel, independent group o f employees” (Nascimento, 1966: 429-30).
56 Medeiros’s (1970: 47) list o f legislation included the 1946 Constitution (as well as the Constitutions o f  
1934,1937, and 1967), the 1952 Statute o f  Civil Servants, and Laws 2284 o f 1954, 3483 o f 1958, 3966 o f  
3967 o f 1961,4054 o f 1962,4069 o f 1962, and 4242 of 1963.
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some autonomous government agencies and foundations made use of discretionary 
powers to enhance merit-based procedures, which transformed them into islands of 
excellence until 1988. But the majority of the indirect administration used the same 
discretionary mechanisms to promote patronage and clientelism. Regarding 
agencification, it should be recalled that despite its novelty in Developed Western 
Countries (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004), this debate did not produce the same impact in 
Brazil -  or even in the United States (Peters, 1997: 256) -  because of the familiarity the 
country had with indirect administrative structures. The terms of relationship between 
the direct and indirect administrations had never been institutionally regulated in the 
past -  for instance between 1967 and 1988 -  but discussions such as that on 
performance agreements took place in the 1980s, and in the late 1990s with respect to 
SOEs.
The layer added by the legal framework of the 1998 reform did not undo the previously 
existing set-up. The government currently has an impressive range of alternatives for 
delivering new public services that began in a ministry and ended up in the private 
sector. But between the two extremes there are myriad possibilities that include 
autonomous government agencies, executive agencies, public foundations, social
cn
organisations, private foundations, and social organisations of public interest. The 
watchdogs have increasingly reiterated their concerns with problems of accountability
CO
and corruption involving this situation, but without effective resonance. Hybridism 
helps create a fluid environment that makes way for particular short-term policy 
solutions without necessarily being the most suitable on the long term or from a broader 
perspective -  in the sense that it is too short-term oriented and does not favour 
cohesiveness.
57 This later arrangement was created in 1999. These are not public-sector types o f institutions, and 
clearly belong to the third sector. For a detailed analysis see Ferrarezi (2000). They have been employed 
as a public alternative in some controversial cases.
58 E3L/Br/58, E1H/MG/52, and JlH/Br/29
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The first theme -  the recurrence of reform attempts -  was treated within the context of 
the analysis of issue definition and alternative specification process. The second issue -  
the role of entrepreneurs -  was explored in all dimensions of the pre-decisional and 
decision-making processes. The problem of clientelism shows up in all problem 
definition processes but the reasons why it has persisted are not clearly explored in the 
thesis. Building and developing State capacities are underlying issues in all four cases 
but the theme is not the focus of the questions this thesis intends to answer. Hybridism 
shows up recurrently in policy specification processes but it is treated in the context of 
Kingdon’s framework.
1.13. The structure of the thesis
This thesis is structured on a multiple-case research design. Therefore, the process of 
replication logic (Yin, 1988: 44) was pursued by patterning the historical and analytical 
narratives under similar broader categories provided by Kingdon (1994). “Historical 
explanation is a normal type o f causal explanation” that
“involves at least an implicit appeal to regularities and recurrences and is 
similar in its fundamental logic to explanations anywhere else” (Frankel,
1957: 138-140).
The narratives are centred on the flow of policy choices over time. The linking points in 
the narratives are provided by their terminal consequences,59 focus events,60 and 
entrepreneurial behaviour and decisions. The key criteria that governed the selection of
59 Terminal consequences (Frankel, 1957: 149) are the public management policy reforms that resulted 
from the four cases.
60 By focus events I am referring to events where decisive choices are made and which have relevant 
consequences for the central subject o f the narrative: public management policy change.
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these elements were their explanatory value, analytical significance, relevance to the 
central subject in question, and the connections with points of intersection within the 
streams and between them and entrepreneurial actions and activities.
The thesis consists of three parts. The first includes this introductory chapter and a 
review of the literature on the theoretical framework adopted in the investigation. The 
first chapter mostly provides basic information about the thesis, placing the 
investigation in relation to the literature on the subject, and describes the 
methodological approach adopted. Chapter 2 provides a systematic view of the 
potentialities and shortcomings of Kingdon’s model and a justification for its adoption 
to investigate the types of cases in question.
The second part contains the four case studies. Chapters 3 to 6 are organised in a 
standard format: an introductory overview containing a diagram of the main events of 
the case, the specification of the questions intrinsically embedded in the episode, a 
description of the events that comprised the episode and the connections between them, 
and a conclusion, where the previous questions are answered.
The third part contains the comparison of the case studies and a conclusion. Chapter 7 
provides a comparison of the four cases on the basis of standard questions related to the 
framework -  agenda setting, alternative specification and decision-making -  and to the 
previously listed research questions that motivated the investigation. Chapter 8 contains 
a conclusion where the main results of the investigation are reviewed.
There are four annexes; they are not essential but may be helpful. The first contains a 
list of the interviewees and their assigned codes. The second contains the schematics of 
each case study with detailed events and research questions. The third contains two 
tables showing the evolution of civil service legislation and the evolution of the
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organisational location of the areas of public administration and planning over a span of 
sixty-years. Finally, the fourth annex contains a chronology of the main events that 
occurred during each period.
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CHAPTER 2 
Agendas, streams, and entrepreneurs
2.1. Introduction
This chapter contains nine sections, including this introduction. Section two reviews the 
concept of streams in Kingdon’s framework and its parentage with the garbage can 
model. The third section reviews the concepts of time, attention, and ambiguity -  key 
categories in investigations that adopt the garbage can model. The fourth section 
discusses the importance of problem definition -  an essential stage in pre-decisional 
processual analysis. The fifth section focuses on the dynamics of the policy process 
within the context of the multipl e-streams framework. The sixth section refers to 
politics -  the events that take place in the political arena that affect the issue career and 
that are influenced by the policy process. The seventh section focuses on the 
convergence of the streams and on the manner by which the streams are coupled. The 
eighth section refers to the role played by entrepreneurs in change processes. The ninth 
section discusses the critiques faced by the framework adopted. The conclusion reviews 
some limits to Kingdon’s model regarding this thesis.
2.2. The kaleidoscopic streams
The choice of Kingdon’s framework to model the analysis of the four cases was a 
consequence of the research questions formulated initially. The investigation is centred 
on the process of change in public management policy during four historical periods.
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Comprehensive administrative reorganisation has been a recurrent and persistent 
phenomenon in Brazil as in many other countries (March and Olsen, 1983). The 
design61 of bureaucratic structures has been the ultimate goal of most Brazilian 
governments concerned with institutional building, aimed at enhancing the State’s 
capacity.
The processual theoretical framework is the agenda-setting model for generating and 
establishing public policies formulated by Kingdon (1994). The framework is 
particularly useful in accounting for minor policy changes (Barzelay, 2000: 55) where 
temporal sorting plays an important role. The approach also incorporates contributions 
from the Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Jones (1994) models of issue definition and 
decision-making. The multi-stream approach offers an alternative logic, based on 
simultaneous processes to deal with cases characterised by complexity, fluidity, 
attention problems, and fuzziness (Zaharadis, 1999). Kingdon’s model is centred on the 
pre-decisional stages of the policymaking process namely, agenda-setting and policy- 
specification processes.
Agenda setting is a key concept in the model (Kingdon, 1994: 3-4). The governmental 
agenda is the list of subjects that draw the attention of office incumbents and high 
officials. Specialised agendas are theme-specific, around which certain interest groups 
and policy communities gravitate. Decision agendas refer to shorter lists of subjects that 
are ready for conclusive decisions by the government. Also relevant is the concept of 
formal agenda (Jones, 1994: 18), which introduces the notion of scheduled items subject 
to decision, within predictable time intervals, such as budgeting. Multi-stream models 
explore how some issues capture the Executive sphere’s attention while others do not; 
how they move from a broader systemic agenda towards the governmental decisional
61 When referring to design I follow Roberts and King (1996: 3) in being “concerned with drawing causal 
connections between a problem and its solutions so as to shape a policy outcome”.
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stage; why certain ideas attain national scrutiny; when this happens; and how policy 
proposals are developed.
Kingdon’s framework is an adaptation of the garbage can model (March and Olsen, 
1981), which perceives organisations as organised “anarchies” -  “loose collections of 
ideas rather than coherent structures”62 -  characterised by problematic preferences, 
unclear technology, and fluid and unstable participation (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972). These are all features of Brazilian political and public policy panorama. The 
variables of the garbage can model are streams of problems, solutions and the amount of 
energy expended by the participants. The garbage cans are choice opportunities shaped 
by the intersections of these variables that may or may not lead to policy outcomes. 
Choices are not necessarily made in accord with the participants’ intentions. Processes 
are the driven-force of garbage can explanatory efforts, as is the case with Kingdon's 
model. The multiple lens framework is processual and contextual but not necessarily 
historical,63 and need not obey public policy stage heuristics.64 Kingdon redefined them 
around problems, solutions, politics and the coupling role of entrepreneurs.
Three distinctions separated Kingdon’s model from the original garbage can model, 
besides giving a more structured focus to the decision-making process (Van Gestel, 
1999: 153). First Kingdon attributed permanent attention to what happens at the 
political level. This, in fact, was why he created a stream for politics. Second, Kingdon 
did not take choices or decision opportunities as streams. They occur either within each 
stream or when the streams are coupled. Third, Kingdon does not treat participants’ 
activities as separate developments, distinct from the other streams. Rather, he considers 
them as potentially intervening in all streams. Both models share common elements,
62 Kingdon (1984: 85).
63 Barzelay (2000: 54) borrowed the term processual from the management domain (Whittington, 1993). 
My observation as to its possible a-historical character refers to the omnipresent time-line dimension of  
history, while random processual approaches, for example, necessarily obey the same logic.
64 Zahariadis (2003: 160).
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such as the logical structure of the process, marked the flow of the streams through a 
system.
Initial preferences are usually ill-defined and not necessarily internally consistent, being 
a kind of loose package of generic ideas. Actions are not based exclusively on previous 
preferences. Preferences are revealed through action, i.e. they are socially constructed. 
Participation is intermittent as is the amount of time and effort allocated. Key actors 
come and go in contexts marked by high turnover. Boundaries of decision structures 
change, as well as the audiences of decision-making processes. Technologies are not 
available on policy shelves, and collateral difficulties -  such as capacity deficits, 
jurisdiction conflicts and cognitive limitations -  make developing them, borrowing 
them or importing them a serious challenge. Even ordinary processes are not necessarily 
understood by those involved in their operation. Trial-and- error procedures and the 
residue of what was learned from past experiences tend to play a major role.
The contents of the can consist of problems, solutions, participants, and choice 
opportunities. Outcomes emerge from this mix of garbage:
“People work on problems only when a particular combination of 
problem, solution, and participants in a choice makes it possible” 
(Kingdon, 1984: 86).
Problems are not necessarily solved on the basis of variations in load and complexity. 
Decision-making, problems and solutions track each other through opportunities of 
making choices.
The agenda-setting process must be deconstructed into its three major streams: problem 
recognition, the formulation and refining of policy proposals, and the political stream.
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Garbage can models presume that the streams flow independently o f one another. The 
discernment of the streams is an analytical resource, albeit debatable.65 An opportunity 
occurs when the convergence of the three streams at a critical junction provides the 
possibility of an issue being included in the national political agenda. Policy 
entrepreneurs are decisive in coupling problems, policies and politics in order to 
promote change.
2.3. Time, attention and ambiguity
Time imprints a certain type of order in any context, especially in those marked by 
flows of complex interactions among problems, solutions, actors, and choice 
opportunities (March, 1994: 198-199). Policymakers interact under time constraints, 
usually of the log-glass type. Temporal sorting is relevant because it operates as a 
needle that sews simultaneous threads in a tapestry whose pattern is not necessarily 
known in advance.
“In a garbage can model, problems, solutions, and decision-makers are 
connected less by their causal relevance than by their simultaneity” 
(March, 1988: 13).
There is no concern with consequential actions or linear sequences. The “time- 
dependent confluence of events” (Bendor et al., 2001: 88) is the assumption underlying 
the policy-making process.
65 Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001).
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“Problems, solutions, and participants are joined together more by the 
timing of their arrivals than by other attributes” (March and Olsen, 1986:
12).
In decision-making processes, the role played by the temporal order is usually more 
important than causal orders.
Decisions do not occur at a single moment in time. Choices are taken and renewed -  
sometimes a decision regarding renovation is repeatedly negative (Jones, 1994). 
Processes of choice are anchored in events that may or may not occur simultaneously. 
Events occur at different times and within different content constellations, not 
necessarily in “batches”. Nested choices are made over time; choices are not necessarily 
irrevocable. In fact, choice reversals are frequent within a process. There is interplay of 
decisions until a final policy outcome emerges. Some choice opportunities are closer to 
others, depending on a variety of possible reasons: time, logic, same actor, common 
locus, consensus, emergency pressures, shocks, networks of individuals, institutional 
connections and others. Temporal proximity can often be more significant than causal 
connections between interdependent decisions. Time patterns of available energy also 
play an important role.
Attention, as well as ambiguity, uncertainty, and satisfaction play a decisive role in 
choosing among multiple stream models, a heritage from bounded rationality66 that 
affects garbage can models. Garbage can models do not presume that the world is 
governed by deliberations based on clear intentions and rational choices. “Choice 
opportunities collect decision makers, problems and solutions” (March, 1994: 200). But 
while individual processing capacities are serial, attention from the system is -  or can be
66 Bounded rationality points out aspects such as the limitations o f  cognitive and information-processing 
capacities and the complexity o f the surrounding environment as inevitable constrains in any attempt to 
make pure decisions.
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-  parallel (Zaharadis, 2003: 7). “Paying attention to attention” is important because it 
highlights the issue of temporal choice, i.e. how choices are made over time, frequently 
without the need for logical consistency.
Attention is probably the scarcest resource of top decision-makers. The process of 
allocating attention is fundamental to understand agenda-setting and decision-making 
processes. Arousing attention, keeping it focused, and concentrating it on the policy­
making process depends on multiple factors in different domains (political, institutional, 
and individual). Allocation of attention is problematic and sequential (March, 1988: 5). 
Awareness of the limitations of attention influences decisions in a way that favours 
decisions based on search behaviour, at the expense of choices among alternatives. 
Problem-oriented search for satisfactory alternatives tends to acquire primacy over 
analysis of distinct courses of action. The “bottleneck o f attention” pervades 
policymaking processes. Continuous or at least persistent attention is even more 
relevant in the absence of a clear range of alternatives, when preferences are confusing, 
when the definition of the problem is conflictive, and when competing scenarios are not 
easily predictable. The ecology of attention69 points out the importance of aspects such 
as “timing” and “mobilisation”, given the simplification of the requirements of decision­
making processes. Decision-makers reduce complex decisional processes into 
manageable options that have been limited to the minimum possible number of 
alternatives, even if  this means a reduction in the quality standards of the choices 
made.70 Attention is rationed and the quality of the attention is influenced by factors 
such as information availability, the executive background of the decision-makers, 
familiarity with the problems, span of attention, concentration, and framing skills.
67 Jones (1994: 13) and Elster (1992).
68 Moray (1970).
69 Decisions are a function o f circumstances, chance intervening elements, simultaneous competing 
appeals and other related possibilities (March, 1994: 24).
70 To a certain extent there is not such a thing like the poor attention management problem. It will always 
happen. It is just a matter o f degree.
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Ambiguity can be understood as the “state of having many ways of thinking about the 
same circumstances or phenomena” (Feldman, 1989: 5). According to March (1994: 
178) “ambiguity refers to lack of clarity or consistency in reality, causality, or 
intentionality”. Given the potential contradictions involved in these different 
perspectives, conflicts, vagueness, misunderstandings, and confusion are expected to 
arise when ambiguity dominates. Uncertainty is associated with predictability of future 
events given a certain amount of information, and can stem from lack of information or 
imprecision (March, 1994: 18-9). While providing more and better information can 
reduce levels of uncertainty, this is not necessarily true for reducing ambiguity. 
Ambiguity in the causal-effect connections is not necessarily driven by the logic of 
causality. March (1988: 12-15) lists four types of ambiguities: about preferences, about 
relevance, about history and about interpretation, and all play a role in the cases at 
stake.71 Satisficing emerged as an alternative concept -  or decision concept -  to rational 
maximising. While a maximising procedure aims at the best possible solution to a 
problem, a satisficing approach looks for the minimally bearable alternative. Later the 
meaning evolved from a decision rule to a search rule, i.e., a specification o f conditions
79required to trigger or stop searching.
71 Preferences are not static. The more unclear the choices, the more volatile they are. The more unstable 
the preferences, the more easily they will be influenced by interaction between among the policy and the 
political processes. Relevance lies in the judgment o f causal connections. Ambiguities in the causal 
connections among events, reasons, and means-ends relationships suggest that their concatenation is less 
straightforward than the logic o f causality might imply. Ambiguity about history is almost a redundancy. 
Historical causality poses a recurrent challenge for learning processes because lessons may be drawn 
from different -  and often conflictive -  understandings o f past events. Ambiguity regarding interpretation 
derives from aspects like symbolic meanings that frequently play a more decisive role in decision-making 
process than do presumably informed and organized policy choices.
72 The starting point for search is failure or at least the perception o f failure. A satisfactory alternative is 
one that attends some criterion, objective, goal or target sufficient to stop search or comparison processes. 
The continuous comparison between targets and performance provides the control elements for searching 
(March, 1994: 27).
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2.4. Problems: The importance of defining the problem
The problem stream is mainly about problem definition, “the process of characterising 
problems in the political arena.”73 It focuses on the ingredients that affect the perception 
of a problem by interest groups, politicians, and governmental structures, and refers to 
where attention is allocated in the first place. Attention-catching events, public opinion 
mood, or external shocks, for instance, are decisive in dramatising a theme as well as 
pointing out what is at stake.
A useful starting point for analysing the recurrent attempts to solve public management 
problems is dissatisfaction. A more detailed framework based on theories of attention 
and search in decision-making process was further detailed by March (1994), who 
centred his analysis on the problem of allocation of attention in a context where 
alternatives, consequences, and preferences are imperfectly known. According to March 
(1994: 24) an “ecology of attention”74 must be incorporated into decision-making 
analysis because o f problems of time, attention, and information management (and 
overload), in order to deal with recurrent problems of intermittent attention, thus 
satisficing search rules. Satisficing makes it possible to activate search behaviour, its 
timing, and its limits. Dissatisfaction, however, is a negative motive for action because 
it does not provide positive guidance but only rejection of certain solutions (Rose, 1993: 
51). The searching process75 has a limited scope because it does not go far beyond the 
rejection of the previous reform attempt as a starting point.
73 Rochefort and Cobb (1994: 3).
74 By ecology o f attention, March (1994: 24) is referring basically to questions related to “who attends to 
what, and when.”
75 The parameters o f search are the expectations derived from a comparison between performance and 
targets. When performance falls below the expected targets, search increases; when performance goes 
beyond expectation, search decreases (March, 1994: 27). March’s search model is complemented by three 
premises: aspirations change over time; search is affected by success and failure; and search depends on 
the market o f “supply o f ’ and “demand for” information.
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There are different routes for problems emerging within the policymaking process. 
First, focusing on events such as crises and disasters traditionally captures the attention 
of decision makers when they occur. Second, indicators point out the state of affairs 
concerning changes and produce feedback messages. Feedback messages arise from 
monitoring and policy evaluation routines, informal channels or persons in charge of the 
implementation process.76
Problem definition is the moment when the whole of the policymaking process is 
defined, even though it occurs in the early stages. It includes finding something to 
blame, or dramatising or downplaying situations (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994: 3). It 
highlights the early stages of career problems, i.e., its emergence, its attention-gathering 
motives, its framing, and its process of winning over a certain amount of public 
legitimacy, until it triggers off governmental responses. It is a process marked by 
moments of transition points, through which the issue career is made. The way an issue 
is defined affects the “type o f politicking” triggered off, the chances of reaching the 
governmental agenda, the probability of a favourable outcome, the audiences mobilised 
around its discussion, and the sort o f filters it will have to go through in order to reach a 
decisional stage (Petracca, 1992: 1).
The positive or negative issue tone (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) affects the mutually 
influential interaction between the definition of a problem and its institutional 
framework. In fact, both the topic and the tone of attention are mutually related, and the 
resulting dynamics will affect the way the issue makes its career through the multiple 
streams. New frames of reference related to the way problems are defined may float 
around for some time before they “catch on”. The tone adopted may or may not help for 
the definition of a problem to take off.
76 Problems in public management policies were recognised via new presidents at the beginnings o f their 
terms o f office. The way they were defined, however, varied from case to case.
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Problem definition is about causal understandings, which lead to certain (and not to 
other) solutions. A variety of ways in which problems are socially understood will affect 
and condition policy processes, policy outcomes, and entrepreneurs’ behaviour. The 
perspective of a problem is frequently important because “an orientation locates the 
problem’s causes and recommends a solution” (Best, 1989: xx). The career of a problem 
to the point at which it receives a policy and a political response is influenced by its 
initial establishment. However, different “selection principles” will be adopted by 
distinct public arenas in order to address distinct problem definitions (Hilgartner and 
Bosk, 1988). Problem definition is also about the degree of authority that must be 
activated to deal with it as well as the volume and type of resources it requires. The 
issue of “problem ownership” (Gusfield, 1981) is relevant in individual and institutional 
terms for entrepreneurial and jurisdictional purposes.
The way an issue for administrative reform is defined (and blocked, depending on the 
moment) is a central concern. “Issue definition is a purposive process (...) intimately 
related to agenda processes” (Baumgarter and Jones, 1993: 22). Thus, the issue of 
definition process includes its emergence, the generation of policy alternatives, 
decision-making, implementation, recession, and learning (when it occurs). 
Baumgartner and Jones (1994: 50) pointed out that different definitions of issues 
generate distinct cleavages, a problem aggravated by the fact that “only some parts of an 
issue become salient at any one time”. Since different actors will benefit differently, 
according to the dominant face of the issue, the debate on problem definition will 
decisively influence, and be influenced by, both the policy process and the political 
context. Therefore, the way an issue draws attention to a policy and the tone of this 
attention can generate different implications for both the policy process and the outcome
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of the policy.77 By the same token, agreements among key actors around the definition 
of an issue enable (or do not enable, as occurred in most of the cases) consensus as to 
what should be done.
2.5. The policy process
The policy stream encompasses alternative generation and policy specification 
processes. "The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power" 
(Schattschneider, 1960: 68). It incorporates the factors that affect the policy ideas that 
are gravitating around the events, as well as the capabilities of formulating policy trade­
offs and proposals. The policy definition process involves the career of the issue from a 
diffused systemic societal agenda to the narrow governmental decisional agenda. In 
order to move upstream “an issue must acquire a clear definition and a sense of 
urgency” (Barzelay, 2000: 56). The march of the issue is marked by the occurrence of 
focal micro-events that push the issue towards government attention.
The problem definition stream does not necessarily precede the policy stream. More 
often than not, solutions spur on problem definitions. Wildavsky (1979: 42) argues that 
“a problem is linked to a solution: a problem is a problem only if  something can be done 
about it.” A problem is taken seriously when there is a proposed course of action; if  not 
a first attempt at a solution, at least attached to it (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994: 24). The 
availability of solutions predetermines the way problems are defined as well as their 
causal explanations. Therefore, “policy makers seeking policy outcomes attempt to
77 The clashes between Helio Beltrao and Teixeira Dias during the 1967 Administrative Reform, Aluizio 
Alves and the economic team in 1988, and Bresser Pereira and the Chief o f  Staff Minister in 1998 are 
illustrative o f  this argument.
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redefine issues to suit their needs, taking advantage of circumstances as they can” 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1994: 54).
Kingdon (1994: 19) compares the emergence of a policy proposal from a “policy 
primeval soup,” with a Darwinist natural-selection process. In principle the winning 
proposals should be those capable of overcoming barriers of scrutiny, including 
technical feasibility, value match, national mood, budget workability, anticipation of 
future developments (including gains and losses), and political support. However, the 
availability of solutions precedes questions of acceptability and affordability (Rochefort 
and Cobb, 1994: 15). Policy gestation can be fast or gradual. Policy solutions are not 
necessarily available on the shelves, as some of the cases will demonstrate. Sometimes 
they must be engendered in the form of problemistic searches.78 New policies are not 
necessarily new and rarely appear as the result of structured and coordinated policy 
development efforts. Competing alternatives confront one another in the dynamic 
interaction.
Policy survival also requires perfect matches between value patterns and the content of 
the policy proposal. Kingdon suggests that policy proposals capable of addressing the 
three components of a value pattern are most likely to make their way through 
decisional processes. Such components are the view of the State and the principles of 
equality and efficiency. All three components must be taken into account in two ways: 
in terms of the content they represent and in terms of the communication challenge they 
pose. The closer the connections between the policy proposal and the value components 
embedded in the surrounding environment, the greater the probability of pro-policy 
decisions.
78 A problemistic search can be distinguished from both random curiosity and the search for 
understanding. It is distinguished from the former because it has a goal, and from the latter because it is 
interested in understanding only insofar as such understanding contributes to control. Problemistic search 
is engineering rather than pure science” (Cyert and March, 1963: 121).
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When consensus building occurs, it is through persuasion in the policy stream. Testing 
certain proposals in order to bring about consensus is another frequent part of the 
specification of policy proposals. It includes softening-up thick proposals, conducting 
inclusive discussions in order to incorporate changes from the very start o f the process. 
Floating trial balloons is a common tactic to pave the way for a policy to rise to the 
decisional arena. There is also a tendency to search for solutions “near” the known stock 
of policy alternatives (Jones, 1994: 68). However, as it will be shown, the Brazilian 
cases did not fit well into these two caveats because the debate tended to be quite 
narrow, given the deficits in critical mass regarding the issues.
The policy venue of each reform -  the institutional locations where authoritative 
decisions are made on a given issue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 32) -  also deserves 
attention. Given their consequences, policy venues are relevant to all stages of the 
decisional process. Jones (1994: 23) emphasises the path taken by political issues: 
“Where they come from, how they are selected for serious consideration, how they are 
framed to attract support, and how they influence the policy process.” Administrative 
reform is the outcome of a series of metamorphoses that need to be established to 
provide a clear perspective of the factors that explain its occurrence.
A complementary model of policymaking to be incorporated into the analysis of the 
policy stream is Barzelay’s (1986) framework, based on the ideas of conflict 
generation/resolution and competition over the structures of authority and assignment, 
an expansion of the so-called “neo-Weberian synthesis.”79 Conflict80 gravitates around 
policy issues, while competition is centred on battles for jurisdiction. Competition over
79 See Simon, 1973 and Cyert, R. M.; March, J.G., 1963.
80 Conflict refers to the battle over policy, and can be split into two dimensions: conflict generation and 
conflict resolution. Conflict arises when governmental agencies with overlapping jurisdictions disagree 
about policies, a frequent situation in the Brazilian cases. An important complementary concept here is 
“quasi-resolution o f conflict”, a label used by Cyert and March (1963) to designate processes that result in 
precarious near-finished outcomes, a very common situation in the public sector.
80
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jurisdiction occurs with respect to productive control and regulatory control. 
Production control refers to production and delivery processes, while the regulatory 
control is associated with authority over regulatory arrangements . All four cases were 
marked by disputes classifiable as competition. While conflicts played a minor role, if  
any, they are little more than a sign of the dominance of political aspects within the 
public management policy-making process.
There is a plausible connection between the distinction between conflict and 
competition, and the process of consensus building for experts and politicians. The 
debate among experts gravitates around substantive policy issues, while, in politics, 
coalition-building processes do not necessarily take into account any of the ingredients 
of the policy proposals (Van Gestel, 1999: 156). And when this happens via 
negotiations and concessions that affect the proposal, the reason frequently lies 
elsewhere, not within the borders of the policy debate. Disagreements over policy 
contents assume proportions of conflict. Interactions among politicians are closer to the 
notion of competition for political gains.
2.6. The political arena
The political stream focuses on politics, on what is going on in the broad political sense. 
“Policy (...) necessarily involves politics, since, in the pitiful words of Harold Wilson,
81 Barzelay (1986: 105) correctly emphasizes that when the granted attributions refer to exclusive 
productive control the distinction blurs because o f the amount o f implicit regulatory control attached in 
this case.
82 Barzelay uses the concept o f segmentation to describe a situation in which the competition becomes 
more intense because o f  an increase in the number o f governmental agencies with overlapping statutory 
or de facto authority over a given issue-area. By issue-area Barzelay (1986: 107) means a set o f 
interrelated policy actions. Three issue-area characteristics affect the level o f  the competition over 
jurisdiction: complexity, age, and size.
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‘policies without politics are of no more use than politics without policies’.” 
(Chapman and Greenway, 1980). So far, “policies matter to public solving and politics 
influence policy”. (Weaver and Rockman, 1993). The sequence is debatable because 
sometimes the reverse is true: policy influences politics (Lowi, 1964).
Even though I am giving ordinary treatment to public management policy, as so many 
other authors in the sectorial sphere have done, this is not the most correct procedure, 
strictly speaking. Public management policies are government-wide84 institutional rules 
and routines, usually with pervasive impacts on the public sector (Barzelay, 2000). 
Thus, public management policy can also be taken as a systemic policy that affects all 
others (Kliksberg, 1990). Therefore, any effort related to the adjustment o f state 
structures and modus operandi is highly sensitive to the political environment. 
Administrative reform is not an explicit political activity but “it necessarily involves 
political elements of various kinds” (Greenway and Chapman, 1980).
Political developments on policy making are affected by three distinct components: 
public mood, organised political forces, and national mood regarding government is an 
elusive concept although in recent decades opinion polls and public opinion surveys 
have provided more elements for understanding how interest groups and society, more 
broadly considered, react to facts, news, images, and political decisions. Kingdon 
assumes that public mood can simultaneously influence and be influenced by the policy 
agenda and policy specification processes.
Policymakers usually monitor the balance of forces between organised (and 
disorganised) political forces that have interests at stake. Any status quo has its clientele
83 Wilson (1977).
84 Public management policies do not include ministries or agency specific change processes.
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to oppose change and many policy proposals have no self-evident beneficiaries to push 
them through the risky political battles, not to mention through institutional veto points.
Policy decisions are taken within governmental borders mainly by politicians and 
bureaucrats. The distribution of power between these two groups determine their 
capacities to exert influence. Change in policy priorities frequently occur 
simultaneously with the election of new incumbents or with new appointments to key 
decision-making positions. Competition for jurisdiction is also part and parcel of the 
political game, given the propensity of politicians and bureaucrats to fight turf wars in 
order to gain political capital (regardless o f whether they are represented by budgeting, 
employees, visibility, claims, responsibilities or even problems!).
The political stream encompasses institutional and non-institutional factors. Institutional 
factors include constitutional provisions, the political system, the political regime, 
party-system dynamics, electoral outcomes, bureaucratic capabilities, federalist issues, 
and veto points. Non-institutional factors involve economic fluctuations, national mood, 
the emergence of new ideas, systems of values and beliefs, cultural practices, and 
external shocks. The impact of events (Chapman and Greenway, 1980: 209) on either 
institutional or non-institutional dimensions in a country’s life interferes, at the same 
time, with policy processes and outcomes.
Consensus building in the political arena does not usually suffer from the snowball 
effect typical of experts’ debates within policy communities. Negotiation, not 
persuasion, is the dominant feature. After an initial period when politicians are only 
vaguely aware of what the negotiation is about, negotiation takes place until the 
imminence of compromise provides a final impulse towards an agreement. Fluctuating 
attention can lead to inconsistencies in policy choices (Simon, 1983: 18). Non-policy
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elements are eventually incorporated into final decisional stages although the critical 
mass about a policy issue tends to be domain specific.
Administrative reforms in Brazil have occurred in accordance with the swings of the 
political system. Reform attempts frequently occurred simultaneously with broader 
regime changes or changes in administrations, when the power avenues are presumably 
more open. Policy decisions have often been made under conditions of ambiguity, 
during which public management decision-making processes were particularly difficult. 
During such periods, “solutions become joined to problems, and both are then joined to 
favourable political forces” (Kingdon, 1994: 20). Not surprisingly, these moments 
coincide with the windows of opportunity, through which entrepreneurs push policy 
proposals up to the governmental decisional agenda.
2.7. Coupling the streams
Policies change via entrepreneurial actions85 by linking the political problem and policy 
streams when “windows of opportunity”86 appear. Timing is critical because when the 
window of opportunity opens,87 influenced or not by entrepreneurial action, the policy 
entrepreneurs88 must take action. Otherwise, the opportunity is lost and the 
entrepreneurs must wait for the next one to come along. Policy entrepreneurs must be 
not only persistent but also skilled at coupling. They must be able to attach problems to 
solutions and find politicians receptive to their ideas. The chance that a given issue will
85 Kingdon focuses on the actions o f entrepreneurs. Nevertheless entrepreneurial functions can also be 
performed by organisations, even if  they operate as extensions o f entrepreneurs’ powers.
86 “Policy windows are opportunities to realize initiatives” (Van Gestel, 158).
87 Political events, rotation o f decision-makers, compelling problems, outside shocks, and seasonal 
predictable opportunities are examples o f keys for opening political windows. They are usually, but not 
necessarily, episodes o f short duration.
88 Kingdon defines policy entrepreneurs as individuals committed to investing “time, energy, reputation 
and money to promote positions for anticipated future gain in the form o f material, purposive joint 
benefits” (Kingdon, 1994: 179).
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gain prominence in the agenda is enhanced when problems and solutions, or solutions 
and politics, are joined together. The chances for a given issue increase dramatically 
when all three streams are joined in a single package. Therefore, environmental 
elements as well as serendipity and chance are incorporated into the analysis, which also 
reserves a protagonist role for entrepreneurs.
There are subtle distinctions among what changes in the different streams affect what 
moment in the policy process. Kingdon (1994: 168) suggests that agenda setting 
processes are more influenced by what happens in the problem stream and the political 
streams, while alternative generation is more sensitive to events in the policy stream. 
This is the reason for more frequent occurrence of problem and political windows than 
of policy windows. Policy windows rarely open, and provide unique opportunities for 
greater policy shifts (Kingdon, 1994: 166). A problem window is opened, for instance, 
by compelling problems, while a political window, for example, is opened by changes 
in administrations. Problems can become compelling regardless of whether they arise 
unexpectedly, such as price crises or natural disasters, or occur via gradual 
accumulation over time until they explode. New administrations come into power 
through elections, new coalitions, coups d'etat and other routes.
O Q
Coupling opportunities occur for short periods during which either a policy change 
takes place, or nothing at all happens. A similar point is made by Downs’s emphasis on 
quick and timely interventions when opportunities arise -  as in the proverb, “Strike 
while the iron is hot” (Downs, 1972). Windows remain open for only short periods, for 
five reasons. First, participants frequently decide that a problem has been solved and
89 “Once the window opens, it does not stay open long” (Kingdon, 1994: 169). This premise will be 
challenged in all four cases, albeit for different reasons.
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ondecide to move on. Second, people sometimes fail to take action for various reasons, 
(skills, attention, resources, chance or other). Third, the events that contributed to the 
opening of the window lose importance and attention is shifted to other issues. Fourth, 
turnover of key people can abort policy or political developments, especially when these 
people were involved in the events that prompted the window. Fifth, windows 
sometimes close because of the absence of adequate, feasible, credible or sustainable 
policy proposals (Kingdon, 1994: 169-170). What characterises the opening of a 
window varies, but timing management is essential if  the moment to push through 
potentially successful policy proposals is to be seized.
Coupling is not a synonym for controlling or conducing. The concept sometimes 
incorporates the notion of coping because entrepreneurs who are coupling the streams 
must stay on board and defend their presence in the decision-making process, while 
disruptive forces press to separate the streams. Coupling assumes that “the effects of the 
streams are interactive” (Jones, 1993: 9) and therefore require congruent management, 
in spite of the unpredictability of its success.
Kingdon’s streams involve theorising the broader systemic level, which means that 
choice is perceived as a product of the intentional and/or non-intentional convergence of 
various factors and multiple causes. The multiple streams model, however, is distinct 
from the system theory in three ways. First, the multiple streams model dissects what 
happens in terms of agenda setting and policy specification processes via clarifying 
what occurs in the politics, problem and policy arenas, instead of taking the decision­
making process as a black box. Second, the multiple streams model incorporates 
elements of randomness at the junction of the streams, while perceiving the system as
90 The most typical example is the approval o f legislation that is followed by a period where attention 
declines and enforcement fails to take place. The capacity to mobilize attention to implement a policy is 
usually weaker than and different from that required to push a proposal through a decision-making 
process, in which case the expectation o f outcome tends to catalyse attention.
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well as the streams as wheels in constant movement consisting o f a dynamic element 
that dispenses with the notion of equilibrium (Kingdon, 1994: 219). Third, the factors 
grouped within each stream affect the policy dynamics in “analytically distinct ways” 
(Barzelay, 2000: 55)
Efforts are made to couple streams, which tend to be more successful in some contexts 
than in others. The first is when there is the perception that the policy proposal is a 
solution to avoid a problem defined as a loss. Second, the presence of the entrepreneur 
in the top decision-making circle allows him to timely and effectively couple the 
streams because of his access to key actors and moments. Third, crisis favours 
opportunities for pushing through solutions or presumable alternatives presented as 
escape routes for deadlocks. Fourth, salami tactics91 are frequently used to improve the 
chances of getting a policy proposal approved via agreement in steps and with minimum 
risk.
Some of the basic features of the multiple streams model are particularly suitable for the 
Brazilian political culture (Martins, 1995) as well as for cases of administrative reform 
(March and Olsen, 1989). The sense of a somewhat “organised anarchy” is a common 
political image associated with the country’s political culture, which considers 
improvisation as a value related to creativity in dealing with scarce resources. The three 
properties associated with the concept -  fluid participation, unclear preferences, and 
unclear technology -  are embedded in the Brazilian political system (Evans, 1995), as 
are the categories of ambiguity and uncertainty. In the case of administrative reforms, 
the difficulties begin with problem definition, a controversial, shifting and misleading 
meaning, as the case narratives will reveal. In this context, coming to terms with the
91 Salami tactics can be defined as “strategic manipulation o f  sequential decision making” (Zahariadis, 
2003: 15).
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problems to be addressed means sharing viewpoints and understanding the reality to be 
transformed (Weick, 1979: 175).
2.8. Entrepreneurs as catalysts and synchronisers
‘Entrepreneur’92 means someone who ‘gets things done’ in the original French 
conceptualisation of the term. Entrepreneurship plays a key role in Kingdon’s multiple 
streams model. Entrepreneurs94 must be prepared to seize opportunities and to couple 
the streams, i.e. to perform the function of bringing together previously separate streams 
(Kingdon, 1984: 182). This present investigation attributes analytical importance to the 
role played by reformist entrepreneurs, without whom these episodes could hardly have 
been carried out. It is important “to understand the personalities involved that actually 
cause the events to be explained” (Dowding, 116: 1994). Contrary to Brunsson and 
Olsen’s (1993) presumption that reforms can eventually dispense with individual 
protagonists, this dissertation intends to show how they played an essential role in 
changing institutional frameworks and institutional capacities. These activities and 
insertion modes include establishing the nature of the problem, defining hypothetical 
causes, creating momentum, platforming efficiently, designing institutions, employing
92 In his classical conceptualisation o f entrepreneurship Schumpeter (1934) emphasised the innovative 
combination o f elements as its defining characteristic as an entrepreneurial stage. Schumpeterian 
typologies (Schumpeter, 1934) related to entrepreneurial behaviour and entrepreneur motivations usually 
went beyond the narrow conception o f homos economicus (Schumpeter, [1946] 1991: 408), which 
encourages a broader use o f his concepts.
93 Given the context o f this investigative analysis -  the public sector and political arenas -  I opted for 
Jarillo and Stevenson’s (1990: 23) definition o f entrepreneurship: “Entrepreneurship is a process by 
which individuals -  either on their own or inside organisations -  pursue opportunities without regard to 
the resources they currently control.”
94 In analysing entrepreneurial roles I also used elements borrowed from Hayek’s (1972), M ises’s (1963) 
and Kirzner’s (1997) understandings o f entrepreneurship, which are distinct but complementary to 
Schumpeter’s approach. Hayek focused on the novelty and unknown aspects and their disclosure through 
the entrepreneurial process. He pointed out the importance o f  practical knowledge -  concrete ordinary 
knowledge -  in the context o f a discovery process. Mises’ and Kirzner’s notion o f ‘entrepreneurial errors’ 
-  perceived as opportunities for another entrepreneur to take action -  is important for an understanding o f  
the policy learning process in each o f the four cases.
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rhetoric, building coalitions, brokering interests, choosing venues, developing strategies, 
and learning with experience and analysis.
March and Olsen (1989: 81) recognised the role of individuals but almost incidentally: 
“Different participants act on the basis of different definitions of the situation.” 
Circumstantial combinations of actors, choice opportunities, problems, solutions and 
forgetfulness are recreated from time to time and generate windows of opportunity. The 
occurrence of policy change depends on the synchronicity of factors that include but 
transcend the design of the policy proposal at stake. Individual characteristics matter 
and play a decisive role in shaping policy outcomes.
Entrepreneurs also play a key intermediate role within the political, policy, academic, 
governmental, and power arenas. Mobility is the driving force that cross-fertilises 
(Greenway and Chapman, 1980: 200) the spheres and pushes the issue from the 
systemic to the governmental agenda. At the same time, entrepreneurs network and 
build up support from different areas in coalition advocacy and coalition building 
processes that are able to provide support for the policy proposal at stake.
Kingdon (1995: 179-181) uses the term entrepreneur to designate an individual who is 
willing to invest “time, energy, reputation, money -  to promote a position for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive solidarity benefits.”95 There 
are three important qualities in an entrepreneur’s success. First, entrepreneurs have 
“some claim to a hearing,” regardless of expertise credentials, representative status or 
authoritative decision-making position. Second, entrepreneurs are basically well- 
connected politically and endowed with negotiating skills. Third, they must be 
persistent. Regarding motives, Kingdon (1995: 122-124) moves beyond standard
95 Another view is presented by Kanter (2000: 185) who lists three basic commodities that are mobilised 
in entrepreneurial processes: resources (“funds, data, space, time”), information (“data, technical 
knowledge, political intelligence, expertise”) and support (“endorsement, backing, approval, legitimacy”).
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rational choice explanations, despite incorporating them in his analysis. For him, there 
are three motives for entrepreneurs to engage in policy specification processes: 
promotion of personal interests, promotion of values (or making a difference in a given 
public policy), and passion for the policy game (the case of policy groupies).
Public entrepreneurs96 engage in the policy process at different stages and from a 
variety of angles. In Kingdon’s (1995: 180-181) terms coupling involves matching 
problems and solutions by taking into account distinct actions and acting from variable 
entrepreneurial and strategic positions. They move through different arenas and push the 
issue through distinct venues. At critical moments, represented by the policy and 
political windows of opportunities, entrepreneurs seize a chance and “clinch” policy 
outcomes thanks to decisive political support.
07Public entrepreneurs operate by manipulating policy monopolies and issue 
jurisdictions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 6). The way entrepreneurs manipulate 
institutional jurisdictions enables coupling and conditions for policy outcome. “Policy 
subsystems are continually being set up and destroyed” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 
6). But public management policies are problematic because they encompass distinctive 
policy sub-domains, such as civil service, organisational design, budgeting, planning 
and others. Changes did not occur in all of them equally throughout the four cases. 
Public administration and planning operated in conjunction in two cases but apart in the 
other two. Planning and budgeting issues did not change in the latter reforms but they 
could have been key partners in both.
961 am not using North’s (1990: 83) notion o f entrepreneurs as agents o f  change responsive to incentives 
expressed by institutional frameworks, because in this perspective they are usually efficiency driven, in 
economic terms.
97 Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 7) listed two defining characteristics o f  policy monopolies: an 
institutional structure which restrains access to the policy process, and a positive supporting idea capable 
o f mobilizing and galvanizing support around it.
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Entrepreneurial action is decisive in coupling the political, problem and policy streams 
with receptive audiences within each of the streams. In all four cases most of the 
entrepreneurs were important political players as well as policy formulators and 
campaigners, and they became engaged in the political game.
“Entrepreneurs whose purpose is to couple the three streams will 
occasionally bend ideological proclivities in order to take advantage o f 
fleeting opportunities” (Zahariadis, 1999: 77).
Well connected, resourceful, and persistent entrepreneurs who are members of multiple 
arenas or institutional venues (Baumgarter and Jones, 1993) can influence the location 
and mobility of an issue through different convenient venues. In the policy specification 
stream the way entrepreneurs drew lessons from other spatial and time contexts is 
particularly important.
Public sector entrepreneurship was intensively exercised during all four cases. 
Entrepreneurship is similar to a practical enterprise (Swedberg, 2000: 7).
“The key defining characteristics of public sector entrepreneurship are 
the promotion, adoption and implementation of new combinations of 
policy, process and/or organisational innovation” (Ioannou, 1992: 166).
Multiple overlapping roles were played during this period: policy intellectual, policy 
advocacy, policy championship, and policy administration (Roberts and King, 1996).
The role of entrepreneurs as reformers poses the intriguing question of why they persist 
in the face of constant setbacks (Caiden, 1982: 223). There are four tentative answers to 
this question. First, belief formation is an important mechanism that links the actions of 
entrepreneurs to politics and policy change (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 28). 
Desires and beliefs influence policies as well as windows of opportunities.
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Entrepreneurs are usually determined people and accustomed to persisting in their 
endeavours. Second, governmental reorganisation and administrative reforms are 
inherent to governments. If the role of the reformers should not be underestimated, 
neither should it be overestimated. Governments are constantly being reformed in 
search of legitimacy. Reformers contribute to these processes and there is no shortage of 
this type of position. They seize opportunities that are generated from time to time. 
Third, they are protagonists o f values broader than their own. Collective beliefs push 
their actions, which, to a certain degree, make them promoters of ideas available in 
society. Therefore, if  such values still exist, society will find a way of producing their 
champions from time to time. Fourth, they see the chance of making a difference 
through their actions. Plausibly, past failures operate as an incentive to make them try 
where others have failed. Eventually, they may incorporate lessons previously ignored. 
The greater a challenge, the more likelihood there is of its mobilising ambitious 
reformers to face it.
An important extension of the argument here is that “ the entrepreneur need not be a 
single person, but may also be an organisation (...)” because “what matters is the 
behaviour, not the actor” (Swedberg, 2000: 17). Roberts assumes that “the process of 
public entrepreneurship can also be understood in terms of institutional requirements of 
innovation that dictate the sequence of development” (Roberts, 1992: 67). In this case 
one could explain the entrepreneurial process on the basis of its institutional requisites -  
“A certain sequence of activities and a set of procedural rules that satisfy the 
prerequisites for an innovative outcome.” It means considering the process of public 
entrepreneurship in terms of “the functions, goals, or forms that are necessary to achieve 
and sustain an innovation” (Poole and Van De Ven, 1989: 64). The entrepreneur 
performs “a functional role which is not necessarily embodied in a single physical
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person.” The entrepreneurs of all four cases treated here worked through 
organisational platforms (Bardach, 1998) that operated as their extensions and operative 
arms but beyond their individual capabilities.
Functional perspective is controversial due to its sequence of stages and its propensity 
to be analysed on the basis of hindsight. Policy and political events do not advance in 
steady, progressive steps. As Kingdon (1984: 215) states, “Participants do not fit into 
problems and then seek solutions for them; indeed, advocacy of solutions often precedes 
the highlighting of problems to which they become attached.” Innovations are solutions 
to problems. In the Brazilian case, however, policy innovation frequently provided 
solutions to problems and political streams. As Ioannou (1992: 163) observed:
“The absence of effective central political control and coordination -  
leading to fragmentation and significant departmental autonomy and 
discretion -  not only made public entrepreneurship possible but to some 
extent necessary” (Ioannou, 1992: 163).
The events of Brazilian administrative reforms strengthen Ioannou’s assumption that 
“public sector entrepreneurship may be a functional need in fragmented political 
systems.” This is a further explanation for the administrative reform processes in the 
segmented Brazilian public sector (Barzelay, 1986).
2.9. The multiple streams model and its critics
Until recently the multiple streams model has been only mildly criticised in the 
literature on political science. The lack of attacks on the model may be seen as a sign of
98 Blau (2000: 83).
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its qualities, or even of its weaknesses, but it may also represent a lack of recognition. 
Processual models like those generated by March and Olsen’s, and Kingdon’s models 
share the absence of concern with outcomes and the concentration on the dynamics of 
the policy process (Dowding, 1994:110).
“Parts of the new institutionalism are challenges to (...) [the] primacy of 
outcomes. Through politics, individuals develop themselves, their 
communities, and the public good” (March and Olsen, 1984: 741).
The main critiques of the garbage can and Kingdon models refer to their indeterminate 
character, their lack of predictive power, their absence of verifiable propositions, their 
looseness, their a-temporal character, the under-specification of causal drivers, their 
concentration on situational and temporal factors at the expense of institutional 
concerns, their descriptive emphasis, the ad hoc role of entrepreneurs and the doubts 
about the unmistakable incrementalist character of the policy specification process 
within the policy stream.
The first critique, indeterminate character, refers to a quality flaw o f the model: its 
indeterminancy and fluidness. The “cloud-like” character o f the multiple streams 
framework is responsible for this aspect: Mucciaroni (1992) points out that the model 
focuses on temporal sorting and situational factors at the expense of more concrete 
structural factors, such as institutions. Kingdon incorporates elements of chance in his 
analysis but he argues “that neither the dynamics within each stream nor the 
connections among the streams are essentially fortuitous or random. Everything cannot 
be connected with everything else” (Kingdon, 1995: 222).
Bendor et al. (2001) also pointed out the macro-level of the explanations offered by 
garbage can models and criticised the absence of any underlying theory of individual
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choice. But Kingdon’s model does not preclude the role of individuals in the process. 
On the contrary, it places entrepreneurs in a strategic function and does not dismiss 
rationality as a choice criteria. It does not presume, however, that rational choices are 
the exclusive or determinant factors in decision-making processes. Kingdon provided an 
improvement on March and Olsen’s anti-individualism when he introduced the 
entrepreneur responsible for coupling the streams. However, the entrepreneur performs 
the role of catalyst in the process of producing policy change, but not necessarily in the 
process of specifying the policy outcome.
The second critique refers to its lack of predictive power. The model does not say much 
about why certain problems and solutions are chosen instead of others and under what 
types of conditions. In fact, an important point of the coupling process is “the 
unpredictability and the inability to monitor the events at the moment that they occur” 
(Van Gestel, 1999: 159). To a certain extent decision-making is an uncontrolled process 
in garbage can models. The outcomes are not necessarily those intentionally pursued by 
the main protagonists. However, Kingdon’s as well as March and Olsen’s ideas do not 
intend to provide predictive insights. They are more concerned with explaining 
processes than anticipating how they will occur in the future because, given their 
premises, there is no standard explanation.
Third, the model does not lead to a testable proposition related to the direction of policy 
change (Sabatier, 1999: 272), but it does not intend to do so. It does not address policy 
outcomes as it addresses the process of generating them. As a consequence of its 
fluidness, the model is not very helpful with anticipations. Things depend on situational 
combinations. Things happen, but their contents and their direction are not relevant for 
the model’s mechanics.
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Mucciaroni (1992) and Sabatier (1999) argue that there are problems in the various 
specification procedures adopted by Kingdon. The former questions the independent 
variables of Kingdon’s model -  problems, policy solutions and political climate -  
because they are too abstract. The latter demands clarifications of what the dependent 
variable might be: the policy alternatives or the process of choosing an alternative. The 
problem lies in the case-oriented approach that Kingdon adopts instead of a variable- 
oriented research design. There are methodological difficulties in organising the 
multiple-streams approach on a variable-oriented basis. This is a characteristic of the 
model, although some authors see it as a flaw.
Fourth, there is the problem of the looseness and independence of the relationships of 
the three streams." Bendor et al. (2002) especially questioned the lack of a logical 
connection between solutions and problems as well as the decoupling of both in 
streams.100 According to the critics, they are too “gross and encompassing”101 and not 
easily discernible. However, the independence of the streams is a useful analytical 
device that does not exclude interactions and intertwined developments of the streams. 
Kingdon refers to Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework, for instance, as
“[P]artly an attempt to see these streams, particularly the policy and 
political streams, as more closely related than I have portrayed them.” 
(Kingdon, 1995: 228).
Mutual interdependence of the streams can add value to the model.
Fifth, Bendor et al. (2001) argued that the garbage can model is not historically 
grounded, even though it attributes disproportional importance to the present. Weir
99 Sabatier (1999: 272).
100 The authors did not even accept the premise that solutions can chase problems, a source o f what they 
call ‘a definitional distortion’.
101 Mucciaroni (1992: 464).
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(1992) and Mucciaroni (1992: 465 and 471) made the same point because of the 
model’s lack of concern with historical patterns and cycles. The multiple streams model, 
however, is different because it is deeply context-driven. What is important is the 
context and the way people embedded102 in this reality perceive the arrival of new 
proposals. The role played by temporal sorting within the coupling process is also 
essential. Context indeed does not mean the same thing as history. However, “nothing 
excludes examining the impact of historical antecedents or of embedding particular
iagenda changes into broader, underlying historical patterns.”
Sixth, the lack of specification of causal drivers is not a problem in Kingdon’s terms but 
a solution, i.e., a way to keep the model flexible and applicable to different situations, 
with different causal drivers. Events are not necessarily driven by a previously known 
cause structure (Bendor et al., 2001). But what critics present as problems, users of the 
model consider advantages. In other words, the multiple-streams model allows 
comparisons among cases explained by different causal drivers. The focuses of the 
comparisons are the dynamics of the processes, and not the causal drivers.
Seventh, Van Gestel (1999) pointed out the minor role attributed to institutions and 
organisational structures in garbage can models. The pure garbage can model is 
basically institution-free, or its structure is treated as exogenous. Bendor et al. (2001: 
173) made a similar point by suggesting that garbage can models provide “a theory of 
short-run dynamics that fails to account for how structure would adjust over time to 
garbage can processes flowing within.” Indeed, “The pure garbage can model is 
basically institution free, or structure is treated as exogenous” as Olsen replied in the 
same journal. But there is nothing in the framework that prevents organisational
102 By embeddedness I mean the nested relationships between the persons and the specific structures o f a 
context (Granovetter, 1992: 60) that influence what happens in a contingent contextual way.
103 Mucciaroni (1992: 474).
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structures from being incorporated into the explanations. However, the framework does 
not consider them determinant in the general formulation.
Kingdon’s model emphasises fluid situational factors as explanations for policy 
change.104 It does not focus on the continuity or deep transformation of less visible 
structural elements capable of pushing or constraining policymaking processes. 
Institutions are important but not only in situational terms. Structural factors are 
political, social, cultural, and technological.105 They are susceptible to Kingdon’s 
triggers of change, such as political turnovers and swings in public opinion, ma non 
troppo. The dynamics of changes in structural factors is not necessarily determined by 
situational elements.
Eighth Bendon et al. (2001: 187) questioned the descriptive character o f garbage can 
models and their explanatory validity. But in refusing to accept descriptive 
explanations, their critiques disregard important traditions of political history, as Olsen 
(2001) argued in his rebuttal in the same journal. This point was also made in the first 
chapter, which explained the research design.
Ninth, there are doubts as to the ad hoc intervention of policy entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs, responsible for coupling the streams, are an ad hoc element in Kingdon’s 
model. It is analytically exogenous to the streams’ dynamics. This is plausible and 
possible, but not likely. Entrepreneurs usually operate within the streams, especially 
policy and political streams. They are more likely to be endogenous to the policymaking 
process, but not to ad hoc couplers.
104 The exception is political culture (Kingdon, 1984).
105 Mucciaroni (1992: 464-5).
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Finally, tenth Durant and Diehl (1989) call attention to the possibility of non- 
incremental developments in the policy stream via “sudden, unexpected and far- 
reaching changes” (Van Gestel, 1999: 160). Kingdon describes policy specification 
processes as incremental but he does leave room for alternative paths, as his critics 
recognise.
The critiques directed at the multiple streams model are plausible and have contributed 
to enrich its application as well as the understanding of the limits of its use. Some of 
these critiques -  such as concerns with organisational and situational elements, 
historical insertion, stream distinctions, policy incrementalism and entrepreneurs’ role -  
refer to insufficiencies of the model that can somehow be incorporated into it. Others, 
such as those related to fluidness, lack of predictive power, causal drivers, 
indeterminacy and design -  have methodological roots. They can be portrayed in the 
context of the debate between different research traditions. They are thus absorbable 
into the model and may contribute to its improvement, a topic to be taken up briefly in 
the conclusion.
2.9.1 Theoretical contributions
The main theoretical contributions of this thesis concern the limits of Kingdon’s 
multiple-streams framework. As the analysis of the cases revealed, the framework 
performed well regarding its quality parameters: explaining the process of public 
management policy change. But this thesis also evidenced three shortcomings of the 
model when applied to objects of the analysis, namely Constitutional Brazilian public 
management reforms.
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Firstly, the windows of lasted for surprisingly long periods. Contrary to Kingdon's 
views, in no case did the issue acquire a sense of urgency, except at the end of 1990, 
when the NCA approved the Single Juridical Regime, with Congress by-passing all 
legislative stages in order to ensure voting of the law. The analysis of all four cases 
clearly demonstrated that the window remained open for quite a long time, measurable 
in years.106 This observation does not invalidate Kingdon’s framework. On the contrary, 
it suggested that it can be used in more expanded contexts of policy change. But the key 
concept here may be that of a political window represented by a President’s term of 
office, not a policy window within competitive decision-making processes.
Secondly, there was no such thing as a singled-out decision within the decision-making 
process (Jones, 1994). “Kingdon’s approach was not particularly designed to account 
for serial decision occurrences” (Barzelay and Gallego, 2004: 15). No decision took 
place at a single moment in any of the cases. Not even the decisions translated into 
constitutional provisions meant a default status for the implementation process. 
Transitory measures, subsequent ordinary legislation, and controversial interpretations 
followed constitutional changes. As such, they contributed to shape an environment 
marked by continuous modifications regarding issues such as employment relationships 
in the public sector and organisational forms of public-sector institutions.
Thirdly, even if it may seem a paradoxical critique to a processual approach, Weir’s 
objection to the a-historical character of the multiple streams seems pertinent, especially 
if a long-term view is taken.107 Weir criticises Kingdon’s formulation to explain policy 
change on the grounds of its a-historical character. She suggests that these streams have 
a previous story and may have been related over time, as was the case of earlier policies,
106 The articles published from the Symposium organized by the Special International Public Management 
Journal (2003) were also based on cases that adopted Kingdon’s framework to model episodes o f policy 
change in periods o f time roughly equivalent to political terms o f office.
107 Bendor et. al (2001) made a similar point when they referred to garbage can models as theories o f  
short terms dynamics.
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structured balances of power, problems, and perceptions. Patterns of bounded 
innovation favour some ideas at the expense of others in a pre-existing reality. Context 
is not necessarily historical enough in certain circumstances, as in the cases analysed. 
The problem of defining processes was embedded in their contexts but they frequently 
presented shortcomings -  notably in 1988 and 1998 -  because they were not grounded 
in a broad enough understanding of the historical processes o f the problems they aimed 
to at specifying. Contexts are time-bounded in ways that frequently disguise the roots 
and origins of problems that current actors and institutions are dealing with. It was no 
coincidence that the reforms coincided with the time of presidential terms o f office, a 
clue for further analysis.
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Part Two
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CHAPTER 3
Building the National (Administrative) State
3.1 Introduction
The early 1930s were characterised by major political upheavals and continuous 
administrative change programs with a single goal: political centralisation. This period 
of multiple attempts at administrative reforms offers an ideal example for studying 
agenda-setting process, policy specification processes and public entrepreneurship in 
public management policy making. Lopes was the main policy entrepreneur of the 
period from 1934 to 1937, although Nabuco played an important role at the beginning 
of the policy specification process, and Vargas was a decisive political entrepreneur 
during the entire period.
President Getulio Vargas made a paradoxical and insightful speech a few weeks after 
Congress had appointed him President in July 1934. He had succeeded himself as 
President, and he was the leader of the so-called Provisional Government that had put 
an end to the Old Republic (1889-1930) with the Revolution of 1930.
“The dictatorship was, overall, a school of public administration. 
Fortunately, the promoters and executives of the revolutionary 
achievements understood that the greatest problem in Brazil is the correct 
organisation and solutions o f administrative issues” (Vargas, 1934).
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This quotation -  a summary of the Provisional Government -  was consistent with the 
President’s initial concerns when he seized power. Therefore, Vargas was not at the end 
of a policy cycle but on the verge of initiating the most widespread set of public 
administrative transformations that Brazil was to see in a century. Administration, then, 
was alleged to be the root cause of the country’s political problems, and an alibi for 
disrupting the constitutional order. The setting up of numerous national institutions 
contrasted with the institutional stagnation that had marked the Old Republic. Right 
from the beginning, Vargas’s personal attention had been turned to management 
problems, since he considered that they were the cause of the administrative anarchy 
that had triggered off the revolution itself.108 Basic functions of the State such as taxing, 
collecting tributes, and borrowing resources abroad were at risk. “The bureaucracy’s 
main function was not to render services to public, but to private interests” (Geddes, 
1994: 45).
Two major series of reforms took place between 1934 and 1937.109 The first round 
produced the “Readjustment Law,” which set up a merit-based personnel system, the 
Federal Civil Service Commission (CFSPC), and the Efficiency Commissions. The 
second round was marked by the introduction of a super central agency110 known as the 
Department of Administration and Civil Service (DASP), and included in the 1937 
Constitution. The reform consisted of a cascade of political and policy events that 
resulted in the radical transformation of national governance structures.
108 “Overall, Brazil’s problem is an administration problem. The errors and faults derived from 
administrative anarchy were the main and direct causes of our larger problems and decisive factors that 
triggered the revolutionary movement” (Vargas, 1931: 124).
109 In fact, it is difficult to refer to “one” reform because there were several rounds o f reforms once he was 
President for four periods in different circumstances: first as the leader o f a revolutionary movement 
(1930-1934), second as a President chosen by a Constitutional Assembly (1934-1937), third as a dictator 
(1937-1945) and fourth as a constitutionally elected president (1951-1954).
1,0 The term super central agency refers to a Department with ministerial status, located at the Presidency, 
with multiple coordinative functions such as budgeting, personnel, organisation, modernisation, 
procurement and control.
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This chapter is organised into eight sections -  including this introduction. Diagram One 
provides a general overview. The second and third sections provide a base line in terms 
of the general and administrative context of the country in the early 1930s. While the 
second part focuses on the general picture, marked by political turbulence, the third 
describes the situation of the Brazilian federal public administration that was beginning 
to change. The fourth section focuses on the beginning of the first public management 
policy cycle of the episode that ended with the approval of the 1936 reforms. The fifth 
section describes the contemporaneous events in the political arena that became 
intertwined with the second group of reforms. The sixth part of the chapter deals with 
the second public management policy cycle that led to the establishment of DASP when 
the coup d’etat occurred. The seventh section describes the events immediately 
following the establishment of the new regime, while the last section presents an 
analysis of the episode according to Kingdon’s framework. It provides a modelled 
explanation of a case based on the analytical categories used in all the other cases.
The research questions related to the episode, to be answered in this chapter, were the 
following: a) How did the civil service reform issue reach the governmental agenda 
(El)? b) How was the problem defined by the leading reformer (E2)? c) Why did the 
president support the reforms (E3)? d) What were the main influences that led to the 
setting up of the CFSPC (E3)? e) Why did a second wave of reforms take place (E5 and 
E6)? f) What were the main ideas that influenced the setting up of DASP (E6)? g) How 
can the setting up of a single super-central department be explained (E6)? h) What was 
DASP’s default modus operandi (E7)?
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3.2. Starting a transition between regimes
The “Old Republic” (1989-1930) was characterised by the combination of an ultra-provincial
presidentialism with a federalist provincialism (Abrucio, 1998: 36-7). Federalism111
primarily meant autonomy of the states, not their coalition around a national project or their
11subordination to a national instance of a supra-state Federal Government. The governors 
were the key links at national level for policy and majority coalitions in Congress, and at 
regional and local levels for their relationship with the “colonels”113 and local urban bases. 
As a result of these institutional arrangements, state parties of the most populated provinces 
rarely lost elections and completely dominated their respective regional politics.
The regional political oligarchies governed on the basis of their command over the local 
politics of rural areas (“political localism,”114 intergovernmental patronage, and tight political 
control of voter bases). The period was known as “politics of governors” or “coffee with 
milk”115 because of the effectiveness of the alliance forged by the States of Sao Paulo 
(coffee) and Minas Gerais (milk), which had the strength to control Congress. Clientelism 
continued to be the key political task during the Republic, as it was during the monarchy. Not 
surprisingly, even the so-called reformers could not resist its appeal, given its embeddedness
111 There was a clear hierarchy among the states and an informal — but effective -  agreement as to the internal 
control o f state politics by their own regional elite without federal interference. The state republican parties 
were political monopolies that never lost elections (Lamounier, 1999). There were no nationwide parties, and 
coalitions in Congress were built on the basis o f regional alliances.
112 The state governors had two instruments to strengthen their power, the regional security forces and 
appointed positions. In fact, the entire public sector except the army was controlled through appointed positions.
113 The term “coronelismo” [“colonelism”] expressed “the political dominance of the landowners and their 
allies, so-called because major landowners had historically been granted the rank of colonel in the National 
Guard (during the Empire, which lasted from 1821-1899). Coronelismo expressed a “distinctive pact” 
(Cammack, 1985: 55) by which local bosses supported state or federal candidates in exchange for appointments 
for provincial allies and resources allocated to that region.
114 Page (1991) defined political localism “as the influence that political elite have in national decision-making 
arenas so far as these affect the locality”.
115 The change to the Republican in 1889 gave the states almost dictatorial executive powers. The incumbent 
governors were named “state presidents”. In Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais the majority parties held power for 
decades.
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and effectiveness as a mechanism for governance (Carvalho, 2000). Since they failed to 
develop alternative forms of institutionalising an impersonal State and played the game 
according to the rules in effect, they sanctioned the perception that the “real and persistent 
function of the State was to provide jobs and distribute positions” (Graham, 1968: 347-8). 
Dominant interests were always protected through the maintenance, reproduction and 
metamorphosis of the clientelist system, which was the main link between State and society.
The basis of the “Old Republic” eroded after World War I, with the emergence of the urban 
classes, the campaign for secret vote, macro- economic policy centralisation, and 
modernisation of the military. The combined impact of crisis (political and economic), class 
conflict (urban classes, meaning workers, middle classes and entrepreneurs) and increasing 
complexity (development of productive forces and the scale of national problems) brought 
about the erosion of the dominant oligarchic system (Skowronek, 1982: 10). Four distinct 
forces undermined the dominant arrangements: corruption under increasing pressure from the 
military forces, the new classes related to the urban and industrialisation processes,116 the 
stock-market crash of 1929,117 and the impact of the new alliances forged among the 
governors of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraiba.118 The conflicts culminated with
116 New social groups were emerging at that time: middle classes (liberal professionals, industrial employees, 
military officials, urban businessmen and tradesmen), urban employees, industrial workers and industrial 
entrepreneurs. Their interests included elements of ideologies from abroad, such as fascism, anarchism, and 
socialism (Faoro, 1959: 247). None of them, however, carried any weight in the dominant rural power coalition.
117 The 1929 stock-market crash dramatically affected the country’s economy, which was based on coffee 
exports. Prices fell sharply after the crash and the international trade market retracted considerably. The impact 
on public finances was dramatic, especially because the public deficits and the maintenance of costly political 
alliances had already taken a heavy toll.
118 The political equilibrium then prevalent began to be broken with the forging o f the Liberal Alliance, a 
coalition between Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and the Northeast. Washington Luis, a politician from Sao 
Paulo and then incumbent President of Brazil, chose Julio Prestes, Governor o f the same State of Sao Paulo, to 
be his candidate as next president, tantamount to declaring him the winner, due to the power of the political 
machines of the oligarchies. That decision caused political collapse of the alliance coalition. Minas Gerais broke 
the stability prevalent until that time in terms o f presidential succession and supported Getulio Vargas as 
candidate. Julio Prestes, the Governor of Sao Paulo, won the election against Vargas, governor o f Rio Grande 
do Sul and candidate o f the Liberal Alliance. The result was contested because of claims o f corruption in the 
election.
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a coup d’etat that placed Getulio Vargas in the Presidency of a Provisional Government, with 
strong military backing.
The Provisional Government’s first concern was to consolidate power. A broad alliance had 
supported Vargas and the immediate task was to accommodate all these political forces. 
After dissolving Congress, the State Legislatures, and Local Councils in November 1930, 
Vargas formalised the Provisional Government and used his powers to strengthen those loyal 
to the national federal executive sphere in the states. Vargas recognised the need “to 
extinguish politics within the military to enable military policies” (Carvalho, 1999). Military 
reforms were systematically and gradually pushed through with a broad range of measures119 
(Camargo, 1999; Carvalho, 1999). Such measures were aimed at creating a modem and 
professional army at the same time that they ensured military loyalty to the president. 
Meanwhile the administration took immediate steps to ingratiate itself with the urban 
working class by creating the Ministry of Labour.
Two years after the Provisional Government was installed, leadership succession problems
190arose in Sao Paulo aggravating regional dissatisfaction with the Federal Government that 
had already weakened the hegemony the most powerful state held over national politics. 
Thanks to the pressure of the liberals, the democratic conquests were materialised in a new 
electoral code121 approved in February 1932,122 followed by the establishment of the electoral
119 The set o f measures included the re-establishment of compulsory military enlistment (which had been 
repealed by the 1891 Constitution), the setting up of special military service for members of the middle class 
and the elite (removing the long-standing feelings of social inferiority by the army, and co-opting from the 
upper classes), the empowerment of the military hierarchy (via strengthening the position of officials and 
holding back promotions from the lower ranks), the discriminatory adoption of elitist recruitment and training 
practices, the re-equipment the national army, and the dismantling of the provincial militia.
20 Four intervenors were successively appointed in less than two years, an indicator of the Federal 
Government’s difficulties in stabilizing the political situation
121 This set o f laws created two important mechanisms to empower the Federal Government: proportional and 
professional representations. The former ensured minority participation in Congress, always a potential ally if a
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10 “Xcourt system and by the convocation of a National Assembly in May. Both manoeuvres 
helped Vargas mitigate Sao Paulo’s broader national political claims and undermine the 
opposition’s potential alliances. Even so, Sao Paulo rebelled in July 1932 with some support 
from high-ranking military officers. Vargas successfully quelled the revolt by claiming that 
Sao Paulo was trying to re-establish its regional hegemony over the country. After two 
months of siege and naval blockage, the so-called Constitutional Revolution was defeated 
with the decisive support of middle-rank officials at the expense of the commitment to 
convoke a National Constituent Assembly and re-establish democracy.
Vargas had successfully surrounded himself with close allies after the purges and 
promotions124 that followed the 1930 Revolution and the 1932 rebellion in Sao Paulo. 
Military loyalty proved to be decisive in supporting Vargas’s transition to a constitutional 
government. The military leaders’ strategy of holding a monopoly on the military force 
matched Vargas’s political project of a strong centralised Federal Government. Another 
decisive source of support was the political representation of the recently established 
corporatist sectors (labour unions, production associations, liberal federations, pension 
institutes and others). Corporatism was another face of the emergent rational and 
administrative State, set up to deal with the uncertainty derived from social conflicts and
regional government controlled comes under the control o f opposition forces. The latter introduced a quota of 
deputies per professional category, a corporatist representation inspired on fascist models.
122 The conquests in terms of democracy were impressive: secret vote, extension of suffrage to women and 
adults age 18 and over, and of an Electoral Court System. However, illiterates were not allowed to vote (Bettel, 
1994:7).
123 The Electoral Code was established by Decree 21076, 24 February 1932, and the Regional Offices by Decree 
21371,6 May 1932.
124 “By the end o f 1933, 36 of the 40 generals in active duty had been promoted to that rank by the new 
government” (Fausto, 1972: 211).
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political instability (Nunes, 1997: 36-39). It became the mechanism forged by the State to 
control and regulate labour and capital relationships.125
Vargas was chosen president for a four-year term, scheduled to end in January 1938, after 
which time presidents would be elected directly. The National Constituent Assembly (15 
November 1933 to 16 July 1934) declared itself the first Chamber of Deputies with powers to 
choose the president by indirect election. In July 1934 the new Constitution was approved, 
based on Germany’s Weimar Constitution (Fausto, 1972: 206).
The new Brazilian political map incorporated two further novelties in Brazilian politics:
\* J ( \  197organised leftist and rightist movements: “the first national political movements with 
sharply ideological orientation” (Skidmore, 1967: 21). While “the left tended to associate 
liberalism with the oligarchies” and did not hide its disdain for formal representative 
democratic procedures (Fausto, 1972: 210), the right was supportive of a “conservative 
modernisation” view, centred on centralised authoritarian state interventionism.
3.3 Dealing with a fragmented State
The Brazilian national State was not a concrete entity during the “Old Republic”. The 
country was an archipelago of provinces, and the nation’s capital (Rio de Janeiro) had no real 
influence over the individual states. Nationwide communications systems were minimal and
125 In contrast to universal procedures typical of bureaucratic or market structures, corporatist schemes provided 
co-optation of professional clienteles on normative bases kept under strict State bound control. The detailed 
labour legislation, basically the same then as today, was a hallmark of the Vargas era and provided political 
support and a release for class pressure for decades.
126 A popular front movement -  the National Liberation Alliance (Alian^a Nacional Libertadora - ANL was 
organized under the communist leadership of the charismatic ex-lieutenant Luis Carlos Prestes.
127 A fascist movement based on Italian and German methods of social mobilisation was organized under the 
name o f “Integralismo” at virtually the same time as the ANL.
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regions like the Amazon and the Northeast had very little contact with the South-eastern
190
triangle consisting of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. The military -  the only 
nationwide institution -  had lost political influence since the installation of the Republic. 
Governmental structures were poorly organised and badly equipped to attend to the country’s 
needs. Provincial police forces, such as those subordinated to the governments of Minas 
Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Sao Paulo, were relatively stronger than the federal forces.
Appointed positions, temporary contracts, and provisional jobs had always been important 
currency in political competition throughout Brazilian history. The dominant traditions of the 
Brazilian patrimonial State were characterised by patron sponsorship, management on a case- 
by-case basis, preferential and discriminatory treatment, dominance by the oligarchy, 
inequality, weak capacity for goal accomplishment, personalism, and lack of qualified skills 
and professionalisation (Siegel, 1966: 29).
1Clientelistic practices were the rule. Given the fact that national politics were built upon 
local and regional agreements, the monopoly of the contacts with the external world 
conferred enormous power and prestige to local bosses (Nunes, 1997: 27). Exchange 
relationships between bosses and clientele also included temporal arrangements that involved 
subjective and objective debts from the past, as well as expectations about future behaviour. 
The patterns of personal relationships provided the basis for political loyalty, on which 
mutual and convergent interests made the links of interdependence strong and durable.
128 The military perceived themselves as the only organised force capable of moralising politics representing the 
entire nation, and, most importantly, defending the public interest.
129 Direct personal contact, asymmetric power, informal connections, and interdependence marked the 
relationships between peasants and their landlords. On the one hand the bosses, originally the landowners, held 
command over the resources from which the communities depended, mainly access to the land, the supply of 
different forms of paid work, and the overall stability of the environment. On the other hand, the community 
functioned as a political clientele basis o f power.
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From his very first moment in power Vargas presented himself as an administrative figure. 
He developed an increasing appetite for administrative modelling because he had a very clear 
perception of the political potential of administrative measures. Vargas used the state 
apparatus increasingly and continuously as a platform for expanding and consolidating his 
personal power base. The period from 1930 to 1934 was characterised by the setting up of 
several new organisational bodies within the structures of the new ministries, including
1 TOpension funds by category of workers (Wahrlich, 1983: 16-22). The rhythm of setting up 
and reorganising administrative structures was fast because of the discretionary powers at the 
disposal of the Executive Branch. Modernisation and rationalisation were the leitmotiv of the 
Provisional Government.
The President’s personal office took the first steps towards solving the civil service problem 
during the first year of the Provisional Government. The theme of organising a national civil
1 -5 1
service was already present in the Liberal Alliance Manifesto. Vargas personal files show 
that the president commissioned an investigation on civil servants’ wages as early as 1931 
(CPDOC, 1931). The workforce was classified into three groups according to age: younger 
than twenty, between twenty and forty, and older than forty. In spite of the absence of 
reliable statistics, the report suggested that the public sector workforce be reduced to one 
third of the existing number. The measures taken in order to achieve this goal were mainly 
compulsory retirement and dismissal of civil servants. There was an explicit concern, with 
the need to rejuvenate the public sector workforce. The shortage of resources and the absence 
of a social security system were identified as bottlenecks that blocked an immediate solution 
to the problem.
130 At the end of the Provisional Government there were 176 Pension Institutes organized by labour and capital 
categories.
131 Alian9a Liberal (1930) and Vargas (1938: 33-34).
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The Foreign Affairs Ministry was re-structured via two processes: the absorption of the 
functions of international trade -  previously performed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
-  and professionalisation.132 The Ministry of Finance also underwent a sequence of minor 
reforms that included the setting up of a Treasury Section (in London) and the establishment 
of a Budgeting Commission in the Ministry and Budgeting Sub-commissions in each 
ministry.133 There was a major reform in 1934134 in order to lend consistency to the new 
structures and, particularly, to enable functional specialisation in financial affairs. The 
utilities sector went through a major reformulation as well. Near the end of the Provisional 
Government, Vargas approved the Mines, Water and Forest Codes, another set of major 
reformulations that would stay in place for decades. A great number of administrative 
measures regarding procurement and accounting were also taken at that time.
1A few months after becoming president, Vargas established a Commission on Standards 
and a Central Purchasing Commission137 both being organs of the Ministry of Finance. The 
material and purchasing sector was characterised by the lack of specifications, bidding 
procedures, and regular price quotations. As might be expected this commission faced 
numerous problems, especially in terms of establishing accountable and acceptable 
procedures. The former failed because of its ambitions for excessive specification ambitions. 
The latter achieved importance given its modality and importance for military purposes. In 
1935 it was transformed into a permanent agency, and later absorbed by DASP (Siegel, 1966: 
38-40). The systematisation of procedures for purchasing office supplies was gradually
132 The organisation o f area o f Foreign Affairs on the basis o f merit, was detailed in Decree 19.926 o f 28 April 
1931. Decree 24486, 28 June 1934 created capacity programs for the diplomatic cadres.
133 22060 of 9 November 1932 and 23150 15 October 1933.
134 24036 of 26 March 1934.
135 Decrees 24642 o f 10 July 1934; 24634 o f 10 July 1934 and 23793 o f 23 January 1934, respectively.
136 Decree 19512 o f 20 December 1930.
137 Decrees 19587 of 14 January 1931; 19709 o f 15 February 1931; 19799 of 17 March 1931; 20290 of 12 
August 1931; 20460 of 30 September 1931 and 23 December 1931.
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improved and the levels of corruption and political intrusion were reduced. Vargas’s 
persistence in improving this sensitive area, traditionally marked by corruption, was an 
indicator of his own rational and modem concerns and his sensitivity to military demands.
During the period of the Provisional Government (1930-1934) practically all ministries 
suffered successive waves of organisational reforms but all were implemented without any 
kind of global or coordinated perspective. The intensive administrative activities were 
marked by prolific but, paradoxically, qualitatively insufficient legislation. The number of 
administrative norms was impressive but the number of decrees reveal neither a global 
strategy nor an overall sense of direction (Wahrlich, 1983: 25).
There was no consensus as to the effectiveness of the new legislation, as the successive 
changes in presidential acts revealed. The obvious critics were politicians concerned with 
Vargas’s propensity for resorting to discretionary powers. But the reformist impetus was also 
characterised by a self-defeating perfectionism (Wahrlich, 1983: 65). It endogenously 
generated the need for more legislation, continuous refinements and further reformulation, a 
problem derived from the country’s incipient administrative culture that would become 
worse with time. The successive appeals for reformulations were also an alibi for continuous 
demands for centralised power.
3.4 Initiating a public management policy reform
Vargas resumed his concerns with public administration in February 1935 when his 
administration sent a bill to Congress for a pay-rise for the military. The military continued to 
be key supporters of Vargas’s Presidency, now within a democratic context, in spite of his
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having been elected directly by Congress. Congress returned the bill to the President with 
unexpected modifications in the wages of public functionaries in general. Vargas vetoed the 
new aspects of the bill and approved the law according its original spirit -  basically a matter 
of resources. In it he set up of a Commission of ten members -  five appointed by Congress 
and five appointed by the Executive Branch -  to deal with four themes: taxes, public
1 Wexpenses, national finances and the payroll of both military and civil functionaries.
The law made an explicit reference to the principle of isonomy: the same payment for 
corresponding functions and responsibilities (Wahrlich, 1983: 82). The justifications for the 
veto included concern with finding a way to reduce the number of federal employees 
combined with better wages within career cadres (Vargas, 1935). The 1934 Constitution had 
made general references to the merit system and to the need for a Civil Servants’ Statute in 
its Articles 169 and 170, but none of this was mentioned at that time.
The initial decision to set up a commission having members indicated by the two branches 
was a surprising answer to the problem of military wages because Vargas framed it in 
broader terms and included the problem of public-sector employees in the agenda. He was 
interested not only in the immediate and sensitive problem of the military, but also in the 
need for a long-lasting solution for federal employees. The disorganisation and fragmentation 
of the state apparatus was identified as one of the main difficulties faced by the Presidency in 
managing the State. The political power of the Presidency lacked the corresponding 
governmental structures, as Vargas had already realised.
However, the Commission was unable to reach a consensus on the personnel problem. First, 
there was a sub-commission in charge of this problem, chaired by Mauricio Nabuco
138 Law 51, 4 May 1935.
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(appointed by the Executive Branch), who had been the Foreign Affairs Minister until the
National Constituent Assembly. Nabuco’s perception of the civil service problems was
1deeply affected by the career of his own father, Joaquim Nabuco, who had been a 
champion of the campaign against slavery. Joaquim Nabuco had also been Brazil’s 
Ambassador to the United States, where he became familiar with the increasingly popular 
progressive ideas championed by Woodrow Wilson.
Mauricio Nabuco was bom in London and lived in the United States for five years. Later he 
would be a travelling adviser to Theodore Roosevelt in his trips to Brazil before the First 
World War. Wilson and Roosevelt were central actors in the progressive saga of the US civil 
service. Given his international background as diplomat, Nabuco had also had contact with 
Taylor’s and Willoughby’s ideas in the 1920s (Wahrlich, 1983: 128). His commitment to 
progressive civil service reforms a la Americana in public administration was not new. As a 
polemist and politician he had published articles in the press during the 1920s and his 
performance in the Foreign Affairs Ministry was clearly oriented to pursue a reformist 
agenda. He was responsible for pioneering efforts to consolidate career structures in the 
Foreign Affairs Office, the main reason why he was designed to head the Sub-commission 
set up by Congress in 1935 to deal with federal payroll problems.
Nabuco’s view of administrative reform was also influenced by his own experiences abroad 
as a member of a cosmopolitan elite, as a managerial minister, and as a politician from a one 
of the most patrimonialist and clientelist regions of the country, the Northeast. He did not 
believe that a rupture with the dominant political and social structures was possible. He was 
concerned about the excessive adoption of norms for controlling administrative behaviour. In
139 Nabuco explicitly attributed to his father the pioneering ideas on civil service reforms in Brazil and indeed 
these ideas were present in Joaquim Nabuco’s speeches in the 1870s and 1880s (Wahrlich, 1983:129).
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his view, such a course of action was risky because it was in conflict with the demands of the 
social and political system (Siegel, 1966: 49). A civil service career system would have to be 
set up gradually and progressively. According to his perspective, politicians could not be 
suddenly and completely excluded from the public sector’s personnel arrangements.
The Sub-commission diagnosed a chaotic situation and suggested a consistent course of 
action in order to rationalise the confusing reality of the functionaries at that stage. They 
presented a proposal140 containing three cadres of personnel -  special nature, federal and 
regional -  to be analysed by the whole Commission in September 1935. They opted for a 
classification based on public functionaries (instead of public organisations) and on positions 
(instead of functions) in order to adapt the new legislation to the merit principle established 
by the 1934 Constitution (Art. 170). Payment tables should be realigned according to 
personnel, not organisations. People should be classified according to their positions rather 
than their functions, which tend to vary. Nabuco’s report proposed the adoption of open 
selection processes for public posts and the setting up of a Federal Civil Service Commission 
(CFSPC) to take charge of public competitive selection processes and personnel mobility 
within the public administration.
The Nabuco Report was inspired on scientific management techniques used in the U.S.A. and 
on his own successful passage through the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Nabuco tried to 
accommodate professional values with patronage practices by proposing an objective means 
of selection as a requirement for appointees. Once a person entered the career no more 
intrusions from patronage would be accepted. Nabuco believed that some type of 
accommodation was necessary since, “traditionally, the President of the Republic and
140 Comissao Mista de Reforma Economico-Financeiro.
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Congress co-operated on patronage for their mutual benefit” (Siegel, 1966: 44). His report 
reflected a pragmatic view, with emphasis on accommodation procedures.
The Finance Minister -  from the State of Rio Grande do Sul, as were both Vargas and Lopes 
-  was concerned exclusively with the financial aspects of the proposed career structures. He 
not only vetoed the propositions but also kept them from being published due to the 
increasing pressure from militant civil servant movements and the military. The report was 
rejected and all two thousand copies of the text were destroyed, as instructed by the President 
of the Commission, the Ministry of Finance (Wahrlich, 1983: 94). This censorship was 
considered a scandal and capitalised in Congress by Nabuco, resulting in an embarrassing 
situation for the administration.
The lack of a solution did not make the problem disappear. Another Sub-commission, 
chaired by Jose Bernardino, who had been appointed by Congress, was set up and a new 
report submitted in January 1936. Bernardino adopted a piecemeal approach to the problem 
and submitted each point of Nabuco’s report to the Commission and the President for 
approval. The final result was an inconsistent piece of legislation characterised by amateur 
and poorly written amendments. Economic concerns prevailed over consistency. The 
Bernardino proposal was designed to produce less impact on public finances because it took 
a more restrictive approach towards functionaries hired on provisional bases who had not 
been previously classified. The final solution was ambiguous -  and typical of Brazilian 
politics. Both reports were sent to the President who decided to give a provisional bonus to 
all public functionaries and a long-lasting solution was postponed.
Vargas decided to tackle the problem in this way because he realised that the solution 
adopted was neither conclusive nor sustainable. A new commission was set up -  later known
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as the Re-adjustment Commission entirely appointed by Vargas. The President chose a group 
of direct advisors to formulate a feasible proposal under the coordination of Luiz Simoes 
Lopes.141 Their task was to conciliate the political, finance and administrative needs of the 
interest groups involved in the process. The Re-adjustment Commission adopted a prudent 
approach, submitting three alternative courses of action to the President before detailing the 
corresponding proposal.142 Vargas opted for the most complex alternative, inspired by the 
Nabuco Report but with more pragmatic and economically absorbable transition rules.
Lopes’s relationship with Vargas was quite close, as three episodes will attest. First, Lopes’s 
father -  Ildelfonso Lopes -  was a Congressman and member of the same party as Vargas in 
Rio Grande do Sul. When Vargas moved to Rio de Janeiro to become Finance Minister in 
1926, he called Lopes -  then a young agronomic engineer -  to introduce him into the life in 
the nation’s capital. Second, Ildelfonso Lopes had been the fundraiser for Vargas’s campaign 
for Presidency in 1929-1930. Thirdly, both father and son were involved in an incident in 
Congress when Ildelfonso Lopes killed a Congressman who had attacked his son with a knife 
during a political debate. It turned into a brawl. Lopes was a kind of son to Vargas, who gave 
him the affectionate nickname of “Zinho” in private situations.143
Under the Readjustment Law, civil service was organised as a hybrid mix of position system 
and career system (Wahrlich, 1983). But it also placed the provisional functionaries in a 
special class -  the supernumeraries. Careers were grouped according to the similarity of 
positions and the nature of each job but it did not differentiate degrees of complexity and
141 After the 1930 Revolution Simoes Lopes had served as a trusted advisor of the President in administrative 
matters and frequently travelled abroad, notably to Europe and the U.S.A. Another key member was a young 
lawyer and diplomat -  Briggs -  who had been strongly influenced by Mauricio Nabuco’s ideas in the Foreign 
Office Ministry.
142 The alternatives were: a) a classification of personnel based on payment by function, b) scheduled pay rises 
each five years regardless o f promotions, and c) adoption of a readjustment policy according to a career system 
combined with wages corresponding to functions.
143 “Zinho” is a derivative of Luizinho, a common nickname for Luiz, which was Simoes Lopes first name.
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difficulty, a step that was planned to be taken later. Only seniority and merit were taken into 
account as criteria for promotion within different classes. The new legislation rejected 
Nabuco’s proposal to create a market reserve for positions to be occupied by career civil 
servants and letting all higher positions be occupied by free appointment (including both civil 
servants and political appointees). The multiplication of appointed positions and the high 
value attributed to chief positions did not strengthen the career system. On the contrary, it 
weakened it.
The bill was sent to Congress in August and where approved in October with practically no 
modifications and with a minor presidential veto. The so-called Readjustment Law144 -  as it 
became known -  was the first general classification of positions and salaries in Brazilian 
national civil service and remained in place until I960,145 when it was updated. It also set up 
two types of bodies in charge of implementing the career system: the Federal Civil Service 
Council (CFSPC) -  explicitly inspired on the U.S. model -  and Efficiency Commissions146 in 
all ministries. Vargas was briefed constantly, due to his close relationship with Lopes. 
Meanwhile, a solution for the functionaries who had been hired on provisional bases was 
provided in July, and this facilitated the specification of an alternative147 consensual policy.
Another battle began immediately. The jurisdiction over personnel, organisation and 
questions of methods was not enough to ensure control over the management of human 
resources. Lopes identified a source of distortions in budgeting processes and intrusions in 
personnel management. He set out to change this situation, constituting a series of conflicts
144 Law 284, 28 October 1936.
145 Law 3780, 12 July 1969.
146 The Efficiency Commissions as well as some of DASP’s prerogatives regarding standards were explicit 
influences o f Taylor’s ideas, that had been disseminated in Brazil since 1931 by the Institute of Rational Labour 
Organisation, created specifically for this purpose
147 Decrees 871 and 872, o f 1 June 1936 basically established parameters for hiring and paying functionaries on 
provisional bases.
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that eventually led to a defeat sustained by the Finance Minister regarding the format of the 
budget. Given his close contact with and influence over the President in administrative 
matters, the budget of 1937 was prepared according to Lopes’s view. Each ministry would 
have a limit for expenditures on personnel.
3.5 The “critical years”
On the political front, oscillations on the national level bypassed traditional regional politics 
and ended up being political forces for de-establishment during the fragile Constitutional 
Government. Strikes by workers broke out on the political scene and there were major riots 
on the streets between fascist and anti-fascist groups. Congress, increasingly intimidated by 
political explosions outside the traditional arenas, approved a National Security Law in 
March 1935. The launching of the National Liberation Alliance, a front led by communists 
and radical lieutenants, received widespread popular support that culminated in a reaction by 
the Federal Government. In response to rhetorical excesses claimed for popular insurrection, 
Vargas approved a second National Security Law that allowed the Federal Government to 
repress the movement and suspend its activities. On 1 May Gois Monteiro resigned as 
Minister. The overconfident revolutionary wing of the Brazilian Communist Party opted for 
popular insurrection. The uprising began in the Northeast, but due to poor coordination, the 
Federal Government was alerted and clamped down on the rebellion in Rio de Janeiro. The 
“subversive” threat provided Vargas with a pretext for declaring a state of siege, thus 
demobilising civil society and consolidating the national State through gradual measures to 
centralise power.
122
At the end of 1936 politics as usual seemed to have resumed, with the presidential election -  
scheduled for late 1937 -  on the political horizon. The two main political forces were the 
Brazilian Democratic Union, championed by Sao Paulo State Governor Armando Salles de 
Oliveira, and Jose Americo de Almeida, a former revolutionary of 1930 from the North­
eastern State of Paraiba. The right wing was represented by a third candidate, Plinio Salgado, 
the fascist leader of the Integralists, strengthened by the repression of the communists during 
the two previous years and subtly stimulated by the President. At the time Vargas was 
pursuing a strategy comprised of three simultaneous movements. First, he kept up all 
appearances for the maintenance of the electoral calendar, suggesting that he would support 
Jose Americo de Almeida. Secondly, he isolated and repressed political opponents through 
“surgical” interventions in reluctant states in a move to disarm any potential opposition. 
Thirdly, he consolidated his indispensability and moves that placed him as the natural 
solution above all other political forces in the conflict.
Congress perceived Vargas’s movements and ambitions. For the first time, it turned down a 
request to renew the state of siege in June 1937, already extended four times during 1936 
(Skidmore, 1967: 23). Vargas reacted surprisingly, releasing left-wing political prisoners. 
This was the first act of a well-engineered scheme. In September, right wing fascist officials 
exposed a forged communist plot, known as the Cohen Plan, to the military. The 
denunciation exacerbated the communist threat in the eyes of the military, many politicians, 
and an increasingly frightened middle class. Thanks to this pretext, Vargas was given 
constitutional powers by Congress to suspend political rights. At the same time, the president 
commissioned studies for a new constitution based on the corporatist fascist models of 
Portugal, Italy, Germany, and Poland.
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The situation was mature and the coup d’etat, applied by the president at the final stage of the 
electoral campaign, occurred in November 1937, two months before the scheduled 
presidential election, virtually without resistance. Congress was shut down and the political 
parties were dismantled on the grounds that they were administratively inefficient and that 
there was need for a strong cohesive government to pursue the country’s national objectives. 
The epilogue was the repression of an improvised predominantly “fascist” insurrection in 
May 1938 led by right-wing military groups that resented the demobilisation of their political 
movement with all the others.
Varga’s successful divide-to-rule strategy during the period that ran from 1934 to 1937 was 
complete. The New State was, to a certain extent, a creation of Vargas’s personal political 
genius, even though he borrowed some of his ideas from European authoritarian and fascist 
regimes. A centralised Brazil emerged. During the initial years of the Provisional 
Government the empowerment of a central federal executive was a reaction against the 
corrupt and decentralised Old Republic. In 1937 the justification was the need to improve on 
an inefficient and fragile democracy. The contradictions of the commitments between the 
two main forces responsible for the movement in 1930 -  liberal constitutionalists and 
authoritarian nationalists -  were finally settled with the victory of the latter. The coup put an 
end to one transitional phase and began a new one: the consolidation of a centralised project 
based on social welfare and economic nationalism, under authoritarian tutelage (Skidmore, 
1967: 30-31). During the New State all elections were suppressed and the opposition 
repressed. Vargas became Chief-of-State and its very personification.
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3.6 Moving a step forward: new public sector reforms for a “New State”
The CFSPC148 was responsible for initiating the civil service reform immediately after it was 
set up. It played two central roles: interpretation and application of the Re-adjustment Law -  
related to classification of positions and definition of the corresponding salaries -  and the 
organisation of the national administrative structures. The implementation of a merit system 
began de facto during that period. Twenty open nationwide public competitive selection 
processes were carried out in two years, an impressive performance given the complexity of 
the tasks involved and their innovative character. Promotions were also regulated. 
Performance management was already perceived as a problem of public management. The 
solutions suggested were based on scientific ideas of management, but the systems never 
worked properly because of bureaucratic heterogeneity, excessive formalism and generalised
149resistance.
The Council was directly subordinated to the President, and was located in the building of the 
Presidency. Vargas appointed Lopes president of the CFSPC. Lopes then brought in Briggs, 
another member of the Readjustment Commission, who was a lawyer and diplomat, to be his 
deputy. At the same time, Efficiency Commissions were set up in each ministry, as 
extensions of the Civil Service Commission.
The CFSPC underwent three important innovations during its lifetime. The first was the 
institutionalisation of a personnel system that included open public competitive selection
148 The numbers concerning its activities during the period of its existence -  twenty months -  were impressive: 
20 national public competitive selection processes, 182 meetings, 2966 resolutions, 66 administrative acts, 6116 
justifications and technical notes, and 32 presidential memos (Wahrlich, 1983: 1342-133). A journal was 
published to be a vehicle o f dissemination of reformist ideas, with translations o f international articles, debates, 
jurisprudence on useful information for top officials and a briefing regarding the implementation of the reforms.
149 The cross-fertilisation of scientific management ideas and a tradition of administrative law worsened the 
federal administration’s tendency towards bureaucratisation.
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processes. The second was a job classification plan that introduced a minimum level of 
rationality and consistency to career structures. The third was the development of preliminary 
studies for a welfare institute for public employees.
Two other major contributions also deserve mention. One was the establishment of a merit- 
based personnel system. This measure included a distinct set of rules to deal with temporary 
personnel and the establishment of a welfare system that extended “to temporary personnel 
the benefits of assistance that the State had formerly granted only to titled functionaries”. 
This practice that would become increasingly popular in the future (Siegel, 1966: 53). 
Another initiative of the CFSPC that indicated the importance attributed to the flow of ideas 
was the founding of the “Civil Service Journal”, which quickly became the main vehicle for 
the diffusion of the ideas and achievements of the administrative reform, including 
contributions from foreign sources.
Lopes and Briggs were deeply influenced by Nabuco’s ideas and immediately initiated an 
ambitious technical cooperation program with the United States Government. Groups of 
young professionals were sent to study in the United States, from the moment the CSFC was 
set up. Nabuco’s enthusiasm for the U.S.A. and the ongoing administrative debate during the 
1936-1938 period absorbed his attention completely. There were no doubts as to what other 
country should serve as Brazil’s role model.150
The cooperation program had the objective of training high-ranking Brazilian civil servants 
in public administration techniques. The United States was considered the promised land of 
“administrative continuity”, the impossible dream of this small group of Brazilian reform 
champions. Efficiency was the policy image of American Public Administration (Silva,
150 E1M/RJ/7.
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1938). These programs were institutionalised and the School of Public Affairs at the 
American University, in Washington, D.C., was the main international reference for these 
connections. A human resources policy was formulated and legally approved, and involved 
sending students to the U.S.A. and bringing in American experts.151 Lopes began to monitor 
the ongoing debate about administrative reform in order to catch up with the Americans, but 
also to find opportunities for leapfrogging.
The option for a super central agency organised according to departmental principles did not
1 Osimply fall out of the blue as its juridical weirdness might suggest. There were two sources
of influence that pushed Lopes in the direction he pursued: Willoughby’s ideas and the 
Brownwood Report. Lopes had been influenced by the thinking of Willoughby -  an 
important participant in the discussions on budgeting reforms almost two decades earlier. 
Willoughby believed in administrative principles that could be applied universally. He 
developed his ideas in one of his most influential books Principles o f Public Administration, 
which treated of the importance of specialising functions by creating departments. In the 
U.S.A. the Executive Branch was conceived as an administrative instance while the 
Legislative branch was designed to be the political instance of government. In order to 
perform his functions, the chief executive -  the President -  needed the support of a General 
Administration Bureau (Willoughby, 1927) that would be responsible for functions of norms, 
coordination and control.
Departmental principles were already known to most Brazilian government decision-makers 
(important administrative reform had been already carried out in the Ministry of Education
151 E1M/RJ/7.
152 DASP was a strange juridical body operating under a Constitution designed according to continental juridical 
principles adopted by Francisco Campos and explicitly inspired on the models of Italy, Germany and Poland. 
The figure of a “Super Department” did not fit in with a federal administration organized into ministries.
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and Public Health). The scope of the reform was impressive and it was the first case o f the 
application of Willoughby’s “departmental” ideas in Brazil. The reform was extensively 
discussed in Congress, under the command of Minister Gustavo Capanema, an intellectual 
who argued convincingly, based on technical documentation, in favour of the reform 
(Wahrlich, 1983: 168-192). DASP’s intellectual formulators originally expected that the 
super central agency would be an the instrument to free the line ministers from housekeeping 
tasks related to personnel and budgeting (Silva, 1942), a task that the Efficiency 
Commissions were not capable of fulfilling.
Lopes was aware that Roosevelt had set up the Committee on Administrative Management in 
1936 with the explicit mandate to analyse the problems of managing the Executive Branch’s 
administration and issue a report on the reorganisation of this branch, to be submitted to the 
President and to Congress. The Brownlow Report had been commissioned by Roosevelt and 
then sent to Congress in January 1937. The report emphasised aspects such as the importance 
of providing the Presidency with high-level technical support, the need to develop 
managerial capacities over the Executive Branch, the need to strengthen the merit system, the 
urgency of reviewing the fragmentation of executive bodies, and the transformation of the 
controlling body into an ex-post auditor in order to strengthen presidential accountability to 
Congress.
At the same time, the Senate, and later on, the Chamber of Deputies, commissioned the 
Brookings Institution to produce an alternative report -  with a broader scope -  to be used in
153 Wiloughby was explicitly mentioned in the Diario do Poder Legislativo o f 15 December 1935, p. 9041. The 
role of Willoughby’s ideas is especially recognised as being more extensive than the influence of Taylor, 
Weber, and Fayol. Willoughby’s “theory of the general management department” suggested that there should be 
a department responsible for activities related to coordination, control, and norms. This Department o f General 
Administration should not be involved in operational matters and should be positioned close to the top 
authority. Willoughby’s ideas included clear adhesion to the principle o f separation between politics and 
administration, and a strong belief in administrative principles that should be applied on a universal basis 
(Willoughby, 1927).
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an Investigation of the Executive Agencies of Government. The proposals of the Brookings 
Institution154 proved more conservative than those of the Brownlow Report because, while 
the former -  as it had been ordered to do -  produced global analyses of administrative 
organisational matters of executive agencies, the latter focused on strategic elements of 
Presidential engineering.155
When the debate came to Brazil, those involved in monitoring the discussion filtered it to suit 
the country’s political moment. The reform was intended to be the cornerstone of the 
enhancement of the capacities of an increasingly authoritarian State. Meanwhile, in the 
U.S.A., the Brownlow Report suggested that an administrative reform was needed to improve 
the efficiency of the administration to enhance the Presidency and, therefore, to preserve 
democracy (Short, 1938). Incidentally, the report was rejected on the grounds that its 
recommendations risked giving the Presidency dictatorial powers. Both initiatives aimed at 
strengthening the Presidential administrative powers, but for different purposes: authoritarian 
in Brazil and democratic in the U.S.A.
In a few months Lopes arrived at two conclusions: a) a civil service statute was required to 
complement the efforts initiated by the Readjustment Law, and b) there was no way to 
implement a merit-based system founded on principles of rationality without taking into 
account budget limitations. The next move was to search for a policy solution capable of 
overcoming these problems and in line with the President’s political project. Lopes realised
154 Shaffer (1973: 89-92) points out that the Brookings Report provided distinct alternatives to the decision 
makers o f that time: a concern with complexity, a cautious approach to simplistic rationalisations, a more 
gradualist piecemeal perspective (instead of doing things once and for all), and a more pluralist contingent 
orientation. As Clay and Shaffer (1984: 1) later emphasised “here are usually others alternatives over the table; 
there is inevitable required solution. “Different policies could be chosen. There is room for manoeuvre.”
155 For a more detailed analysis o f the contrast between these two reports, see Roberts (1995).
129
that if he wanted to implement a human resources policy he needed powers beyond his 
jurisdiction.
The concept of a central agency oriented towards a combination of personnel, procurement, 
and budgeting matters gradually took shape in Lopes’s mind. But the powers of the Council 
were too limited to carry out the actions Lopes saw as necessary for an effective 
administrative reform. The CFSPC provided a transitional platform for overcoming the 
bottlenecks already diagnosed. Lopes presented a revealing argument regarding the destiny 
of the CFSPC: the overwhelming demand by employees within the context of implementing 
the merit system absorbed the commission’s energy at the expense of its organisational 
functions. A central agency with broader functions -  personnel, organisations, budgeting, and 
procurement -  was required to carry out the tasks demanded by the President. As a result, 
Lopes himself suggested that the CFSPC be replaced by with a central agency invested with 
a broader mandate to implement the administrative reforms he deemed necessary. This 
foregone conclusion led him to fight the Ministry of Finance for the control over the budget 
(initially only expenses on personnel, but later the entire budget). A few months before the 
coup Lopes suggested that the Council be disbanded and replaced by a new agency, with 
empowered functions.
The concept of a central agency had matured enough to be incorporated into the 1937 
Constitution, as the result of Vargas’s coup d’etat. The authoritarian character of the 
constitutional text156 was evident, given the ideological views of its intellectual author, 
Francisco Campos. Campos was committed to designing a National State defined as
156 The 1937 Constitution was labelled “A Polaca” (“The Polack”) because of its authoritarian nature. It was a 
mosaic of foreign influences due to its combination of labour aspects from the Italian Carta del Lavoro, its 
American administrative influences and its anti-liberal biases (clearly inspired on German, Polish and Italian 
experiences).
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authoritarian in order to promote modernisation (Medeiros, 1978). In 1938, DASP was set 
up, consisting of a legal spillover from the prescriptions contained in the 1937 Constitution 
introduced by Lopes.
A powerful and visible institution at the top of the federal administration was set up to pursue 
the policy of structuring a national civil service and a budgeting department. DASP was a 
super central agency directly subordinated to the President that absorbed the functions of the 
CFSPC and was the equivalent of the Office of Management and Budgeting in the U.S.A. 
DASP was given an unprecedented monopoly over policies, an experience that would never 
be repeated.
DASP corresponded extraordinarily with the needs of the moment and with Vargas’s 
ambitions. The project for administrative reform had been increasingly adapted to Vargas’s 
need to consolidate his power. He encouraged the development of a policy solution that 
would empower him in the name of a project to build a National State. The super-agency was 
destined to become the symbol of the Presidency, a policy icon of Vargas’s personal will, 
because DASP concentrated normative, organisational, regulative, executive, and control 
roles without parallel since the Republic was established in 1989.
According of the constitution, DASP consisted of five sectors: organisation; civil servants; 
supernumeraries; training and selection; and procurement and budgeting. By budgeting the 
constitutional text meant drawing up and monitoring the execution of the budget. But it was 
only in 1940 that the Budgeting Commission was set up in the Ministry of Finance,
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subordinated to DASP.157 And only in 1945 was the Division of Budgeting formally installed 
at DASP.158
In November 1937, when Vargas presented the new Constitution, he delivered a revealing 
speech to the nation in which he explained the fundamentals of the “New State”. His 
discourse was straightforward.
“The governmental apparatus established by the 1934 Constitution does not 
suit national imperatives. On the contrary, it constrains the needs of the 
executive administration. State efficiency has been severely inhibited (...) The 
Legislature has proved to be a paralysing force (...) The budgeting process 
has never obeyed the legal deadlines (Vargas, 1937).
The installation of a new governmental apparatus was a policy event, fruit of an incremental 
process geared to imposing a national modernisation and developmental project. In fact, the 
“New State” equated government with administration. It represented a political fusion, 
opposite to the tradition of Wilson’s classical dichotomy. Scientific management was 
adopted as a substitute for politics.
3.7 Taking advantage of the momentum: the aftermath
In his inaugural speech as President of DASP Lopes made three significant statements during 
a brief retrospect of his experience of working with Vargas since the 1920s (Lopes, 1938). 
First he confessed to being an ordinary diligent man, not specially qualified in administrative
157 Decree-law 2026, 21 February 1940.
158 Decree-law 7416, 26 March 1945.
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affairs, in charge of pursuing the President’s will to implant an efficient administration but 
frustrated with the constraints of Brazilian political regimes. Secondly, he recovered the 
gradual cascade of measures since 1936 by setting up a central agency capable of 
empowering the Presidency, which was hampered by democratic constraints and political 
interference. Thirdly, he referred to the course taken from the CFSPC towards DASP as the 
most important pacific revolution that the government had masterminded in order to promote 
an “active” State, which, for him, meant the “New State”.
DASP was designed to be the head of the Ministerial Bureaus of a General Administration 
System. Such a department had existed only in the Ministry of Education and Health, and 
only until 1938. DASP’s modus operandi suggested that all ministries should have a kind of 
standard format, an organisational straightjacket (Wahrlich, 1983: 852). In the period 
between 1938 and 1943 Ministerial Bureaus of General Administration were set up in the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Labour, Justice, and Infrastructure. The 
decentralisation initiatives implemented by DASP were de facto an extension of its oversight 
powers, not an instance of delegation. The Efficiency Commissions and, later, the ministries’ 
General Bureaus were DASP’s eyes and ears, and, by extension, those of Getulio Vargas 
(Siegel, 1964: 319).
The first Civil Servants’ Statute was approved two years after the coup. DASP favoured the 
statutory thesis -  as defended by jurists influenced by French and Italians ideas -  rather than 
the contractual thesis -  presented as a more rigid, individual-rights conception. Admission of 
employees to the public sector should take place through public competitive selection 
process, and promotion should occur according to merit. Retirement should be based on each 
employee’s full current salary. Tenure was guaranteed. In a nutshell, DASP enabled the
133
design of a professional legal framework for Civil Service, although it was not put into 
practice because of the persistence of clientele practices.
Governmental activities were centralised through administrative empowerment in two 
different ways. First, many functions previously performed by the states159 and local 
governments were federalised, i.e. transferred over to federal jurisdiction.160 Regional 
“intervenors” and federal organisations carried out the process of unifying the country 
administratively. DASP took over the administrative functions that supervised the states’ 
administrations. Second, Federal Governmental activity was expanded towards new social 
and economic areas, namely economic infrastructure, social welfare, and labour-union 
organisation (Skidmore, 1967: 33-4). Both movements gave the federal executive 
unprecedented patronage powers in terms of jobs and policy favouritism, given the 
administrative powers centralised in the President’s hands.
According to Lopes, the creation of DASP represented the evolution of administrative 
principles in discussion in the U.S.A. The absorption of the CFSPC and the Permanent 
Standardisation Council161 was regarded as a desirable improvement.162 In view of the delay 
in implementing the Budgeting Division, DASP assumed the role of Civil Service Controller 
(Briggs, 1938). Traces of the British Civil Service were recognised because of Nabuco’s 
influence, although American Civil Service was considered the closest explicit model. 
French and Italian influences could also be identified via constitutional and administrative
159 The important symbolic dimension of the New State was emphasized by a ceremony presided by Vargas at 
which the state flags were burned as a sign of the new times (Skidmore, 1967: 37).
160 The nationalisation of taxes, especially export taxes, was a key change in tax jurisdictions revised by the 
1937 Constitution.
161 Decree-law 579, 10 July 1938.
162 The contrast could not have been more significant. In the U.S.A. the establishment o f a civil service system 
was a direct challenge to patronage to the Jacksonian spoil principles and in order to be successful the reforms 
were historically presented as a democratic conquest — “as a way for the common man to participate in 
government.” (Lutton, 2003: 172).
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law. Similarities with the structure in Germany were seen in the conception of the entire 
structure.
Two other functions attributed to DASP -  to support the analysis of proposals for legislation 
in order to enable presidential decision-making, and to oversee the execution of public 
services -  brought about severe collateral effects that emerged later. The former was, in 
practice, a substitute for a legislature while Congress remained closed by the dictatorship. 
The latter exacerbated DASP’s tendency to control in a closed regime (Wahrlich, 1983: 193). 
DASP’s affinity with Vargas and the authoritarian regime caused inevitable identification of 
the organisation with both the regime and the dictator.
The tendency toward centralisation operated simultaneously with changes in foreign policy. 
The cohesive support of the military forces to the “New State” coup was guaranteed, thanks 
to governmental support of their nationalist objectives of modernisation and even at the 
expense of international financial commitments.163 Brazilian foreign policy had oscillated 
between the U.S.A. and Germany since the early 1930s. The United States filled in the 
vacuum left by the collapse of British hegemony accelerated by the 1929 stock-market crash. 
Great Britain was Brazil’s most important economic international partner after the U.S.A., 
thanks to the ongoing modernisation process of the army. Vargas manoeuvred supporters on 
both sides in order to obtain maximum gain from the country’s option for the U.S.A. at the 
end of the 1930s. The military establishment’s sympathies for Germany, together with the 
ideological affinities between the New State and the nazi-fascist movements in Europe were 
not enough to block Vargas’s choice, in view of his need to eliminate the fascists from the 
political scene.
163 Brazil declared moratorium at the end of 1937 and defaulted on its foreign debts until the beginning o f 1939, 
when economic agreements with the U.S.A. allowed the country to re-establish its international credibility.
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DASP’s role in expanding the State apparatus, especially for purposes of economic 
development, was impressive. The list is self-explanatory. Between 1937164 and 1945 DASP 
participated directly or indirectly in the setting up of councils (National Oil Council in 1938, 
National Economic Mobilisation in 1942, the National Fuel Commission in 1941, and the 
Commission for Industrial Electrical Material in 1944), autonomous government agencies 
(Executive Commission on Fishing, Fruit and Manioc in 1942, Merchant Marine 
Commission in 1941, Amazon Navigation Services in 1940, Port of Para in 1940, Rio de 
Janeiro Port Administration in 1940, National Salt Institute in 1940 and National Pine 
Institute in 1942) and state-owned companies (Departments of Banco do Brasil, such as the 
Agricultural and Industrial Section, and the Export and Import Department in 1941), 
Brazilian Social Security Institute in 1939, Sao Francisco Hydroelectric Company in 1945, 
Cooperative Credit Bank in 1943, Rubber Credit Bank in 1942, Rio Doce Valley Company in 
1942, and National Steel Company in 1942).
The New State generated an administrative machine protected by a reformist rhetoric that, in 
fact, generated a need for continuous expansion on the grounds of its need to control itself. 
The dominant feature of the emerging State was not the growth of a merit-based civil service 
but the multiplication of politically appointed positions and a significant expansion of the so- 
called “supernumeraries,” two clear proofs of the resilience of the patrimonialist State that 
the 1930 revolution was expected to have overcome.
“Avoidance of responsibility, corruption, and inefficiency had continued to be 
endemic in the bureaucracy, in spite of the regulations designed to eliminate 
them” (Geddes, 1994: 52).
164 The External Trade Council (1933), the National Coffee Department (1933), and the Brazilian Lloyd (1937) 
were created before DASP further reorganized by DASP actions and legislation.
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Vargas progressively balanced the exercise of patronage powers to his own benefit with the 
gradual construction of a merit-based bureaucracy, paradoxically also identified with his 
project. But in spite of all rhetoric associated with a progressive administrative reform 
involved in establishing it, only “token efforts were made to set up a career track where merit 
was the basic qualification for entry” (Fausto, 1999: 225).
Brazil’s entry into the war165 triggered a new dynamics within the New State because it 
revealed the contradictions involved in having a semi-fascist dictatorship support the 
Western democracies. The first to be influenced by ideas of democracy were the members of 
the liberal opposition to the regime, such as students and intellectuals. More important, 
however, was how the war affected the military involved in it and in international 
relationships with Brazil’s allies, especially the U.S.A.
Pressured by internal politics and having sided with the allies in Vargas assimilated 
aspirations for re-democratisation and began a new political move aimed at preparing the 
country, as well as his own populist political basis, for the reestablishment of democracy. 
First, the approval of successive pieces of national welfare legislation166 was sure to win 
political support from urban workers. Second, a national labour structure tutored by the State 
was implanted in order to equip "trabalhismo" (labourism) with clientelist powers to win 
over political support and co-opt dissidents. Vargas ensured a successful bureaucratisation of 
the new corporatist structures by institutionalising union dues that would guarantee the new 
labour machines with solid funding. Third, Vargas stimulated the setting up of a labour party
165 More than 20,000 men were sent to the campaign in Italy in June 1944, as members o f the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force. The death in combat of 454 soldiers and contact with high military authorities of the 
Western democracies deeply affected a number of Brazilian officers who were to play leading roles in 
subsequent Brazilian politics.
166 The main measures destined to build Vargas’s populist basis with the working class were the determination 
o f the minimum wage, the establishment of the Labour Court System, the setting up of social security institutes, 
and the approval o f progressive labour legislation.
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based on the political corporatist machine and on the unions dominated by the government, 
whose role was to struggle for economic nationalism and social welfare. When Vargas was 
ousted from power in October 1945 -  in a smooth operation conducted by his military 
ministers -  he had already paved the way for his eventual return, under democracy, five years 
later.
3.8 Explaining the cascade of public management policy changes
Capturing the President’s attention was not a problem for the reformists of that period. The 
concern with administrative reform was already present in Vargas’s speeches during the 1930 
presidential campaign. Since then, the “functionaries’ problem” had already been classed as 
an appealing and sensitive political issue. Vargas’s awareness of progressive public 
administration themes was reiterated in two annual speeches to the nation in 1931 and 1932 
(Vargas, 1931 and 1932). But his ideas about civil service were postponed because of other 
initial priorities pressing for building the State. In many areas there were no organisations or 
public structures to modernise. They had to be set up first. The political instability of the 
Provisional Government also absorbed the President’s attention. The setting up of 
governmental structures, such as in the welfare and commodities areas, absorbed part of the 
President’s attention allocated to administrative matters.
Initially the civil service reform issue rose to the governmental agenda through pressure from 
another pivotal interest group: the military forces. Their demands were presented to the 
Legislative and Executive Branches after the beginning of the new constitutional 
government. The first move to be highlighted was Vargas’s decision to deal simultaneously -
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and in the same political package -  with the military’s demands and the situation of the 
public functionaries. The second move was to search for a solution through a bi-branch 
procedure: a commission formed by persons appointed by the Executive and by the 
Legislature. With this, Vargas achieved three objectives: a) he put problems of the military 
and civil service in the same policy framework, b) he shared the responsibility with Congress 
for finding a solution for the problem, and c) he bought time in terms of financial pressure.
The Bi-branch Commission was the first “issue station” of the personnel management 
problem. The entrance of Nabuco on the political scene marked the opening of a new phase 
in a practically virgin policy arena. He brought new ideas to the discussion and projected an 
image of a policy solution for the problem of the public functionaries. He specified a policy 
proposal that -  in spite of its vagueness -  provided general principles for organising a 
national civil service. Moreover, he fuelled a conflict around possible solutions without 
neglecting pragmatic concerns related to demands of clienteles.
The expansion of the conflict attracted new players and contributed to the re-definition of the 
issue. At the beginning there was only the need to accommodate military demands for better 
wages. Later on, other public employees were included and the discussion of recruitment, 
provisional employment arrangements, job classifications, extension of appointing powers 
and other related themes were brought to the discussions within the bi-branch commissions. 
The debate gained political status. In fact, it made room for policy entrepreneurship in 
defining the problem and formulating policies.
The impasse in the Bi-branch Commission was not necessarily a problem for Vargas. On the 
contrary, the problem returned to him because both the official Bernardino Report and the 
minority Nabuco Report were submitted for his consideration. The main antagonists involved
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in the debate -  Souza Dantas, the Finance Minister, and Mauricio Nabuco, his ex-Foreign 
Affairs Minister -  were both comrades of his. Specification of the policy was within the 
President’s political domain. Therefore, when Vargas decided to take care of the issue at 
Presidential level he had already envisioned the opportunity of opening up discussions 
related to other sorts of demands. The issue had gained critical mass and new policy 
alternatives had been drafted.
The setting up of a new commission subordinated to the Presidency marked a substantial 
change of attitude by the President with respect to the issue. The President had become pro­
active and interested in the specification of a policy solution for the problem. In appointing 
Lopes to chair the new commission, Vargas signalled his personal engagement in the 
process. By bringing in Briggs to participate in the commission, Lopes signalled the option to 
slip Nabuco’s ideas back into the debate.
Lopes’s view of the administrative reform was intimately associated with the need for 
strengthening both the State and the Presidency. He had had contact with the American 
literature on scientific management and saw federal public administration as a unified 
structure. The entire governmental body should be organised following the departmental 
principles of division of labour. Work differentiation should be set up in line with the nature 
of the individual tasks and their level of responsibility. All these concerns reflected the 
influence of ideas that were being discussed in the U.S.A. at that time. The conclusion was 
straightforward: the United States was the country from which to draw lessons with respect 
to civil service reforms.
The decision-making process did not take place at the final stage of the proposal formulation. 
In contrast to his predecessors’ Bi-branch Commission, and influenced by concerns of
legislative politicians, Lopes briefed the President continuously about what was going on. By 
this self-reversed monitoring process, the definition and expansion of the issue were being 
achieved while also incorporating the President’s views and anticipated approval. The 
strategy had four advantages: it involved the President in each stage, it allowed the correction 
of courses of actions with minimal tensions, it incorporated his views along the process, and 
it generated an opportunity for the reformers to gain the President’s support for further 
proposals.
In a well engineered move, the demand for pay rises -  which was the origin of the policy 
process -  was met separately. An across-the-board bonus drained the political pressure that 
surrounded the discussions related to the civil service issue. In splitting issues that had 
initially been linked to one another, Vargas paved the way for a smoother discussion on the 
civil service problem. The proposal passed in Congress with minor modifications.
The policy specification process was influenced by a policy transfer process (Rose, 1993), an 
idea Lopes borrowed from the U.S.A. for the CFSPC. The American model was seen as a 
modem and suitable answer to Brazil’s needs, as opposed to the French alternative, perceived 
as excessively formal.167 The CFSPC provided Lopes with a policy platform to implement 
the Re-adjustment Law through the Council and its instruments -  the Efficiency 
Commissions. The implicit view of the arrangement was systemic, a novelty at the time. It 
was also mutually reinforcing in terms of the centralisation process underway.
The installation of the CFSPC was a step ahead in the agenda-setting process: the issue 
moved from the generalised systemic political agenda to a formal agenda to be “scheduled by 
a policymaking body” (Cobb and Elder, 1983). An institutional platform was set up as a
167 E1H/RJ/33.
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consequence of the momentum generated by the commissions’ work. Personnel management 
would be the object of permanent analysis from that time on. Given the fact that “the scarce 
factor is usually attention” (Simon, 1981: 167), the CFSPC represented the
institutionalisation of an issue that had not yet been properly defined. The initial political 
issue -  pay rises -  evolved into another issue -  job classifications. But the final outcome was 
an even broader civil-service policy.
Lopes evaluated that implementation was problematic because the financial instruments 
required were beyond the CFSPC’s mandate and jurisdiction. The problem of personnel 
management and a career system were diagnosed as inevitably related to the personnel 
budget, until that time under the control of the Ministry of Finance. Empowered by his 
appointment as President of CFSPC and by his physical, political and personal proximity to 
the President, Lopes installed the latent competition problem that had been anticipated in the 
Bi-branch Commission. Control over the budget replaced personnel as his major concern 
because budget control was essential for solving the problems of personnel. Because Vargas, 
Lopes and Dantas were all from Rio Grande do Sul, the competition was kept under Vargas’s 
control, who gradually tipped the balance in favour of Lopes.
An amazing aspect was the fact that Lopes expected to leapfrog the American model by 
setting up DASP, therefore anticipating an administrative proposal that Americans were 
reluctant to adopt. The model adopted by Vargas, after implementing the dictatorship, was 
closer to Willoughby’s concepts than to those of the federal public administration in the 
U.S.A. (Furtado, 1946). But the level of centralisation imposed by DASP had no precedent or 
similarity with the structures of the American administrative State. Nor did Willoughby 
(1927: 54-57) suggest the fusion of the Bureau of the Budget (his main concern) and the
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Civil Service Commission. He also had in mind a bureau of general administration close to 
the Presidency but without executive powers (1927: 52-54). The context of his proposals 
oriented to empower the Presidency was a struggle against the restrictions that Congress 
imposed on expanding executive capabilities.
The influence of the Brownlow Report was also fundamental in the way the reformist elite 
projected an institutional platform for administrative reform. An efficient democracy was the 
broader appeal. The Committee Report’s main argument was that the survival of a modem 
democracy depended on the government’s capacity to promote efficient administration. 
Empowering the presidency, by authority and by advisory means, was considered the best 
way to accomplish that goal. Consent to democracy and good management were the critical 
factors recognised as essential for governmental efficiency. The major recommendations
I z o
were to empower the presidential staff, encourage the merit-based system, and modernise 
the budget system,169 in the best tradition of Luther Gulick and the POSDCORB principle. 
Under DASP’s responsibility the budget was organised in line with this framework.
Concern with the Budget Bureau’s modernisation and staffing was plainly absorbed by 
Vargas. However, he suppressed his being accountable to Congress by establishing a 
dictatorship. Unlike the budget reforms of the 1920s and 1930s in the U.S.A., placing the 
budget under DASP’s jurisdiction meant empowering the Executive at the expense of 
democratic accountability. The new budget system combined the need for a central personnel 
agency and a budget bureau in the same organisational solution -  DASP -  a personal
168 DASP was supposed to be the concrete manifestation of the American ideal, but with two exceptions. First, 
Vargas would encourage the adoption o f the merit system in the period after 1937 but always kept an important 
stock o f positions to be filled directly by the President. Second, he reclassified the holders o f all positions into 
civil servants, a recurrent practice that would continue until the 1980s. Thus, even while this new arrangement 
was being installed, Vargas maintained substantial discretionary powers, centralising and incorporating a legion 
of grateful followers incorporated into the State.
169 “The Bureau o f the Budget was set up as the right arm of the President for the central fiscal management of 
the vast administrative machine (...) .” (Brownlow et ah, 1937: 16).
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1 7 0governmental machine. The identification of the President with the chief of the 
administration was borrowed from United States presidentialism (Briggs, 1941), although 
Vargas removed the democratic dimension of this system.
Brazilian public administration developed on the basis of American administrative theory, 
which was highly prescriptive and, at the same time, emphasised the machine issue-image of 
the state apparatus. The combination of these two elements with the rise of an authoritarian 
project magnified DASP’s hypertrophy (Graham, 1968: 38-41). American public 
administration theories were the main source of policy influence in Brazil, especially
171Willoughby’s General Bureau Theory and Taylor’s Scientific Management ideas.
American experts who visited Brazil in the years that followed the setting up of DASP made 
favourable comments on the reform attempt although usually made caveats regarding the 
implementation of the merit system, the replacement of CFSPC’s collegial decisional style
170 The machine metaphor in the Brownlow report (1937: 3) was explicitly mentioned: “Real efficiency ( ...)  
must be built into the structure of a government just as it is built into a piece of machinery.” By machinery o f  
government the authors meant “the organisation o f those branches of government, and generally national as 
against local government, other than primarily legislative and judicial sections: the structure o f executive 
administration” (Schaffer, 1973: 77).
171 Wahrlich (1983: 290-312) tracked the influence of Taylor’s and Fayol’s ideas in the cascade of policy 
proposals that emerged in the 1930s. Taylorism had arrived in Brazil in the 1920s. In 1931, the Institute for 
Rational Organisation of Work, a think-tank that would diffuse Taylor’s ideas in Brazil, was created. The Civil 
Service Council’s decisions and acts, the Purchasing and Standards Commissions, and DASP’s activities would 
be strongly influenced by concepts such as efficiency and standards, typical of the scientific management 
movement. Fayol’s ideas were basically oriented to private business, in contrast to Willoughby’s concerns with 
public affairs. Fayol prescribed education in administration as an essential requirement for the diffusion o f  
administrative techniques and principles, seen as the main sources of increased productivity. His ideas would 
result in the basic justification for the human resources development functions that DASP would assume and 
carry out in the 1940s. The setting up of the first programs in administration as a degree were explicitly inspired 
on Fayol propositions, as well as on the American and British experiences in the field (Wahrlich, 1983: 298). 
The principles of coordination, unity of command, division of labour, and functional specialisation were 
recurrently evoked in the late 1930s as essential requirements for solving sectored administrative reform 
initiatives.
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with hierarchical departments,172 and the challenge of delegation and decentralisation 
(Reining, 1945).
Public entrepreneurship173 was intensively exercised at the time. By scrutinising the main 
policy events of the period, it was possible to track the policy initiation (Polsby, 1984) 
process of administrative reform in the 1930s. The policy process included specifying policy 
alternatives, gaining adherents to the proposal, building an institutional platform for its 
development, and transforming it into a plausible program.
Multiple overlapping roles were played out during this period, including policy intellectuals, 
policy advocates, policy champions, and policy administrators (Roberts and King, 1996). 
Mauricio Nabuco was the policy intellectual who introduced the new ideas that started the 
process. He also played an important policy advocate role for the public in general. Simoes 
Lopes played a similar role oriented to government’s the internal system, especially the 
Presidency, and advanced the process of designing the proposal. His success in advocating 
and championing the policies adopted by Vargas was decisive. All these roles referred to the 
entrepreneurial activities that enabled the timely combination of political, problem, and 
policy streams.
Many of the new ideas put into practice were not unprecedented. Their origin can be traced 
to the scientific management movement and mainly in United States history. However,
“[T]he newness, or innovativeness, of an idea is defined by the context in 
which the entrepreneur is embedded. (...) A new idea is innovative to the
172 Morstein-Marx, F., 1941.
173 “The key defining characteristics of public sector entrepreneurship are the promotion, adoption and 
implementation o f new combinations of policy, process and/or organisational innovation” (Ioannou, 1992: 166).
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extent that individuals involved in the context perceive it to be” (Roberts,
1992: 57).
In other words, it is the context and the way people embedded in this reality perceived the 
arrival of new proposals that counts.
Public entrepreneurship174 was present virtually during the entire period. Lopes was 
constantly engaged in the search for a design solution for multiple political and 
administrative problems through a variety of angles in the policy process. These activities 
and their insertion modes include establishing the nature of the problem, defining its 
hypothetical causes, borrowing ideas, creating momentum, efficiently platforming, designing 
institutions, employing rhetoric, building coalitions, choosing venues, developing strategies, 
and learning from experience and analysis.
The functional perspective is the object of controversy given the sequence of its stages. 
Policy and political events do not unfold in progressive and synchronised steps. Innovations 
are solutions for problems. In the Brazilian case, however, policy innovation provided 
solutions to the problem and political streams. As Ioannou (1992: 163) observed regarding 
Zambia:
“[T]he absence of effective central political control and coordination -  leading 
to fragmentation and significant departmental autonomy and discretion -  not 
only made public entrepreneurship possible but to some extent necessary” 
(Ioannou, 1992: 163).
174 “The key defining characteristics of public sector entrepreneurship are the promotion, adoption and 
implementation o f new combinations of policy, process and/or organisational innovations” (Ioannou, 1992: 
166).
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The facts about the period from 1930 to 1937 support Ioannou’s assumption that “public 
sector entrepreneurship may be a functional need in fragmented political systems”, another 
complementary explanation for the administrative reform process in the period. Vargas’s and 
Lopes’s efforts were vectors of coordination and centralisation within a context of a seriously 
fragmented country.
Vargas’s charisma (Eisenstadt, 1968) was developed while he managed to overcome 
successive political crises during a period of social instability and the establishment of 
institutions His leadership emerged as a social cohesive factor that lent a personal face to the 
regime during the “New State”. Vargas accumulated multiple personal characteristics that 
included conciliation, mediation, negotiation, pragmatism, and a brilliant capacity for 
calculation. Under his leadership a new political deal was established. A centralist 
nationalised State replaced regionalism as the main dynamic force of Brazil’s political 
organisation (Camargo, 1999).
The setting up of DASP produced intended and unintended consequences. Academic experts 
identified administrative dysfunctions typical of the mechanical view of a closed perspective 
of government -  an intrinsic characteristic of authoritarian regimes -  in its first years of 
existence. Such distortions included excessive formalism, disregard for informal elements of 
Brazilian administrative culture, concentration of attention on means-activities at the expense 
of ends-activities, and lack of flexibility to deal with change processes. DASP was caught in 
the worst situation -  a trap of inflexibility -  because it combined the rigidity of 
administrative law with the mechanical distortions of Taylorism, within the context of an 
authoritarian State where the President had great interest in being involved in daily 
administration.
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Henry Reining -  invited to develop a report on Brazil in 1943 -  observed that the setting up 
of DASP followed Willoughby’s suggestions dating from the period when the Budgeting 
Accounting Act of 1921 was under discussion. The subject was later undertaken in 
Willoughby’s 1927 book on the centralisation of administrative functions in the Bureau of 
General Administration (Reining, 1943). It is interesting to note that while DASP was set up 
as subordinated to the Presidency, the U.S.A. Bureau of the Budget was subordinated to the 
Finance Ministry. Roosevelt only transferred it to the Presidency in September 1939. Lopes 
had intuitively anticipated this move.
Politics at the top might well have played a role in the overwhelming power concentration 
process that DASP triggered off. Speculations about other possible solutions instead of the 
creation of DASP highlighted a political issue: Vargas’s inner circle was short of reliable 
collaborators to take charge of heavy responsibilities (Wahrlich, 1983: 840). Lopes was an 
extension of Vargas’s political power but, unlike other key allies, had no political ambitions. 
The concentration of power in the hands of a person whose unquestioned loyalty favoured 
the concentration of power, roles and attributions in DASP.
Another point is the possible lack of a clear evaluation of themeaning of the connection 
between personnel and budgeting in administrative terms. Given the novelty regarding the 
budgeting debate it is plausible to infer that Vargas and Lopes may have underestimated the 
overwhelming proportions of the super-agency tasks as well as the potential collateral effects 
of such combination on the long run. But DASP was their instrument of political power. It is 
hard to see how they could have avoided the over-centralisation trap under the circumstances.
Finally, in 1937 neither Vargas nor Lopes could anticipate that DASP would eventually 
replace Congress, technically speaking, as the legislative body of the country, subordinated
to the Presidency. “There was more governing to be exercised in regimes that dispense with 
popular consent” (Wahrlich, 1976: 30). The attitude favoured by the 1930 reformers was 
imposition, not guidance or deliberation. Emphasis was placed on control, not on the delivery 
of public services. It is hard to see how DASP could have been saved from its own 
constitutive genes. The authoritarian biases of Lopes’s team were self-serving and, in the 
long-run, self-defeating. The accumulation of roles and the consequences of the 
concentration of authoritative powers generated a deep distrust toward DASP when re- 
democratisation took place in 1945.
3.9 Conclusion
The regime change opened a political window for multiple policy changes -  labour, social 
security, public management and others -  starting with the very installation of the Provisional 
Government. The main changes in public management policy took place during the second 
phase of the broader process of regime change, during Vargas’s Constitutional Government, 
between 1934 and 1937.
The convergence of problem, policy, and political streams opened a window of opportunity 
for successive public management policy changes in 1936 and 1937. In the first round, the 
policy outcome was new legislation followed by the setting up of the CFSPC, an office in 
charge of implementing a civil service reform. In the second case the policy outcome was a 
constitutional provision that foresaw the establishment of a super-agency in charge of 
personnel, budgeting, organisational and procurement matters, and responsible for promoting 
a nationwide authoritarian organisational form of bureaucratic rationalisation.
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The political stream was led by Vargas’s own personal history and gradual commitment to 
Lopes’s proposals. Vargas's own ideas were compatible with the scientific management 
movement and Weberian bureaucratic ethos. His political skills became progressively 
evident, first in piloting a revolutionary movement, secondly in leading a Provisional 
Government, thirdly in serving as an indirectly elected president, and finally, in being self- 
confident enough to be dictator. Step by step, Vargas built his power basis and adopted an 
organisational bureaucratic rationalisation model as a solution for his own problems of 
leadership.
The problem of the military salaries plus the problem of the situation of federal functionaries 
were compelling enough to initiate a career issue throughout the governmental agenda, first 
in Congress and later within the Executive Branch. The former was a strategic interest group 
and the second was a promising constituency. Congress -  the same group of Congressmen 
that participated in the National Constituent Assembly -  was sensitive to the issue because it 
had already been dealt with in the Constitutional text.
The development of the policy proposal that resulted in the introduction of the Re-adjustment 
Law and the setting up of the CFSPC obeyed all the elements mentioned by Kingdom 
technical feasibility, political appeal, suitability to government requirements, and political 
support from the top. The only problematic element was budgetary workability, diluted in 
another time frame in order to be tackled later. Not surprisingly the fight for the control of 
personnel budget became the immediate consequence of the installation of the CFSPC.
The problem was initially defined as a matter of financial resources. Thanks to Lopes’s 
entrepreneurial action the issue was expanded, split, and eventually redefined as the setting 
up of a national civil service. A policy solution for a new problem emerged only to be
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handled by an opportunistic political force. The continuous refinement of the proposals was 
pursued at the same time that Vargas became gradually involved in the process of 
redefinition of the issue. Vargas perceived that the setting up of a national civil service 
converged with his own political purposes, and he backed the idea.
Progressive American public administration ideas were becoming increasingly influential 
among the reformist elite. More surprisingly, the evolution of Brazilian reforms took a route 
grounded on the debate in the late 1930s in the United States, but diverse from the trajectory 
of the Roosevelt administration, strongly influenced by the Brownlow Report. Willoughby 
disappeared in the vast gallery of academics of American public administration, but his ideas 
became the main source of inspiration for Brazilian reformers, who adapted his proposals and 
those presented in the Brownlow Report to Brazil’s context and political moment.
The problem of defining and expanding was processed in a way that made administrative 
reform become the motto of the regime installed in late 1937. The self-denominated “New 
State” represented the decisive rise of administrative reform on the national agenda because 
it was indistinguishable from the regime itself. In fact, administrative reform became the 
Federal Government’s agenda and Vargas became the personification of the State. A 
progressive public administration policy was no longer associated with the improvement of 
democracy, but with an authoritarian instrument. In the future, rather than being remembered 
as a product of democratic politics, it will be remembered as its substitute.
The definition of a policy venue for administrative reform evolved from the program of the 
Liberal Alliance to campaign speeches and to piecemeal executive initiatives in the period 
between 1930 and 1934. In the fragile democratic interval between 1934 and 1937, the 
successive commissions headed by Nabuco, Bernardino, and Lopes would incrementally
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expand the issue. The venue changed in this period from the Executive-Legislative field 
(before 1936) to direct attention, by the executive sphere first informally, and later in 
institutionalised form via the CFSPC. The last policy venue, piloted by a policy entrepreneur 
closely positioned to the president, provided the platform for launching the project of the 
DASP. This new super-agency would be a policy venue, self-sufficient enough to deliver the 
policies that were its raison d’etre.
The policy image of the administrative reform was gradually associated with the main 
strategic goals of Vargas’s political project and personal characteristics. In the first case the 
institutional building of a civil service system enabled the Executive Branch to implement 
policies for modernisation, welfare, and development. In the second dimension, bureaucratic 
insulation was a proper form of representation and projection of his rationalising, 
authoritarian, and controlling tendencies. These contradictory images, intimately associated 
with each other, rendered the distinction between creature and creator impossible, a 
connection that would later explain the success and failure of the 1937 Administrative 
Reform.
Lopes linked the streams throughout the period. He ignited the process and translated 
proposals into policy venues capable of supporting the performance of his entrepreneurial 
roles. He also operated as Vargas’s extension, in close and permanent contact with the 
President’s orientations. The periodical convergence of the problem, policy and political 
streams was recurrently catalysed by his action. He also continuously redefined the issue and 
implementing of a great number of measures consistent with his ultimate goals.
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CHAPTER 4
“The mother-reform of all other reforms”175 
A reform oriented towards national economic development
4.1 Introduction
After thirty years on a long-standing agenda, administrative reform produced results. It was 
the last structural change put forward by General Castelo Branco’s Administration (1964- 
1967), a period marked by impressive macro-economic adjustments and by the launching of 
multiple social welfare initiatives.
On becoming President in April 1964, Castelo Branco listed the priorities that were to be 
immediately pursued by his Extraordinary Minister of Planning and Coordination, Roberto 
Campos. Administrative reform was among his major concerns. Administrative reform was 
seen as a prerequisite for promoting the country’s economic development, although the 
government was aware that it should be carried out in the company of several other important 
economic, social and institutional reforms. Castelo Branco’s initial concerns were vague: the 
re-establishment of administrative morality, the modernisation of instruments of bureaucracy, 
and the implementation of planning techniques.
175 The expression was created by Beltrao to designate the reform of 1967, after he became Minister of Planning 
and Coordination in March 1967.
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It took three years to transform the President’s priority into reality. In February 1967, two 
weeks before transferring power to his successor General Costa e Silva, Castelo Branco 
included in the 1967 Constitutional text and in Decree-Laws 199 and 200, one of the most 
important, widest, and most comprehensive public management reforms that Brazil had seen 
in the twentieth century.
17The 1967 reform was the outcome of “a long-term collective enterprise” and a rare 
combination of policy talents and political leadership during a period marked by economic 
difficulties, political turbulence, and increasing military radicalisation. The comprehensive 
character of the reform could be seen through the incorporation of a significant number of 
nested sub-areas of the public management policy. There were contributions from the most 
outstanding experts who had been engaged in reform attempts since the late 1930s. A 
subdued Congress approved the new constitutional text as well as the decrees that regulated 
the new constitutional provisions.
The starting point of the process was an inherited administrative reform proposal that had 
been sent to Congress by the preceding (and deposed) President. The issue was initially 
approached via a high-profile commission of experts appointed by the President to work 
under the coordination of the Extraordinary Ministry of Planning. The participants were 
chosen by the President himself,177 who also personally monitored the evolution of the 
process, in a frequently disperse, confused, and tense environment. After an intense period of 
exhausting debates and persistent conflict, the outcome was a stalemate. Political instability 
made things worse, and the issue was left aside for some time. Definitions at the leadership 
succession level retrieved the stability required to resume the project. A key member of the
176 E1H/RJ/67.
177 E1H/RJ/67.
154
earlier commission -  Dias -  took up the challenge and finalised the policy formulation 
process. A comprehensive policy proposal was assembled, packaged, and submitted to the 
scrutiny of politicians, military officials and international experts. President Castelo Branco 
had the final word on sensitive problems where consensus had not been reached and 
impasses were established.
The policy outcomes of the 1967 reform were the institutionalisation of planning, budgeting, 
coordination, delegation, and control principles organised under innovative institutional 
arrangements. Core executive capabilities were enhanced in a completely different way from 
what had been done before. The range of public management policy changes was impressive 
because it covered a vast number of areas such as planning, budgeting, control, auditing, civil 
service labour relations, organisational design, and procurement. Decree-law 199 completely 
redefined the modus operandi of controlling activities within the Federal Government. 
Decree-law 200 marked the evolution of the Brazilian public sector apparatus for the next 
two decades, until the re-democratisation of the country.
This chapter is divided into five parts, plus this introduction and the conclusion. Diagram 2 
provides a global view of the narrative of the process. The episode under analysis is found 
within the time frame marked by the beginning of the second period (1964-1965) and the 
conclusion of the third period (1965-1967). The first part (1963-1964) comprises the final 
year of Goulart’s Presidency, after a national plebiscite that ended the fragile parliamentary 
experiment and re-established full presidential powers. The second part (1964-1965) began 
with the military coup d’etat and ended with the impasses within the commission in charge of 
the administrative reform -  known as the Commission for Administrative Reform Studies 
(COMESTRA). The third part (1965-1966) refers to contemporaneous events that played a
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decisive role in the political arena and later on generated the conditions necessary for the 
policy specification process to be resumed. The fourth part began with the setting up of an 
organ called the Administrative Reform Advisory Unit (ASESTRA), to take up once again 
the discussion of the reform after the military radicalisation, triggered by the elections for 
state governors. It ended with the promulgation of the 1967 Constitution, and Decree-laws 
199 and 200. The fifth period runs from Costa e Silva’s inauguration until Beltrao’s
178resignation from his post as Minister of Planning, when Medici was organising his cabinet. 
The conclusion analyses the episode in the light of the research questions listed below.
The main questions specifically related to the episode to be answered in this chapter are: a) 
Why was the previous proposal initially rejected? (El -  I), b) How did the issue reached the 
decisional executive agenda so quickly? (El -  I), c) Why did the policy outcome of the 
experts’ commission end in a frustrating deadlock? (E3 -  II), d) What explains the 
widespread policy solution placed in the Constitutional text and in Decree-laws 199 and 200? 
(E2 -  III), e) Why was the problem of control tackled within the context of the reform 
package? (E -  III), and f) Why was the setting up of a Senior Corps watered down in the final 
format of the policy proposal? (E 3 -  III).
178 Medici was named President by the Military Junta to replace Costa e Silva in October 1969. The Junta 
governed the country between Costa e Silva's departure from power due to a stroke, in August 1969, until 
Medici’s inauguration in January 1970.
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4.2. Engendering public management reforms in a regime change juncture
4.2.1. An administrative reform proposal in waiting
Administrative reform was on the governmental agenda when the military seized power in 
March 1964. The Extraordinary Ministry of Administrative Reform179 had drafted a twenty- 
volume report -  the Peixoto Report180 -  under the intellectual leadership of Lopes’ team. It 
was written basically by Benedito Silva and Jose Arantes, and was designed to be the 
baseline of a broad administrative reform. The previous administration had sent a proposal to 
Congress in November 1963. The main implicit objective of Peixoto’s selection had been to 
provide the Goulart Administration with political stability through the co-optation of his 
party -  the largest in Congress -  via the debate over the required New State structure.
The administrative reform issue did not fall out of the blue. Previous attempts at reform had 
occurred in 1953 and 1956, but without conclusive results. When Vargas returned to power 
in 1951, Lopes and his team tried to revamp DASP and update the public sector’s structures 
and legislation. A new Civil Servants’ Statute was approved in 1952 and an administrative 
reform bill was sent to Congress in August 1953. But it was engulfed by the political crisis
that led to Vargas’s suicide. A few years later, President Kubitschek (1956-1961) set up the
181 182 Commission for the Simplification of Bureaucracy (COSB) under the supervision of
179 Two important new aspects regarding the cabinet had been introduced during Goulart’s Administration: the 
Ministries without Portfolio of Planning, and Administrative Reform. Goulart created both ministries as 
extraordinary ministries -  without portfolio -  in order to presciently obtain authorisation from Congress.
180 Amaral Peixoto -  Vargas’s son-in-law -  had been intervenor in the State of Rio de Janeiro during the New 
State and one o f the main PSD bosses, the decisive party partner in the weak governmental coalition.
181 Decree-law 39510,4 July 1954.
182 COSB was instructed to provide a report in two months to back up the President’s acts in this area. The way 
the problem was perceived and diagnosed at that time pointed to over-bureaucratisation as the key issue. 
Delegation o f responsibilities and simplification o f routines were identified as the appealing remedies, thanks to 
the participation of a young public executive champion -  Helio Beltrao -  who was eventually to become a 
leading reformer.
158
DASP. It was later followed by the Commission for Administrative Studies and Projects
1 8 ^  1 Q1(CEPA). CEPA's report highlighted the need for strengthening executive coordination
by decongesting the Presidency, an essential step in institutionalising new planning and 
budgeting practices, in grouping functions and simplifying structures (Beltrao, 1969).
Kubitschek’s attention was focused on the Plan of Goals, however. COSB and CEP A were 
quickly set aside on “timing” grounds. CEPA’s report was sent to the President only at the
1KSend of his term of office. The Plan of Goals signalled a clear set of priorities aimed at
accelerating industrialisation through substantial investments in infrastructure and
consumption industries. He therefore opted for an ingenious “escapist” strategy: government
through “bypassing”. His resource to “executive groups” (Motta, 1968) was part of an
evasive manoeuvre. These groups were especially set up to overcome the increasing inertia
of a public sector characterised by ossification and a lack of dynamism, and to avoid the
186political controls and constraints typical of direct administrations. CEPA’s conclusions
183 CEPA was presided by Simoes Lopes, then president of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. Other important 
members included Benedito Silva (Lopes’s right-hand man), Roberto Campos, Octavio Bulhdes (future 
Minister o f Finance under Castelo Branco), Carlos Medeiros da Silva (Castelo Branco’s future Minister of  
Justice), Moacyr Biggs (who had been president of the Federal Civil Service Council in 1936), Mauricio 
Nabuco (one of the early reformers in the 1930s) and others. CEPA’s main suggestions included the 
systematisation of data to improve research in the conduction of public affairs, measures to ensure coordination 
of the President’s policies, identification o f ways to reduce waste and inefficient practices, and development of 
studies to orient the initiation of the public sector reforms (Dias, 1968).
184 CEPA's report comprised four volumes: Re-organisation of the Presidency, New Ministries, Budgeting and 
Financial Execution, and Summary (CEPA, 1960).
185 The Plan o f Goals was a developmental plan formulated by team of young economists championed by 
Campos. It was much more appealing to Kubitschek because it could provide timely effective political and 
economic results. Typical critiques of government structures at that time (1950s) were their lack of concern for 
performance; their orientation towards means and procedures; their penchant for rule and norms; and their 
disregard for enforcement of rules (Campos, 1988: 205).
186 Parallelism, fragmentation, and autonomy were the typical features o f the organisations that began to 
multiply during that period. SOEs became the government’s favourite form of operation. Their responsibilities 
and budgets were frequently much more important than those of their parental ministries. They were functional 
because of the lack o f control and interference, justified in terms o f the need for flexibility in the decision­
making processes. They were thus different from rigid, old-fashioned bureaucracies. SOEs provided ways of 
channelling and catalysing demands from entrepreneurial industrialist groups, guaranteeing quick decision­
making processes with the participation of the President (but not of Congress), and effective implementation 
through means other than the transmission belt o f conventional governmental hierarchy. A parallel 
administration was established that bypassed hierarchical structures and process-oriented behaviours.
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1 2 7were ignored. Great numbers of appointments were made, powers were granted to 
presidential advisors and executives of task forces, and open public competitive selection 
processes were abandoned.188
The Amaral Peixoto Commission,189 as it became known, produced an extensive diagnosis190 
that was sent to Congress at the end of 1963. The main points of the report were the 
reinforcement of the need for a general law on the design and modus operandi of the state 
apparatus, a council to be set up with the explicit mandate to protect the merit system, 
administrative guidelines for the Federal District, and new rules for the purchase and supply 
of materials. The words of Peixoto, on the occasion of his sending his bill to Congress, 
revealed nostalgia of DASP’s days of glory and traces of Lopes’s generation of reformers.
“It is relevant to emphasise that, until 1945, the Brazilian Civil Service was in 
a better situation and a step further ahead than it is now. If we had persisted 
along the path of those previous years (1937-1945) we would now be able to 
support and facilitate national development” (Peixoto, 1963: 4).
The report proposed a reform based on general principles191 but without substantial 
innovations.192 There was no significant change in the reform strategy in spite of all the
187 CEPA recommended the setting up Central o f the Planning Department, located at the Presidency (Monteiro 
and Cunha, 1974: 21).
188 At the end of his administration, Kubitschek approved legislation -  Law 3780, 12 July 1960 -  that 
eliminated the distinctions between permanent civil servants and provisional functionaries and extended civil 
servants’ rights to all “supernumeraries”.
189 Peixoto set up of twenty-three work groups that mobilized more than two hundred civil servants, appointed 
officials, experts, and politicians -  a strategy that Alves would reproduce in 1985. In doing so, he expected to 
legitimate the report’s conclusions and recommendations via participation of all relevant actors potentially 
interested in the issue.
190 The Amaral Peixoto Report contained twenty volumes but was not in the format of a bill o f law.
191 The general guidelines included the institutionalisation o f departments, restrictions to opening appointed 
positions, delegation and decentralisation of executive functions, centralisation of control functions, 
management by guidelines, unified and centralised command, restrictions to “agencification”, simplicity, and 
the adoption o f practices based on planning, research and control methods (Peixoto, 1963).
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previous failures that resulted from persisting in the formula of DASP (Wahrlich, 1993). It 
focused essentially on structures, an approach already perceived at that time as being 
obsolete, insufficient, and below the point of a substantial administrative reform 
(Nascimento, 1966). The reform addressed neither decentralisation, delegation, or the 
enforcement problems that had worsened after the capital was moved from Rio de Janeiro to
1QTBrasilia (Unknown, 1963). But the main critique was that Peixoto intended to take 
advantage of the opportunity to present himself as a presidential candidate instead of 
delivering timely results to support Goulart.
4.2.2. The rise of planning
Most of Castelo Branco’s reformist impetus194 derived from Campos’s strategic195 presence 
in the administration. The choice of the Minister of Planning and Coordination became the
192 The Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) was the locus where the “daspian” elite came together between the 
1940s and 1960s (Wahrlich, 1993).
193 The critics (Unknown, 1963) mentioned that Peixoto adopted a traditional approach to the administrative 
reform that had also “transferred” the problems of the Federal Administration from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia, 
making them even worse because of the lack of structure in the new city.
194 On the economic front the most important pieces o f new legislation included the modernisation of the 
income tax system, the emission of guaranteed treasury papers, the Industrial Action Law, the loosening of the 
regulations in Law 4357, that determined procedures for sending profits abroad, and the bank reform called for 
in Law 4595, 31 December 1964, which also created the Central Bank. In the social welfare sector there was 
also intensive legislative activism that included the establishment o f the National Housing Bank, the setting up 
of the Education Wage, the Tenant Law, the Estates Law, and the Land Statute (this latter being meant to 
stimulate land reform).
195 Campos’s first job abroad was in Washington where he joined the Brazilian team at the Breton Woods 
Conference. He had taken his master’s degree in economics at George Washington University in the post-war 
period and worked until 1949 with the Brazilian Mission at the United Nations. In June 1951 he was appointed 
economic advisor to the joint Brazil-United States Commission, where he worked under Simdes Lopes’s 
supervision. A year later he became the Economics Director at the recently created National Bank o f Economic 
Development (BNDE). In 1958 Campos assumed the presidency of BNDE and worked on the Monetary 
Stabilisation Plan. In mid-1959 he resigned because of JK’s decision to break off negotiations with the IMF. He 
then taught at the Federal University o f Rio de Janeiro and worked for a private consultancy group. At the 
beginning of Goulart’s parliamentary administration he was invited to go to Washington as Brazilian 
Ambassador. In late 1963 Campos resigned from his position, tired o f sustaining positions inconsistent with 
Goulart’s Presidency (Perez, 1999: 263-265).
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most important civil choice in the cabinet in spite of the political sensitivity involving his 
name.
Roberto Campos was particularly suspect by the nationalist military hardliners who 
supported the coup. When he left the Kubitschek Administration because of the President’s 
populism he was labelled Bob Fields -  a literal English translation of his name -  as a form of 
identifying his positions with the IMF and other international investment interests. 
Immediately after leaving BNDES he joined up with Jorge Flores in a consultancy firm that 
worked on infrastructure projects, Flores was a close friend of Simoes Lopes and an 
important articulator of the coup d’etat. Flores was one of the persons most responsible for 
suggesting Roberto Campos’s name to Castelo Branco, and was later invited to join 
COMESTRA.196
The reasons behind choosing Campos were fourfold. First, Campos was a champion of 
liberal developmental ideas identified with the emerging winning coalition. Second, he had 
the expertise and contacts necessary for the required economic stabilisation process. Third, 
Castelo Branco’s own personal beliefs and values matched those of Campos. Fourth, 
Campos197 was a close colleague of the Finance Minister, Bulhoes. When the latter was
-I QO
informed that Campos was to be named Minister of Planning , he suspended his objections 
against setting up the ministry. These two men had worked together at CEPA and shared the 
same political and policy ideas.
196 E3M/Br/19.
197 Roberto Campos told Castelo Branco that he had already left the government three times, under Vargas, 
Kubitschek and Goulart, because of his personal convictions. He had also previously pursued austerity policies 
under adverse political conditions (Bieslschowsky, 1988: 284).
198 Campos saw no intrinsic opposition between planning and liberal developmentalism. He explicitly 
mentioned in later texts that excessive interventionism occurred not because o f the planners, but despite them 
(Campos and Simonsen, 1976: 47).
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Campos199 conditioned his acceptance of the job to the institutionalisation of a Ministry of 
Planning. From that moment until the end of Castelo Branco’s term of office, the 
Extraordinary Ministry of Planning was the administration’s policy platform set up to tackle 
multiple challenges in the economic, administrative, and social spheres. Administrative 
reform was perceived as the best way to pursue the institutionalisation of planning. Campos 
was far from being a supporter of big government. However, he was determined to 
strengthen the coordination capabilities of the Executive, combining the two policy areas -  
planning and public administration -  in a single broad formulation. Nevertheless, when he 
began did not have a detailed proposal.
Historically, the administrative and planning areas had been incubated within DASP until 
their nested developments led to their separation. The institutionalisation of these two areas 
exposed DASP’s shortcomings and obsolescence, and gave birth to two intertwined issues 
under new jurisdictions. The planning area had been latent since the early 1950s (Daland, 
1967; Lafer, 1970). The third of a succession of U.S. missions to Brazil had evolved towards 
a more precise diagnosis of the country’s development bottlenecks. A manifesto issued by 
the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAD)200 agreed with 
and reiterated the claim that planning was required for a developmental policy based on 
industrialisation. Planning was the strategy to be adopted to focus on "germinal points" 
that should be tackled (Perez, 1999: 98). On the one hand the setting up of the new Ministry 
of Planning -  which was also responsible for administrative reform matters -  revealed a
199 Roberto Campos acquired a kind of Prime-minister status, according to both supporters and critics of the 
Castelo Branco Administration.
200 The intellectual role structuralism played in Latin America was similar to that played by Keynesianism in 
developed countries at that time (Campos, 1994: 242).
201 The concepts of “germinal points”, and the main principles to back up the Plan o f Goals, came from 
suggestions by the Brazil-U.S.A. Parity Commission.
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different way of dealing with public administration, planning and budgeting issues. On the 
other, it was a symptom of DASP’s failure to carry out its core coordination functions.
4.2.3. The military turn
The military’s rise to power was not a surprise. On the contrary, it was the result of a long­
term process dating from the Vargas period. Brazil’s involvement in World War II had 
changed the military’s perception of their role in national politics, thanks especially to the 
close economic, political, and military relationships established with the U.S.A. The concept 
of national security replaced the notion of national defence within the context of the Cold 
War. An international formulation emerged: the Doctrine of National Security (Comblin, 
1978). The locus of the ideology of indoctrination202 was the War School (ESG), founded in 
1949 by military officers who had been among the Brazilian forces fighting with the allies in 
Italy during World War II. Castelo Branco was the professional strategist as well as the 
natural leader of the Sorbonne military faction,204 given his leadership skills, widespread 
recognition among the military, and professional reputation.
The military gradually designed their new national development project between the late 
1940s and the early 1960s. The ESG fulfilled two roles at this period. First, it supported the 
formulation of the National Security Doctrine. Second, it enabled the circulation of a civilian
202 The military doctrines were proclaimed as apolitical but, in fact, they seemingly despised politics. The 
military saw themselves as a cohesive organic solution for the nation’s problems. Their notion of political 
conflict and party dynamics were identified as damaging to the country’s interests and the unfolding conclusion 
was that national objectives could not and should not be subject to democratic politics (Dreifuss and Dulci: 
1983: 91).
203 Castelo Branco had studied at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in France -  thus, the label “Sorbonne” -  and 
at Fort Leavenworth in U.S.A. He had also fought in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy.
204 Stephan (1971: 237-240) identified certain common features shared by the senior officers that made up the 
Sorbonne group: studies abroad, teachers at the War School, combat in World War II in Italy, and members of  
the leading technology sectors of the military forces.
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elite in a military school aimed at training top officers. Frequent debates were sponsored with 
military and non-military experts invited to discuss national development perspectives, 
governmental priorities, and needed reforms. The result was a shared knowledge basis and 
vision of the main problems to be tackled by the government, beyond the ordinary military 
rhetoric.206
The relationships between the military intelligentsia and the civilian elite opposed to Goulart 
were established via the work of think tanks (Dreifuss, 1981) organised by the business elite 
worried about the risk of a pro-communist coup d’etat. Many businessmen and their 
professional organisations sponsored these think tanks, although some projects received 
foreign (mainly American) funding as well.
707By March 1964 there was no longer any room for a civil solution, as there had been in the 
political crises of 1954, 1955, and 1961. The military as an organisation capable of 
performing a self-fulfilling protagonist role was poised to seize power. “The succession 
belonged to the military” (Skidmore, 1988: 19). The military uprising took place on 31 
March 1964 in what they called a pre-emptive move. The President was peacefully deposed, 
practically without resistance after long and complex negotiations. The military rebelled 
against the constitutional government on the grounds that there was need to contain 
communism, fight corruption,208 eliminate populist practices, and maintain the military 
hierarchy.
205 Castelo Branco was introduced to Roberto Campos on one o f these occasions (E3M/Br/19).
206 The military rhetoric targets expressed middle-class aspirations. It included claims such as tackling 
corruption, curbing clientelism, promoting economic growth, modernizing the country, guaranteeing public 
order, and preserving a professional military.
207 “Goulart’s ouster was first and foremost a military operation” (Skidmore, 1988: 17).
208 The National Security Doctrine included strong antagonism towards the amoral familism (Banfield, 1967) 
typical o f societies dominated by clientelistic and patronage practices (Coelho, 2000:180-1).
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Castelo Branco emerged as the consensual solution from within the military and civilian 
forces that brought down Goulart. However, an unstable element -  Castelo Branco’s Minister 
of War -  was present in his administration from the start because an improvised uprising of 
hardliners in Minas Gerais had precipitated the coup. As a result, power became fragmented 
and divided among the military forces represented by the Revolutionary Command209 of the 
three military corporations, the Presidency, and Congress.
The ministerial coalition included conservative politicians, military factions, and maverick 
technocrats. Castelo Branco’s cabinet included ministers with much more political support,
910governmental experience, and military background than himself. The President saw the 
military intervention as temporary, with a Congress that was intimidated but still active. 
After the coup the military promulgated an Institutional Act211 that granted the Executive 
exceptional powers in order to dissolve the political deadlock. Even so, the support of 
Congress had to be negotiated daily for each decision and legislation, partly because the 
President consistently refused to invest himself with full dictatorial powers (Skidmore, 1988; 
Vianna Filho, 1975) in spite of the exceptional authority granted to him by the Institutional 
Act, which gave the new regime legal coverage.
In March 1964 Castelo Branco had brought together three convergent vectors of Brazilian 
politics. He was the natural authority of the military, he was the leading military official who
209 The Revolutionary Command consisted of the top officials o f the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. A key 
circumstantial event on the day after the coup was Costa e Silva’s self-appointment as the Army’s 
representative, on seniority grounds. From the very beginning of the new regime he positioned himself 
successfully as Castelo Branco’s successor and the guardian of unity among the military forces, with the 
support of hardliners.
210 The ministers in Castelo Branco’s Administration were qualified as high-profile, technical and centrist. They 
all had a level o f delegation unique in the Brazilian history because o f the way Castelo Branco delegated powers 
without giving up authority and because of their own policies capabilities (Schmitter, 1971).
"" Congress’s efforts to keep constitutional legality were aborted by Institutional Act No. 1 (AI-1), issued by 
the Supreme Revolutionary Command, consisting of the heads of the three armed forces (Army, Navy and air 
Force) plus the Chief o f Staff.
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had contributed to the Peixoto Report, and he was also deeply engaged in the debate about 
the country’s macro-economic stabilisation, given his connections with the think tanks that 
had provided ideological support for the coup d’etat.
4.3. A reform surrounded by high expectations
4.3.1. Crafting and operating the Ministry of Planning and Coordination
A few months after the Extraordinary Ministry of Planning and Coordination was 
established, the administration launched the Governmental Economic Plan of Action (PAEG) 
with guidelines for the economic adjustment policy to be implemented and a general view of 
the ongoing social reforms that Castelo Branco intended to promote. Administrative reform 
was not part of PAEG because, at the time, it was considered a distinct task, to be formulated 
in different spheres. Macro-economic problems related to inflation control and the balance of 
payments were pressing concerns. PAEG aimed at reducing inflation and setting up the 
conditions needed to encourage the resumption of national development. A gradual anti- 
inflationary approach combined with a restrained monetary policy and severe wage limits 
constituted the main elements of Roberto Campos’s strategy. Market discipline was the target 
that had to be pursued, but preceded by discipline in public expenditures (Lara Rezende, 
1990:214-216).
Conscious of the importance of enhancing the government’s economic policy capabilities,
212Campos founded the government research institute at the end of 1964. This institute was
212 Escritorio de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (Applied Economic Research Office), later renamed Instituto de 
Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) (Applied Economic Research Institute).
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specialised in applied research in economics and would become the most influential source 
of ideas on economic policy during the following decades. With this step, the planning policy 
sub-system became endogenously equipped with a source of organisational and personnel 
resources to deliver articulated macro- and micro-economic policies in multiple areas.
Two governmental commissions were set up to address planning and administrative reform 
issues: the Special Commission for Administrative Reform Studies213 (COMESTRA) and the 
Advisory Planning Council214 (CONSPLAN), both of which were under Campos’s personal 
jurisdiction and supervision. CONSPLAN functioned as a locus for testing and questioning 
governmental policies. COMESTRA was established to generate an administrative reform 
proposal to be submitted to the administration. CONSPLAN was set up not to deliberate but 
as an arena for public consultation. It sought to provide an impression of constructive debate, 
although the main objective was the legitimation of governmental actions. COMESTRA’s 
role was to understand and process views of the historical public administration community 
grouped at DASP and at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, and make the bill available to 
Congress as its starting point. During its six months of existence, COMESTRA held thirty- 
six ordinary meetings (Dias, 1968) besides numerous sectorial and related debates. In striking 
contrast, CONSPLAN met on less than ten occasions (Cruz, 1978: 101).
213 Decree 54401, 9 October 1964.
214 The Advisory Planning Council (CONSPLAN) was created in February 1965 and represented a defensive 
move aimed at providing procedural legitimation to a regime that could be characterised as “authoritarian in 
transition” (Anderson, 1970). CONSPLAN functioned as a “procedural instrument” (Cruz, 1978: 116-7) geared 
to de-politicising the debate on political economy.
168
4.3.2. Establishing and reformulating the administrative reform agenda
Castelo Branco had ordered Campos to address the administrative reform problem as soon as 
possible. The task of taking stock and briefing the President was delegated to Dias, an 
experienced executive who had worked with Campos at BNDE. Their major concerns were 
instrumental: governmental planning and programming, budgeting and financial execution, 
auditing and control, and the setting up of a Senior Executive Corps (Dias, 1968: 4). Both 
were concerned with equipping the Executive with the necessary tools to perform its 
functions efficiently and effectively but subordinated to a broader planning and coordinating 
framework. Neither had participated in drawing up the Peixoto Report, then under 
examination by Congress, although Campos (and Bulhoes, the Finance Minister) had 
participated in CEPA. The other possible route to tackle the problem was via re-empowering 
DASP. But DASP was beyond Campos’s jurisdiction. Jose Arantes, a close ally of Lopes, 
was appointed as DASP’s president. Besides, Dias considered DASP ossified, obsolete and 
in disarray.215
The first dilemma Castelo Branco and Campos faced was what to do about the bill in 
Congress. A memo was submitted to the president and the secretary of the Commission in the
'yxfiChamber of Deputies, for them to decide on how to deal with the issue. The commission’s 
president and reporter were, respectively, Amaral Peixoto and Gustavo Capanema, both 
extremely familiar with the debate. Amaral Peixoto was responsible for the project in 
question when he was Minister of Administrative Reform during the Goulart Administration. 
Capanema was the Minister of Education who implemented the first ministerial reform based
215 DASP had five presidents in less than two years and had organised no adequate statistics on federal 
administration or legislative matters, even on personnel issues (E1H/RJ/33).
_l6 The brief entitled “Algumas medidas consideradas essenciais a eficacia de uma Reforma Administrated” 
and the memo entitled “Consideraqoes sobre a Reforma Administrativa” were prepared by Dias (Dias, 1968: 4-
9).
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on scientific management principles in 1934 and the Reporter of the Administrative Reform 
Project of 1953, during Vargas’s comeback.
The memo incorporated the aspects previously mentioned plus a number of new additions 
(Dias, 1968: 4-9). First, it suggested the simplification of the proposed reform, the so-called 
Organic Federal Administration Law. The law was to contain only guidelines and principles, 
with the remaining norms being left to ordinary legislation. In other words, the law was to 
regulate legal, but not financial or administrative matters. Second, the project was to 
incorporate administrative and legal instruments to equip the Executive. The main concerns 
were personnel, finances, statistics, control, and auditing. All these issues demanded new 
institutional arrangements and effective solutions, given the impasses and deadlocks they 
were caught up in due to confused and inadequate legislation. Third, the concept of 
administrative reform had to be broadened in scope but not in detail. There was an incipient 
evaluation that the Peixoto bill would not be sufficient to meet the multiple expectations that 
had been raised. Fourth, work teams would have to be set up to deal with separate issues. 
This suggestion was geared to preparing the grounds for bilateral negotiations with all areas 
of government. Fifth, the role of the National Audit Body (TCU) required re-evaluation. The 
ex-ante register of government contracts was recognised as an obsolete, formalistic, and 
innocuous mechanism of control that had to be redefined. Finally, the document emphasised 
the need for updating personnel and control structures. It anticipated the idea of setting up 
a task force to work on a new administrative reform project, which would be implemented 
gradually.
217 The ideas o f transforming TCU into an external control institution responsible for ex-post control and of  
creating a Senior Corps were also advanced at that stage by Dias.
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The choices were to reformulate and amend the Peixoto proposal or give it a fresh start. 
Castelo Branco opted for the latter, with the agreement of the Ministry of Planning. “The 
initial concerns were mainly related only to the incorporation of the tripod of planning, 
budgeting, and financial control in the project. But the President was so enthusiastic that the
^10
government decided to seize the opportunity to promote a broader reform ”. The next move 
was the setting up of COMESTRA.219
The reform machinery platform consisted of a commission comprised of twelve high-profile 
members directly selected by the President who would work under Campos’s supervision. 
COMESTRA was practically a cabinet. COMESTRA’s composition and attributions were 
revealing of Castelo Branco’s expectations. The commission consisted of twelve members -  
four military and eight civil -  with Roberto Campos as its president. Beltrao, a well-known 
public champion of Brazilian public administration, was invited to be the president of 
COMESTRA, while the Executive Secretary was Dias, representing Campos. The political 
leadership of COMESTRA was delegated to Beltrao and the administrative tasks to Dias.
Helio Beltrao was a tireless critic of all reform efforts oriented to design and legal changes. 
According to his views reality cannot be changed by decree or by new structures, but only 
through permanent persuasion (Beltrao, 1967 and 1969). Beltrao was, at that time, the 
Secretary of Planning220 of Carlos Lacerda, the Guanabara State Governor and main civil 
leader of the opposition to Goulart. He had been a national public executive champion since 
his entrance into civil service in the late 1930s, after becoming one of the leading "cardinals"
218 E1H/RJ/33.
2,9 Decree 54501, 9 October 1964.
220 The State of Guanabara was the former capital of Brazil, comprising basically the city o f Rio de Janeiro. Its 
governor was Carlos Lacerda, the main civil opposition leader of Goulart. Beltrao had national visibility 
because Rio de Janeiro was then still the de facto political capital o f Brazil.
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of the industrialist social security elite.221 He also had studied at the American University in 
Washington D.C. in the late 1940s, where he came into contact with the managerial concepts 
that would influence his performance from that time on. In the early 1950s Beltrao joined the 
group of nationalists who made up the first board of Petrobras -  the largest state-owned 
company, which monopolised the oil sector. Later on he became a member of the COSB 
during Kubitshek’s Presidency. In the early 1960s he became responsible for important 
public management policy innovations in Guanabara.
Dias was a less-known professional executive with public and private experience who was 
working for a multinational utilities company. He had begun his professional life in the civil 
service in the Ministry of Infra-structure in the 1930s and later at DASP, where he 
represented his ministry on the Federal Civil Service Commission. In the early 1940s he had 
studied public administration in the U.S.A. and took classes with professionals from the 
budgeting and personnel areas, who were also leading civil servants in the Brazilian 
government. From that time on he carefully observed the evolution of United States public 
administration. He later became Director of Human Resources at DASP and Administrative 
Director of Petrobras (immediately after Beltrao left the post). In the mid-1950s he worked 
with Campos for a short period in BNDE. In the early 1960s he spent two years at UNESCO, 
in France, where he had close contact with the French and British civil services. Returning to 
Brazil he assumed a position in a multinational electricity company, in part due to his interest
221 Helio Beltrao had built up a technocratic elite at the Industrial Workers Social Security Institute (IAPI).
Those innovations occurred in the budgeting, administration, and coordination areas. In the first group he 
introduced programmatic budgeting, distinctions between activities oriented to ends from those oriented to 
means, budgeting and financial execution, cash flow techniques and other minor changes that would later be 
incorporated into Law 4320 of March 1964.
223 These two men had known each other since the early 1950s, when they worked together on the establishment 
of Petrobras, the largest Brazilian SOE. Dias replaced Beltrao as Administrative Director and was surprised at 
how little the latter had done, since they developed a business-like solution for the problem of Petrobras’s 
employees (E1H/RJ/33 and CPDOC, 1988).
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in gaining experience in the more advanced financial and budgeting techniques then 
available.224
The high level of the commission was astonishing by all standards. Simoes Lopes had been 
personally invited by Castelo Branco, and had been the champion of all previous attempts at 
reforming public administration in Brazil, in 1936, 1937, 1953, 1956, and 1963. Lopes was 
the respected senior of the group, flanked by Flores, one of his close partners at the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation. Flores had played a leading role in the 1964 conspiracy as a leader in the 
business sector. Medeiros was a notable jurist who had participated in CEPA and was one of 
Castelo Branco’s main constitutional advisors. Arantes -  DASP’s president -  was one of the 
leading authors of the Peixoto Report, an old comrade of Simoes Lopes and one of the main 
contributors to the Peixoto Report. Not surprisingly, the military participation in 
COMESTRA -  one third of the members -  was a reflection of the increasing military 
presence in the public sector. Modernisation was a key concept of the new “military 
managerialism” (Almeida, 1967: 110) and an image associated with the ideology of national 
security (Piquet Cameiro, 1988).
4.33. Assembling the reform machinery and generating reform proposals
The speech delivered by Campos at the opening of COMESTRA incorporated the 
contributions of the two men -  Beltrao and Dias -  who would lead the administrative reform 
process. The key ideas introduced by Beltrao were: understanding reform as a process, 
placing the emphasis on behaviour rather than on structures, the need to debureaucratise the
224 Dias personal conviction was that there was need to combine superior efficiency-oriented private 
administration with politically accountable public administration (E1H/RJ/33 E2M/RJ/38 and CPDOC, 1988).
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government machinery, and the adoption of the principles of decentralisation and delegation 
at the federal level. The key ideas introduced by Dias were governmental planning, 
programming, budgeting, cash flow, financial control and monitoring systems, and a merit- 
based personnel policy (Dias, 1968: 13). The two men shared a concern with the over­
centralisation of administrative matters in DASP, under the presidency.
The members of COMESTRA decided that the modus operandi225 should not repeat the 
previous mistakes of the 1953 Commission, CEP A, and the Peixoto Commission, namely, 
the format of a report, administrative paralysis, and excessive public mobilisation (Dias, 
1968: 15). COMESTRA decided to work on a draft of a piece of legislation. COMESTRA 
was also intended to serve as the advisory staff for the organisational changes that could not 
wait for the reform to be approved, a task championed by Dias who was on Campos’s staff. 
COMESTRA carried out its functions as a small ad hoc unit located at the Ministry of 
Planning, not as a political or meta-academic exercise. Organisational design issues were 
treated separately with each ministry in the context of a systemic approach, according to a 
previously agreed upon common strategy (Dias, 1968).
Given such a pool of talents the expectations for a spectacular outcome were enormous. Or 
maybe “things could not have worked at all given the personalities involved and the lack of 
meaningful data”.226 The lack of data and of understandable legislation was a recurrent 
nightmare for reformers because of their conflictive character. They allowed problems and 
practices to emerge that had been kept opaque for decades in order to conceal the network of 
power relationships. DASP was involved in a self-defeating census of the public sector 
workforce that had been ordered in 1963 (Law 4242 of 17 June 1963) but which effectively
225 E1H/RJ/33.
226 E1H/RJ/33.
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began in 1966 (Decree 58297 of 2 February 1966). The first results, always inaccurate and 
subject to doubt, were made available too late, only in 1967.
Conflicts had been anticipated since COMESTRA was created.
“How could such an heterogeneous group of strong personalities work 
together? Lopes was concerned with revamping DASP ” 227
Initially, Dias and Beltrao intended to phase out DASP. Lopes therefore distanced himself 
from the process as soon as it became clear that the commission had taken another direction 
(Flores, 2000: 200-201). Medeiros was known for his propensity and capacity to transform 
anything into a piece of legislation in a matter of minutes. The military were involved in 
internal disagreements. The jurisdiction conflicts between the Air Force and the Navy -  both 
historical lieutenants of the 1930s -  brought about a severe crisis. Castelo Branco’s idea of 
creating a Ministry of Defence was defeated by a majority of the high military officials. 
Beltrao was obsessed with de-bureaucratisation, and Dias was worried about financial 
instruments and technical details. But in spite of all the problems regarding jurisdiction,
'yjQ
competition and conflicts of ideas, COMESTRA did not cease to refine the proposal.
The initial result was a congressional bill (which included justification and attachments), a 
Constitutional Amendment concerning the Supreme Audit Agency, and a bill for an Organic 
Federal Administration Law. Activities related to planning, budgeting, personnel, finance, 
accounting, auditing, statistics, and general administration became organised as a single plan, 
a policy system (Wahrlich, 1974: 32). (See Table 1 for an overview of the contrast between 
the reform proposal and the previous status quo.)
227 E1H/RJ/33.
228 E2M/RJ/38 and E1H/RJ/33.
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TABLE 1 -  A contrast between the 1967 administrative reform content and the
previous arrangement
Topic Previous arrangement Proposed arrangement
Public Management 
Jurisdiction
DASP policy monopoly at the 
Presidency
Open: Ministry o f  Planning 
and/or Ministry o f  
Administrative Reform*
Fundamental principles Hyper centralization
Delegation, decentralization 
and systemic co-ordination
Organizational Design
Centralized and unified public 
sector co-existing with SOEs 
and autonomous government 
agencies
Split between direct and 
indirect public administration
Decentralized organizations 
subordinated to ministries
Planning
There were spasmodic 
initiatives located at DASP, 
BN D E or ad hoc Councils
Centralized at the Ministries 
o f  Planning and Regional 
Development
Budgeting
Disputed by DASP 
(Presidency) and the Ministry 
o f  Finance
Centralized at Planning
Public Expenditure 
Programme
Non-existent Articulated to the budget process
Auditing and financial control 
within the Executive Non-existent
Creation o f  Finance 
Inspectorates to carry out the 
function o f  internal control
Auditing and financial control 
by TCU
Ex-ante auditing procedures 
by TCU
Ex-post auditing procedures 
to perform the functions o f  
external control
Personnel
Unified civil service but de 
facto a distorted variation o f  
the spoil systems with 
recurrent hiring o f provisional 
employees.
Split between direct 
administration (Senior Corps 
consisting o f  civil servants and 
appointed officials) and 
indirect administration 
(competitive managerial basis)
* DASP had its jurisdiction narrowed down to civil servants. It was kept legally subordinated to the presidency 
but administratively to the Ministry of Planning and Coordination.
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The main conflict was between Beltrao and Dias, caused by the generalist philosophical 
vision of the former in opposition to the detailed instrumental approach of the latter. 
Surprisingly, the problems were not centred on content -  they had many ideas in common -  
but on the policy format and the degree of institutionalisation they strived for in the 
legislation. Beltrao conceived administrative reform as a crusade, as a campaign, as a 
permanent advocacy process. Dias, in contrast, was concerned with instruments oriented to 
enhancing the government’s capabilities. Beltrao considered Dias a bureaucrat excessively 
committed to norms and rules. Dias expected Beltrao to deliver concrete instrumental 
suggestions, not simple principles. While Beltrao was anxious to persuade the general public 
and the political leaders, Dias hoped to equip the Executive with new governmental tools. 
While Beltrao addressed the public demand for a responsive government, Dias appealed to 
insiders, as he was used to facing daily problems.
The third draft of the proposal was strongly criticised by Beltrao, who was invited by 
Campos to present amendments to a fourth version. As Beltrao saw it, the main problems to 
be tackled were the centralisation230 of the federal public administration and the great 
emphasis placed on administrative structures and legal procedures. Nevertheless his 
contribution was based on general principles and represented a step backward when 
contrasted with the third version. Given the impasse, Campos took the issue to the Ministry
229 Their combat lasted all during Castelo Branco’s Administration and undermined their personal relation, with 
further consequences for the implementation of the reform (E2M/RJ/38, E1H/RJ/33 ElH/Br/28).
230 Beltrao (1967, 1969) defended that decentralisation and delegation should be the fundamental guidelines of 
the public administration reform. Executive activities should therefore be transferred to sub-federal levels, 
governmental agencies or SOEs, and to the private sector. He used the concepts o f delegation and 
decentralisation indistinctively. But “delegation could be reverted”, a point made by one o f Campos’s advisors, 
who suggested the adoption o f an approach based on redistribution o f  responsibilities (E2M/RJ/38). Beltrao’s 
concept prevailed in the final text of the legislation. However, from 1967 on, only agencification occurred. 
SOEs, foundations and autonomous government agencies were favoured in detriment to the private sector and 
the direct administration. In intragovemmental terms, the Federal Government centralized resources and 
functions in detriment to the sub-federal level (OlL/RJ/15 and O2L/RJ/30).
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of Planning for consideration, where a fifth version was drafted under Beltrao’s command in 
August 1965.
According to Beltrao the tendency to submit all types of decisions to higher consideration 
derived from: a) the Brazilian historical political culture; b) a complex and unmanageable set 
of laws, rules, and norms; and, c) DASP's legacies from the Vargas era. He did not link the 
problem with clientelistic practices, which transformed each decision into an essentially 
political currency for building coalition support (Beltrao, 1967 and 1969). The governmental 
elite of the country -  especially the military presidents themselves -  shared the same 
diagnosis because they were desperate to solve the problems of agenda congestion, resulting 
from excessive paperwork. Vianna Filho (1975) described Castelo Branco’s impatience with 
the problem. The President’s weekends were spent signing great stacks of documents, a habit 
that began to change only after 1967, contrary to the bureaucracy culture.231
However, many of those involved in the process did not see the fifth version proposed by 
Beltrao as an improvement over the previous negotiations. Interlocutors from the ministries 
involved in the discussions about modernising their administrative structures were appalled. 
In many cases their concerns were removed from legislation, breeding anxiety, fears and 
perplexity. The result was a loss of momentum and a new impasse because Dias, who had 
been the focal aggregator of the previous discussions, had distanced himself from the 
process.
Other relevant conflicts involved the military and the Supreme Audit Agency. In the first 
case the tension was caused by disputes among the military: the unification of the three 
military ministries and a dispute over jurisdiction. Castelo Branco attempted tirelessly, but
231 E1H/RJ/43.
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without success, to set up the Ministry of Defence. In addition, the Air Force Minister and 
the Minister of Transportation both top military officials -  could not agree on where to place 
the responsibility for Civil Aviation. The other source of confrontation was between 
COMESTRA’s proposal and the Supreme Audit Agency. There was not enough consensus 
within the government, notably between the Ministries of Justice and of Planning, to push 
through the Constitutional Amendment related to the Supreme Audit Agency (Dias, 1968: 
16-25). The ex-ante mechanism of contract register was a barrier to executive government 
and a deep-rooted formalist and legalist practice. Even the approval of ordinary legislation in 
March 1964, through Law 4320, which introduced the principles of planning and annual and 
triennial budgeting, was not enough to change the control mentality of the national auditors. 
The solution proposed by Dias was to "upgrade” the 1964 legislation to Constitutional level 
in order to establish its supremacy over the antique Accountancy Code (Dias, 1968: 27), but 
the Supreme Audit Agency rejected it.
The group dispersed during the second half of 1965 and the issue was temporarily shelved. 
Dias assumed other tasks, especially the wage negotiations involving the military and civil
j ' l ' y
servants, who were treated separately for the first time since the 1930s. Beltrao became the 
CEO of a troubled Brazilian retail store chain after the end of Lacerda’s term of office. After 
saving the firm from bankruptcy his executive credentials gained even more recognition 
because of this performance in the private sector.
232 This fact was the second relevant reason for Simoes Lopes’s distancing himself from COMESTRA. The first 
was the downgrading o f DASP (E1H/RJ/33).
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4.4. A new constitutional rupture: the coup inside the coup
The evolution of the political dynamics led to the institutionalisation of the authoritarian 
regime, despite Castelo Branco’s democratic convictions and those of the majority of his 
ministers. The pressure from hardliners gradually reduced opposition activities, mainly via 
the suspension of the political rights of all those identified as enemies of the revolution. 
Critics of the government multiplied, partly because of the unrealistic expectations raised by 
the revolution. Political groups within Congress joined the hardliners and negotiated 
extending Castelo Branco’s term of office for one more year, against his will (Vianna Filho, 
1975). What is surprising about this episode was Castelo Branco’s reluctance to accept the 
extension of his term of office.233 He surrendered to the argument that the maintenance of the 
electoral calendar would intensify all sort of conflicts, even among the military (and this was 
his main concern). He demanded a sole condition: the maintenance of the elections for state 
governors at the end of 1965. Ironically, the results caused effects opposite to those he 
intended.
The results of the state gubernatorial elections of October 1965 gave another thrust towards 
an even more authoritarian regime. The clashes within the military fractions that supported 
the regime were costly for democracy and almost ousted Castelo Branco from the 
Presidency. Castelo Branco guaranteed the recently elected governors’ term of office, but at 
the price of the unilateral issuing of AI-2,234 because Congress resisted granting the 
presidency any exceptional powers. The Minister of War, General Costa e Silva, played a
233 Castelo Branco was divided between his anxiety to deliver the best policies from his team, which would take 
longer, and the risks to the regime inherent to postponing the return to power of the civil political forces. The 
military intervention was intended to be brief, only long enough to conclude Goulart’s term of office, and the 
extension sounded like a consented coup.
234 AI-2’s main provisions included the extension o f indirect elections -  via legislative -  to all executive 
positions, the right o f the Executive to suspend the political rights of opponents o f the regime re-definition of  
the composition of the Supreme Court with an increase in the number of justices from 11 to 16, and the virtual 
establishment o f two-party system based on a alignment o f government opposition.
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key role in the crisis because he guaranteed military support to Castelo Branco. Costa e Silva 
thus virtually guaranteed his own position as the “natural” candidate for President, capable of 
reducing the strife within the military forces235 a year before the presidential election.
AI-2, however, was not enough to satisfy the hardliners. At the beginning of 1966 AI-3 
established indirect elections for state governors and defined deadlines for prospective 
candidates to resign from executive positions. The Sorbonne group was late, and limited, by 
Castelo Branco’s slowness in proposing a candidate (Stepan, 1971). Costa e Silva was the 
forerunner of the hard-liners. The presidential succession was practically defined after Costa 
e Silva’s tacit decision to politically and militarily support Castelo Branco’s236 administration 
during the latter’s last year in office.
Ironically, the longer the President negotiated for government reforms, the tougher were the 
measures that Roberto Campos adopted, and the more they produced dissatisfaction.237 
Castelo Branco’s and Roberto Campos’s development strategy modified national 
development policies in two ways: by emphasising a macro-economic stabilisation policy as 
a requisite to recover international credibility, and by modernising the public sector’s 
executive machinery.238 As time passed, more and more groups became dissatisfied with 
Castelo Branco’s and Roberto Campos’s policies.239
235 Costa e Silva had historically been closer to the hard-liners, and the impasses favoured his projection, in 
spite of the opposition o f Castelo Branco’s closest allies in the Sorbonne group.
236 “Only after Costa e Silva had effectively promised to continue the stabilisation program did he receive 
Castelo Branco’s unqualified support in the presidential campaign (Skidmore, 1967: 320).”
237 For the first time an unpopular economic policy based retraction of demand -  received continuous 
presidential support for a period capable o f generating results (Fishlow, 1974: 8).
"38 The main reform o f the public sector was in the Finance Ministry, with help from the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation. The tax reform was followed by a modernisation of the tax collecting system, which enabled the 
Executive to improve federal revenues in an unprecedented way.
239 At a certain point only the President’s individual political support prevented Roberto Campos from being 
replaced. Needless to say, once the administration progressively gained its electoral support the question 
became progressively manageable, since Castelo Branco’s Administration was coming to an end.
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Castelo Branco turned his attention to the issue of administrative reform only after 
presidential succession had been dealt with, but within the context of a broad constitutional 
reformulation. A new constitutional order was required in order to update the country’s new 
regime and satisfy the military’s concerns with appearances of legality. The turbulent 
political environment became stabilised at the expense of the institutionalisation of the 
authoritarian regime and of the definition of Costa e Silva as future president.
Castelo Branco dedicated his last year in office to delivering a new package of reforms; 
meanwhile the new revolutionary order was “legalised”. The administration’s final act was 
the 1967 Constitution240 that sanctioned the new regime and incorporated four institutional 
acts imposed by the military command, but still kept some minimal democratic precautions.
4.5. The final assembly of policy proposals and the decision-making process
Faced with the dilemma of trying harder or giving up, Castelo Branco opted to compromise 
so he could conclude the administrative reform. Campos resorted to an artificial 
administrative solution to bypass the sensitive impasse caused by the personal clashes 
between Beltrao and Dias241 without hurting susceptibilities and alienating support. The
240 According to Ronning and Keith (1976: 231) “He [the President] is given exclusive power in the initiating 
laws relating to (1) financial matters, (2) the filling o f public offices, functions and employment, (3) the 
establishment or modification of the size of the armed forces, (4) administration and judicial organisation, 
taxation and budget matters relating to the Federal District and the territories, and (5) federal public employees, 
including their tenure and the recruitment of military personnel. ( ...)  Proposed legislation can be amended only 
if  it does not increase the proposed expenditures. Among other things, this curbs the ability o f any congressman 
to build up his own clientele via ‘pork-barrel’ legislation -  unless he can do so via the presidency in the original 
drafting of a bill.” Besides this, by resorting to decree-laws, in cases o f urgency or national relevance, the 
President could decide on national security, public finances (and taxation), set up public organisations, and 
wage policies; in short he had almost dictatorial powers.
241 Beltrao was a popular champion, a public relations phenomenon, a charismatic political figure regarded as a 
charming and friendly executive. His curriculum vitae and his rhetoric were impeccable. Dias was a
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reform was resumed in November 1965 with the setting up of an advisory unit directly 
subordinated to him, named ASESTRA,242 a one-man staff unit. This one individual was 
Dias, COMESTRA’s former Executive Secretary, who had resigned from his post after 
Beltrao took over leadership of the process. Campos delegated to Dias the responsibility of 
resuming and concluding the coordination of the process. Dias was obliged to negotiate the 
final text directly within the Presidency because the administrative reform proposal had 
reached the President’s decisional level.
The public management reform package was resumed on the basis of the third version. There 
was now a clear time horizon to be complied with and a final destination for the proposal: the 
new Constitution. There was also broad and consistent logic in the project. Government 
planning, programming, budgeting, financial execution, and organisational design had been 
increasingly assimilated in advance by COMESTRA partly because of its connections with 
macro-economic policy. There was no opposition to their additions to the proposal, but there 
was one point that called for special attention: the problem of governmental accountability. 
ASESTRA therefore turned its attention to a joint solution for the two more sensitive 
components of the reform, namely, the unfinished business of personnel, and control.
The public administration became formally divided into direct and indirect. The former -  the 
ministries -  were to be organised on the basis of bureaucratic civil service. The latter -  the 
SOEs, autonomous government agencies and foundations -  were to function on a managerial 
basis, with private-sector employment and accountancy approaches, in order to carry out 
business-type activities. They were to perform governmental developmental functions that 
were to be performed by the indirect administration (Campos, 1994: 698). Control was
professional executive operator who increasingly gained his confidence and became a recognised trouble­
shooter for the government.
242 Ruling 137, 18 November 1965.
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divided into external and internal. External Control was to be performed by the Supreme 
Audit Agency on an ex-post basis and internal control was to be carried out by the Executive 
itself according to the principle of ministerial supervision, which subordinated the indirect 
administration to the ministries of their respective areas and with the support of a Senior 
Corps of high-ranking civil servants.
This approach towards control was innovative and controversial for Brazilian standards 
although it dated back to the debate in the late 1930s in the U.S.A. (Dias, 1968). According 
to ASESTRA, control should be addressed via two complementary proposals: the setting up 
of the finance inspection organisational units in the direct administration and the redefinition 
of the Supreme Audit Agency’s role. The former was generally endorsed but the latter was 
the object of intense controversy because it transformed the auditing attributions of the 
Supreme Audit Agency into an external a posteriori process. The proposal replaced the 
obsolete bureaucratic procedures of a priori audits of governmental contracts with internal 
control audits and redefined the Supreme Audit Agency’s attributions as external control. 
The Audit Agency resisted the new proposal as earnestly as possible. First, the amendment 
related to its role was held up at the Ministry of Justice, the same institutional location where 
COMESTRA’s proposal had stopped. Second, the Supreme Audit Agency sent its own 
contribution to Castelo Branco in October 1965, in which its members explicitly ignored the 
text of Law 4320, 1964, which had updated accountancy and legal procedures related to 
public expenditure at state and local levels (Dias, 1968: 22-23). Third, the agency had the 
support of the Commission of Jurists that advised the new Ministry of Justice in charge of 
preparing the new Constitution between July and September 1966. Finally, they sent a final 
contribution to the President again, to be incorporated into the text of Decree-Laws 199 and 
200, issued immediately after the promulgation of the 1967 Constitution. Castelo Branco
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personally analysed these attempts but sided with ASESTRA, thanks to his full agreement 
with Campos’s and Dias’s positions.243
The personnel solution was anticipated, since COMESTRA was established.244 DASP was an 
ambiguous icon but there was no room for a super central agency in the new formulation. 
Therefore the acronym was kept but its meaning was changed. DASP became responsible for 
the civil servants, but not for the civil service. The distinction was subtle but meaningful. 
DASP became responsible for personnel in the direct administration. DASP’s role was thus 
redefined and narrowed. The brand was kept but its name changed from Administrative 
Department for Public Service to Administrative Department for Civil Personnel. The 
downgrading of its jurisdiction was clear: from the management of public administration 
affairs to that of statutory civil servants. Moreover, although DASP kept its formal status as 
an agency functionally subordinated to the Presidency, it became de facto subordinated to the 
Ministry of Planning 245
Because of DASP’s weakness and the vagueness of the principle of ministerial supervision, 
ASESTRA proposed setting up a small corps of functionaries. The “Senior Executive Corps” 
should perform high-level policy and control functions. The organisations of indirect 
administration were intended to have autonomy to hire their employees on a managerial basis 
on the private market. The direct administration should have its “Senior Executive Corps” of 
highly qualified professionals and senior positions should be occupied by several hundred 
permanent civil servants recruited on the basis of public competitive selection processes. 
Appointed high officials recruited from the private sector would complement it in the top
243 E1H/RJ/33.
244 This idea was in Dias’s first draft presented to Roberto Campos in August 1964 (E2M/RJ/38).
245 Decree 61930 o f December 21 1967 placed it under the supervision of the Ministry o f Planning in respect to 
all issues concerning administrative reform (Abreu e Silva, 1970: 12-15).
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political positions. The “Senior Executive Corps” was intended to function as a connection 
between the direct and indirect administrations. Its members were expected to be the 
connectors, the enforcers, and the top policy advisors of the direct administration.246
The proposal was an explicit hybrid247 inspired on successful models adopted in the U.S.A., 
the UK, and France (ASESTRA, 2005). The core functions of the direct administration 
should be performed by a small contingent of generalists, in charge of the functions of policy 
formulation, planning, administration, implementation monitoring and financial control. 
Appointed professionals, whether or not they were senior civil servants, should occupy the 
top positions. A structure of permanent career civil servants parallel to top appointed 
positions should be constituted in order to guarantee administrative continuity and policy 
learning. A high profile training centre should provide initial and permanent training at 
entrance level as well as throughout the individuals’ careers.248 From the British, the proposal 
borrowed the idea of a small core of “talented amateurs”. From the French, the proposal 
borrowed the human resources centre, inspired on the Ecole Nationale d ’Administration. 
From the United States the proposal borrowed a clear division of political spaces among the 
Senior Corps, some positions to be occupied by appointed outsiders, and some to be occupied 
exclusively by ordinary civil servants. “The proposal was a combination of all three 
models ”.249 In early 1966 it was submitted to experts of the three mentioned countries, who 
strongly supported the setting up of a cluster of merit-based civil servants who were to
246 E1H/RJ/33 and E2M/RJ/38.
247 A comparative study of British and French civil service was one o f Dias’s main references (E1H/RJ/33).
248 The Ecole Nationale d'Administration and the military and diplomatic academies were the main sources of 
inspiration on this point E1H/RJ/33 and E2M/RJ/38.
249 E1H/RJ/33 and ASESTRA (1965).
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gradually replace the existing public sector workforce, but in substantially fewer numbers 
and only in certain strategic areas.
After submitting the proposal to experts from the three countries and receiving their
9 c 1
approval, Dias thought he had an updated, suitable and feasible solution for the recurrent 
problem of having, high-level professional personnel in the Executive. But he was taken by 
surprise at the final decisional stage. The proposal was submitted to Castelo Branco and his 
two closest advisors, Generals Geisel and Couto e Silva, the intellectual leaders of the 
Sorbonne group. Both rejected the proposal on the grounds of the elitist character of the 
“Senior Corps”. “It is an elitist proposal and it would generate a privileged caste ”. In spite
of Dias’s arguments both remained unconvinced that the proposal would fit the country’s 
needs. Castelo Branco decided to support the proposal but asked Dias to make it more 
general. “It’s a good idea but I think it’ll be better to let my successor make the final decision 
on this one”.253
The final proposal received a pro forma approval from Beltrao, at that time the person 
appointed by Costa e Silva to monitor the administrative reform process. During the second 
semester of 1966 Costa e Silva appointed Beltrao to the transition team, a government in 
waiting. Beltrao had been invited to join Costa e Silva’s administration on the strength of his 
liberal humanist credentials -  a counterforce the dominant hardliners. Given his political 
beliefs as a liberal nationalist, his executive credentials, his popularity, his Rio de Janeiro
250 The numbers proposed for the Senior Corps varied from 700 to 900, a relatively small number o f the total 
contingent o f  appointed positions available (over 10,000).
251 See Wood (1966), Roson (1966) and Randall (1966). Their reports were supportive. The British expert, 
however, pointed out the need to pay attention in the executive coordination problem that the reforms might 
raise (Wood, 1966).
252 E1H/RJ/33
253 E1H/RJ/33
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origins254 and his connections with the military, Beltrao was invited to be Minister of 
Planning. The choice was made on the basis of his opposition to Campos’s macro-economic 
policies, within the context of the political and military forces that supported the regime. 
Although he had not been closely involved in the process since the dissolution of 
COMESTRA, Beltrao was still publicly recognised as the administrative reform champion. 
Who better than he could be in charge of implementing the administrative reform?
Castelo Branco sent Beltrao a copy as a political gesture because Beltrao was to take charge 
of the reform during the next administration. Beltrao considered the project very good,255 in 
spite of the serious disagreement he had had with Dias. The text was incorporated into the 
Constitution and immediately became Decree-Laws 199 and 200. The “reform of reforms”, 
in Beltrao’s words (Vianna Filho, 1975: 485), was one of the last acts of Castelo Branco’s 
Administration.
According to the generally accepted version, Beltrao managed to persuade Campos to back 
up his ideas, which were later fully incorporated into the Constitutional text and into Decree- 
law 200 (Oliveira, 1984: 60). The main points of his contributions were adopted as general 
principles and he later mentioned that the Constitutional text as well as Decree-law 200 
derived from a compromise between his ideas and more detailed concerns of other 
individuals involved, notably Teixeira Dias (Beltrao, 1967 and 1969)257 Beltrao’s 
amendments were fundamentally doctrinal. They focused on simplification, decentralisation 
and delegation. He had repeatedly argued against any over-emphasis on organisational
254 Beltrao was the son of a famous UDN member, Heitor Beltrao, and grew up in Tijuca, a very traditional 
region o f Rio de Janeiro, well-known as a military neighbourhood. His “old friends” included many military 
men from his adolescent days.
255 E1H/RJ/33.
256 A3L/RJ/31 A3M/Br/19 and Oliveira (1984).
257 “There are pieces o f the legislation whose authorship I do not recognize because the legislation received 
many amendments. ( ...)  I am not the father o f Decree-law 200, which was drafted by many hands” (Beltrao, 
1969 quoted by Oliveira, 1984).
188
design, obsessions with efficiency, or excessive formal control. Beltrao explicitly recognised 
that his position was exclusively to provide guidance because he did not believe that reforms 
could or should be carried out on the basis of detailed objectives. He proposed only a set of 
philosophical principles, or general guidelines, for an administrative reform, which he saw as 
a permanent process.
The last act of the administration a few days before Costa e Silva’s inauguration was the 
launching of the Ten-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, a final 
contribution to the institutionalisation of planning practices. Castelo Branco and Roberto 
Campos had designed a government structure capable of strong autonomous action, although 
subject to variation in its modality. Ironically, the subsequent “mushrooming state 
interventionism” (Weyland, 1998: 53) was possible thanks to them, in spite of their liberal 
developmental convictions.
4.6. Heading towards a surprising anti-climax
4.6.1. Passing the baton
Costa e Silva did not retain any minister from the previous cabinet, in spite of his positive 
personal relationships with Castelo Branco259 and the rhetoric of revolutionary continuity. 
The new president decided to prove that he was not the troupier that the Sorbonne group had
258 The plan contained several macro-economic projections and sectorial studies that were meant as guidelines 
for governmental planning. However, the plan was not used for this purpose, given the differences between the 
two teams and Beltrao’s own ideas about the country’s priorities.
259 Even at the most delicate moments Castelo Branco never publicly expressed the slightest criticism towards 
Costa e Silva. Castelo was paralysed by his duties as President, his sense of loyalty and respect for his old 
colleague, and above all his concerns with military unity. Some private collaborators mentioned that he had 
three main concerns about Costa e Silva as President: his health, his wife’s ambitions, and his propensity for 
forceful solutions in moments o f impasse (E2M/RJ/38 E1H/RJ/33 E1H/RJ/43).
189
labelled him, but rather the champion of a “human development” model. A few weeks later 
Campos reiterated his concerns: “premature humanisation can bring about future cruelty” 
(De Oliveira Campos, 1967: 296).
The transition from Campos to Beltrao was somewhat rough. The former’s farewell speech 
was emblematic. Campos warned the new administration against complacency and the risks 
of loose economic management. According to him there was no possible compromise in a 
trade-off between inflation and development. Planning should avoid the easy seduction of 
“false compatibility”. A balance between prudence -  to deal with the facts -  and the will to 
make a difference while avoiding fatalism were the ideal attitude.
"Everybody would like to achieve maximum development at the expense of a 
minimum of inflation. But anyone who becomes complacent in combating 
inflation because they want to stimulate development will get much more 
inflation than development" (Campos, 1967).
Beltrao was the liberal humanist who represented the hopes of multiple social sectors for a 
“relief policy”. Beltrao’s rhetoric addressed multiple audiences simultaneously: ordinary 
citizens, businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, and governmental authorities. His personal 
charisma provided a unique opportunity for the reforms. Moreover, his presence in the 
cabinet brought hopes of an earlier redemocratisation process.
The choice of Beltrao as Minister of Planning was decisive for the administrative reform 
because he was personally and publicly identified with the issue. It seemed to be a case of the 
right man in the right place, a man who had solutions for a problem and for the political 
circumstances of the moment. Beltrao was chosen to steer the administrative reform due to
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the new President’s perception of his public entrepreneurial role in pushing it. But the main 
reason, however, was to provide a counterpoint to Campos’ cool technocratic approach to the 
macro-economic policy. Beltrao was closer to the national businessmen squeezed by a 
monetarist credit policy. Finally, his position against prolific legislative activism, typical 
of Castelo Branco’s administration, suited Costa e Silva’s desire to lend a friendly face to his 
new administration.
The priorities of Costa e Silva’s administration were exposed for public discussion only in 
July 1967, even though he knew a year earlier that he would be President. A few months later 
the government’s triennial plan -  The Strategic Development Programme (PED) -  was 
publicly launched. The new administration had been benefited by the second harvest of the 
applied Economic Research Bureau (EPEA) that had previously prepared and launched the 
Ten-year Economic Development Plan a few months earlier (Alves and Sayad, 1970).
Beltrao’s personal style of action -  simple, direct, and frank -  made an immediate public 
impact. Administrative reform was re-defined as a national crusade, not a technocratic
9 f\ 1construct. His personal abilities allowed him to silence protests expressed by the business 
community. Beltrao travelled around the country to numerous conferences and gave 
numerous speeches in an effort to diffuse the PED plan. His explicit objective was to 
mobilise civil society, change the national mood in order to inaugurate a new development 
cycle, and tackle pathologies in the bureaucracy. Beltrao was the public relations crusader of
260 The waves o f legislation approved at the end of the previous administration were intended to provide the 
country with updated legal frameworks in various areas -  land, housing, taxes, and others. The perception of 
Costa e Silva’s group was different. They thought that the Sorbonne group had tried to put a straitjacket on 
Castelo Branco’s successor (Skidmore, 1988). Beltrao’s words served to publicise a contrast between the 
unpopular outgoing government and Costa e Silva’s newly inaugurated term of office.
261 A2L/RJ/40.
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a weak government, the main triumph of the fragile liberal forces that still had hopes that the 
military would re-establish full democracy.
4.6.2. Administrative reform as a political crusade
Beltrao’s liberation management discourse (Light, 1998) was built up as a combination of 
two key principles: delegation and decentralisation. The cornerstone of his discourse was an
'jfsy
innovative rhetoric figure -  de-bureaucratisation -  which completely transformed the 
image of administrative reform, promoted to a national imperative (Beltrao, 1967). In doing 
so, he called public attention to the problems and dysfunctions involved in bureaucracy, 
including red tape, slowness, inefficiency, lack of responsiveness, formalism, obtrusiveness, 
and other common-sense adjectives that denote general frustration with public services.
The term de-bureaucratisation was not new, although there is no evidence that Beltrao was 
aware of its academic connotation. The term had been used to designate the subversion of 
requirements of the bureaucracy in order to favour interest groups (Eisenstadt, 1958). 
Beltrao’s vision incorporated the first idea but in a different way. He established a slogan for 
a course of action that was expected to bring about a shake-up of simplification in the public 
sector. He also deliberately neglected organisational and functional problems, given his 
obsession with the pathologies derived from over-centralisation, formalism, rigidity, 
legalism, and other elements in the legacy from DASP.
262 Although the term was popularised in 1979 when Beltrao returned to government as Extraordinary Minister 
of De-bureaucratisation, he had began to use the term as Minister of Planning.
263 Eisenstadt’s (1964: 270-271) concept implied two inter-related ideas: unbalancing dynamics and 
functionality. The former referred to the rupture with the autonomy statute o f bureaucracies and their rule- 
bound foundations. The latter concerned the re-orientation o f the aims o f the organisation for personal benefits.
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Beltrao’s first decision was to launch “Operation Clean Slate”264 (Operagao 
Desemperramento), according to which each ministry would set up a commission to pursue 
the administrative principles of decentralisation and delegation. Beltrao’s main targets were 
centralised organisational structures and fossilised methods and procedures, especially in the 
areas of financial and legal control. However, at a certain point the need for some kind of 
institutionalisation was seen as a necessary condition for sustaining that processual type of 
initiative. There was a need for organisational structures, capable of channelling and 
mobilising resources regardless of the respective minister’s direct involvement.
Beltrao did not underestimate the problem of control. The relationship between the direct and 
indirect administration was regulated by the vague concept of ministerial supervision, which 
was even more meaningless now, in the context of the authoritarian regime. Financial 
Inspection Bodies were therefore set up in the ministries, but without the support of a special 
cadre of civil servants, as Dias had originally suggested. Their main role was to take care of 
budgeting and finance execution under the coordination of the ministries of Planning and 
Finance. An organisational solution was provided, but with no mention of who would carry it 
out. When a subordinate of Beltrao and Dias handed Beltrao the dossier with the Senior 
Corps Project and International Advisors’ Reports, Beltrao said, “Isn’t this Dias’s business? 
I’m not interested. I know what it’s about”.265 Moreover, when one of Campos’ former 
advisors returned from France, after taking the prestigious Finance Inspector course at the 
Ecole Nationale d ’Administration, he did not join Beltrao’s staff. A training centre was m 
fact set up, but with a much lower profile than that designed by Dias. Personnel were the
264 Circular RA-1-67. This name came from a document Beltrao had prepared for Costa e Silva when the latter 
was chosen Castelo Branco’s successor (Beltrao, 1967).
265 E2M/RJ/38.
266 Two senior advisors o f Roberto Campos were sent to ENA, but neither o f them remained with Beltrao’s 
team after returning. They were expected to work with the training institution responsible for the Senior Corps 
called for in Dias’s proposal (E2M/RJ/38).
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missing link in Beltrao’s implementation strategy in spite of his personal commitment to the 
reform.
There was consensus among Beltrao and his main advisors -  most of them old IAPI 
“cardinals”267 -  that the administrative reform team should be strengthened in order to get his 
ideas across. Aiming at empowering reform efforts, the administration set up the
' J f . Q
Administrative Reform Bureau (ERA) to implement the reform. ERA became responsible 
for the Executive Office of a Central Commission for Federal Administrative Reform 
(CERAF). Beltrao opted for a middle-rank policy venue under his supervision, instead of 
adopting the other technical alternative: the setting up of a ministry without Portfolio. ERA 
was expected to provide technical assistance to all bodies of the direct and indirect federal 
administration. It also had organisational representations in the states to provide technical 
assistance to the state governments in implementing the reform.
Although the implementation of EPEA had successfully channelled the flow of 
developmental planning ideas that were becoming better known at the time, this was not true 
of ERA. Unlike its counterpart, ERA did not have a critical mass of a new generation of 
professionals in touch with the more advanced theoretical ideas in the field. CERAF had 
representatives in all ministries, in important high-ranking positions and with political 
backing to fulfil leadership roles. Under Beltrao’s direct supervision, DASP was to provide 
executive training for all the functionaries involved in “Operation Snowball” -  the 
dissemination of the reform principles. A massive training programme was initiated. The 
spillover effects were to reach all federal organs, including federal offices located in the
267 The “social-security cardinals” represented the elite of Brazilian civil servants until the unification of all the 
social security institutes in 1967 (HOCHMAN, 1990). Although Beltrao left IAPI in the 1950s, his reputation 
followed him for the rest o f his career.
268 Decree 63500, 31 October 1968.
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states. But ERA neither attained the influence of EPEA nor the degree of institutional 
consolidation of its counterpart.
The climax of the process of the mobilisation of public opinion around the public 
administration reform was a national workshop held in Rio de Janeiro in October 1968. The 
administrative reform momentum was magnified by the organisation of Administrative 
Reform Week, a seminar on successful experiences in administrative reform (Brazil -  
Ministerio da Justi?a, 1969). Costa e Silva’s presence gave some importance to the event and 
signalled Beltrao’s prestige as well as the President’s support for his initiatives. The year 
ended with the choice of two “laboratory states” to test the project and the studies for the 
“Joao da Silva”269 project. Beltrao was obsessed with the idea of reorganising the public 
sector from the perspective of the ordinary citizen, as a forerunner of the customer-oriented 
models of public services. He relied on his own prior experiences to reform the ministries’ 
priorities. But the political events that invaded the media in December eclipsed the 
achievements made.
4.6.3. Discontinuity and change
In 1968 the administration had faced a gradual increase in pressure from social movements 
consisting mostly of students and labour unions (Skidmore, 1988). The economic situation 
was unable to distribute the gains from the recessive policies of the previous years. Antonio 
Delfim Neto, the Minister of Finance, occupied the economic centre stage. The political
269 Joao da Silva is one of the most common names in Brazil. It was a name that had a communicational concern 
with meeting the needs of ordinary citizens, a typical manifestation of Beltrao’s public relations and marketing 
gifts.
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atmosphere was increasingly polarised by the main opposition forces and the government. 
The confrontation culminated with a speech given by an opposition congressman, which was 
considered unacceptable by the hardliners. In spite of Costa e Silva's insistence, even 
congressmen of the party in power joined the opposition, refusing permission to prosecute 
the rebellious congressman. This incident was the final pretext for a further hardline 
ultimatum. In the previous administration the authoritarian regime had acted within self­
defined limits of “revolutionary legality” (Almeida, 1967: 66), which were always stretched 
farther out when power struggles within the military forced se required. The administration’s 
reaction represented a further rupture because it closed down Congress and established a de 
facto dictatorship. Costa e Silva signed Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) in December 1968, and 
Beltrao reluctantly signed it. The return to democracy was postponed indefinitely.
The political meaning of Beltrao’s presence in the administration had crumbled. The de- 
bureaucratisation credo no longer fit in with the political environment and the consequences 
of the policy quickly appeared. The administrative reform proposal lost its relative 
importance in view of other, proposals for, national development turbinated by EPEA’s 
activities and the flourishing of a new economic model with military support.
The subsequent events of 1969 -  the emergence of terrorism, Costa e Silva’s stroke, the 
forces against the Vice-president. Pedro Aleixo, who was barred from assuming the 
Presidency, and the Military Junta -  brought about Beltrao loss of interest in continuing in 
government. General Medici was appointed by the college of generals to be the winning 
candidate in the indirect presidential election, conducted in Congress. The future president 
invited Beltrao to remain in the Ministry, but he decided to step down in favour of his
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deputy, Reis Veloso, a young Ph.D. economist who had recently returned from the U.S.A. 
and who had been in charge of IPEA.
Beltrao expressed his frustration and disappointment in his farewell speech at the Ministry of 
Planning, when he transferred position he had declined to his deputy and successor Reis 
Velloso.
“We were personally in charge of the reform and we put all the Ministry of 
Planning’s resources to work on it. But the administrative reform lost intensity 
and impetus from 1969 on. It did not achieve its final objectives, which were 
simplification and de-bureaucratisation” (Oliveira: 1984: 14).
Administrative reform remained an ever-reiterated aspiration, not a realisation, as one of their 
policy formulators later admitted. “The reform bureaucratised itself”.270
Administrative reform became institutionalised as a formal structure in the Ministry of 
Planning. The Department of Modernisation and Administrative Reform (SEMOR) was set 
up to implement the administrative reform throughout the Executive Branch. SEMOR made 
intensive use of contracting practices. The alleged justifications included urgency, the lack of 
expertise of the direct administration, and the efficient use of human and financial resources 
(Ochs and Pinto, 1973: 135-6).
In spite of the adverse context, DASP, now a forgotten institution -  persisted with its original 
-  now narrowed -  mandate. Law 3780 of 1960 had classified all public sector employees 
under a single classification system regardless of whether they were civil servants recruited 
via merit-based competitions, functionaries contracted under private employment legislation,
270 ElH/Br/28.
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or professionals on short-term contract bases. According to DASP, however, no more than 
10% were obliged to participate in public competitive selection processes (Wahrlich, 1970: 
21). A Civil Servant Administrative Reform Commission271 was set up and resulted in a final 
effort to implement a policy based on functionaries’ merit, by approving a new career law. 
Once more DASP presented the implementation of the merit system as an absolutely 
minimum requirement to achieve national development (Wahrlich, 1970: 8-9). The struggle 
for a merit system again attempted to provide the public sector with a Career Plan through
' j n ' j
Law 5645 -  10 December 1970. This legislation was aimed at providing the guidance and 
legal parameters needed to position all civil services in the Federal Government and 
autonomous governmental agencies. However, DASP did not have the power to implement, 
nor was the government interested in regenerating the direct administration. The historical 
attempt to organise the federal civil service came too late in view of the ongoing process of 
state expansion through private-like organisations. To make matters worse, the salaries in the 
direct administration were no longer competitive within the Executive because of fiscal 
constraints. Government expansion occurred basically through the . indirect administration, 
where quasi-private rules and wages governed the modus operandi of SOEs, foundations and 
autonomous government agencies (Wahrlich, 1974: 43). In the early 1970s it was evident 
that Brazil had failed once again to implement a civil service reform although the 
organisational landscape of the public sector had completely changed.
" Decree 64335,9 April 1969.
272 This piece o f legislation also re-created conditions for internal vertical mobility within the public sector, as 
had Law 3780 of 1960. In practical terms these provisions helped guarantee a captive market for lower-level 
civil servants, since new open public competitive selection processes were conditioned by the exhaustion of the 
previous internal possibilities of internal selections (Guerzoni, 1996: 46). This possibility was eliminated only 
in the 1988 Constitution, thus doing away with this internal opportunistic and secret route to better positions.
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4.7. Conclusion: Analysis
There was a paradox in all the attempts at reform that took place between 1951 and 1963. 
They occurred simultaneously with contradictory practices that demoralised reform efforts, 
especially in the area of employment relations in the civil service. From time to time 
constitutional or ordinary legislation reclassified public-sector employees into permanent 
civil servants in various ways. While the reformist efforts were typical in the first months of 
presidential terms of office, the needed legislation was approved only near the ends of these 
terms. Estimates of the number of public functionaries that had been recruited on the basis of 
merit never went above 10% between the 1930s and the 1960s. (Medeiros, 1970: 46).
Between 1964 and 1967 the tone of the reform was unmistakably managerial -  an 
international novelty at the time -  but engineered in terms of hybrid policy formulation. 
Performance management, orientation of citizens, and performance auditing were some of 
the elements incorporated into the policy proposal. They were innovative in terms of the 
Brazilian and -  to a certain extent -  the international debate of the times, which was still 
dominated by a functionalist perspective of administrative reforms.
The process of policy formulation benefited from dialogue with experts from the U.S.A., UK 
and France. Public management and macro-economic policies were put together in an 
innovative and coherent way to enable the country to overcome the economic crisis it had 
inherited from the previous administration.
273 Medeiros’s (1970: 47) legislation included the 1946 Constitution (as well as the Constitutions of 1934, 1937, 
and 1967), the 1952 Statute of Civil Servants, and Laws 2284 o f 1954, 3483 of 1958, 3966 and 3967 of 1961, 
4054 o f 1962,4069 of 1962, and 4242 of 1963.
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The political context affected the issue career at critical junctures during the process. 
Conflicts in policy solutions and competition for political protagonism made the alternative 
specification process more difficult than expected. Personal, political, and policy differences 
within the commission and with the military forces meant lost time in coming to a 
conclusion. Even more impressive was the administration’s determination to insist on such a 
significant policy change for three turbulent years in spite of the difficulties involved in 
negotiating during this delicate political period. The President’s attention to the issue was 
intermittent but constant over time. An articulated and coherent proposal emerged only when 
the policy specification process was centralised under the control of the Minister of Planning 
and his key advisor.
Beltrao had the power and the resources to pursue his strategies later (Rose, 1993: 15), but he 
was not particularly concerned with securing the support of experts, and preferred to keep 
things simple.274 His conceptions of the problems were indeed simple, as were many of the 
solutions he offered. He was chosen minister because his personal values and behaviour were 
easily assimilated by the President. He could not have hoped for greater political support to 
deliver his proposals.
In his book, published after he left the government, Dias (1968: 32) expressed his 
disappointment with the lack of effective pressure for reform from inside the government in 
spite of the steps made to reduce the number of personnel. He listed seven factors responsible 
for this accommodation: lack of taxpayer mentality, lack of businessmen interest in public
274It is important to mention that Beltrao had a choice to make at that stage. Public administration was achieving 
the climax of its importance at that time. Undergraduate programs were mushrooming around the country. 
FGV’s expertise basis was expanding thanks to international co-operation programs supported by the Inter- 
American Development Bank and the return of the second generation of Ph.D. scholars trained abroad, usually 
in the U.S.A. (Gaetani, 2000). DASP and FGV were “expertise beacons” (Medeiros, 1970: 43) that Beltrao 
failed to incorporate into his efforts.
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affairs on the part of businessmen, labour union sympathies for clientelism, absence of 
critical mass, politicians' attachment to patronage practices, short-termism of the media, and 
absence of cumulative learning over time.275 Therefore the reforms depended on the 
voluntarism of a handful of self-motivated individuals instead of a permanent concern. This 
was far from being a momentary evaluation.
The perspective of a policy reversal (Hood, 1994) provides a plausible interpretation of the 
reform regarding its content. The policy reversal hypothesis was confirmed on the basis of 
the combined occurrence of its four constitutive elements. The 1937 reform outcomes had 
already run their course. DASP’s legacy had become self-defeating after thirty years of 
demoralised attempts to reinvent itself. New ideas were floating around, such as those 
regarding human relations, developmental planning, and PPBS. The political, economic, and 
social environment was also very different. Brazil had changed enormously in thirty years 
and had become a much more urbanised, industrialised and integrated country during the 
period, despite all its political instability. The transfer of the country’s capital from Rio de 
Janeiro to Brasilia enabled the unification of the country’s internal markets. Finally, there 
were changes in the dynamics of interests that expressed the new government’s alliances 
under the command of the military. The political forces were distinct and the conflicts of 
interests in the case were different from those that occurred during the Vargas dictatorship in 
the 1930s. The country faced new political and economic trade-offs hardly comparable with 
the process of building a nation-state seen at the beginning of the Vargas era. Finally, the 
presence of skilful entrepreneurs provided a catalyst for coupling the streams.
275 The well-known exceptions were the armed forces and the foreign affairs area where bureaucratic merit- 
based careers attached to training institutions were solidly established (Dias, 1968: 33).
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Entrepreneurial functions were performed not by a single individual but by a cluster of public 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, at the end of the process it took only one man to assemble the 
reform proposal. Once the reform had been approved, the default implementation model was 
then jeopardised, for four reasons. First, there were communications problems between the 
two main entrepreneurs responsible for the reform. The personal relationship between the 
public champion reformer, who took over the implementation process, and the 
entrepreneurial insider, who engineered the final proposal, deteriorated in detriment to a 
critical aspect of the package: control over the indirect administration by a Senior Corps of 
civil servants located at the direct administration level. Second, there was a shift of power 
between the planning and the financial policy sub-systems. Third, the institutionalisation of 
the reform vector was weak, personalised and improvised. It did not follow the robust model 
of institutional building adopted by the economists who were engaged in institutionalising 
the planning policy domain. Finally, there was a process of military radicalisation that led to 
the reversal of certain decentralising aspects of the reform, deemed unsuitable for the 
consolidation purposes of an even more authoritarian regime.
The indirect administration expanded on a private managerial basis -  based on clientelism in 
some cases and on merit in others. The career legislation approved in 1970 was soon 
undermined by strong career-minded people, primarily diplomats and tax inspectors. In 1974 
Decree-law 200 was amended by a law that practically removed administrative reform 
concerns from the government’s legislation and structures. A few months later another piece 
of ordinary legislation nearly reduced the traditional civil service to a historical residual 
workforce. From that moment on, private arrangements were to be made to hire people for
276 Law 6036, 1 May 1974.
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virtually anywhere in the entire public sector. A few months later diplomats, tax inspectors 
and the federal police managed to be exempted from the national career plan and set up 
special, specific schemes to regulate their respective areas.
277 Law 6185, 11 December 1974.
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Chapter 5
The reform of the State in the context of re-democratisation 
5.1 Introduction
The transition in Brazil from an authoritarian regime to democracy took place in the midst of 
a turbulent political environment. During one short period of five years (1985-1990) the 
country had four presidents, six finance ministers, four macro-economic stabilisation plans 
and a National Constituent Assembly that lasted eighteen months (from February 1987 to 
October 1988). A constitutional public management reform -  particularly regarding civil 
service and organisational design -  took place and immediately afterwards suffered two 
subsequent changes in direction as the result of political reshuffling while it was being 
transformed into ordinary legislation.
A Ministry of Administration without Portfolio was set up in March 1985 as part of the initial 
cabinet, in order to accommodate one of Neves’s and Samey’s pivotal political allies. In 
March 1986 the Ministry was transformed into an ordinary Ministry of Administration that 
absorbed the National Department of De-bureaucratisation -  until that time subordinated to 
the Presidency, the Office of Modernisation of the Ministry of Planning -  at that time 
organised as a Department of Planning of the Presidency (SEPLAN-PR). In September 1986 
the Ministry of Administration was reorganised as the Department of Public Administration 
(SEDAP-PR) -  directly subordinated to the Presidency, as SEPLAN-PR had been. Two years 
later, after the new Constitution was promulgated, SEDAP-PR was phased out and absorbed 
by SEPLAN-PR. In March 1990, the directly elected President Fernando Collor merged
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SEPLAN-PR with the Ministry of Finance and established the Ministry of the Economy. At 
the same time, he set up the Department of Federal Administration (SAF) with ministerial 
status, directly subordinated to the Presidency.
During the first two years, two commissions functioned as intermediate steps for scaling up 
the Public Administration platforms. In June 1985 President Samey set up a General 
Commission to take charge of the Reform of the Federal Public Administration. The General 
Commission was further divided into six sub-commissions. State reform was the main debate 
in the re-democratisation process. In February 1986 the Commission was phased out, its 
work having resulted in the political changes introduced soon after, in March 1986, at the 
same time the first macro-economic stabilisation plan was launched: the Cruzado Plan.
The appointment of Marcelino -  an advisor of the Ministry of Planning who had participated 
in the General Commission Works -  to be Alves’s deputy brought about a change in policy 
dynamics. Marcelino set a strategic plan into motion that he had designed with collaborators 
from the General Commission for Modernising the Federal Administration (Marcelino, 
1986). Another commission was later set up, first on an informal basis, called the Inter- 
Ministerial Executive Group for the Reform of Public Administration. Until August the 
group worked assiduously to prepare a package of policy proposals that led to the setting up 
of SEDAP-PR in September 1986. SEDAP-PR succeeded DASP -  that had existed for forty- 
eight years -  and formally absorbed the National Department of De-bureaucratisation and 
SEMOR.
The General Commission issued three guidelines at that time: rationalisation and reduction of 
public expenditures, formulation of a new human resources proposal (progressive public 
administration style), and rationalisation of the federal administrative structure. The first
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guideline aimed at strengthening the economic coordination capacities of the administration 
via the setting up of the Office of the Treasury, an organ of the Ministry of Finance. The 
second guideline aimed at providing the federal administration with a consistent human 
resources policy, and was based on careers and training structures inspired on the French 
model. The third guideline emphasised the need to update procurement procedures and called 
for the administrative reorganisation of specific public institutions (Marcelino, 1988: 52-55).
The next years were marked by other parallel events that deeply influenced the scope and 
dynamics of the policy proposals: the National Constituent Assembly278 the aggravation of 
the economic crisis that led to the launching of successive macro-economic stabilisation
->7Qplans following the Cruzado Plan, and the rapid turnover of ministers, especially those of 
the economic portfolios: Planning and Finance.
SEDAP-PR became involved in several fragmented tasks related to government 
reorganisation. The main proposals had to wait for the Constituent Assembly to take a 
position. The main innovations at that time included the setting up of a National School of 
Public Administration to form the apex of the new careers in the civil service, and convert 
private foundations under state control into public foundations, a juridical concept that was 
not included in Brazilian administrative law.
A further cabinet reshuffle in late 1987 brought a number of experienced technocrats into the 
Ministries of Planning and Finance, persons who had made their career during the 
authoritarian regime. An antagonism with SEDAP-PR immediately set in because of the way
278 The Congress that had been elected in November 1986 was transformed into a National Constituent 
Assembly in February 1987. The new Constitution was finally promulgated in October 1988.
279 The Bresser Plan in June 1987, the Summer Plan in January 1989, and the Collor Plan in March 1990.
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the economic team proposed to deal with the expenditures on public functionaries who faced 
the opposition to Alves.
Simultaneously, the Constituent Assembly provided another route for the specification of 
proposals of public management policies. SEDAP-PR sent its proposals -  related to the 
empowerment of the direct administration and to the adoption of a Single Juridical Regime 
for civil servants -  to Congress. A new Constitution was promulgated in October 1988 and 
its final text reflected SEDAP’s propositions. SEDAP-PR was phased out three months later 
and absorbed by SEPLAN-PR. A new course of action was pursued in 1989 to approximate 
the discussion on administrative reform to the planning tradition but the new initiative was 
aborted by the worsening economic situation and the extraordinarily high inflation rate, that 
had to be resolved by the first elected president in three decades. Collor de Mello adopted a 
different approach to public management reform: downsizing. But the proposal of a labour 
regime for civil servants had already advanced considerably and it was approved in 
December 1990.
The chapter is divided into five parts, including the conclusion. Diagram 3 provides a global 
view of the process. The period under analysis began in November 1984 and ended in 
December 1990, although the episode under investigation occurred between March 1985 and 
December 1988. The first phase -  from November 1984 to March 1985 -  included the events 
described above that clarify the beginning of the episode, and a short history of a new 
Ministry of Administration without Portfolio until SEDAP-PR was set up in September 1986. 
The second part began in September 1986 and ended in March 1990, and included the 
National Constituent Assembly (February 1987 to October 1988). The third period began 
with the new presidential term of office in March 1990 and ended in December 1990 with the
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approval of the new civil-service legislation. It also included Collor’s downsizing reforms. 
The conclusion analyses the episode in the light of the research questions presented below.
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The main questions to be answered in this chapter are: a) What event triggered off the 
process of specifying a policy proposal? (El); b) What explains the setting up of SEDAP- 
PR? (El); c) What explains the policy solution proposed by SEDAP-PR for personnel and for 
public organisation problems? (E2); d) What explains the setting up of an institution like the 
Ecole Nationale D \Administration in Brazil? (RE2); e) What explains the final constitutional 
outcome? (E3); f) To what extent did public entrepreneurship play a decisive role in the 
decisional process? (E3); g) What explains the extinction of SEDAP-PR? (CE2.2); h) What 
explains the approval of the Single Juridical Regime in December 1990? (LE3).
5.2. Gaining terrain within the political transition
5.2.1. A fragmented picture
The public sector looked like an ungovernable archipelago in the early 1980s. 
Industrialisation and modernisation were successfully achieved thanks partially to the 
implementation of the institutional arrangements established by the 1967 Constitution and 
Decree-law 200 but with an unaccountable bias (Castor and Franca, 1987: 15). The 
government did not have a global view of its own structures because of the fragmentation of 
public organisations and their degree of autonomy. The direct administration had merely 
residual importance at that time. The Executive governed mainly through appointed positions
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in the direct administration and, particularly, through the “indirect administration ”.
280 The indirect administration consisted of utility companies, industrial firms (some with private shareholders), 
educational and academic organisations, research institutes, financial institutions, public regulatory and 
normative agencies, public social-security bodies, social policy institutes, cultural foundations, information
The emerging multi-party system was characterised by the resurgence of personal politics, 
although these practices had never ceased in the previous decades and had been more 
predictable under the military (Cammack, 1985; Hagopian, 1996). The atypical 
circumstances of the transition also allowed populism to make a comeback, under political 
and partisan pressure to make room in the government for all the participants in the broad 
coalition that had backed Tancredo Neves. This problem was solved by expanding the 
ministries and setting up positions for appointed outsiders across the board.
Regarding personnel, the direct administration consisted of a few careers associated with 
exclusive state functions (diplomacy, policy, tax inspectors, procurement, military, and 
judges) and by the degraded structures responsible for infrastructure and social provision. 
The indirect administration consisted of a mixture of structures. Even though the formal rules
n o iwere the same for all sectors: one part was organised around professional principles and 
the other was based on clientelist principles. While some institutions became known as first- 
class bureaucracies, others were marked by clientelism and corruption. In principle the 
indirect administration was hierarchically subordinated to the direct administration but there 
were no institutional mechanisms capable of enforcing this hierarchy, except through 
interference by the top executive, who controlled all appointments in both the direct and 
indirect administrations.
technology firms, regional development structures, as well as a number of private firms absorbed by the State 
when they were faced with bankruptcy (Holanda, 1988).
281 Some o f these organisations also developed a strong esprit de corps. Given the autonomy of their 
development they emulated classical Weberian organisations, usually incorporating elements o f professional 
and machine bureaucracies, as was the case of the utilities, steel, oil, and chemical sectors. They were organised 
in such a way that the executive control depended on collective bargaining that enhanced the companies’ 
corporate power at the expense of the government’s ability to control them. These organisations felt “justified” 
in reinvesting profits and revenues in their employees as compensation for the government’s use of them for 
non-commercial purposes (Martins, 1995).
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The public sector was burdened down with numerous mutually aggravating problems (Piquet 
Cameiro, 1988: 3-4). Instead of improving performance or wages, increased expenditures on 
personnel added to the numbers of public functionaries and increased costs enormously. 
There was an increasing number of distortions in hiring processes because of the multiple 
mechanisms invented to get around DASP’s rigid control. Given the lack of discernment 
and appropriateness, internal and external control mechanisms were expanded and became 
more innocuous and counter-effective. Paradoxically, dynamic and profitable SOEs as well 
as other islands of excellence of the indirect administration saw their performance 
jeopardised because of the "control syndrome", usually motivated by financial concerns.
The responsibility for public management policies in the direct administration was split 
between three public bodies. DASP was reduced to a personnel department responsible for 
managing less than five percent of the public sector workforce. The Department for 
Modernisation and Administrative Reform (SEMOR) had become part of the Department of 
Planning and Coordination of the Presidency (SEPLAN-PR) since the early 1970s but its 
actions were no longer taken into account because of the boom in the indirect administration. 
The De-bureaucratisation Program -  organised as a federal office -  was a small sector 
subordinated to the Presidency, a faint reminder of Beltrao’s popular Ministry of De- 
bureaucratisation.283 The relevant sectors in charge of public policy management issues were 
financially motivated, namely, the Office of Control of SOEs, in SEPLAN-PR, and the Inter- 
ministerial Council of SOEs Salaries, in the Labour Ministry.
282 At the beginning of 1985 there were approximately 100,000 public functionaries classified 104 under special 
and emergency tables o f positions in the Plan of Positions established by Law 5645 of 1970 (Alves, 1987: 11- 
12).
283 For an analysis of the history of the Ministry o f De-bureaucratisation see Oliveira (1984).
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5.2.2. A politically motivated choice
After Neves’s election by Congress, Beltrao was invited to occupy a new ministry, set up to 
work on administrative reform and decentralisation because the states and municipalities 
were expected to assume new political, economic and social responsibilities. But Beltrao 
preferred to occupy the presidency of Petrobras, the country’s largest state-owned company, 
because he was interested in protecting the company from potential political interference.284
Initially, the setting up of the Ministry of Administration did not have policy connotations. 
Neves wanted a place for Alves in the Cabinet close to the Presidency. DASP had no 
ministerial status and Alves’s acceptance was conditioned to its being upgraded. Alves was 
appointed President of DASP and Minister without Portfolio, confirmed later by Samey, his 
old friend and ally from the years before the 1964 coup. Alves had been a decisive actor in
^ o r
persuading Neves to accept Samey on the opposition ticket and he was even closer to 
Samey than to Neves.
Alves had been the youngest deputy of the National Constituent Assembly of 1946 and had 
belonged to the same party as Samey from 1946 to 1964. He had also been governor of a 
north-eastern state and a member of PMDB in the mid-1980s. He aspired to a position in a 
more important ministry, such as Infrastructure, Transportation, or Mines and Energy, but, 
politically, his credentials and political weight were not enough for him to achieve his 
ambitions.
Initially, Alves’s Ministry was responsible only for overseeing DASP, a training centre, and 
the Governmental Property Department. But the expectations regarding some sort of State
284 E2H/Br/13.
285 E2H/Br/13.
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reorganisation were enormous. Alves was successful in persuading Samey that
administrative reform was an appealing theme.
5.2.3. Scaling up
Samey’s first concerns regarding the problem of public administration were a conventional 
script: governmental coordination and modernisation (Samey, 1985). The theme did not 
occupy an important place in the President’s priorities. But thanks to pressure from Alves, in 
June Samey named a general commission to draw up a Master Plan for Reforming of the 
Federal Administration. Alves chaired the commission, which included four other members, 
his vice-minister, a representative of the National Department of De-bureaucratisation, a 
representative of the Ministry of Finance, and a representative of the Ministry of Planning.
The Commission was divided into thematic sub-groups that presented their conclusions in a 
disperse way in early 1986, a few weeks before the launching of a first macro-economic 
stabilisation plan. The suggestions included themes such as the re-organisation of the 
federal administration and procurement legislation, but the focal point was human resources. 
The proposals included the setting up of a career policy, an elitist human resources approach, 
a reduction in the number of appointed positions in favour of professional civil servants, the 
setting up of a national personnel database, and the adoption of a Single Juridical Regime for 
the public sector.
286 The sub-commissions were: Organisation of the Direct and Indirect Administration; Human Resources; 
Treasury Programming System; General Administrative Services; De-Bureaucratisation, Decentralisation and 
Simplification; and Projects and Norms. The setting up of the Office o f the Treasury at the Finance Ministry 
was the most important outcome o f the Treasury Sub-Commission’s work in early 1986.
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In March 1986 Alves invited Marcelino -  Ministry of Planning’s representative on the 
Commission -  to be his vice-minister, as part of a broader jurisdictional redefinition. 
Marcelino had been Alves’s Secretary of Planning in the State of Rio Grande do Norte in the 
1960s. He was an academic at the University of Sao Paulo when the Ministry of Planning 
invited him to be the Secretary of Modernisation. The appointment of Marcelino to the 
position of vice-minister provided the Ministry of Administration with formulation capacities 
that Alves’s team lacked287 and, at the same time, established a strong relationship between 
him and the Minister of Planning, Joao Sayad.
Marcelino realized that governmental planning had lost importance since 1979, together with 
budgeting, and modernisation, as a result of the economic centralisation in the final years of 
the authoritarian regime. There were no coordination policies in the so-called New Republic. 
Regarding public management, Marcelino’s initial concerns were with reversing the 
processes of phasing out DASP, SEMOR, and the De-bureaucratisation program. The 
diagnosis made by Marcelino (1988: 46) pointed out five general dysfunctional problems: the 
collapse of governmental planning, insufficiency of policy coordination and implementation 
mechanisms, separation of planning from management, absence of modernising capacities, 
lack of a human resources policy, and abandonment of the personnel development area. 
These problems caused and reinforced escapism from the direct to the indirect 
administration, the demoralisation of traditional civil servants, administrative discontinuity, 
and a decline in the importance of the issue in public opinion. To tackle these multiple 
problems, the ministry set up an executive group to take further steps that required inter- 
ministerial support -  later formalised as the Executive Group for Administrative Reform 
(GERAP). This organ had representatives from the ministries of Administration, Planning,
287 “Marcelino joined the team but he remained an outsider to Alves’s “nest” from the beginning till the end of 
their partnership” (E3L/Br/39).
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Finance, Labour, and Chief of Staff. The group worked intensely between April and August 
to prepare a set of measures to be adopted by the government.
5.2.4. Building a promising but premature peak
? oo
The adoption of the first package of policy measures was announced in September 1986. 
The Ministry of Administration was upgraded, and became a special office directly 
subordinated to the Presidency (SEDAP-PR), with the same status as the Planning Ministry 
(SEPLAN-PR). The enhancement of the policy status was an important move within the 
context of a political strategy aimed at strengthening the Presidency both politically and 
administratively. It also aimed at expanding ministerial jurisdiction over the indirect 
administration.
Three axes provided guidance to the decisions taken at that time: rationalisation, human 
resources policy, and reduction of public expenditures. The setting up of SEDAP-PR was 
not an isolated political event but part of a broader package of administrative measures which 
also included the setting up of the national personnel database,290 a payroll management
001 000 oo^system, auditing of personnel procedures, the new SOEs’ monitoring of mechanisms, 
the administrative routines of the national attorney,294 and the National School for Public
288 The government used the mechanism o f decree-laws to launch them. Decree-laws were a mechanism left 
over from the authoritarian regime, consisting of laws issued by the President that needed no approval from 
Congress.
289 Decree 93211, 3 September 1986.
290 Decree 93213, 3 September 1986.
291 Decree 93214, 3 September 1986.
292 Decree 93215, 3 September 1986.
293 Decree 93216,3 September 1986.
294 Decree 93237, 8 September 1986.
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Administration (ENAP). The cascade of relevant administrative measures was followed by
other important acts that involved the phasing out of four SOEs and other public 
organisations,296 governmental councils and boards, and regional offices of the Federal 
Government; the juridical clarification of the concept of public foundation governed by 
private personnel and accounting legislation (a de facto reality); the approval of new updated 
purchasing legislation; the reorganisation of the statistics institute and a national bank; the
907updating of procurement legislation, and the intergovernmental decentralisation of some 
SOEs via transfer of share control to the states (Pimenta, 1993).
The situation of the foundations controlled by the State but functioning according to private 
personnel and accountancy legislation was solved by setting up of a new juridical public 
sector figure298 -  the public foundations -  an innovation that the National Constituent 
Assembly would later suppress.
Marcelino brought in a reputed public executive, Nilson Holanda -  former president of the 
Banco do Brasil and a Ph.D. from JFK/Harvard -  to structure the National School of Public 
Administration. Holanda had diagnosed the reform of the State at that time, suggesting that it 
should be attacked in three fundamental dimensions: political-institutional, economic- 
financial, and administrative-managerial. A multi-purpose reform was deemed essential in 
order to simultaneously face a heterogeneous group of problems: state economic 
interventionism, public deficit, the low quality of public services, the gigantism of the 
indirect administration, clientelism and corporatism, formalism and patrimonialism, lack of 
coordination and public policies, absence of a human-resources policy, and managerial
295 Decree 93277,9 September 1986.
296 Decrees 93063, 93068 and 93612.
297 Decree-Law 2300.
298 Decrees 2299/1986 and 7596/1987.
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inefficiency. Marcelino shared Holanda’s main concerns but was pragmatic in terms of the 
limits of the possibilities for reform. He was aware of the Administration’s difficulties as 
well as of the impossibility of tackling all public management coordination problems in the 
presence of a nearly un-govemable coalition. 299
The Executive Branch had adopted an intensive escapist strategy in previous decades in the 
context of the non-democratically accountable military dictatorship (Marcelino, 1987). The 
legal framework of the period from 1967 to 1984 allowed for the emergence of collaborative 
and often collusive relationships between private enterprise and the State. But
"a relationship that enhances economic performance is probably not in 
equilibrium because it is subject to strong corruption temptations" (Schneider 
and Maxfield, 1997: 5).
In the absence of gatekeeper meritocratic bureaucracy capable of working as an obstacle 
against corruption, the frontiers between benign collaboration and collusion became blurred.
The Administration won the elections for governors and a majority in Congress in 1986. In 
the aftermath of the elections the macro-economic plan was blown up, followed by an 
international moratorium in February. The beginning of 1987 saw a succession of economic 
problems -  domestic inflation, international default, and others -  that distracted the Federal 
Executive’s attention and reshaped the face of the Administration.
299 ElH/Br/23 and E3L/RJ/39.
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5.3. Policy making in the context of the unexpected decline of SEDAP-PR
5.3.1. Turnover at the top
On the economic front two important changes took place at the end of the first half of 1987: 
the Minister of Planning was replaced by a traditional politician close to Samey, and a new 
Minister of Finance was appointed in April 1987. Ulysses Guimaraes -  the president not only 
of PMDB, but also of Congress and the Constituent Assembly -  overruled Samey’s 
preferences and forced the appointment of Bresser Pereira,300 a reputed heterodox economist 
aligned with PMDB’s positions.
Institutional reforms had occurred in the two economic ministries -  Planning and Finance -
in 1987, and both were running out of staff. The ministries had often borrowed cadres from
institutions such as the Central Bank, the Banco do Brasil, and some SOEs -  an alternative
that was more difficult because of administrative constraints. Most occupants of appointed
positions had been hired on provisional or private types of contractual arrangements. The
instability of their staffs coincided with an organised effort to untangle the institutional
conditions of macro-economic policy-making regarding budgeting processes, cash flow, and
0^1the relationships with monetary authorities.
The two ministries also set up two careers to fulfil their needs for personnel. These careers 
were established through administrative procedures, i.e., by those who were working in these 
areas as civil servants, located in both careers. SEDAP-PR assisted both ministries in 
carrying out the administrative acts regarding the setting up of the new organisational forms
300 Bresser Pereira launched a new macro-economic stabilisation plan, but without political presidential support, 
popular response, and economic credibility.
301 ElH/Br/53.
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and the new careers. A third administrative career -  consisting of those working in human 
resources and administrative matters -  were unable to catch up. They were not organised 
well enough and were not prepared to push through their proposals. Bresser Pereira -  the 
Minister of Finance -  therefore decided not to include them in the project decided to keep 
them out of the initiative.
Bresser Pereira launched a second macro-economic plan in mid-1987, but without effective 
presidential support the plan failed to move ahead. At the end of the year the economic team 
was again reshuffled. The new ministers were experienced technocrats from the authoritarian 
regime who did not sympathise with Alves’s ideas and populist profile. In February 1988 
Alves joined up with the Minister of Labour and the military forces in order to curb attempts 
to freeze the salaries of the public functionaries. In April he was forced to agree to a two- 
month freeze. A confrontation with the economic team (the Ministries of Planning and of 
Finance) thus arose.
During the year Alves increasingly distanced himself from the inner decision-making circle 
that surrounded President Samey. The Minister of Chief of Staff, the Minister of Planning, 
and the Minister of Finance shared the impression that Alves was a traditional politician 
characterised by clientelistic practices and not committed to macro-economic stabilisation. 
Alves had also successfully introduced a thirteenth monthly wage (year-end bonus) -  typical 
of private contracts -  for the civil servants, another blow to the economic team’s efforts to 
keep down public expenses.
302 This decision suggested that the economic area lacked interest in merit principles and a self-serving view of  
the situation of the personnel hired on provisional bases (E3L/Br/35 and E2H/Br/36).
303 ElH/Br/53.
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Accusations of corruption also arose concerning Alves, that were grouped and magnified in 
order to convince the President that his minister was a dangerous ally. The opportunity came 
after the National Constituent Assembly had concluded the Constitution ended its job. The 
federal executive had lost resources and competencies to states and municipalities. Within 
the context of the “Operation Dismantling”, championed by the economic team, SEDAP-PR 
was phased out and the Ministry of Planning absorbed the functions of SEDAP.304
5.3.2. An autonomous National Constituent Assembly
The macro-economic situation was deteriorating rapidly (the Minister of Finance had 
declared moratorium in February 1967). During this same period, Ulysses Guimaraes, 
President of both the Chamber of Deputies and PMDB, convoked the National Constituent 
Assembly. The latent dual executive power that was put in place after Tancredo Neves died 
became manifest...The country’s full attention became focused on the legislature that had 
been elected in November 1986, and the entire juridical basis suddenly became subject to 
overall revision. PMDB’s formal majority was ineffective, as coalitions were organised by 
theme rather than along party lines.
Due to the weakness of Samey’s Administration and the progressive deterioration of the 
economic situation, the President decided to adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude in view of the 
events taking place in the National Constituent Assembly. His only official contribution was
304 Immediately after being fired Alves faced inquiries by the TCU
and the Supreme Court o f Justice regarding procurement transactions. Samey tried to appoint him to the 
Supreme Military Court but resistance was enormous. The solution was to name him an officer of a SOE under 
the Ministry of Energy (Abreu et al., 2001: 163). In 1990 he was again elected deputy for his state. In 1993 he 
became President Itamar Franco’s Minister of Regional Integration. Marcelino returned to the Ministry of  
Planning where he was given specific tasks.
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to appoint a commission of notables305 to draft a Constitution. Executive pressure was 
exercised fundamentally on voting two critical political issues: the type of political regime 
and the duration of the President’s term of office. The main consequence of Samey’s 
position was that the constitutional outcomes in general reflected the decisions made by 
deputies and those resulting from straggles among interest groups.
Except in a few cases, the policy outcomes of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) 
generally diverged from guidelines emanating from the Executive. One rare point of 
consensus was the need to re-establish the bureaucratic merit system in the constitutional text 
-  in fact to reiterate it, because it had always been there. But five other decisions consisted of 
surprises The first was the adoption of the Single Juridical Regime for the entire public 
sector. The second was the subordination of all types of administrative changes in the
0^7Executive -  only -  to Congress. The third was the extension of civil service rights and 
benefits to all employees of the public sector contracted under private law. The fourth was 
that the NCA re-introduced the principle of isonomy to align salaries in the three powers. 
Finally, the rales of retirement for civil servants -  per years worked -  were reiterated.
The National Constituent Assembly was not a faceless body. Each topic had its champions. 
The Administration’s project and the mood of Congressmen were convergent regarding the 
organisational design. The power of Congress over the direct administration was considered 
essential for the re-establishment of democratic accountability, i.e., the supremacy of elected
305 The resulting draft was welcomed by the Constituent Assembly but ignored. The parts of the text regarding 
public administration generally coincided with the final provisions: a single pro-regime court system, pro­
classic bureaucracy, avoidance of hybrid types of organisations, pro-career system, etc. (Ferreira Filho, 1987).
306 Samey used his patronage powers, especially in the telecommunications sector, to guarantee the victory of 
the presidential regime. The first draft o f the new Constitution had presumed a parliamentary regime and five- 
year terms o f office for presidents. Plans were that the six-year term of office would be reduced to four.
307 The fact that the Executive lost its self-organising prerogatives while Congress and the Judiciary acquired 
this capability was an indication of changes in the balance o f power among the three branches and a symptom 
of the weakness of the Executive during the Constituent Assembly.
308 This principle of isonomy meant identical wages for identical jobs.
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politicians over appointed officials and public organisations that were not part of the direct 
administration. Leading figures in the Judicial Branch had never agreed with setting up 
hybrid organisations such as public foundations, a concept that had no place in Brazilian 
administrative law. Neither was it an appealing theme. It had no sponsors in the debate and 
was therefore suppressed without difficulty.309
The approval of the Single Juridical Regime was a case of impressive unanimity. No one 
opposed the adoption of this proposal during its course through the NCA commissions. In 
addition, the transitory provisions made it possible to re-classify thousands of employees as 
civil servants (Santos, 1997; MARE, 1995). It was a popular and appealing issue,310 and 
powerful lobbies were organized and sought to influence the work of the members of 
Congress. Moreover, champions to fight their causes were found, such as Geraldo Campos
Til(PSDB), the most visible leader for the proposal but by no means the only one.
Campos had been elected by Brasilia -  the Federal District -  that had elected deputies for the 
first time. Functionaries of all types formed his constituency. But there was an additional 
detail: he himself had gone through a similar situation during the Goulart Administration. At 
that time he was a union leader representing employees who had worked for private firms on 
the construction of the city of Brasilia in the late 1950s and the 1960s. He had also 
participated in successful negotiations that reclassified all these workers as civil servants. He
309 E1H/MG/52.
310 The adoption o f the Single Juridical Regime was particularly appealing to functionaries who had been 
working under private arrangements, because of the different legislations regarding tenure and retirement. The 
labour situation o f civil servants was regulated by the Statute of Civil Servants and by the constitutional 
provisions that granted them tenure and full wages upon retirement. Employees in the private sector, on the 
other hand, could be fired and were subject to a maximum of ten minimum monthly wages upon retirement.
311 Irma Passoni (PT) and Miro Teixeira (PMDB -  former Vice-minister to Alves) were examples of other 
important supporters of the proposal.
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knew it was possible and he was aware of the fact that the more politicised the theme was, 
the less risk of defeat there would be.312
High officials in the Ministries of Planning and Finance, as well as isolated voices from the 
team at SEDAP, began making noise about some of the decisions emanating from the
' X 1 'XNCA. These zealous technocrats were concerned with the financial impact of extending 
civil-servants’ rights to the public-sector workforce that had been contracted under the 
private labour legislation. According to SEDAP, in 1998 the Federal Government had 
144,000 civil servants working under the 1952 Statute of Civil Service (most of them had 
been “transformed” into civil servants through political administrative acts such as laws 
approved in 1963 and 1967). The other 563,000 public sector employees were working under 
private employment legislation.314
Marcelino, the Finance Minister realised that the extension of tenure and retirement rights to 
thousands of functionaries would represent a time-bomb for the social security budget, 
jeopardised by the maintenance of the right to retire on the basis of years worked, rather than 
on age. If implemented, the Single Juridical Regime would increase the public deficit. 
Marcelino was more concerned with the over-reaction against the advances of Decree-law 
200, enacted in 1967, meaning the comeback of a homogeneous legalist view of the State.
312 PlH/Br/54.
313 ElH/Br/53 and E2H/Br/32.
314 The private legislation called for higher labour costs, subordination to the Labour Courts, collective contracts 
signed with unions, contributions to social security and saving accounts for housing. Although employees 
subject to private legislation did not have tenure in the public sector, they enjoyed it de facto. But they were not 
able to retire with full wages and, as mentioned above, were subject to a limit o f ten times the minimum 
monthly wage, often lower than the average salaries in the public sector.
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These warnings failed to produce effect, for three reasons: the President’s posture, the 
dynamics of the NCA, and inflation "fog".315
5.3.3. Loss of momentum of the reform
The year of 1987 saw a decline in SEDAP’s importance. The intensification of the economic 
crisis forced increasing concentration of decisions in the hands of the economic team. But the 
political command of the country was shared between Ulysses Guimaraes, the prominent 
National Constituent Assembly president, and Jose Samey, the low-profile but true President 
of Brazil. SEDAP’s activism and impetus slowed down and was reduced to incremental 
actions, especially on one front: human resources development via the establishment of the 
National School for Public Administration (ENAP).
By 1987 it was becoming clear that the problems caused by the reforms aimed at improving 
the State’s capacity could not be faced. In fact, ENAP was emerging as the only proposal that 
was progressing in the political turbulence of the convocation of the National Constituent 
Assembly. It was apparently inoffensive and had political appeal. The Executive Branch had 
decided not to operate in conflict with the National Constituent Assembly on important 
matters, and preferred to wait for the new legal framework before taking the initiative.
The important legal innovation of the period was the setting up of the juridical figure of 
public foundations -  something previously unthinkable within the juridical parameters of the 
country, because foundations were, by definition, private organisations. This initiative was an
315 The inflation -  at two digits per month, and rising -  destroyed any possibility of meaningful economic 
calculations, even in the government’s own accounting.
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attempt to settle a long strike by teachers and employees of public universities -  some of 
which were classified as autonomous government agencies and others as private foundations. 
The duality had become impossible to deal with. The hybrid solution was confusing and was 
not well received by the judicial community. But because the mechanism of decree-laws -  
inherited from the authoritarian regime -  was still available, the government went on with the 
project. The idea was to wait for a more conclusive positioning from the NCA in order to 
deal with the issue in the context of a new organic law for the entire public sector.
The small reform team evaluated that the best way to rebuild institutional capacities in the 
direct administration was by adopting a fast-track recruitment process oriented to the creation 
of a bureaucratic elite -  the “best and the brightest” approach. The model adopted was 
inspired on the French enarque model of training and recruitment of higher officials. The 
focus on ENAP represented an attempt to preserve the positive appeal of the public debate 
about administrative reform by concentrating on a promising topic. The ENAP project 
increasingly became the locus of multiple expectations that perceived the “new-blood” 
recruited elite as the instrument for implementing a new utopia. Civil Service Reform 
became the solution for the consolidation of democracy, equitative promotions, and public- 
policy implementation.
Three episodes weakened the initiative of founding the school at its earliest moments: the
17negative reaction from the academic community, the cynicism of the technocrats regarding 
the initiative, and the resignation of the first director of the school. The academic public 
administration community in Brazil was weak but represented the higher-education 
establishment with great prestige within a context of transition. The failure to muster the
316 ElH/Br/23.
317 E3M/Br/4.
226
support of the few teaching and researching centres to the ambitious initiative represented a 
blow to the credibility of the project (Cavalcanti, 1981).318 The technocracy in Brasilia 
simply did not take the initiative seriously. They could not believe in an initiative led by a 
populist politician who intended to transform a handful of young professionals recruited on 
the basis of a single public competitive selection process into the country’s elite, bypassing 
generations of highly experienced cadres, most of them belonging the “pockets of 
excellence” of the country. Holanda’s resignation in November 1987 meant the loss of 
Marcelino’s closest policy operator. Holanda was a well-known technocrat with impressive 
academic and executive credentials, and was performing strategic functions in close
11 Qinteraction with Marcelino. His resignation was precipitated by clashes over the 
controversial behaviour of members of Alves’s team in traditionally sensitive areas. He 
resigned because he disagreed with political interference that jeopardised the credibility of 
the national school project (Holanda, 1989). Holanda’s "departure" hurt the initiative on 
ethical and reputational grounds and caused a loss of momentum and impetus for the project.
In late October 1987 Alves sent his reform proposal320 to Samey. It consisted of the setting 
up of a Single Juridical Regime for all functionaries of the direct administration, a proposal 
to reclassify functionaries hired by private autonomous government agencies and public 
foundations as civil servants, a draft of a civil-servants’ statute, and a career plan (Abreu et 
al., 2001: 163).
SEPLAN-PR backed the project that proposed the automatic reclassification of public-sector 
employees as civil servants on the grounds of its being a short-term cost reduction for the
318 A3L/RJ/51 and A2L/RJ/40.
319 Holanda (1985a, 1985b, 1986a, and 1986b) and E3L/RJ/39 and ElH/Br/23.
320 Project of law 4058,25 October 1989.
321 Decree-law 2.403,21 December 1987.
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Executive Branch. The labour costs of active civil servants represented 5% of their wages -  
and were channelled to the Treasury -  while the payroll of active employees under private 
labour legislation reached 23,5%. The justification for the proposal recognised that these 
“new-born civil servants” would have the right to full pensions but they would be expected to 
pay for them in the future, a scheme that was never put into practice. No studies were made 
regarding the impact on social security because, with inflation above 20% per month, the 
difference between a social security deficit and a huge surplus shifted from one month to the 
next. SEPLAN-PR did not agree with the proposal but nevertheless decided to send it to 
Congress, following the President’s orientation. This was Alves’s last victory. But at that 
stage SEPLAN-PR was already working from another perspective, with everything on the 
stove but leaving the final decision to the next government (ElH/Br/53, E2M/Br/21 and 
E2H/Br/32).
5.3.4. The country comes to terms with its new Constitution
The new institutional arrangements for the State apparatus as determined by the Constitution 
transformed the new constitution into a “monument to old problems” (Schon, 1973). 
Operational costs of the Brazilian public administration became rigid due to the new 
legislation, and inflation masked the costs of the decisions taken by the Constituent 
Assembly. The outcome was a trap of inflexibility because the legal constraints failed to 
match the volatile reality of the mathematics of the economy.
A structural adjustment of the federal Executive Branch became imperative after the 
“Citizenship Constitution” was promulgated in October 1988. The allocation of resources
228
among the three branches of government had changed and the 1989 budget had to express the 
new reality in the country. Inflation was once again skyrocketing towards hyperinflation. The 
government took two simultaneous moves: a deep cut in public expenditures that included 
reducing the number of ministries -  called “Operation Dismantle” -  and one more macro- 
economic stabilisation attempt -  the Summer Plan.
SEDAP-PR was not a simple cause of Operation Dismantle. The formal argument was the 
extinction of all five ministries that had been established in March 1985, in order to reduce 
government costs. The real motive was the importance of ousting Alves from the 
government, as he was not aligned with the economic team’s efforts to contain public 
expenditures.322 Besides, the charges of corruption against him were accumulating and on the 
brink of becoming public.
Two protagonists emerged at that time: the Vice-minister of Planning, Ricardo Santiago, and 
the new President of ENAP, Antonio Octavio Cintra. Santiago was an IPEA economist who 
had been involved in the efforts exerted by the Finance and Planning Ministries to stabilise 
the economy, but he had also been involved in the initiatives that led to the setting up of the 
Treasury and Budgeting Departments, and their internal careers. Cintra was a political 
scientist who had been the President of the Joao Pinheiro Foundation in Minas Gerais before 
becoming involved in higher education policy-making. Both had taken their Ph.D.s at 
American Universities and both were particularly sensitive to problems related to the 
qualitative deficit of human capital in the Federal Administration. They also shared a public
322 ElH/Br/53.
323 In fact they exploded a few weeks later and made Alves’s appointment to the Supreme Military Court 
impossible. The dossier was produced by an unusual alliance of control watchdogs and national information 
services that had served the military regime (ElH/Br/55 and E3L/Br/35).
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policy view of planning and administration problems324 but with reservations regarding 
Alves’ hopes of creating a French-style National School of Administration in the tropics.
SEPLAN-PR did not discontinue SEDAP-PR’s initiatives regarding the Single Juridical 
Regime, the plan of careers, and the civil-service statute. Marcelino was invited to become 
Ricardo Santiago’s deputy and continued working as a trouble-shooter for the government in 
administrative matters. But Santiago and Cintra decided to amend the ENAP project. The 
commitment to the “govemmental-manager” trainees was maintained -  but not on the basis 
that had been previously suggested -  and three selections for new career bureaucrats for 
the Ministries of Finance and Planning were held. The career of governmental managers was 
effectively set up some months later.
In 1989, ENAP was upgraded, and took over the training centre where it had been incubated. 
Public competitive selection processes were organized for the Treasury and Budgeting 
careers. The career for the public managers who had been selected in the previous year was 
then established. The course was reshaped in order to incorporate a public-policy approach in 
the disciplines taught. For six months the students were sent to work in public institutions as 
trainees. IPEA -  the Ministry of Planning’s powerful think tank -  launched a journal that 
signalled the new approach, named Planning and Public Policy. At the end of Samey’s term 
of office the first class of "governmental managers" had graduated and three groups of
324 ElH/Br/53, E3M/Br/4 and E3L/Br/37.
325 The adjectives used to designate the previous project were revealing The opinions varied from over- 
ambitious, unrealistic, and inadequate to irresponsible, perverse, and egocentric (E3M/Br/4, E3L/Br/37, 
A3L/RJ/51, A2L/RJ/40).
326 The first promotion included a national public competitive selection process that involved 70,000 candidates 
for 120 positions.
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budget and treasury analysts were promoted, although on a more instrumental and pragmatic 
basis than the former group.327
At the same time, Cintra organised four national events in different regions of the country in 
order to discuss the implementation of the reforms approved by the new Constitution. Each 
seminar aimed at analysing the problems related to the implementation of a career plan and 
the consequences of the adoption of the Single Juridical Regime. All events reiterated the 
importance of adopting a career plan in order to modernise the State, in spite of a more 
cautious approach on the part of the organisers.
The Career Plan that Alves had sent to Congress in December 1988 was not voted on and, 
due to one of the transitory provisions of the new Constitution, therefore rejected by 
Congress. But SEPLAN-PR set up task forces for three main vectors of the Constitutional 
Reform: a Single Juridical Regime, a career plan, and a public administration organic law. In 
October 1989 SEPLAN-PR sent bills on the new civil servants’ statute and a new careers 
plan to Congress (Bills 4058 and 4059) and left the bill for a new organic law of public 
administration ready for the next administration to take the steps it deemed best.
The two intellectual authors of the new legislation that emerged at the end of the process 
were Jose Maria dos Santos Arantes -  former president of DASP (in 1965) who had 
participated in COMESTRA -  and Jose Vicente de Paula Mendes -  a professor of 
administrative law who had been the director of the Joao Pinheiro Foundation when an ENA 
type of project was developed at state level. Both had participated in all discussions
327 The Governmental Manager Indoctrination Program lasted eighteen months and included six months of 
trainee experience in the government. The Treasury and Budget Analysts’ Program lasted three months.
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regarding both legislations since the second half of 1985, when Alves set up sub-
328commissions.
5.4. The coup de grace: Collor de Mello’s downsizing329 of the federal executive 
machinery
Fernando Collor de Mello was elected President of Brazil, by popular vote, in December 
1989 in a single election, unrelated to regional or local elections. His campaign was centred 
on corruption charges against Samey and high-paid public functionaries -  the so-called 
“maharajas”. The new administration’s initial decisions included launching another macro- 
economic stabilisation plan, the reduction of the number of ministries to twelve, and the 
setting up of the Federal Administration Department (SAF) -  subordinated to the Presidency 
-  to be in charge of downsizing the federal public administration. All these measures were 
adopted thanks to the utilisation of an exceptional type of legal instrument known as 
provisional measures (medidas provisorias) (Pessanha, 1998) -  which allowed the President 
to adopt emergency legislation to be later confirmed or not by Congress. Collor was an 
impressive political communicator and skilfully combined “the public’s perception of 
inefficient public service with the powerful symbol of the ‘maharajas’” (Rinne, 2001: 76) and 
made his offensive against big government the cornerstone of his macro-economic 
stabilisation attempt.
328 A1H/BZ/45.
329 The definition of downsizing used in this thesis has no similarity with that used by either McCourt (2001) or 
Nunberg (1989). It is loose and vague given the improvised character o f the downsizing policies adopted.
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At first Congress supported Collor’s initiatives but soon the lack of political support the 
President himself dispensed to the traditional political parties became evident. Moreover, it 
was the first year of the Collor Administration but the last year of the NCA legislature. It was 
not long before Congress began opposing the Administration in most matters; more because 
of the way the new president treated politicians than for ideological reasons.
One of the new President’s first measures was to set the goal of laying off 360,000 public 
sector employees. S AF set a deadline -  18 June -  for all ministries to reduce their numbers of 
personnel by 30%, across the board. Collor also issued a decree that allowed the 
government to place public sector functionaries on compulsory leave, while receiving wages 
proportional to their time on the job. But neither the Legislature nor the Supreme Court 
approved this decision.
“Brazil’s Supreme Court overturned this decree after it was voted down by the 
legislature and re-issued by the President” (Rinne, 2001: 83).
The main reason for the refusal by the other branches of government was their interpretation 
of Article 41 of the 1988 Constitution, which states that public employees placed on 
compulsory leave will continue to receive their present salaries until appointed to some other 
position. The STF interpreted this as a full salary, contrary to the Administration’s intentions.
Collor’s administrative reform attempts disorganised an already unstable federal structure 
and produced perverse effects that lasted for years (Weyland, 1998). The numerical results 
were contradictory. According to government sources, 110,000 public-sector employees were 
laid off and another 38,000 were placed on compulsory leave. But the newspapers suggested
330 Decree 99300.
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that less than 14,000 (including compulsory leaves) were actually removed from the public 
sector (Rinne, 2001: 82).
Still more surprising, Law 8112 was passed in December 1990, detailing the constitutional 
principles regarding the new civil-service statute and, particularly, the reclassification of 
public sector employees into civil servants. This bill belonged to Congress and the new 
executive area was unable to control its treatment. The Executive tried to retire the bill in 
June 1990, at the same time as it suggested new legislation (Bill 5504/1990), which was 
much simpler, re-affirming the validity of the 1952 Civil Servants’ Statute. But two 
commissions -  Constitution and Justice, and Administration and Civil Service -  had already 
analysed and approved Law 4058 of December 1989. The third commission approved the 
original bill on 28 June, and in August the Chamber of Deputies rejected the 
Administration’s request. The bill was sent to the Senate on 24 August. A week later the 
Administration tried once again to retire the bill but the Senate refused again. To accelerate 
approval of the bill, the Senate amended the Executive’s proposal with the content of the 
original proposition. The bill returned to the Chamber of Deputies and was finally approved 
in November. In December President Collor sanctioned the new legislation (Law 8112/1990) 
with several vetoes that were later overturned by Congress in April (Guerzoni, 2000). The 
project for the career plan got as far as the Senate but never reached the floor, as had the 
proposal for the Civil Servants’ Statute.
331 ElH/Br/48.
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5.5. Conclusion
5.5.1. The rise of the issue to the agenda and specification of the proposal
The overlapping of three agendas characterised this period: the agenda for transition, the 
agenda of the National Constituent Assembly, and the agenda of macro-economic 
stabilisation process. As usually happens during regime changes and constituent processes, 
the problem of simultaneous reforms was inevitably a complicated issue (Elster, 1993). But 
“State Reform” -  the slogan of the period -  found its way into the governmental agenda.
The setting up of a Ministry of Administration without Portfolio had been a sign that 
Tancredo Neves intended to change the structure of the federal administration. The 
appointment of a skillful political operator to be minister was also a promising indication 
because Alves was an close friend of Neves and even closer to Samey. But Alves by no 
means fit the image of a merit-based ENA-style political champion, and this inconsistency 
reduced the credibility of the project..
The installation of a commission to draw up a Master Plan in June 1985 generated an 
opportunity for the alternative specification process to be put in motion. The first policy 
outputs were the upgrading of the status of the ministry and the simultaneous acquisition of 
political control over the National Department of De-bureaucratisation and the Office of 
Modernisation.
332 There were hopes that re-democratisation would bring about a dynamic movement of regeneration o f the 
State apparatus, for two reasons. First, it was supposed that politicians would take over the process o f allocation 
o f resources, which, until then, had been kept in the hands of administrators. Second, politicians were expected 
to appoint high officials in charge o f public institutions. Both reasons, however, were also present in the 
situation that led to the military coup of 1964. There was fear that corruption and clientelism would make a 
comeback (Zajdsnajder, 1984).
333 A1H/BZ/45 and E1M/BZ/6.
235
Although there was no formal blueprint, master plan or a priori global reform strategy, the 
commission had a clear diagnosis and sense of priority concerning the course of action to be 
pursued. Although it recognised the advances of Decree-law 200, the issue image associated 
with the state apparatus consisted of unaccountability, fragmentation, and democratic 
unresponsiveness. The general policy orientation included the strengthening of the direct 
administration, improvement of the Executive Bench’s capacity to coordinate, and the 
putting in place of the institutional requirements to pursue the previous requirements. There 
was indeed a sense of purpose in the reformist attempts to revitalise and empower 
bureaucratic structures in the direct administration within the context of rebuilding a 
developmental State,334 especially at the beginning of the process when the Ministries of 
Planning and Administration were politically and ideologically aligned.
At the time of re-democratisation the Brazilian public administration was dominated by five 
obsessions: economic-sector efficiency, uniformity of control, large scale, homogeneous 
system approach, and modernity. Hence, at the beginning of the New Republic, the most 
efficient areas were facing a combination of multiple and simultaneous problems: turnover of 
personnel, clientelistic attacks, discontinuity of policies, inhibition in controlling, inadequate 
forms of control, and financial problems.
Five factors contributed to convince Alves to adopt the proposed guidelines by the 
Commission for State Modernisation. First, there was a clear demand for restoring 
democratic political accountability in the government. Neither the Executive nor the 
Legislative Branches had administrative and political control over what was going on in the 
indirect administration and this was an unacceptable situation in a democratic context. 
Secondly, the direct administration was identified with democratic public administration -  in
334 Johnson (1982) and Evans (1995).
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opposition to an authoritarian technocracy, entrenched in the indirect administration -  and its 
core functions had been depleted and eroded over the last twenty years. Thirdly, there was 
the challenge of fulfilling the “heroic” progressive public administration agenda, a cycle that 
was never completed, even under authoritarian regimes. The thrust of this aspiration was the 
construction of a professional merit-based civil service backed up by an effective career 
system. Fourthly, greater empowerment of the direct administration was perceived as the best 
way to tackle clientelism and corruption, at that time attributed to the authoritarian regime 
rather than to Brazil’s inherent cultural traditions. Finally, all these ideas would require the 
empowerment of Alves’s Ministry and he had a personal solution at hand: Marcelino.
The invitation of Marcelino -  the leading figure of the commission -  to be Alves’s deputy 
changed the dynamics of policies at the same time that it sealed an alliance between the 
Ministry of Administration and SEPLAN-PR. Specification of a broader policy proposal was 
carried out by Marcelino from that moment on. GERAP’s institutional platforming process 
was on the march and the alternative specification process was under policy (Marcelino) and 
political (Alves) control. Alves’s prestige was rising and the change consolidated his 
ministerial jurisdiction over the issue. The approach was neither global nor excessively 
ambitious, and its method was incremental, paced, and gradualist. It must be admitted, 
however, that GERAP was in charge of fragmented administrative reform initiatives. The 
fact that other ministries were involved in the process meant that it represented a collective 
governmental initiative.
The setting up of SEDAP-PR marked the peak of Alves’s political power and an impressive 
status conquest by the reformers because the new ministry was on the same footing as 
SEPLAN-PR in terms of formal powers and potential for supra-ministerial coordination.
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Administrative reform is about the redistribution of power resources, and Alves and 
Marcelino’s team counted on the President’s political support. The content of the policy 
solution generated by SEDAP-PR reflected a consensus of all those engaged in the debate at 
that time, with few exceptions. But the reformist group overestimated its political support 
and its delivery capabilities at the same time as it underestimated the importance of the 
economic team. The hopes that strong political will and noble purposes would be enough to 
overcome the difficulties and promote change gradually disappeared. “Ignoring traditional 
politics will not make traditional political elites and practices go away” (Hagopian, 1996: 
xiii). The mismatch between SEDAP-PR’s aspirations and practices was a reminder of the 
cost of pretending ignorance with respect to this subject.
However, the appointed technocracy that had operated the government for almost twenty 
years was basically ignored from the beginning. The turnover in ministries in key areas 
changed the balance of power within the cabinet, while the economic situation was 
essentially out of control. The academic community -  basically entrenched in FGV/RJ -  was 
antagonised despite Alves’s efforts to bring them on board during his first year as Minister 
via the sub-commissions, and Holanda’s attempt to co-opt them. Neither of these two groups 
-  Brasilia’s technocracy or the public administration’s academic community -  was 
committed to SEDAP-PR’s efforts.
335 A2L/RJ/40 and A3L/RJ/51.
336 Linz and Stepan (1996: 17) state that a “usable” professional bureaucracy is one of the “interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing conditions” required for a consolidated bureaucracy and for a functioning State. The 
authors point out that “the question o f the usability o f the state bureaucracy by a new democratic regime also 
emerged in countries such as Chile, where the outgoing non-democratic regime was able to give tenure to many 
key members of the state bureaucracy in politically sensitive areas such as justice and education.” A similar 
process took place in 1988 in Brazil but it was the Constituent Assembly, not the authoritarian regime, that 
guaranteed “entrenched rights” to the majority of the public-sector employees in public functions.
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5.5.2. Re-establishing political accountability oyer a re-unified State
All forces committed to the re-democratisation processes were engaged in regaining political 
control over the State apparatus. The power of the techno-bureaucracy during the 
authoritarian regime was identified as a source of inefficiency, corruption and democratic 
deficits. In this context, politicisation was perceived as positive, although the reformers -  
specially Marcelino and Holanda -  had repeatedly circumvented problems that political 
interference brought to the process of specifying alternatives.
There was no clear understanding of the complex reality of the authoritarian regime, where 
normal institutional features brought about a variety of informal, effective bureaucratic- 
politic arrangements (Hagopian, 1996; Evans, 1995; and Schneider, 1991). The main aim 
was, simultaneously, to restrain the Executive Branch and reshape the capacities of the State. 
Moreover, accountability measures -  the thrust of the problem -  were conceived as legal 
restrictions to the discretionary powers of the Executive. In attacking the enormous 
discretionary powers of the Executive Branch under the authoritarian regime, the Executive 
and the deputies ignored the policy motivations of Decree-law 200, especially its delegation 
and flexibility principles.
Hybrid and confusing solutions emerged. Political accountability motivated the NCA to 
submit all sorts of public organisations to the public accountancy regime and the Single 
Juridical Regime. Convergent moves that blurred the distinction between public and private 
arrangements came from different sides, as two examples demonstrated. First, Alves 
successfully convinced Samey to extend the year-end bonus (one month’s pay) -  a right of 
workers in the private sector, which was not guaranteed to public employees -  to civil 
servants. In 1987 Marcelino had also issued legislation that classified the private foundations
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under state control as public foundations. This was a de facto situation but a legal 
contradiction.
In a context of political instability and confusing hybrid solutions all political actors, 
including the economic team, moved towards a simple, familiar, desirable, but historically 
failed solution to the entire public sector, namely, a classical public bureaucracy. The 
provisions on delegation and decentralisation contained in Decree-law 200 had been totally 
obscured because of the collapse of control over macro-economic policy and because of the 
turnover at the top of public organisations resulting from the change in regimes.
To make things even more confusing, Alves was identified by his critiques as an example of 
the problems that his proposal was supposed to eliminate. Those members of the technocracy 
who had merit-based origins could not interact with a minister committed to economic 
populism and charged with corruption. But they had neither the expertise nor the political 
clout to engage in a debate that distracted them from the dramatic worsening of the economic 
situation. The maintenance of Marcelino as Santiago’s deputy meant the recognition of the 
validity of his positions, but also signalled the absence of any other plausible alternative at a 
moment that a desperate administration was launching a third macro-economic stabilisation 
plan in the final year of the term of office of a weak President.
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5.5.3. The French connection
The human resources policy was the central piece of SEDAP’s proposal: the setting up of a 
career policy, an elitist human-resources approach to the civil service, a cutback in the 
number of appointed positions in favour of professional civil servants, the setting up of a 
national personnel database, and the adoption of a Single Juridical Regime for the public 
sector.
Six sources of influence can be traced in the decision to clone the ENA, in the midst of an 
administrative reform: the Rouanet339 report,340 the Minas Gerais Experimental School of 
Government, 341 led by one of Alves’s legal consultants, similar to the School of Financial 
Affairs342 the Argentinean case,343 the "cleaning” analogy,344 and the belief in top-down
337 Schneider (1995) points out that the emphasis on the career policy was an essential part o f the efforts 
oriented to strengthen the autonomy o f the bureaucracy in face of political pressure. Once a corps o f adequately 
insulated civil servants had been trained, they should be capable of executing administrative functions in an 
internal public-sector market protected against political instability. The maintenance o f the possibility for higher 
officials to move about within the State is important for enhancing the State’s capacity and performance. 
Schneider praised easier relocation as a key element for the success of a number o f ideas on government during 
the authoritarian period. The challenge under democracy should be to make it possible to move bureaucrats 
anchored in the direct administration to other positions. Appointed officials from indirect administrative 
organisations could easily move to the Executive, for example. The challenge was to recreate this mechanism in 
a way that would allow a merit-based civil service system to perform just as well, if  not better.
338 With the benefit of hindsight the proposal o f beginning at the top sounds absurd, especially because broader 
political changes in Brazil and Argentina had led to the rise of anti-State Presidents such as Collor de Mello and 
Menen. But the strategy o f focusing first on the higher bureaucratic echelons in order to begin civil service 
reforms is still considered a valid strategy because it allows donors to size the structure of incentives designed 
to align high civil servants with governmental priorities (Nuremberg and Wescott, 2003).
339 Sergio Rouanet was a respected diplomat commissioned to produce a report on the schools of government 
abroad and in Brazil. Given his bureaucratic background in the diplomacy and his contacts with civil service 
professionalisation systems abroad, he understandably recommended the founding of a school o f government as 
a key instrument o f a Strategic Human Resources Development Policy.
340 The Rouanet Report (Rouanet, 1982) was commissioned by DASP, a last attempt at revamping the classical 
ideal o f a public bureaucracy. Its main conclusions suggested the implanting o f a French model o f careers and 
formation with some adaptations. It played a mythical role among governmental managers who had always 
considered themselves creditors of the propaganda promises of the national public competitive selection process 
o f 1988.
341 The Minas Gerais Experiment consisted o f an undergraduate program o f public administration as a 
recruitment mechanism for a fully insulated career for public executives. Its champion, Vicente Paula Mendes, 
became one o f Alves’s advisors and became a member of the human resources sub-commission of  
administrative reform.
342 ESAF was constituted in the 1970s in the context of an international cooperation agreement with the German 
Government (E2H/Br/32).
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induced changes. There was a sense of urgency that exacerbated the conviction that a top- 
down elite positioned at the core of the state apparatus and with strong political support was 
required to pilot administrative change. All these factors converged to bring about the 
founding of the National School of Public Administration, which was to become Alves’s pet 
project.
Why France and not the U.S.A., since the existing disintegrated state was constituted of 
fragmented departmental agencies similar to the those in the US public sector? The main 
explanation was Alves’s enthusiasm for the idea of “grandeur”, implicit in the ENA model. 
Also, apparently, the reactions against the authoritarian regime obscured reformists’ capacity 
for analysis.345 Unlike Argentina, where political relationships between the Radical Party and 
the French Socialists provided political affinities for the policy transfer process (Rinne, 
2001), the tracking of the origins of the Brazilian option pointed to the juridical culture of 
administrative lawyers.346
The more the project attracted attention, the more it also caused suspicion and reactions from 
all pre-established interests in the state apparatus. The more ENAP tried to emphasise its role 
by inflating expectations, the more vulnerable and isolated it became. The mixture of Fabian 
(Barker, 1987) and enarque elements associated with a reformist and directive approach were 
expected to transform “governmental managers” into a prototype of a Jesuitical corps
343 Brazil had a policy of learning from Argentina regarding macro-economic policy. Argentina had adopted the 
French model and suggested that Brazil do the same, although no one insisted publicly on this course o f action.
344 The "cleaning" image derived from the view that the country needed a new bureaucracy to play a new role in 
the context o f a democracy, in opposition to a pseudo a-political technocracy. There was a crude analogy with 
the setting up in France of the ENA after the Second World War as a requirement to "cleanse" the French 
government of vestiges from the Vichy Government.
345 Brazilian reformers were partially aware of the on-going experience in Argentina regarding the “cuerpo de 
administradores gubemamentales”, a similar alternative launched by President Afonsin’s Administration, 
which had been in operation for three years, with controversial results. But they knew almost nothing o f the 
American Senior Civil Service experiment.
346 Holanda was familiar with the experience in Argentina, backed up by the World Bank. The design o f the 
ENAP project received superficial French support, but made no reference to what was happening in Argentina.
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destined to save the Brazilian State from clientelism and authoritarian influences. But this 
was a self-destructive utopia that would prove to be costly as soon as the NCA finished its 
task.347
The ENAP project produced a strong backlash coalition against its implementation. The 
project clearly intended to attribute a secondary role to the technocracy that had been running 
the country since the 1960s. It promised a permanent basis of power to merit bureaucrats 
rather than to transitional appointed technocrats. At the same time, it challenged clientelist 
patterns of behaviour, a classical source of political support for traditional politicians like the 
minister and the President himself.
Cintra, the director of ENAP in 1989, pursued a more public-policy-oriented approach, based 
on the American academic tradition, whose institutional features were more similar and 
where the dialogue on policies would have been much easier. The U.S.A. would have been a 
source of policy learning closer to Brazilian political cultural tradition. Even the interfaces 
between public administration and planning traditions could be used as a bridge.348 After an 
international tour of technical visits to governmental schools, Cintra noted that the way the 
governmental managers career was set up in Brazil exposed it to two risks. First, the proposal 
suggested the idea of setting up a caste that tended to identify its interests with those of the 
State. Second, by aiming at the apex of an inexistent career system from its start, the proposal 
made things difficult for governmental managers who had to face the hostility and 
competition of all established technocrats. His deputy shared his views and suggested that the
347 This sort of elite corps approach was basically patterned after France’s ENA model (Oslak, 1994: 143). It 
was tried in Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Argentina without sustainable results, except in Brazil, when the 
“experiment” was resumed on other basis in the late 1990s.
348 E3M/Br/4 and E3L/Br/37.
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option for the French model would be more balanced if a number of elements from the 
American model, which was more academically oriented, were introduced (Santos, 1989).
5.5.4. The alternative track: the convergent National Constituent Assembly route
The National Constituent Assembly (NCA) became the locus of the manifestation of the 
country’s mood and, per definition, the focal point of the expectations of society and the 
administration. Democracy was expected to solve the country’s numerous problems and the 
Constituent Assembly was responsible for providing the proper constitutional framework in 
order to fulfil these unreal expectations, distorted by two decades of dictatorship. Although 
PMDB controlled 54% of the Chamber, thanks to the popularity of the Cruzado Plan, 
launched prior to the 1986 election, there were no stable majorities associated with 
programmatic projects. Coalitions were produced on an ad hoc basis and characterised by 
volatility. Logrolling was the general rule because of lack of discipline in the parties, the 
fragmented party system (more than ten parties were represented in the NCA), and the lack 
of ideological party commitments. In fact, PMDB was in charge of the National Constituent 
Assembly because it occupied the presidencies of both the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate, although not of the voting processes. The final product was a constitutional text with 
315 articles and over 2000 clauses (Martins, 1995). These numbers show the prolific action 
of the multiple interest groups engaged in the process, as well as of the formalist and legalist 
Brazilian political tradition.
The National Constituent Assembly characterised the problem of modernising public 
administration as a sub-element of the challenge to democratise the country. Problem
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definition involves more than finding someone or something to blame by "dramatising or 
downplaying the problem in question" (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994: 1). The NCA naturally 
captured the political discourse and the initiative to define alternatives for nearly all policy 
issues, and public management was no exception. Discretionary policy making was 
perceived as an intrinsic attribute of the authoritarian regime. Thus, against these fluid, non­
institutionalised, and personalised practices, a legalist bureaucratic reform emerged as a 
global solution. The power attributed to authoritarian technocracy was much higher than its 
real capabilities because the technocrats could not rule except through delegated power 
(Schneider, 1991: 45).
The state-led development model had always been adopted in combination with patronage 
powers (Evans, 1995). The mechanisms varied between democratic and authoritarian regimes 
but the consequence was always the same: the addition of a new cohort of employees or 
appointed or contracted professionals to the public sector workforce, by-passing the classical 
civil-servant structures. The 1988 Constitution maintained the rights that had been extended 
to all civil servants (including retirement and pensions) who worked for the State until 1983. 
In fact, once again, the Legislative Branch sanctioned the same clientelist practices as the 
Executive Branch had done in the past, as in 1967, 1946, 1937, and 1934. The eroded image 
of “drawing a line" was evoked once more.
The NCA had provided a solution that could be approved in terms of the requirements of 
availability, acceptability, and affordability (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994: 24). The deputies 
targeted on political problems from the past, but not the challenges of the future nor the 
insufficiencies and inadequacies of previous solutions. They were obsessed with the removal 
of the “authoritarian blockage”. Through a bandwagon effect, the entire Congress of the
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1987-1990 legislature threw its weight on a proposal in favour of a clear group of 
beneficiaries. This project had originally been presented by the Executive.
By missing the myriad micro-intersections between economics and politics (Hirschman, 
1971) the policy solution that was approved merely worsened problems and, in spite of its 
democratic intentions, proved unable to provide innovative solutions. The attempt to 
dismantle the authoritarian legacy and simultaneously launch the basis for redesigning the 
State apparatus paralysed the public sector. Some authors (Bresser Pereira, 1999; Martins, 
1995) explained the policy outcome of the 1988 Constitution also as the result of "rent 
seeking" behaviour of public sector employees and their unions. Although this interpretation 
makes sense, it would seem controversial because it acquired pertinence only some years 
later.349 The rationality identified ad hoc by Bresser Pereira and Martins made sense only 
after Collor de Mello’s attempted to downsize the Federal Government and after the Real 
Macro-economic Stabilisation Plan was implemented.
Two other reasons to explain the deputies’ behaviour were: a) pressure from unionised civil 
servants to guarantee the extension of civil-service rights to the vast majority of public-sector 
employees (95% of the government’s workforce at that time), and b) beliefs in the 
advantages of the classical Weberian model of public administration as adequate for the
349 At the time o f the National Constituent Assembly and during the period immediately following it there were 
doubts as to the advantages of converting the private employment regime into a statutory civil-service situation, 
for three reasons. First, the legislation on wages for the private sector had been more generous than the 
governmental policy in terms of minimising losses caused by inflation. Second, tenure was not a legal right but 
a political fact in the entire public sector regulated by private legislation. Third, the complementation schemes 
for employees retired from the indirect administration were frequently much more attractive than the 
perspective of the full wage as retired civil-service employees. Again, the phenomena of hybridism made 
discernment difficult. There were indeed categories o f workers -  such as the social-security inspectors -  
interested in becoming civil servants. But many members o f the technocratic elite were better off under their 
private labour arrangements.
350 Indirect evidence o f my argument is the great number of people who decided to retire after the Real Plan in 
1993, but not in 1990, after the adoption of the Single Juridical Regime although they had worked the number 
of years needed in order to retire. The main explanation is that it was obviously advantageous for many o f these 
people because they would receive better retirement benefits from the government if  they were later unable to 
find some supplementary source o f income.
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country (Pimenta, 1993: 52). Other authors have identified a kind of “constitutional 
protectionism” (Santos, 1997) in the National Constituent Assembly. According to this 
interpretation the deputies introduced corporatist antidotes into the constitutional text to 
prevent anticipated anti-state ideological threats, later labelled as neo-liberal.
5.5.5 Endgame for SEDAP, but not for the proposal
SEDAP-PR produced a recipe for disaster: a grand strategy, problem misplacement, rule 
making in the absence of adequate information, lack of concern with means and resources, 
and disregard for the problem of upper executives (Larkey and Downs, 1986: 237). The lack 
of cohesion in the Executive, a problem that SEDAP-PR aspired to tackle, was decisive for 
the failure of the reform. There was a great deal of conflict regarding ideas, and competition 
for the President’s ears. SEDAP-PR fell prey to its own incapacity to tackle the problem that 
became the central issue toward the end of the Samey Administration: cost cutting measures. 
Marcelino pursued rationalising initiatives during 1988 but they were too limited and came 
too late. The corruption charges against the Minister’s regional team as well as the Minister’s 
own performance contributed decisively to put them on the causality list of Operation 
Dismantle of January 1989.
The phasing out of SEDAP can be explained by a set of factors. First, the two cabinet 
reshuffles of March and April of 1987 and, especially, in November and December of 1987, 
changed the balance of power within the Presidency. Second, in mid-1988, even the ENAP 
incubation project was affected by suspicions of sleaze that affected the credibility of the 
minister who was championing the initiative. In the absence of social networks (Granoveter
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and Swedberg, 1992) capable of sustaining SEDAP’s proposals or delivering the NCA’s 
decisions, administrative reform became totally submitted to short-term economic 
orientations. Besides, neither the executive project nor the decisions of Congress were 
minimally implanted (Evans, 1995) in governmental structures, political parties, or social 
perceptions.
Third, the conditions under which the reform started were adverse because of congestion on 
the agenda, inherent to the NCA’s work, during a period of transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic one.
“A successful comprehensive reform depends on expanding time horizon 
efforts and buffering them from short-term fluctuations in attention. (...) The 
organisation implication is to establish institutional reform as program or 
policy of its own” (March and Olsen, 1989: 98).
The outcome was the opposite even though the transitory provisions of the Constitution 
established a timeframe for administrative reform. Fourth, at the end of 1988 the Chief of 
Staff and SEPLAN-PR had received a dossier with accusations of sleaze and corruption that, 
although they did not directly involve either Alves or Marcelino, mentioned persons in the 
ministry very close to the minister himself. The phasing out of this ministry was one of 
Samey’s attempts to protect his administration from charges of corruption.
351 E3M/Br/35.
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5.5.6. Policy entrepreneurship and policy outcomes -  an unusual story
The entrepreneurial functions of the episode were performed by Alves, Marcelino, and 
Santiago in the Executive Branch and by Campos in the Legislative Branch. Marcelino was 
the main policy entrepreneur of the entire episode but the political entrepreneurial functions 
were performed mainly by the others: Alves until December 1988, Santiago until March 
1990, and Campos until December 1990, in the last stage, when Congress took the lead and 
pushed the proposal forward.
To what extent they were essential is another matter. One might argue that the NCA would 
have produced a similar outcome without the participation of the Executive Branch. But in 
this case, a plausible argumentation to support the hypothesis that entrepreneurship was 
essential for coupling the streams represents a refraining of the question. If there had been an 
entrepreneur with a different problem perspective, different ideas, and political support, 
another outcome, would have been plausible, even if it meant friction between this person’s 
positions and the dominant view in the NCA (formulated on the basis of the executive 
proposal). But even if the doubt remains, there also was an entrepreneur in the NCA -  
Campos -  who seized the opportunity provided by the process of revising the Constitution.
There were four additional factors that contributed to maintaining the claim that 
entrepreneurship was decisive for policy change in the episode. First, in regard to agenda 
setting, Alves was decisive in establishing a policy venue and for mobilising resources 
required to specify a policy proposal. There was presidential support for the continuous 
upgrade of the ministry thanks to Alves’s political manoeuvres. It was not active support but, 
at least until the end of the NCA, Samey provided all the political support Alves needed.
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Second, Marcelino commanded the policy specification process as of June 1985, when he 
was invited to join the General Commission, until the phasing out of SEDAP-PR, even 
though he played a secondary role in 1989. For nearly four years, he was responsible for 
defining the problem and for generating and implementing a policy alternative, despite all the 
political instability of the period. It was a purposeful, resourceful and complex process 
although the final policy outcomes were not exactly those intended at the beginning.
Third, Santiago’s posture after the extinction of SEDAP-PR was decisive to preserve the 
general path of the process, although with some modifications regarding ENAP and the 
governmental managers’ career. The policy refinements introduced by him and Cintra 
incorporated the economic team’s concerns with the process to regenerate the direct 
administration and build a bridge between the public administration and the policy planning 
sub-systems. The streams were kept together in the difficult year of 1989 and the main policy 
proposals were improved on and concluded in order to be submitted to the future 
administration.
Fourth, Campos played an important entrepreneurial role in Congress during the existence, of 
the NCA, and in 1990 he closely monitored the traffic of the proposal for a Single Juridical 
Regime until its final approval in December 1990, despite a hostile executive. He benefited 
from the popular appeal of the project -  at that time all public sector employees saw it as a 
protection against losing their jobs (Rinne, 2001) -  and from the antagonism between Collor 
and Congress. Even so, the acceleration of the legislative procedures would have been 
unthinkable without his full commitment.
352 ElH/Br/53 and E3M/Br/4.
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5.5.7. Epilogue
The dynamics of imbalance that shaped the context of the 1988 episode were aggravated by 
the circumstances of the change in regimes. But two other processes also affected the 
administrative reform: the sequence of macro-economic stabilisation plans and the 
convocation of the National Constitutional Assembly. Effects of interference were caused by 
both events.
The process of institutional platforming allowed the executive sphere to pursue an 
administrative reform policy at the beginning of Samey's term of office. The new 
institutional arrangements provided mutually reinforcing political understandings of the 
problem, a variation on an old theme submerged in pre-authoritarian memories: the adoption 
of a classical public bureaucracy. The progressive consolidation of a policy venue was 
possible thanks to the combination of an institutional structure responsible for policy making 
and a powerful supporting idea attached with the institution.
The positive images associated with the reform attempt -  although they contradicted the 
reputation of SEDAP-PR’s minister -  eventually dissipated in the political and economic 
turbulence that dominated the period. At the end of the President’s term of office, 
administrative reform was pushed, but not decisively, to the decisional agenda, even though 
it was called for in the new Constitution itself, in both its main articles and in the transitory 
provisions. The main responsibilities for its implementation were transferred to the new 
Presidency.
The outcome of the NCA’s public management policy was a mixture of democratising 
administrative reform (Heredia and Schneider, 1998) and civil-service reform (Ingraham and
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Rosenbloom, 1992). The democratising vector was represented by the effort to give more 
political control to the executive sphere while increasing its accountability. The progressive 
public administration vector derived from concerns with the re-building of a classic public 
bureaucracy, directly and strictly controlled by elected politicians (Hood, 1991: 88) and the 
implementation of a merit-based career system aimed at improving bureaucratic 
performance. The new institutional arrangements swung the pendulum again in the direction 
of uniform structures, meaning a shift towards the ‘lego brick’ (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 75) 
doctrines of organisational design. The solution to the problems with personnel favoured the 
adoption of a career system capable of singling out the ‘best and the brightest’, inspired on 
the French model.
The Constitutional policy outcome apparently confirmed the argument that politicians only 
give up their clientelistic and patronage prerogatives when all are affected simultaneously 
(Geddes, 1994). It was not a conflictive party issue, but constitutional text was not sufficient 
to guarantee the institutionalisation of bureaucracy. Decisions looked appropriate, natural and 
"harmless" within the context of NCA’s cacophony and the natural agenda congestion 
process. They did not face real controversy. The worsening of the economic crisis and the 
increasingly high inflation rates also contributed to making it still more difficult to discern 
the policy outcomes.
Neither the political system nor the policy sub-system took notice of emerging phenomena 
such the crisis of Keynesianism, de-regulation and privatisation, globalisation, and new 
public management. Although these trends were not clearly observable at that time, the NCA 
exacerbated the country’s dissociation from the new times, since the Assembly itself was 
strongly influenced by the political context of the previous years of authoritarian regime that
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had been in power from 1964 to 1984. The transitory provisions included a reference to an 
urgent administrative reform that should be carried out eighteen months after the Constitution 
was promulgated. This serves as an explanation for Santiago’s commitment to detailing the 
policy outcomes.
The political culture353 of the country was being questioned by the very nature of transition 
and by the process of the National Constituent Assembly. There was general consensus that 
the direct administration should be enhanced on accountability grounds. The restoration of 
Rule of Law was associated with the direct administration -  then responding for less than 
five per cent of the public sector workforce. The reestablishment of the Constitutional 
principles of legality, morality, impersonality, and publicity emerged as the cornerstone of 
the politicians’ aspirations.
353 Martins (1995, 13) defined political culture as a system of beliefs and values related to government and 
politics that shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. According to his view the evolution o f the country’s 
entire public administration cannot be understood without taking into account the national political culture, 
strongly marked by the legacies of clientelism, formalism, and patrimonial ism.
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CHAPTER 6
Public Management Policy Change In Brazil: 1995-1998 
6.1. Introduction
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s first term of president (1995-1998) was marked by substantial 
reforms and policy initiatives in the public sector, notably macro-economic stabilisation, 
trade liberalisation and privatisation. But there was an important policy domain where a 
significant reform took place, even though it was listed neither in the influential Washington 
consensus nor in Cardoso’s party manifesto (PSDB, 1994), namely public management. More 
interesting, for the first time a public management reform with a constitutional outcome took 
place without there being a context of a regime change, as was the case during the Vargas 
(1934-1937), the Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and the Samey (1985-1990) Administrations.
When Cardoso took office in January 1995, there were no clues that Brazil would soon be 
going through public management reforms, although the so-called New Public Management 
(NPM) ideas and literature had been around for some years (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; 
Barzelay, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The policy landscape was not particularly 
favourable because of the weakness of the academic community (Gaetani, 1999), the lack of 
awareness of what was going on in the field in other countries, and the prevalence of a
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traditional view of public administration in supranational institutions like the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (Bresser Pereira, 2002).
At the end of Cardoso’s first term a constitutional amendment related to reforms in the public 
sector apparatus was approved with the support of a qualified majority of Congress after 
almost three years spent in debates, negotiations, reformulation and deliberations. The 
amendment included provisions that authorised new forms of public sector organisations 
(including agencies and quangos), modifications of employment relationships in the public 
sector and the mitigation of tenure constraints on government employees. The least likely of 
the planned constitutional reforms -  in contrast to social security and fiscal issues -  had been 
approved thanks to Bresser Pereira’s entrepreneurial actions and skilful strategy (Melo, 2002) 
with minimal governmental support, despite the uphill battle faced by reformers.
The Brazilian reform captured foreign attention. Under Bresser Pereira’s leadership and 
intellectual influence, CLAD published a continental manifesto entitled New Public 
Management for Latin America (CLAD, 1998), which seemed to suggest a turning point in 
the region’s perspective on public management reforms. Thanks to Bresser Pereira’s 
persuasive argumentation, the Inter-American Development Bank provided Brazil with a 
loan to implement these reforms. At the same time the World Bank, which had taken a more 
traditional and cautious approach to the problem, began to change its attitude after publishing 
the influential 1997 Report on State Reform (World Bank, 1997).
However, after the reform was approved by Congress and Cardoso had been re-elected, the 
reform lost momentum and was dropped from the executive agenda. The ministry in charge 
of the implementation of the reforms was phased out and the Ministry of Planning absorbed 
its functions. Bresser Pereira was transferred to another ministerial post and left the
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government six months after the beginning of the second term of office. The reform label -  
managerial administration -  was replaced with another term -  entrepreneurial management -  
that also lost momentum after a cabinet reshuffle later in 1999. Bresser Pereira’s team was 
dissolved and the members reassigned to new areas. The reform moved on to a new 
implementation stage under the direction of another group. Only two years later were some 
reformist initiatives resumed, but in another mode and with new priorities.
There are seven research questions to be answered in this respect: a) What factors explained 
the occurrence of a reform that apparently “came out of the blue”? (El), b) Where did the 
reformist ideas come from? (E2), c) What factors explain Bresser Pereira’s success in 
persuading the Administration to adopt his ideas? (E3); d) Why did it take almost three years 
for Congress to approve the Constitutional Amendment proposed by President Cardoso? 
(E3.2), e) To what extent did the reform content make policy change possible, and produce 
it? (E3.3); f) Why was the Ministry of Administration and State Reform (MARE) phased 
out? (LE3); g) What factors explain the exclusion of the issue from the agenda during the 
transition between Cardoso’s first and second terms, just after it had faced an uphill battle in 
the Executive Branch and in Congress? (LE3). These questions are answered in the text and 
refer to the structure of the events.
This chapter is organised into six sections including the introduction. In the first part there is 
a brief description of the context of Brazilian public administration before the beginning of 
Cardoso’s Administration. The second part focuses on the period before Bresser Pereira’s 
choice as minister. The third part begins with Cardoso’s inauguration and continues until the 
moment his proposal was sent to Congress. The fourth part concerns the period during which 
the reform was implemented even though it was still being debated. The fifth section
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concentrates on the period between the approval of the reform until the cabinet reshuffle that 
led to the phasing out of MARE. The last section contains an analysis of the episode from a 
theoretical point of view.
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6.2. An enabling interregnum
Vice-president Itamar Franco became president after Fernando Collor was impeached in late 
1992. One year later, at the end of 1993, there was little hope that Franco could reach any 
one of the ambitious goals he had set for his term of office (Constitutional Revision, Macro- 
economic Stabilisation, Social Security Reform and others.) In a desperate move, he chose 
his then Foreign Minister, Senator Cardoso, a well-known social democrat intellectual, to be 
his fourth minister of finance in less than two years. The Constitutional Revision was aborted 
because of scandal in the budgeting commission that paralysed Congress and forced several 
deputies to resign. The country was more than anxious for another fresh start after the 
frustration that followed the first presidential election in thirty years.
Cardoso bought together a solid and experienced economic team under the coordination of 
Clovis Carvalho, an old friend and reputed executive. Against all odds, a successful macro- 
economic stabilisation plan was formulated and implemented within months, shortly before 
the next presidential elections. Based on the plan’s success, Cardoso became Franco’s 
presidential candidate, leading a broad coalition formed by his centre-left party and the far- 
right liberals. The more the population felt the impact of the elimination of inflation, the 
more his political support grew, independently of ideologies. Cardoso was comfortably 
elected president in the first round, although he had been virtually unknown to the majority 
of the population just a few months before.
Given his extraordinary political capital, he had a free hand to organise his cabinet. A few 
weeks before his inauguration, he invited Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, another old friend who
had been the coordinator of the fundraising activities of his campaign, to join the 
administration. Bresser Pereira was a hybrid, a mixture of political activist, academic 
economist and private executive. He had also been Finance Minister for a few months during 
the Samey Administration (1985-1990). He had also participated in Andre Franco Montoro’s 
Administration as governor of the State of Sao Paulo (1982-1986), together with other 
important ministers of Cardoso’s cabinet, such as Jose Serra (Planning), Clovis Carvalho 
(Chief of Staff) and Paulo Renato (Education). Bresser had been Montoro’s Home Office 
Secretary and later became president of the Sao Paulo State Bank.
Bresser Pereira aspired to be Minister of Foreign Affairs but his personal profile as well as 
political and corporatist background stood in the way of his ambitions. He told the President, 
however, that he would be glad to contribute to his government in a challenging position 
close to Cardoso, with many things to be done such as the Federal Administration 
Department, (SAF), a federal department which was subordinated to the Presidency.
Cardoso had other alternative names for the position354 including his long-time advisor 
Eduardo Jorge, and Dorothea Wemeck. Eduardo Jorge was a Ph.D. in public administration 
who had become a civil servant in the Senate during the 1980s. He had been on Cardoso’s 
staff in the Senate since the National Constituent Assembly. Dorothea Wemeck was a 
reputed technocrat who had served as Labour Minister during the Samey Administration. But 
Cardoso preferred to appoint them to other posts. Jorge became Minister of the General 
Office of the Presidency and Wemeck became Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism.
354 It would later become clear that the former Finance Minister’s shadow was a threat to the economic team 
from the very start of Cardoso’s presidency. Bresser Pereira was doomed to face difficulties not only because of 
his past in State reform, but also because o f the threat he posed for the economic team in terms of the political- 
economic debate within the government, regardless of whether he was to join it or not. As a personal appointee 
of the President (and given his background) he could always be a political and economic alternative.
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Romindo Cahim, Bresser Pereira’s predecessor, was a retired army general who had been 
chosen to implement the President’s pledge to fight corruption but he made no serious 
attempts at implementing public management policies. Representatives from a group of 
careers tracks intended to negotiate special pay rises with Cahim at that time. The group 
called itself Forum of State-Type Careers. It included twenty-one labour unions and 
associations in areas such as diplomacy, tax inspectors, public managers, budgeting, treasury, 
control, financial regulation and others (Cheibub, 1999: 132). They hoped to stand out from 
the functionaries of the public sector who had been reclassified as civil servants by the law. 
The negotiations were not successful but the idea was the embryo of the concept of core state 
functions, later taken up by Bresser Pereira. After Collor’s disastrous downsizing period, 
Franco’s inactivity was not seen as a huge problem because at least the federal executive 
machine could rest and recover from its debacle under the previous President. SAF was 
therefore perceived by politicians as an unattractive position because it would give them 
neither the resources nor the image to project them into the political arena. The choice of 
Bresser Pereira seemed perfectly convenient and politically costless at that time, with the 
extra advantage of bringing a reputed economist into the Administration.
A few days before Cardoso’s inauguration, Carvalho and Bresser Pereira agreed that the 
latter should be at the head of a ministry, not merely of a department. Bresser Pereira 
successfully demanded that the Cabinet should specify its mandate in its name. Therefore he 
took over a new Ministry called Ministry of Administration and State Reform (MARE). A 
ministry was a more powerful platform in terms of resource mobilisation and political status. 
However, there was a loss involved in this choice, neither properly perceived nor correctly
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evaluated at that time. As a minister, Bresser Pereira would not have the automatic access 
to the President that a Secretary of the Presidency would have had.
6.3. A sprint from the start: climbing the agenda and formulating a proposal in record 
time
6.3.1 An accidental reformer
Bresser Pereira and Cardoso were the founders of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party 
(PSDB) but the party’s manifesto proposed no innovative approach with respect to public 
management issues. Its main ideas were related to the historic progressive public 
administration challenge: the setting up of a merit-based civil service, the battle against 
corruption and the professionalisation of the bureaucracy. Public management reform was 
not on the administration’s initial agenda, nor did Bresser Pereira have any previous 
familiarity with the issue, in spite of his long and successful professional background.
The top team at his Ministry was comprised of a homogeneous group of alumni from the Sao 
Paulo branch of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.356 Bresser Pereira tried to bring in more 
reputed intellectuals to key positions at MARE but several of his invitations were declined. 
Some of those he invited were sceptical as to the possibility of making a difference and of the 
insufficient incentives offered to experienced professionals who joined the Administration.
355 The debate around the setting up of MARE was an avant premiere o f the competition problems that Bresser 
Pereira would face in dealing with Carvalho at the Home Office. Jurisdiction disputes as well as disputes over 
access to Cardoso’s attention would mark their relationships for the next four years.
356 This specification is important because the Sao Paulo branch was not the historical base of the Brazilian 
public administration community, which was at the FGV headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. Although both 
branches belonged to the same organisation, they were also rivals and took different paths. Rio de Janeiro was 
oriented towards public administration and economics while Sao Paulo concentrated on business administration 
and local government.
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There was also a reputation problem: one of Bresser Pereira’s legacies when he left the 
Finance Ministry was a court claim related to the indexation of wages when he launched an 
unsuccessful stabilisation plan. Thousands of employees appealed to the courts to recover 
those losses and eventually won their cases. As a result, people tended to consider Bresser 
Pereira a potential liability because of his tendency to allow his personal will to prevail over 
his judgmental capacity.
One of Bresser Pereira’s personal assets was his comprehensive diagnosis of the situation of 
the federal administration, which included an overview of the changes going on in the main 
OECD countries around the world. A report on this topic had been commissioned by ENAP 
in 1993 and it pointed out the critical situation of the Federal Government, especially 
regarding professionalisation and training in the direct administration.
Bresser Pereira also successfully co-opted a residual group of holders of positions called 
public managers, who belonged to a career that had been set up during the re-democratisation 
process. This group consisted of less than half of the members it had at the time of the 
original, and until then the only, recruitment round. They intended to be a professional 
vanguard in the Fabian style of the State reform process. By no means were they popular in 
Brasilia because of their hegemonic aspirations. But they were respected and taken seriously 
because of their professional commitments and civil service ethos, comparable only with the 
values of certain pockets of excellence in the direct and indirect Brazilian administration.
Bresser Pereira was happy to have them on his team and assigned the National Human 
Resources Office to members and former members of the career of public managers. After
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just a few months, there was a clash within the core group of these careerists because of 
their reluctance to adhere to the managerial credo. While this group was concentrating on 
implementing a bureaucratic reform in the attempt to revive the 1988 proposal, Bresser and 
his team had a different priority: to establish flexibility mechanisms to allow the removal of 
tenure and the adoption of a private type of contractual arrangements in the public sector. 
Bresser Pereira sympathised with the public managers, but he did not intend to invest in 
building a career system and put them on the top of it as they so ardently wished. However, 
thanks to the influence of these cadres and Bresser Pereira’s envisioning capacities, the 
Minister later decided to resume selection recruitment rounds for the public managers’ career 
as well as the posts of treasury and budgeting analysts,358 because he recognised the 
importance of regenerating the core of strategic functions of the State, although in different 
terms from those intended by the public managers.
In organising periodic public examinations, Bresser Pereira was seeking to regenerate the 
executive core, aborted in 1988-1989, and provided MARE and the Ministry of Planning
I C Q
with a qualified and fresh workforce to implement public management initiatives. MARE 
would always retain the members of these revamped cadres at second and third hierarchical 
levels (but not in top positions). Although managerialism was emphasised as the key element 
in Bresser Pereira’s rhetoric, he de facto implemented unprecedented progressive public
357 The origins of the clash are controversial and were generally described as a problem of trust. The public 
managers claimed that the ministries were weakened by a serious deficit in numbers o f personnel -  in terms of 
qualified cadres at the top of their hierarchies. The proposal of these managers was a combination o f the 
resumption of the public managers career on an intensive basis, combined with pay rises destined to attract 
high-level people. Bresser Pereira took this suggestion badly because that was not his priority. In addition, some 
of his political appointees were fighting for political space and did not sympathise with the almost “monopolist” 
aspirations of the public managers regarding appointed positions (ElH/Br/48 and E2M/Br/49).
35 As Minister, Bresser Pereira had created both careers in 1987 though administrative means, i.e., through 
granting civil servant rights to people that had been working in these areas, whether hired on provisional or 
private basis. At that time he did not have a clear picture of what it about was but recalled it quickly, although 
he played down the fact that what he had done was not closely related to public management reforms at that 
moment (E2H/Br/36).
359 See Administrative Rulings (Portarias) 1731 and 1732,04/07/1997.
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administrative measures that had been tried since the thirties. Some years later, when 
criticised by a public manager for his “bureaucratic” legacy, Bresser Pereira reacted with 
good humour. He felt happily outraged by the critic360 but did not give up his beliefs in his 
managerial credo.
6.3.2. Initial positioning
Bresser Pereira took over his position with remarkable enthusiasm (Melo, 2002). It was his 
second chance as minister -  now in much more favourable circumstances than in 1987 and 
with more room for manoeuvring his priorities -  and he did not want to miss out on the 
opportunity to influence the country’s destiny once again. He had dedicated most of his 
life to public matters and he knew that this was his last shot. In his acceptance speech as 
Minister, Bresser Pereira made clear his conviction that a State reform should deal with three 
challenges: the urgency of a tax reform, the need for institutionalising a formula for strategic 
development, and the re-structuring of the State apparatus and its bureaucracy. This was 
MARE’s mandate.
Five principles were listed to indicate his priorities: draw the labour market of the public 
sector closer to the parameters of the private sector; strengthen high level careers, encourage 
decentralisation, delegation and accountability, review the hierarchical principles that shaped 
the States’ functioning; reduce the State’s role to its core functions via privatisation; and 
transfer executive functions to public but not state-owned organisations, in other words, to
360 E1H/SP/8.
361 It was not exactly a second-chance type o f opportunity because Bresser’s previous domain was macro- 
economic policy and he never gave it up, as we will see later. But in political and personal terms that is how he 
perceived it.
362 Bresser Pereira. Acceptance Speech at MARE (1995).
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social organisations. His words caused mixed reactions. On the one hand, people welcomed 
the entrance on the stage of an active policymaker. On the other hand some public opinion 
sectors picked up the issue of tenure and began attacking the government on the grounds of 
its apparent intention to replicate Collor de Mello’s state-shrinking policies.
For Bresser Pereira, administrative reform should to join up with other constitutional 
reforms, such as social security, fiscal, regulatory and political system reforms on the 
Executive Branch’s pipeline of negotiations with Congress. But the question of reform itself 
was not very high on the government’s agenda (nor on the public’s agenda). Given Cardoso’s 
previous commitment to the aborted Constitutional Review of 1993, Bresser Pereira’s initial 
attitude was consistent with the Administration’s general approach to the problem, to remove 
from the constitutional text everything that could be the subject of ordinary legislation. This 
was his the “deconstitutionalisation” approach. However, Bresser Pereira immediately 
realised that given Brazilian political and juridical culture, this process could not work on 
sensitive matters such as administrative reform. Neither Congress nor Brazilian civil society 
would agree to give the government a blank check, a strategy that was later tried by the 
Social Security Ministry, with frustrating results.363 Therefore he opted for a detailed 
constitutional reform strategy to push through a constitutional amendment.
At the same time, a more precise definition of the state reform issue emerged. Bresser Pereira 
and his team knew they needed a tractable definition in order to work on it. They needed to 
specify an issue image under their jurisdiction if they were to structure the specialised agenda 
as a basis for the reform. Two decisions were taken in the first months of the new
363 See Melo (2002) for an interesting comparison between the administrative, fiscal and social security reform. 
Melo argues convincingly that Bresser Pereira’s strategy is one of the key explanations for the relative success 
of his public management reform, in contrast to the deadlocks and failures that had characterized earlier 
reforms.
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Administration.364 First, MARE’s work should concentrate on the reform of the State 
apparatus. Second, two other controversial issues -  regulatory agencies and social security of 
civil servants -  should not be addressed by MARE but by other ministries (the Chief of Staff 
and sectorial ministers, and the Social Security Minister, respectively). Both decisions 
reduced MARE’s friction with other areas of the Executive Branch and clarified the focus of 
its work in the public management domain. The scope of MARE’s mission had also been 
reduced, allowing a more cohesive approach to the challenge of rewriting the chapter on 
public administration of the 1988 Constitution.
In his second month in office, Bresser Pereira was giving interviews about his perception of 
the state reform problem and the administration’s intentions in terms of priorities and 
strategies. This immediately triggered off public controversy around the tenure issue, 
perceived as a constraint to intra-state adjustment needs. The rigidity of the 1988 
Constitutional provisions was identified as the main bottleneck to be overcome. Employment 
relationships as well as organisational matters were both crystallised in a way that blocked 
State action. MARE concentrated its initial efforts on reviewing constitutional provisions in 
order to scrutinise all topics that needed to be updated and adjusted to the Administration’s 
determinations.
In taking the constitutional text as the main focus of his attention, Bresser Pereira generated 
immediate conflict with Eduardo Jorge, the Secretary of the Presidency, who had been a 
close advisor of Cardoso ever since the latter had been senator in the 1980s. Jorge had 
worked closely with Cardoso during the 1988 National Constituent Assembly and had
364 The first decision was made with Bresser’s agreement. The second was a presidential choice, influenced by 
coalition reasons and advice from his Chief of Staff (E1H/SP/8).
365 The Chief o f Staff of the Presidency -  Clovis Carvalho -  publicly overruled Bresser Pereira and asked him to 
restrain from making provocative statements that might embarrass the Administration, especially with respect to 
issues that had not been sufficiently discussed within the cabinet.
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participated in the discussions related to the public administration chapter of the new 
constitution. His personal view was that the Administration did not need to change the 
constitution to promote administrative reforms. His perspective was closer, on the one hand, 
to that of Helio Beltrao, who tended to minimise the role of changes in legislation and 
structures as signs of public management policy change and, on the other, to the public 
managers’ progressive public administration style of reforms.
At the first meeting of Cardoso’s cabinet in February, Bresser Pereira’s proposal for a 
detailed strategy to review the Constitution caused an immediate impact. None of the 
ministers present had anything similar to talk about, not even the Finance and the Social 
Security ministers, who were in charge of more mature issues closer to the Administration’s 
decisional agenda. If, on the one hand, Bresser Pereira’s proposal caught the President’s 
attention, on the other, it caused concern among other ministers who were suspicious of his 
personal style and innovative ideas. His move placed the reform of the State apparatus onto 
the list of structural reforms that should be considered priorities of the Cardoso 
Administration. Politics followed policies (Lowi, 1964). In fact, politics followed 
entrepreneurial actions that raised expectations around policies.
6.33. Generating a policy alternative
As a fast mover, Bresser Pereira was personally involved in taking stock of the national and 
international history of the public management issue. He met with Beltrao and assimilated his 
concerns about over-bureaucratisation. He met with Cintra, who had tried to build up a public 
policy approach anchored to the Ministry of Planning in the late 1980s. He met with
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Croizier who had made strong criticisms about the over-bureaucratisation of the French 
public administration. He met with Osborne, who suggested he pay attention to what was 
going on in New Zealand and Britain.367 He then visited Britain where he made a first contact 
with Jenkins, a key operator of the Next Steps Agencies process. Bresser Pereira also began 
frequenting the international public management policy circuit in order to keep in touch with 
different perspectives on public sector reforms.
The fusion of Bresser Pereira’s ideas and the contacts with the policy proposals that were 
floating around the world, as well as stimulating debates with some of his advisors resulted 
in a new formulation (MARE, 1997). The public sector should be divided into three areas: 
areas that should remain under state control, those that should go public but not be made 
state-owned organisations, and those which should be privatised. See Figure below.
366 An alleged comment made by Croizier on an informal occasion (“You should be thankful that you do not 
have a French type o f bureaucracy”) became part o f the “anecdotic knowledge pool” of the period and would be 
used from time to time as an authoritative argument against critics o f the Administration’s proposal (E2M/Br/9).
367 E1H/SP/8.
368 The Secretary of State Reform brought together a creative group o f public administration experts, who 
played an influential role in the policy design stage but later faced greater difficulties at the implementation 
stage.
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Figure Setting the Limits for the Sphere of Action of the State
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Within this framework, most o f  the secondary administrative functions o f  these organisations 
should be contracted out. Accountancy and employment legislation for the private sector 
should be adopted in the second and third groups, while traditional public sector rules should 
be reserved for the core State activities. Moreover, tenure should be eliminated and firing 
mechanisms should be introduced into the public sector under two special circumstances: 
insufficient performance over time, and organisational redundancy situations, when positions 
or institutions should be terminated.
The proposal included other relevant elements such as the establishment o f a limit on wages 
in the three branches o f  government; the review of distortions in the human resources 
legislation; and the creation the o f new forms o f  public sector organisations, such as 
executive agencies, social organisations and others. The Administration took notice o f
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Bresser Pereira’s intense activity to the extent that the public debate tended to concentrate on 
the tenure issue, which was a public opinion dogma at the time. Bresser Pereira was 
successfully capturing the attention of the Administration and the media, while other 
ministers were barely familiarised with their missions.
At that time MARE was fully operational and began to generate initial data that provided 
empirical proof of most of Bresser Pereira’s arguments. A first diagnosis of the executive 
public administration emerged and allowed a broader strategy, based on five points, to be 
developed. First, data should always be used to strengthen the reform proposals. Second, the 
public opinion debate should be diverted from the President and redirected to the Minister or 
MARE itself in order to preserve Cardoso. Third, the constitutional amendment should be the 
basis of the working plan of the Ministry. Fourth, a white paper should be written to support 
the public advocacy required for negotiations in Congress regarding the amendment. Finally, 
MARE should take the initiative on all reform fronts regardless of the negotiation status of 
the constitutional amendment. Therefore the reforms should be tackled simultaneously to 
activities involving advocacy, implementation and negotiation.
Bresser Pereira knew there was a deficit of cadres in the ministries but he did not share the 
under-bureaucratisation diagnosis of the public managers. Especially, he did not want to 
position MARE as a resource-demanding ministry. The personnel issue had acquired the 
status of an anathema for the economic team, for two reasons. First, there were huge 
concerns regarding control of the payroll, a test that Bresser Pereira successfully managed to 
pass thanks to the tough controls he implemented and the review of legislation on personnel. 
Second, a phenomenon of policy contamination was present because the economic team now 
wanted public competitive selection processes for civil servants who would acquire
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retirement rights under the current legislation, which, at the time, was about to be 
reformulated. Despite the above-mentioned concerns, Bresser Pereira carefully managed to 
resume public competitive selection processes for the careers of public managers, budgeting 
(later reformulated to budgeting and planning) personnel, and those involved in treasury and 
control.
6.3.4. Reaching the executive decisional agenda
MARE operated intensively during the year of 1995 in order to get executive approval for 
two important documents: the constitutional amendment and the White Paper on the Reform 
of the State Apparatus. A State Reform Chamber had been set up to discuss and approve 
both. The chamber was a collegial mechanism organised by Carvalho to allow consensus to 
build up government cohesiveness around sensitive issues to be pushed through the 
congressional agenda.369 In principle, Cardoso should have coordinated the activities but he 
named his Chief of Staff to represent him.370 The Chamber included important ministries 
such as Planning, and Labour, which played no relevant role in the process. Bresser Pereira 
expected the Chamber to function as an agency to disseminate the ideas contained in the 
policy proposal. He also expected the Chamber to function as a supportive instance to 
encourage adhesion of other ministries to the new mechanisms envisioned by the white paper 
to shape the relationships between parental ministries and autonomous government agencies 
and foundations. It did not work this way, however.
369 The chamber was both a coordination and decision-making arena that Carvalho had piloted successfully 
during the launching o f the Real Plan. Cardoso decided to adopt it to deal with coordination problems in some 
government sectors, such as State reform.
70 The chambers were mechanisms typical o f Carvalho’s managerial style but did not fit the President’s profile 
or modus operandi.
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The stage was dominated by the clashes between Bresser Pereira on one side and Carvalho 
and Jorge on the other. These clashes were based on different motivations. In Barzelay’s 
terms (Barzelay, 1986), there were problems of competition with the Chief of Staff and 
conflict with the Secretary of the Presidency. The dispute with Carvalho was personal, and 
based on territorial claims, while the differences with Jorge were ideological and based on 
different perspectives regarding policies.
Carvalho also had a managerial view toward public affairs, although based on micro­
principles. He had been a successful private executive and gave great importance to 
processes at the same time that he was suspicious of what he perceived as excessive 
expectations brought about by changes in structures and organisational design -  as was the 
case of the proposal by MARE. But more importantly, Carvalho did not have the same 
intellectual admiration of Bresser Pereira as Cardoso so often demonstrated. On the contrary,
• • • • ^71he considered Bresser Pereira’s personal style a problem because of his hesitant behaviour, 
a characteristic that Carvalho perceived as a weakness for the government because it did not 
transmit consistency.
Eduardo Jorge was an obstacle on ideological grounds. He considered that all initiatives 
oriented to enhancing autonomous forms of public-sector organisation would have a single 
final destination: they would end up being governed by administrative law, as was the case 
with the civil servants’ statute and the public sector accounting legislation. His beliefs were 
historically grounded, due to his participation in the 1988 National Constituent Assembly and 
his academic knowledge of Brazilian public administration. He identified two reasons to
371 Bresser Pereira was an intellectual with a passion for ideas. He did not hesitate to change his mind if  he was 
convinced that a given idea was better than his own. He also tended to concentrate on the core issues o f any 
debate, and showed no special concern with making concessions with respect to secondary elements. Carvalho, 
by contrast, was a tough negotiator who raised a wall to free Cardoso from housekeeping affairs (E1H/Br/17).
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explain the phenomena. First, the employees of these organisations sooner or (usually) later 
sought special retirement rights -  after initially demanding wages equivalent to those in the 
private sector in order to perform better when the organisations were set up. The successfully 
tested solution was to ensure that all such employees be reclassified as civil servants. After 
all, they had been working for the public sector for many years. Second, traditional 
watchdogs, such as public prosecutors, the Attorney General, the Internal Control Office, and 
the Supreme Audit Agency (the TCU) tended to set up new control mechanisms that 
increasingly forced these “autonomous” organisations to comply with administrative law.
'y 'j'y
Roughly speaking, Jorge considered the reform innocuous, almost diversionist.
The two adversaries were in a much better position than Bresser Pereira to influence 
Cardoso, because, unlike Bresser Pereira, they had direct and immediate personal access to 
him. As a result, successive versions of the two documents were generated and continuously 
refined until they were considered minimally adequate for publication. The stress had been 
great and the price had been high in terms of political capital. Ironically, the more Bresser 
Pereira changed the proposal to accede to his key interlocutors' demands the more they 
became suspicious of the robustness of the proposal and of MARE’s capacities.
MARE counted on the acquiescence of the economic team because of the plan’s main 
proposals on fiscal priorities. Bresser Pereira attached approval of the reform to the 
consolidation of the “Real” (the new Brazilian currency), a piece of rhetoric that worked at 
defining moments of the debate on reform early in Cardoso’s first term of office. But consent 
does not mean effective or sufficient support. The economic team’s perspective was shaped
372 E1H/Br/17.
373 The version of the Constitutional Amendment sent to Congress would be its 58th amendment (Melo, 2002: 
189) Although this was considered natural, as part o f a continuous refinement, it contributed to reduce the 
credibility of his team in Carvalho’s and Jorge’s eyes.
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around cutting costs. Bresser immediately turned his attention to efforts at reducing costs, 
especially with respect to distortions in the payroll. His team’s determination and the 
adoption o f modem information-technology control systems, paid off. As a result, MARE 
gained credibility to move forward to the innovative areas of the public management design.
Bresser Pereira’s insistence on questioning certain aspects of the macro-economic policy -  he 
never gave up his leanings as a political economist -  made his rivals suspicious of his real 
intentions. Given his intellectual competence, previous experience in executive posts, and 
personal relationship with the President, some people always perceived him as a potential 
candidate for the Finance or Planning Ministries. He was firmly aligned with the then 
Minister of Planning, Jose Serra, in his criticism of the valuation of the Brazilian currency. 
His position was not public, but known to those who mattered: the Ministers of Finance and 
of Planning, and the Presidency.
The public positioning of the governors who supported Cardoso’s coalition convinced the 
President that he had nothing to lose by sending the proposal to Congress. MARE’s advocacy 
work was decisive at that stage in mid-1995. One of its main advocacy arenas consisted of 
the National Forum Offices of Administration. Backed by facts and figures, Bresser Pereira 
successfully persuaded the state governors who took office at the same time as Cardoso that 
if they did not adjust their payrolls they would not be able to deliver popular and effective 
public services. A federal law establishing tight controls and parameters for public 
expenditures had recently been approved.374 Therefore, the best they could do was to support 
his proposal strongly in order to get it approved as quickly as possible, therefore being able 
to fire redundant employees. Paradoxically, the possibility of removing tenure served as a
374 According to the Camata Law, states could not spend more than 65% of their current revenues on their 
payroll. Only two states were able to attain this goal at that time.
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pivotal issue in the political decision. And the issue moved from the executive arena to the 
legislative.
Bresser Pereira had won the initial rounds against the President’s two gatekeepers and had 
neutralised the reluctance of the economic team with respect to his plan. The President 
endorsed the proposal, which meant that it was ready to be sent to Congress. Cardoso’s 
words in support of the Bresser proposal at that time were revealing:
“You will face three challenges. First, to persuade the public opinion that the 
proposal is in the country’s best interests. Second, to negotiate the proposal 
with Congress. And last but not least, you will have to convince the Executive 
Branch that it is a good proposal for the functioning of the public sector. You 
will have to convince the Administration ”
In this speech, Cardoso skilfully marked three positions. First, he gave his support to sending 
the proposal to Congress. Secondly, he stayed at a distance from the process, transferring this 
task of the Executive Branch to Bresser Pereira. Finally, he did not explicitly commit the 
resources of the Presidency with negotiations within the cabinet or with Congress. Bresser 
Pereira was doomed to face an uphill battle in multiple fronts to persuade the three audiences 
Cardoso had mentioned. The Presidency supported the negotiation more actively later on, but 
the terms of the negotiation were not under Bresser Pereira’s full control.
375 E3M/Br/27 and E2M/Br/9.
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6.4. Implementation during negotiation
6.4.1. Keeping up the momentum
In the Brazilian political system, sending a bill to Congress is an important step towards 
enacting a new law, but not as significant as one might ordinarily presume. First, it does not 
mean that the Executive Branch has taken a final and cohesive position on the issue at that 
stage. Negotiation within the Executive Branch goes on, now also influenced by the 
Administration’s coalition supporters. The Executive can always change things later. Second,
'1H /L
the executive sphere can also use a provisional measure to ensure that its proposals will 
have legal effect if Congress does not vote on them on time. Therefore, the Administration 
frequently publishes ordinarily legislation before Congress decides on it.377 Third, sixty per 
cent of favourable votes in Congress are needed to approve a constitutional amendment, a 
quorum that usually goes beyond the limits of any support from a coalition allied with the 
President.
The process of implanting the public management reforms began simultaneously with the
'J'TQ
submission of the bill to Congress, for three reasons. First, the approval of new legislation 
by Congress takes time, especially for a constitutional amendment (Melo, 2002). Second, a 
case had to be built with public opinion in order to exercise pressure on Congress to approve 
the amendment. The white paper was written especially with this aim. Third, the greater the
376 On Provisional Measures, see Pessanha (1998).
377 This practice changed only in 2002 when new legislation was approved by Congress and the Executive. The 
new law says that: the government must vote on a provisional measure within in a certain period o f time, 
provisional measures may not be re-issued, and there is a limit to the number of provisional measures being 
analysed simultaneously by Congress.
378 Another example of the shortcomings o f the linear model o f policy-making analysis: implementation before 
final decision-making.
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number of implementation measures taken while the amendment was under consideration in 
Congress, the more the entire piece of legislation would seem natural and inevitable.
MARE’s activities were structured on multiple fronts: human resources (recruiting, training, 
and allocating), innovative organisational issues (implementation of social organisations and 
executive agencies, because they did not depend on the constitutional amendment even 
though included in it), procurement, international loans, negotiation and advocacy. The 
minister directly championed most of them. Given the unpredictable pace of the reform in 
Congress, Bresser Pereira tried to implement everything that did not depend on legislative 
approval, even as he took the future changes for granted. It was a conscious tactical decision 
that seemed reasonable at the time, when the dimensions of the resistance had not yet been 
fully realised.
On the human resources front, MARE immediately delivered impressive results. First, data 
on the federal payroll began being generated, refined and published for the first time in the
» • » ,)'7Q # #Brazilian administrative history. Second, MARE implemented information-technology- 
based systems to manage the payroll. The results in terms of savings and corruption control 
were immediate. This initiative alone accounted for most of the credibility and respect that 
MARE gained from the economic team. Moreover, it was a transparent public crusade. 
Third, Bresser Pereira determined that public examinations should be carried out annually for 
strategic careers such as public managers, in order to equip the Executive Branch with the 
manpower it needed to carry out governmental functions. For the first time, a timetable for 
public competitive selection processes was issued. Bresser wanted civil servants recruited on
379 Data had been a nightmare in all previous reforms and not even during the period from 1985 to 1988 was the 
problem properly faced. Bresser Pereira was benefited by the advances in information technology in the 1990s, 
which enabled him to take control o f the payroll on an unprecedented basis.
380 See Law 9527, 10 December 1997.
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a merit basis to populate the core of the Executive Branch. Fourth, the National School for 
Public Administration (ENAP) was aligned with MARE’s policy and drew up a program of 
ongoing education based on new public management ideas. At the same time ENAP prepared 
recently recruited civil servants for strategic careers and carried on a publicity strategy that 
emphasised the ideas of the reform.381
Procurement was another area immediately tackled by MARE. Procurement had always been 
a traditional bottleneck in the relationship between the State and the private sector. It had 
been a source of dissatisfaction for all those in the public sector concerned with 
responsiveness and timely and effective delivery. An imperfect change in the legislation had 
occurred in 1993,382 when Bresser Pereira adopted a sensible and fresh approach to the 
problem. Given his personal experience as a private executive, he knew how important it was 
to provide a simple and manageable system in contrast to the excessive-bureaucratisation 
derived from dominant legalist views. The technical approach adopted resulted in new 
updated legislation.
6.4.2. Facing (un)expected difficulties
The design and assimilation of the new organisational forms proved more problematic. The 
concepts of executive agency and social organisation were not properly understood, as one 
might naturally expect. They did not fit into the Brazilian legal system, resembling imported
381 During the existence of MARE, the public management debate flourished as it never had since the 1930s, 
when Simoes Lopes launched the Civil Service Journal at the CFSPC. Impressed by the public debate, the 
Graduate Sector of the Ministry o f Education launched a program to support research and graduate initiatives in 
the field. Strangely enough, ENAP opted to stay out of this project on the grounds that it did not intend to 
become an academic institution, but a centre for ongoing education and training.
382 See Law 8666/1993.
383 See Law 9648, 27 May 1998.
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bodies at odds with administrative law. First, there were lists of organisations that applied as 
candidates to MARE’s initiative. Some regarded the opportunity as an attractive experiment, 
others as the only alternative to organisational change. The Department of State Reform was 
in charge of persuading potential candidates to take one route or die other. But many were 
reluctant.
In spite of MARE’s efforts, most of the ministries whose organisations were potential 
candidates for being transformed into executive agencies and social organisations were not 
convinced by the reform rhetoric, nor were the public employees and top managers. They did 
not see how MARE could honour performance agreements that committed flows of resources 
over time without the Budgeting Area and Treasury being involved in the negotiations.
An unexpected difficulty came from some parent ministries. The performance agreements 
had to be signed by parent ministries and organisations, under corresponding supervision 
from MARE, and with the institutional approval of the economic team. These ministries 
became jealous of the potential benefits that the organisations under their supervision -  even 
if only formal -  might receive in the process during a phase when they were facing fiscal 
constraints and financial difficulties.384
Meanwhile, in MARE, a paradox gradually took shape: while Bresser Pereira’s deputy 
piloted the ministry’s machinery, the innovative aspects of the reform were carried out by the 
Department of State Reform. The area that required the greatest support of all was selling 
new organisational arrangements to the executive bodies. The fate of the implementation of 
the reform was being defined by setting up new organisations as executive agencies and
384 E3M/Br/25.
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social organisations. But this was the area that had the most limited resources to deliver its 
mission, in spite of the team’s motivation.
The degree of difficulty became clear when the Ministries of Education and of Culture, and 
part of the Health Ministry stated they were not interested in the alternatives offered by social 
organisations for universities, hospitals, museums, and institutes under their responsibilities. 
MARE received sympathy only from sectors in the Health Ministry, led by a reputed 
cardiologist, while the two other ministries closely identified with Cardoso disregarded the 
discussion.
Further unexpected opposition came from an invisible but powerful actor: Ruth Cardoso, the 
President’s wife. Ms. Cardoso was in charge of the important Community Outreach Program 
-  located at the Presidency. The program was in charge of multiple initiatives directly 
connected with civil society, and she did not buy the idea either, but for a different reason: 
the social organisations model was identified as an attempt by the state to control the third
-IOC
sector. Later, Ruth Cardoso sponsored the development of another organisational solution
•>Q£
close to Bresser’s view, but based on a different logic.
The reluctant attitude of the economic team was simple but not explicitly declared. They 
strongly believed that there was room for sliming bureaucracy in general. The premise that 
guided their operations was that they should cut public expenditures. Performance 
agreements meant committing the flow of resources over time, and they did not intend to 
make this type of concession. They preferred to keep their informal discretionary powers of
385 Martins, 2003: 154.
386 In Cardoso’s second term o f office, thanks to Ruth Cardoso’s initiative, a new organisational figure of 
private law called Social Organisation Oriented the Public Interest was approved (Organizagoes da Sociedade 
Civil de Interesse Publico -  OSCIP). While OSs aimed at public organisations that should be organised outside 
the public sector, the OSCIP aimed at private organisations interested in developing special relationships with 
the public sector.
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cutting costs independently of policy outputs and outcomes, and they saw no reason to 
change their position, and were not asked to do so by their superiors. They simply did not 
engage in the process. Without the support of the economic team and faced with internal 
tensions, the reform lost momentum when the institutions that were to be transformed into 
innovative structures became sceptical.
During the critical years of 1996 and 1997 the reformist initiatives did not make a dent in the 
traditional administrative structures of the federal administration, despite the efforts made by 
MARE to win over support (Martins, 151-157). In 1997 Bresser Pereira realised that MARE 
could carry on with its plans to set up new organisational structures because this did not 
require a constitutional amendment. A simple "provisional measure" could allow the
* 0 0
Executive to set them up. This had also been the case with the regulatory agencies. He 
could therefore accelerate their implementation without having to wait for the approval of the 
amendment, which was facing an uphill battle in Congress. He knew this from the start, but 
he wanted the constitutional amendment to institutionalise the proposal. Bresser Pereira also 
hoped that social organisations and executive agencies would reinforce the case for reform 
with Congressmen. A provisional measure was enacted letting the administration set up both
-> O Q
new organisational bodies, but the list of potential candidates had been reduced from over
<JQ/\
20 to a few special cases.
Two social organisations and one executive agency were finally set up, but faced immediate 
legal objections regarding their constitutionality. This possibility had already discouraged 
some reluctant candidates from attempting the changeover. The two social organisations
387 E2H/Br/13.
388 See Laws 9427, 26 December 1996; 9472,16 July 1997; and 9478, 6 August 1997.
389 See Laws 9637, 15 May 1998, and 9640,27 May 1998.
390 Only one institution was chosen to become an executive agency (INMETRO) and five were to become social 
organisations (one state-owned television station and four science and technology institutes).
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were a physics laboratory and a public television station. The former was a perfect candidate 
for an experiment because it was commanded by an entrepreneurial scientist and because it 
had proved to have the ability to find funding. The latter was a typical case of the less likely 
candidate -  a worst-case scenario story -  but the Minister of Communication’s proximity to 
the Presidency persuaded Bresser Pereira to try and win over a key ally in his political battles 
within the Presidency. The executive agency was the Metrology Institute, a small 
organisation subordinated to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism.
The difficulties were overwhelming in all three cases. The formulation of performance 
agreements was a painful learning process that had to face the opposition of the economic 
team, the ministries and, surprisingly, of sectors in MARE itself, especially those involved in 
control mechanisms. The demonstration effects were minimal although the energies absorbed 
by the process drained the Department of State Reform’s attention and exhausted its 
resources. The case of the public television station did not work at all and eclipsed the gains 
timidly attained in the other two cases.
MARE needed major institutional support in the form of British technical cooperation to 
train its own personnel and persuade the intermediate managers of the organisations that 
were candidates to be “converted”. DFID sponsored a three-year program led by Kate 
Jenkins, who had participated in the Next Steps Agencies projects in the United Kingdom. 
British involvement was important for three reasons. First, it lent an international imprimatur 
to MARE’s proposal and paved the way for international recognition. Second, it helped
391 E3M/Br/27.
392 MARE’s Board of National Offices and Bresser Pereira’s vice-minister were generally perceived as serious 
professionals but they were not national figures. Some favoured the enabling dimensions of the reform and 
others would have preferred a tougher -  a fact that did not help sell the reform (E3M/Br/27). But most o f the 
team needed to be trained and convinced first if  they were to function as multipliers of the new public 
management credo.
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MARE in its permanent cajoling and persuading activities its own officials had to engage in. 
Third, it strengthened Bresser Pereira’s internal struggle for recognition in the core of 
Cardoso’s Administration.393 Despite the British team’s best efforts, however, the executive 
agencies and social organisations were still considered strange and inappropriate institutional 
creatures by Brazilian governmental authorities.
Behind the scenes opposition was put up by the Judicial Branch and by the judicial 
establishment. The proposal had the support of two outstanding young jurists -  the Vice- 
minister of Labour and a reputed expert in administrative affairs from Bahia -  but they did 
not represent the larger group. In fact, the Judicial Branch kept a safe distance from the entire 
process also because many persons involved in it had interests at stake regarding the limit for 
public salaries that affected their own cadres. Bresser Pereira’s precedent regarding the 
Supreme Court was not helpful either.394
Given the long period that passed before a final Congressional decision was reached, one 
might ask why Bresser Pereira did not change his tactics. He was aware of what was going 
on. How could he be become so isolated from the rest of the government despite the 
impressive start of MARE? There are three answers to this question. First, he was determined 
to win over and persuade people regarding his proposal. To a certain extent he was a prisoner 
of his own ideas and beliefs, despite the uphill battle he was facing (although this did not 
intimidate him in the least.) Second, he expected the constitutional amendment to be 
approved in Congress “shortly”, as we shall see in the next section. Therefore, why should he
393 Ironically, at the end of MARE’s cycle o f existence, Jenkins had private conversations with Carvalho, at 
which time they evaluated the problems o f the implementation of the reforms (E1H/Br/14).
394 The entire country was familiar with the fact that the macro-economic stabilisation plan led by Bresser 
Pereira in 1987 resulted in a ruling that provided a gain for all people that received salaries from that year on. 
The Judiciary decision confirmed the premise that the government of that period subtracted 28% of people’s 
salaries because o f the transition rules o f the stabilisation plan without respecting legal procedures. The damage 
to Bresser Pereira’s reputation was palpable although not publicly recognized by his team.
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change? He was not convinced by any other arguments -  partly because he did not face 
opponents that he respected as equals in intellectual terms -  and he was likely to win the 
legislative fight. Third, he was blind to his own shortcomings and those of his team, which in 
some cases were contributing to the alienation of potential collaborators, instead of bridging 
partnerships.
6.4.3. Fighting a long battle in the Legislative Branch
The trajectory of the amendment bill in Congress was influenced by three main factors: the 
legislative dynamics, the ability of interest groups to exert pressure, and the Executive’s 
timetable of priorities.
The literature on executive-legislative relationships in Brazil provides arguments for two 
opposite interpretations. The first suggests that the President is hostage to an unmanageable 
Congress, given the weakness of the Brazilian political party system. According to this 
interpretation, the President is forced to build and manage a huge and costly coalition every 
time he needs Congress to vote on important matters, because of the fragility of his 
congressional base (Lamounier, 1996 and Mainwaring, 1997). The second suggests that, in 
spite of the above-mentioned features of the Brazilian political system, the President has 
plentiful resources available to get whatever he wants voted, given his ability to trade favours 
and resources for votes when the situation requires. The approval rate of executive bills 
submitted to final voting in Congress is quite high (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999, and 
Pereira, 1999). Critics suggest, however, that bills reach the final stages only when they are
395 The most intense opposition Bresser Pereira faced during those years was organised by the Worker’s Party in 
the Judicial Branch, which blocked some of MARE’s initiatives (ElH/Br/47).
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ready to be voted on, based on the strength of prior backdoor logrolling practices. 
Intermediate explanations suggest that the truth lies somewhere in between, because both 
phenomena occur, depending on the circumstances.
The Constitutional Amendment faced strong opposition from both committees through which 
it had to pass (Melo, 2002). In both cases, Bresser Pereira’s political skills, as well as 
influence from the Executive Branch, were decisive to pull it through. But the concessions 
stripped the project of most of its important aspects, such as the limits of public wages and 
the elimination of tenure.
With respect to the interest groups involved in the constitutional amendment debate, Bresser 
Pereira faced two types of opposition: explicit and implicit. The explicit opposition was 
championed by the civil servants' labour unions. But the unions had neither the votes nor the 
strength to block proposals from the Administration. The other type of opposition, however, 
was much stronger and more effective: Congress, the court bureaucracy, and the juridical 
establishment. Public management reform was not a theme that could easily draw the 
attention of public opinion, except on the issue of tenure. Bresser Pereira successfully 
persuaded the Executive that tenure should be mitigated in some cases but he was not able to 
change the positions of the Legislature and the Judiciary with respect to this issue.
There was a more serious problem emerging, however. The constitutional amendment 
included a provision that limited the power of both branches to set their own wages. Due to 
long-standing arrangements, the ordinary wages of bureaucrats in the Legislative and the 
Judicial Branches were proportional to their top salaries, specifically, those of congressmen 
and judges, and neither group would accept limitations to their wages from the Executive 
Branch.
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The coordination of the issue-traffic of the governmental projects in Congress was under the 
responsibility of the Secretary of the Presidency and the Chief of Staff. They thus had three 
crucial capacities: establishing the voting priorities, defining the desired sequence of the 
projects, and negotiating the final project texts, in view of the President’s broader interests. 
The constitutional amendment had been included among the administration’s priorities, in 
spite of Jorge’s and Carvalho’s reluctance. They gave in, thanks to Bresser Pereira’s 
insistence, the President’s acquiescence, and the fact that sending a proposal to Congress 
would not effectively commit the Administration to its approval.
Once the amendment was sent to Congress, Bresser Pereira had to continuously fight for the 
attention of the Executive. There were always other projects that took higher priority, such as 
the constitutional amendments on Social Security and the re-election of the President. There 
was never a good moment to push it to the top of the executive-legislative agenda. Nothing 
moves in Congress without being pushed and it became evident that Bresser Pereira did not 
have enough political clout to make it move faster. Exasperation, however, was not 
necessarily a good advisor. Ironically, the approval of the provisional measure that set up 
social organisations and executive agencies weakened Bresser Pereira’s position. Together 
with the watering down of the elimination of tenure from the Constitution, the provisional 
measure reinforced Jorge’s long-held opinion that there was really no point in changing the 
Constitution to implement public management reforms.
Second thoughts about the strategy that the Administration had been following were 
disseminated within the inner circle of the Presidency. A consensus slowly emerged: the 
champion involved in the policy specification process should not be the same person 
responsible for implementing the reform.
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In the last stages of the issue-transit in Congress, when negotiations arrived at an impasse, 
the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Presidency stopped acting as brokers and took 
Bresser Pereira’s place in the last-minute negotiations, especially with the Judiciary and 
Congress regarding the limits to their salaries. The result was a new round of concessions “in 
order to get something approved”, in the words of a key government minister. After all, at 
that stage, the Administration, needed to approve anything to avoid demoralisation in the 
public eye. The Executive gave up on the limits to wages and the final bill was at last voted 
on, virtually without difficulties. The Administration was so sure of its low political risk after 
so many changes that the amendment was finally approved ahead of schedule, several weeks 
before the voting on the constitutional amendment on second terms for presidents.
6.5. Heading towards an anticlimax
6.5.1. Declaring victory and moving on.
In early 1998, Bresser Pereira painfully realised that he had lost the battle within the 
Administration to implement the reforms. On the political front he could not over-rule the 
Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Presidency. His relationship with Cardoso did not give 
him enough political capital to win the dispute over the limits of jurisdiction and policy ideas 
the president had distanced himself from. On the implementation front, he did not have the 
instruments to persuade executive institutions to become executive agencies and social 
organisations. The economic team had narrowed its priorities to fiscal targets and did not 
support innovative projects that sounded suspicious in terms of resource demands on the
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short term. On his own turf, tensions between members of his team were building up in spite 
of the influence he wielded over his supporters.
Then “the creator decided to destroy the creature”, in the words of a participant of the 
process. Bresser Pereira was frustrated with the difficulties faced within the Administration 
and conscious of the limited support from the President. The constitutional amendment 
allowing a second term of office for the President was the only real issue on the agenda at 
that stage. Bresser had concluded that MARE could not accomplish its mission without the 
instruments -  notably the budget -  needed to implement the reform. Therefore, why not 
merge MARE and the Ministry of Planning? This idea was immediately accepted by 
Carvalho. After all, after the approval of the constitutional amendment on the reform was just 
“a matter of implementation”, as Bresser Pereira wrote in his last newspaper article in 1998 
(FSP, 12/1998).
Bresser Pereira published a personal note in his website in December 2002 in order to avoid 
misunderstandings that might have led to interpretations that MARE’s extinction was a sign 
of a managerial failure of the reform. The pertinence of his argumentation is another matter. 
He argued that he was the author of the proposition and quoted the example of Chile in order 
to advocate the principle that those in charge of the Ministry of Planning should take care of 
the implementation of the reform because they had the budget (Bresser Pereira, 2001). In his 
words, MARE did not have executive powers and should eventually return to its status as a 
Secretary of the Presidency. However, Cardoso decided otherwise. In this article, Bresser 
quoted the President’s words upon inviting him, Bresser, to be the Minister of Science and 
Technology in Cardoso’s second term of office as evidence for his arguments: “The essential 
part of the reform was finished (...) You have successfully fulfilled your role” (Bresser
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Pereira, 2002: 1-2). Intriguingly, in a previous article commenting on the same proposal 
(Bresser Pereira, 1999: 28) Bresser Pereira, mentioned in a footnote that
“I proposed, as an alternative, that MARE be transformed into a Presidential 
Department with ministerial status (as it was before, under the name of SAF) 
and with the direct involvement of the President in the matter. But the 
alternative we adopted looked better to me because of President Cardoso’s 
lack of time (and interest) regarding issues related to implementation and 
daily administration” (Bresser Pereira, 1999: 28).
There was a curious reference in that sentence: the explicit reference to Cardoso’s lack of 
time and, especially, interest in the theme. The reform no longer had his attention.
Bresser Pereira’s final act was to take leave from the Ministry to be fundraiser for Cardoso’s 
upcoming presidential campaign. Once again the President convoked his reliable old 
colleague to take care of a delicate issue. After Cardoso’s easy win in the first round of 
elections, the President appointed him to the Ministry of Science and Technology, an area 
with which Bresser was presumably familiar and an appealing piloting sector for the reform 
projects, especially in organisational matters.
MARE was phased out and its functions were reassigned to two different areas: the Public 
Administration Department (SAP) and the Office of Entrepreneurial Management (SEGES). 
The former was headed by Bresser Pereira’s deputy, and the latter was led by one of 
Carvalho’s advisors. Both were located at the Ministry of Planning, although SAP had 
ministerial status. SEGES became the successor of the State Reform Department and the 
labour entrepreneurial expressed Carvalho’s view on managerial reforms.
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The new appointee for the Ministry of Planning, Budgeting and Management -  Pedro Parente 
-  was regarded by Cardoso, Carvalho and Bresser Pereira as a man capable of implementing 
the reforms. An experienced technocrat, Parente was the resourceful executive apparently 
capable of getting the approval from others. He was to be the bridge between the planning 
and budgeting areas, on the one hand, and budgeting and public management, on the other. A 
policy cycle had come to an end and the transition to a new one had began.
6.5.2. Meanwhile, other important things were happening
Bresser Pereira’s dominant role in the entire process frequently overshadowed other 
important issues that were in the works at the same time and that were not noticed or at least 
not publicised. To have a more accurate picture of the episode they should also be mentioned 
briefly because they are intimately related to the case, but not always directly. MARE’s 
actions later gave rise to an initiative in governmental management by the Ministry of 
Planning. In addition, distortions continued in personnel regimes in the federal 
administration. Technically speaking, one might argue that these issues were out of MARE’s 
formal jurisdiction, but this point is questionable, especially with respect to personnel.
Bresser Pereira did not notice the emergence of another managerial vector in the Ministry of 
Planning, represented by the Brazil in Action package of projects. Since the second semester 
of 1996 Jose Silveira, the Secretary of Plans and Investments, had begun to craft a new 
managerial rhetoric that combined total quality management and project management 
concepts -  borrowed from the private sector -  with performance management formulations. 
Bresser Pereira knew Silveira, a retired engineer from Petrobras, and respected him as a
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professional and a capable manager. But he did not seek any special type of relationship, 
except to reactivate a total quality management initiative within MARE.
The initiative aimed at grouping selected projects in which the President had personal interest 
in a different track. Individual managers were made visibly responsible for the forty-five 
projects. The process was led by Minister Kandir and caught Carvalho’s attention. In 1998 
the Administration already had a managerial proposal for his forthcoming second term of 
office: “Advance Brazil” (.Avanga Brasil) -  a pluri-annual plan based on the lessons drawn 
from Brazil in Action.
Regarding personnel, despite the resumption of public competitive selection processes for a 
few careers, Cardoso’s Administration implemented a severe contraction of the public sector 
workforce simply by failing to replace those who retired and those who adhered to volunteer 
layoff programs. The numbers were impressive. Between 1988 and 1998 the number of civil 
servants fell from 705,548 to 516,242 (Cheibub, 1999: 128). Replacements were minimal, in 
selected areas, and did not go beyond ten thousand civil servants in all.
Given the depopulating process of the Federal Administration, each ministry sought 
individually to solve its personnel problems. A “toothpaste effect” took place. The solutions 
emerged slowly and when the administration took notice, new problems had been created. 
There were three paths to follow: international agencies, private foundations connected to 
public universities, and information technology manpower firms.
International institutions began to be used to hire personnel on a temporary basis. Initially, 
the profile was technical -  basically consultants. But after a few years United Nations 
Agencies were hiring thousands of “consultants” for administrative, technical, and strategic
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tasks. They received overhead funds to hire people -  in principle according to their internal 
procedures (Santos, 1997: 103). Some agencies used selections, others not. Some agencies 
did no contracting at all, others did. Some agencies were systematically audited by their 
headquarters, others were not. Personnel were hired under special circumstances, such as 
those needed to avoid discontinuity of strategic initiatives involving emergency initiatives of 
government, the implementation of high-level scientific and technology cooperation, and 
others (Shiki, 1999).
The phenomenon was not exclusively Brazilian. The so-called Latin-American cost-sharing 
model was developed with aid from the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank (Galvani 
and Morse, 2004). The first resources came from these banks, but later the governments 
themselves began to allocate budgetary resources of international agencies in order to 
accelerate expenditures and reduce internal and external political and administrative controls. 
The agencies helped the administrations by offering “development services”, rather than 
develop institutional capacities (Gaetani, 2004). Only at the end of Cardoso’s second term of 
office did the Administration take official measures regarding the problem, but not 
voluntarily. The Executive Branch was forced to do so because of legal actions taken by 
public prosecutors and the Labour Courts. Approximately nine thousand persons were 
hired in Brasilia on the basis of international contracts.397
The second route for getting around governmental restrictions against hiring personnel 
consisted of private foundations of universities, a hybrid juridical figure that had survived the 
implementation of the 1988 Constitution. While universities themselves are subject to public
396 The action was based on a provision o f Law 7347/85 that enables public suits against certain situations that 
jeopardize the public interest. The Declaration o f Conciliation and Adjustment o f Conduct was signed by the 
Attorney General and the Public Labour Prosecutors only on 7 June 2002, at the end o f Cardoso’s second term 
of office, with effects to be valid basically in the following Administration.
397 E1H/Br/14.
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law, their foundations exist under private legislation and are subject to loose arrangements 
connected or not with the university hierarchy. Given the unquestionable expertise of the 
university scholars, the foundations could be hired by public organisations without having to 
participate in bids or competitions. Occasionally the foundations could hire people on a 
short-term and private basis for consultancy, research and training, and for providing
1QQ
manpower. Everything was legal or at least on the fringes of legality.
The case of information-technology companies was more delicate and controversial. Brasilia 
did not yet have a pool of suppliers as did other large Brazilian cities. The Administration 
began to depend increasingly on information and communication services rendered by 
private providers. More importantly, the management of politically sensitive systems in all 
governmental areas was increasingly being contracted out. The management of these 
contracts became a recurrent nightmare for all data-intensive areas of the government. The 
watchdogs regularly pointed out in their reports, that these contracts are potential sources of 
corruption, but the administration took no counter-action to solve, or even mitigate, the 
problem.399 These contracts were frequently used to “smuggle” personnel into other areas of 
the Administration and renewed on the grounds of “essentiality”, because some sectors 
cannot cease functioning while the government organises new bids and procurement 
transactions.
Together, the three routes account for tens of thousands of professionals, mostly in Brasilia, 
but the numbers are only guesses. There are no mechanisms to check the precise numbers
398 E1H/Br/14.
399 E3L/Br/58.
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because the data is disperse and the ministries in charge of the problem do not have 
mechanisms to enforce data collection regarding these contracts.400
6.6. Conclusion
Bresser’s entrepreneurial role was so evident in this episode that lasted from 1995 to 1998 
that the reform became personalised. In contrast with 1937, it became Bresser’s reform, not 
Cardoso’s reform. He defined the problem in his own terms at the beginning of the issue 
career in a way that neutralised potential opposition. He generated an innovative policy 
proposal that combined elements from the new public management fad with traditional 
progressive public administration ideas. He also played a key political role in negotiating the 
constitutional amendment within the Executive Branch as well as with Congress. In short, he 
catalysed the three streams in such a way as to promote policy change according to 
Kingdon’s formulation. But a closer look at what went on suggests a picture different from 
the one the minister later presented to the world (Bresser Pereira, 1999 and 2003).
Regarding the problem definition process, Bresser Pereira in fact provided an undisputable 
legacy, but not on the issues he presumes. MARE’s statistics regarding the Brazilian civil 
service, the payroll, appointed positions, retirement, distribution, age, the three branches, the 
three levels of government, and other meaningful data were a major breakthrough, and 
Bresser Pereira decided to make them public. For the first time the government generated 
reliable data that showed that the public sector paid better salaries than the private sector at 
the operational level but that government wages were not competitive at the executive level.
400 E1H/Br/14 and E3L/Br/58.
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Bresser Pereira used this fact to guarantee pay rises for personnel in certain careers he 
decided should be resumed, a historical achievement in the direct administration, which, until 
then, had basically reacted to corporatist demands, specially from some very well organised 
career “bunkers” such as tax inspectors and diplomats.
The data also evidenced a phenomenon that people knew existed, namely, the manpower 
deficits at managerial level in some ministries of the direct administration, notably in 
infrastructure (Transportation, Mines and Energy, and Telecommunications) but also in the 
social areas (Education, Health, Culture, and Environment), Industry, and Trade and 
Tourism. But, as described above, Bresser Pereira downplayed the problem. His diagnosis 
was primarily defined on the basis of a homogenous managerial deficit. The problem of 
under bureaucratisation did not fit well in its neat design. Moreover, he was engaged in the 
designing of an enabling proposal. He could not risk clashes with the economic team, who 
were absolutely obsessed with the problem. Also, there was no pressure to “populate” these 
ministries from any political actor. The situation was taken for granted and it was not 
perceived or defined as a serious problem although ministries “pragmatically” dealt with it as 
described in the previous section.
The way the problem was defined did not take into account the arguments presented by Naim 
(1995), Evans (1993) or Shick (1999) for instance, nor those of the surviving public 
managers involved in the 1988 experiment. Bresser Pereira was indeed aware of the 
importance of the problem of the salaries of top officials but he underestimated the 
bureaucratic deficits in areas such as,
“policy planning, budgeting, personnel practices, information systems,
coordination mechanisms, control and oversight, maintenance, and general
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services, (...) [all] realms that have obviously been deeply affected by decades 
of neglect, improvisation, politicisation, and lack of resources, especially of 
skilled and stable personnel” (Naim, 1995: 35).
He was unable to regenerate a bureaucracy capable of engendering the so-called second 
generation of reforms, which depended more heavily on middle managers than on the small 
group at the top required to steer macro-economic structural adjustments (the President, the 
Minister of Finance, and the President of the Central Bank). By choosing not to emphasise 
the case for bureaucracy in the strategic core and in frontline ministries, Bresser Pereira 
dismissed the possible gains he could have made by “rediscovering bureaucracy” (Olsen, 
2004).
In the confusing bureaucratic jungle of Brasilia, MARE’s team failed to realise that the,
“developmental state engenders a more meritocratic civil service and long­
term career rewards that heighten commitment and create a sense of corporate 
coherence within the state that, in turn, becomes a major source of autonomy”
(Evans 1993, 2).
Bresser Pereira in particular did not make an intellectual connection between the importance 
of a Weberian elite bureaucracy and economic development (Evans and Rauch, 1999; and 
Rauch and Evans, 2000). His views on bureaucracy in Brasilia were ambiguous and he 
attributed to them a paradoxical position related to the 1988 reform: “At that moment, since 
the state bureaucrats lacked a minimal national project, they engaged in successful rent- 
seeking [...] [via] the tenure article and the pension system in the 1988 Constitution” 
(Bresser Pereira, 2003: 95). What Bresser Pereira failed to grasp was the fact that some few 
merit-based bureaucrats who had acquired civil servants rights on a merit basis began to be
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treated the same way as all others by those who saw all state bureaucrats as practitioners of 
rent-seeking. He indeed made important moves regarding the strengthening of some strategic 
careers. But, symptomatically, even when MARE was finally phased out, a line had not yet 
been drawn to define the borders of the strategic core functions, an ambiguity that deprived 
the Minister from counting on solid support from within the bureaucracy.
One plausible explanation for Bresser Pereira’s position was his need to adopt a cautious 
approach towards the economic team. Bresser Pereira had historically been a developmental 
economist whose beliefs were closer to structuralist economists in Brazil and in Latin 
America. If he had made this connection -  which he surely envisaged -  he would have 
become an easy target for the prevailing economic view in Cardoso’s Administration. He was 
also genuinely motivated by the managerial credo. Therefore he tried to craft a balance that 
paradoxically did not help strengthen his position because he never de facto got any support 
from the economic team. At the same time, he could not count on decisive adherence of the 
high civil service despite his rhetoric at that time, or even more recently (2003). Moreover, 
he faced opposition regarding some of MARE’s policy sleazes (Wright, 1997) that only hard­
line bureaucrats could possibly commit.
Regarding policy specification Bresser Pereira clearly and, to a certain extent, consciously, 
gave into the temptation to leapfrog (Schick, 1998: 123). He held a clear position that he saw 
no point in “first” building a bureaucracy and “then” heading towards a managerial state. He 
could concede that in the Brazilian case both such aims should be pursued simultaneously as 
his neat design suggested. But the primacy, the emphasis, and the future were managerially 
driven. Borrowing ideas from De Soto (1989: 12), Schick (1998: 127-129) argued 
extensively and convincingly that in public sector landscapes dominated by informal
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practices -  notably in the civil service and budgeting arenas -  governments should not “move 
directly from an informal public sector to one in which managers are accorded enormous 
discretion to hire and spend as they see fit”. His basic argument was that managing the 
budget properly, controlling public spending tightly, and handling a professional civil service 
correctly were essential preconditions for adopting elements from the New Zealand model. It 
is not fair to say that Bresser Pereira tried to adopt the stylised New Zealand model of public 
sector reforms in Brazil because, in fact, Britain was his main reference. But his pretension of 
having produced “a clear design from a precise diagnosis” (Bresser Pereira, 2003: 97) 
showed no concern for any sort of prerequisites in order to jump onto the new public 
management bandwagon.401
His policy design was neat but ambiguous, although the ambiguity was not explicitly 
evidenced. The question regarding where to draw a line to delimit the strategic core remained 
unanswered402 for four years. Despite the improvements in personnel management MARE’s, 
reluctance to resume public competitive selection processes for key areas, including the 
recently set up regulatory agencies -  presumably to avoid upsetting the macro-economic 
rulers, as this was a policy contamination issue -  led to attempts to institutionalise short-term 
contract jobs for the public sector,403 a third type of employment arrangement that granted 
neither civil servants’ rights nor private employees’ rights to public functionaries. The
401 Bresser Pereira’s statements and decisions, both during his period as minister and later, are frequently 
assumed to match MARE’s organisational performance. He did his best at the time and continues arguing with 
respect to his legacy. But it is a mistake to take his skilful rhetoric for granted, even in the absence o f an 
effective counter discourse (Brunsson, 1989: 231).
402 In 2000 a former member of the MARE team, who had been a member of the public managers career’s first 
promotion, in 1988, carried out a limited personnel reform and drew a tempting line -  roughly accordingly to 
the concepts o f Bresser Pereira and to the mobilisation around the Forum of State-Type Careers (Gaetani and 
Heredia, 2002).
403 As usual, what was assumed to be an exceptional resource for emergency situations, defined in Laws 8112 of 
1990 and 8745 o f 1993, became an expediency for controversial purposes (Santos, 1997: 103). The objective of 
this possibility was to provide time to come up with a conclusive solution -  to the problem or to recruitment -  
not to economize on resources.
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initiative prospered for some time but it was contested by a suit filed by the Workers’ Party 
that obtained initial gains in the first rulings.404
The straightforward question that MARE could not answer institutionally was how to match 
the organisational design with the organisation’s labour regime. The transition procedures 
adopted with respect to the three experiments under MARE’s supervision plainly revealed 
that there was no clear understanding -  not to mention positioning -  regarding the issue, not 
even in the ministry in charge of the reform of the State. A problem of policy sleaze -  
whether under MARE’s full control or not -  became evident to the insiders of the executive 
machine, despite the overwhelming rhetoric dedicated to the reform.
Other ambiguities drained Bresser Pereira’s political capital as well: Cardoso’s position, his 
fellow ministers, the way the economic team perceived MARE’s efforts, the internal 
divisions of his team, and, particularly, the dispersion of his attention and energy. As we 
observed in the other cases, entrepreneurs frequently accumulate multiple roles within the 
political and policy streams. Biit in Bresser’s case he was the leading figure of multiple 
simultaneous struggles that kept him from concentrating his efforts in single directions to 
solve the pending issues that were undermining his actions. After remarkable gains made 
during the first months of administration, the reform lost momentum and credibility.
As a resourceful person, Bresser Pereira felt confident to take multiple -  and to a certain 
point conflictive and competitive -  initiatives simultaneously, and lost perspective of the 
sequence, a concept he never sympathised with. This too was the result of his position in a 
dispute that belonged to the economic domain. In claiming that clientelism was a residual
404 In fact the decision is still pending at the Supreme Court, but, to the present, all the justices who have made 
statements in this regard have positioned themselves against the Administration’s initiative.
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political phenomena in Brazilian politics and by underestimating the need for consolidating 
merit-based bureaucracies, Bresser Pereira contributed to the traditional “dam effect” 
generated recurrently by the posture of the economic team with respect to personnel.
What I am calling the “dam effect” refers to cost-cutting policies adopted with respect to 
personnel for long periods of time without any particular selective criteria or sense of 
purpose. This presumably “heroic” posture, as it is usually perceived by the economic team -  
which in turn is frequently commanded by political appointees -  builds a “dam”. But because 
the flux of public competitive selection processes is so severely constrained and the frontline 
ministries have to find solutions for themselves, two recurrent phenomena take place. The 
first was mentioned above, the “toothpaste effect”. The second -  closer to Brazilian political 
traditions -  was the conversion, or reclassification, into civil servants, of all those who had 
been hired on provisional bases. This occurred again a few years later to almost five thousand 
employees of the environment sector405 in the final years of Cardoso’s second term of office.
When the dam cracks as the result of overwhelming political pressure, the embarrassed 
economic team sweetly acquiesces, convinced that it fully complied with its guardian role. 
The invisible explanation was that, because an enabling human resource policy was not 
pursued continuously in the undifferentiated but tense field of public expenditure, the 
vacuum opened up a political window for the historically persistent solution. MARE was not 
able to produce a breakthrough in the undifferentiated traditional posture of the Budgeting 
and the Treasury areas regarding frontline ministries. It did not have the political clout and
405 The script was familiar. The minister was the son of former President Jose Samey -  then a pivotal figure in 
the Brazilian Senate. The Administration was coming to an end. Not even the Workers’ Party was interested in 
generating obstacles against a popular corporatist demand just before a presidential election. No legal objections 
on the grounds o f the unconstitutionality o f the initiative were raised.
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the executive instruments to force it through, although its team had exhaustively tried to, 
especially those members who worked at the Department of State Reform.
There were no surprises in this story, except for those who heard it for the first time. Bresser 
Pereira’s fascination with new public management overshadowed his sense regarding more 
embedded practices in Brazilian public administration. Recent investigations in development 
theory suggest that kicking the ladder might be a strategy carried out by developed countries 
to block competitors' efforts to catch up (Shang, 2005). Bresser Pereira failed to realise that -  
even if economic, social, political, and cultural differences were ignored -  some OCDE 
countries were capable of moving towards new public management reforms because they 
became aware of the “scaffolding” bureaucracies that had been there for centuries.
The epilogue was sad but revealing. When Cardoso reshuffled his cabinet in the wake of a 
political scandal and the international financial crisis, he took advantage of the political 
turbulence to move Bresser Pereira from MARE and phase it out. The issue could not survive 
at the top of the government agenda without its champion, in spite of his shortcomings. 
Implementation took place on other bases, although Bresser Pereira’s legacy was beyond 
dispute.
Two substantial policy changes had been carried out in two public management policy sub- 
domains: organisational arrangements and labour legislation. It is not fair to say that social 
organisations406 and executive agencies became part of the Brazilian institutional landscape, 
but the precedents were there, although on an tentative basis. Three new forms of
406 Social organisations have shown an intriguing slow-growing career. At the federal level only a few 
institutions with characteristics closer to the science and technology environment adopted the model -  “a 
special model for a special type of institution” in the words o f a former high officer in the Ministry o f Science 
and Technology (Steiner). In recent years such organisations have also been set up at new hospitals in the State 
of Sao Paulo.
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employment arrangements emerged from the reform: civil service, private contracts and 
public contracts -  but the latter did not endure. In spite of all the defeats and concessions 
during the negotiation stage, Bresser Pereira successfully engineered a more flexible public 
sector.407
All the major policy processes, such as agenda setting, problem definition, issue image 
formulation, alternative specification, and decision-making derived from Bresser Pereira’s 
relentless action and determination. The context played an important role and affected the 
institutional features of the Brazilian political system. The political stream was stable over 
the period as was the economic domain until the second semester of 1998, shortly before the 
presidential election, which Cardoso was to win in the first round. But it is unthinkable to 
conceive of the 1998 reform without Bresser Pereira’s decisive interference. The public 
management debate became part of the national scene, and a policy community flourished 
under the leadership of MARE’s activities. The dissemination of new public management 
ideas was possible mainly through the role played by ENAP in providing training on a large 
scale, based on new concepts, techniques and tools. But a better understanding of the past, 
combined with structure policy dialogue, could have helped the reformers do a better job.
407 There is an ongoing judicial case regarding the legislative procedures required for voting on constitutional 
amendments, but it is not likely to succeed. In the remote hypothesis that it does occur, the country will have to 
undo 1998 decisions by Congress.
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Chapter 7
Comparing Brazilian Constitutional Public Management Reforms
7.1. Overview
The comparison of case studies demands that the evidence be organised on the basis of an 
analytical framework to enable identification of significant similarities and differences 
among the episodes. This chapter provides a comparison of the four cases of changes in 
public management policy in order to enhance historical understanding of the four reforms. 
The comparisons aim are intended primarily to enable clearer understanding of the distinct 
dimensions of the policy processes, and secondarily, of substantial aspects of the public 
management policies themselves.
The challenge of providing analytical comparisons patterned on Kingdon’s approach is based 
on a historical understanding of the four episodes described in the preceding chapters. The 
comparisons are based on standard research questions derived from Kingdon’s framework, 
since the major concern of the thesis is to generate claims about processes in the four 
episodes. Kingdon’s processual model has been broken down in order to provide a 
comparison among disaggregated elements of the framework: agenda setting, problem 
definition, alternative specification, public entrepreneurship, and decision-making.
Three properties of the agenda-setting process are compared in the four cases: issue 
inclusion, issue formulation, and issue status, each one of which affects the policy cycle in a 
different way. Policy initiation is influenced by the way the issue reaches the governmental 
agenda. The way the issue is constructed provides the parameters that will condition the
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definition of policy alternatives. The status of the issue over time affects -  and is also 
affected by -  the efforts of entrepreneurs with respect to its career proposal for the policy­
making process (Barzelay, 2003: 260-1). The role of political leadership is also explored in 
this section because of the importance of the actions by heads of governments in including 
public management policies on the top executive agenda.
The specification of alternatives depends on the pace of the process and on how much effort 
policy advocates exert in its regard, including inputs, outputs and outcomes. The starting 
point for the process of specifying alternatives consists of the projection of an issue image, 
which may gradually change during its career until it arrives at the decision-making level. To 
enable a comprehensive and detailed understanding of each of the four cases, this chapter 
treats the process of problem definition and the process of alternative specification. The 
distinction is artificial but it is functional for analytical purposes.
In all four cases entrepreneurs played decisive roles up to the decision-making process, in 
different but comparable ways. The explanations for the intensity of their efforts in different 
contexts are contrasted. Entrepreneurs moved through the problem, policy, and political 
streams in a variety of ways. How the entrepreneurs coupled the streams in all four episodes 
is analysed, as well as the values and beliefs of the individuals that performed the 
entrepreneurial functions. The comparisons included both their individual and their public 
dimensions.
The comparisons among the decision-making processes in the four cases take into account 
two dimensions: the role of the entrepreneurs regarding decisional effectiveness, and the 
institutional setting. There is a difference between the role of entrepreneurs in problem-
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definition processes and in policy-formulation processes. Their capacity had decisive effects 
on the outcomes of decision-making processes.
The comparisons of policy outcomes are affected by two other angles of analysis, policy 
reversals and policy transfer, both of which are useful contributions towards understanding 
the policy content of the four episodes and their interconnections with the policy-making 
process. The content of the policies affect the policy processes. Each policy proposal 
regarding civil service reform and organisational forms of public services was developed to 
revert the consequences of the previous one. Policy transfer took place in all four cases, 
although in different ways.
All these comparisons aim at generating analytically significant insights that go beyond the 
idiosyncrasies of each case. Comparisons of the cases emerge based on the angle approached. 
There are few common aspects among the four cases. Different social mechanisms operated 
in distinct ways in all the streams and at different stages of the policy cycles. The 
comparisons are especially interesting due to the contrasts among the episodes, no matter 
how unquestionable the common aspects may seem.
The chapter contains ten sections, this introduction being the first. The second section 
focuses on the issue dynamics. It includes comparisons on how the issue was included in the 
governmental and decisional agendas and explores how the issue status evolved during the 
episode in general. The third section compares the role played by attention, ambiguity and 
chance in all four cases. These elements are important in garbage can models and they appear 
in different ways in the episodes. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections highlight the dynamics 
of the streams -  treated analytically, one by one, in order to clarify how they evolved. The 
political stream incorporates an analysis of how presidents participated in the reforms,
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provides a review of political events that influenced the episodes, and details the involvement 
of other political actors in the four episodes. The problem stream includes a comparison 
among the issue definition processes. The sixth section also compares the development of the 
policy streams, including policy transfer processes. The seventh section focuses on 
comparisons among the entrepreneurs’ personal styles -  including their values and beliefs -  
and their effectiveness at different moments in the policy-making processes. The eighth 
section compares the decision-making processes and the default implementation model after 
the four reforms. The ninth section compares the policy reversal hypothesis to explain the 
policy outcomes. The chapter closes with a conclusion that reviews the main comparative 
issues.
7.2. The dynamics of the public management issue
Public management reforms were never part of a formal agenda or regularly scheduled 
within the context of a governmental calendar. However, the reforms took root in public 
management policy subsystems in all cases, sometimes right from the beginning of the 
presidential term of office. Agenda setting processes had different types of starts in the four 
cases. In 1937 the first issue on the agenda dealt with the wages of the military forces. The 
Minister of War threatened to resign if Vargas refused to accede to the demands of the 
Armed Forces. In 1964 the Castelo Branco issue was placed on the governmental agenda by 
the President himself in the first weeks of his term of office. He had participated in the 
drafting of the Peixoto Report, which was in Congress waiting for a new executive 
positioning regarding the reform. In 1985, the setting up of a Ministry without Portfolio of 
Administration aimed at accommodating a political ally in a new coalition. The issue was
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included on the agenda for coalition-building reasons. The default logic was very much the 
same in 1995. Thus, while, in 1988 and 1998, the new ministers in charge of public 
administration portfolios were responsible for putting the issue on the agenda, in 1937 the 
issue was included in response to military problems, and, in 1987, directly by the President.
Both the issue status and the initial policy venues of policy specifications and decision­
making processes varied greatly from one episode to another. See Table 2, below, to monitor 
the evolution of the issue traffic through different venues: provisional commissions, 
institutional commissions, ministries without portfolio, line ministries, and Congress.
Table 2 -  Policy Venues and Issue Traffic
1 9 3 4 -1 9 3 7 1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 9 1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9
F ir s t B i-B ra n ch  
N  abuc o  S ub 
C o m m iss io n
(1 9 3 4 )
M inistry w ith o u t  
P o r tfo lio  (1 9 6 3 -  
1 9 64 )
M in istry  w ith o u t  
P o r tfo h o  o f  
A d m in istra tio n
(1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 6 )
S A F -P R  (1994 )
S e c o n d B i-B ran ch  
B ern ard in o  Sub 
C o m m iss io n  
(1 9 3 5 )
C O M E S T R A
(1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 5 )
G en era l
C o m m iss io n  /  Sub
C o m m iss io n s
(1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 6 )
M A R E  1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 8
T h ir d E x e c u tiv e
C o m m iss io n
(1 9 3 5 -1 9 3 6
A S E S T R A  (1 9 6 5 -  
1966)
In ter-m in ister ia l
C o m m iss io n
(1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 7 )
C o n g r e ss  (1 9 9 5 -  
1998 )
F o u r th C o n g r e ss  (1 9 3 6 ) C o n g ress  (19 6 7 ) S E D A P -P R  (1 9 8 6 -  
19 88 )
S E A P  (1999)
S E G E S /M P O G
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 )
F if th F ed era l C ivil 
Service  
C o m m is s io n
M inistry  o f  
P la n n in g  an d  
C oor d in a tio n  /
E R A  (1 9 6 7 -1 9 7 2 )
C on gre ss ion a l 
L egislature (1 9 8 7 -  
1 9 9 0 }  in c lu d in g  the 
N a tio n a l  
C o n stitu en cy  
A sse m b ly  (1 9 8 7 -  
1 9 8 8 )
S E G E S /M P O G
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 )
S ix th D A S P M inistry o f  
P la n n in g  an d  
C oor  d in a tio n  /  
S E M O R  (1 9 7 0 -  
1986)
S E P L A N -P R
(1 9 8 9 )
S e v e n th S A F -P R  (1990 -  
1 9 9 2 }
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There were different dynamics within the episodes. In 1937 there was a gradual escalating 
process including the Bi-Branch Commission, the Nabuco Sub-Commission, the Bernardino 
Sub-Commission, the Executive Commission, and then the Federal Civil Service 
Commission. The issue gradually gained momentum until it achieved high status on the 
presidential agenda. The CFSPC intended to stabilise the issue at a high level. From the 
moment the CFSPC was set up until DASP was created, Lopes carried out his actions based 
on an institutional platform located at the Presidency. The process of increasing issue 
momentum thus took three years, divided into two periods: 1935-1936 and 1936-1937. In the 
first period the issue gradually gained status, while in the second it was handled within the 
institutional context of the CFSPC, where the second wave of reforms was generated.
In 1967 there were two clear policy cycles: one took place in COMESTRA and the other in 
ASESTRA. The first was a collective process, whereas the second was almost an individual 
process. The initial issue status was high because it benefited the President’s priority and the 
proposal then in Congress. The removal of the congressional proposal and the setting up of 
COMESTRA sustained the high priority attributed to the theme, but the impasses in 
COMESTRA blocked the issue career. After the political “clearing” of the presidential 
succession Dias resumed the process in ASESTRA, and public management reforms 
regained their initial status. The issue career during the second cycle was under the full 
control of the main entrepreneur in action and the issue status was kept high the entire time, 
although paradoxically in low-profile terms.
In 1988 there was a gradual process of escalation until SEDAP-PR was set up, when the 
issue status achieved its climax. Expectations had been raised by the re-democratisation 
process and by Alves’s close relationships with President Samey -  a significant benefit for
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the issue building process. The first policy venue was the Ministry without Portfolio -  de 
facto DASP -  but its status was relatively low. The second venue was the General 
Commission, as of the moment Marcelino joined the process and the issue began to grow in 
importance. The General Commission soon broke up into several sub-commissions, and the 
issue gained importance again only when Marcelino moved to the Ministry of 
Administration, and the Inter-ministerial Commission (GERAP) was informally established. 
The launching of the “September Package”, which included the creation of SEDAP-PR, was 
a turning point. From that moment on the issue gradually lost importance.
In 1998 the issue career moved amazingly fast in the Executive Branch, but it took three 
years for the reform to be approved by Congress because the degree of cohesion within the 
Administration regarding the project was low. The lack of a serious engagement of the 
Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, and Education before the proposal was sent to 
Congress suggested that the theme was treated as being under the jurisdiction of MARE, just 
as social reform belonged to the Ministry of Social Security. Despite the advances in the 
issue career, the predominant attitude of line ministries regarding the reform was simple: 
“It’s not in my backyard”. Bresser Pereira had overcome the opposition and distrust of key 
Ministers of the Presidency -  the Chief of Staff and General Secretary -  against sending the 
proposal to Congress (the climax of the issue’s status) but they kept their views throughout 
the process. One might argue that the proposal was prematurely sent to Congress, possibly at 
the expense of gaining political density, but this would be mere speculation.
The occurrence of other attempts during the intervals (as in 1952, 1956 and 1979) or during 
contiguous periods of the cases (as in 1963, 1967 and 1990) suggests that the issue 
occasionally returned to the governmental agenda, especially at the beginning of presidential
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terms, as if, by definition, some sort of reform is expected to take place after a new President 
takes over. Reform fatigue became an inevitable consequence, especially when the results 
failed to come up to expectations.
7.3. Dealing with attention, ambiguity, and chance
7.3.1 Capturing attention and keeping the attention focused
The cycle of attention varied greatly from one case to the other. It was not specially difficult 
to capture attention in the first stages of the process, the allocation of attention to the problem 
being impressive in all cases. Only in the last case did the reform fail to occur between 
political periods. Lopes and Dias, for instance, managed to ensure Vargas’s and Castelo 
Branco’s continuous attention on the policy specification process despite political and policy 
interferences of all sorts. Regime change and agenda congestion were important contextual 
factors in 1937, 1967, and 1988. But because the reforms were considered an important part 
of the respective political processes, they were pushed forward.
In the 1937 case, the issue had already been the object of presidential attention since the 
electoral campaign of the 1930s. But it was after the 1934 National Constituent Assembly 
that the problem reached the legislative agenda. The Bi-Branch Commission was set up as a 
policy-spillover from the constituent process, sensitive to pressure from the military with 
respect to their salaries. But Vargas dedicated permanent attention to the issue only after 
having set up an exclusively Executive Commission, chaired by Lopes. From that moment on 
the issue began an impressive uphill trajectory that culminated in the creation of DASP.
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In the 1967 case, the issue was on the governmental agenda. There was a project in Congress 
that had been sent by the previous Administration, and the President had participated in the 
initiative. COMESTRA’s cycle ended in an anticlimax. But after the problems with 
succession of political leadership had been settled the President and the Minister of Planning 
turned their attention to the problem again and monitored the work being done by the policy 
entrepreneur in the policy specification and decision-making processes until the end.
The step-by-step approach taken in 1988 ensured gradual attention to the reform until 
SEDAP-PR was set up. The momentum was reduced after a cabinet reshuffle in the 
Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Chief of Staff. The new ministers were all professionals 
whose economic principles were not shared by the Minister of SEDAP-PR. The 1988 
National Constituent Assembly absorbed the President’s political attention. The aggravation 
of the macro-economic context increasingly seized the Administration's attention and 
consumed its energies. Macro-economic stabilisation pressures slowed down several ongoing 
initiatives, including public management reforms, that were pushed farther ahead by the 
Legislative Branch in another context.
The first six months of the Cardoso Administration were dominated by successful attention- 
grabbing efforts by the Minister of MARE, who successfully placed the issue at the top of the 
presidential agenda. However, once the proposal arrived at the Legislative Branch the issue 
gradually lost appeal to the point that when the Constitutional Amendment was finally 
approved there were no more serious conflicts to be solved. Many questions had been 
watered down over the previous three years, and the reform was no longer considered 
sufficiently important to maintain the players’ attention.
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7.3.2 The appeal of ambiguity
Ambiguity is about the coexistence of different views of the same object. It is usually 
accompanied by a poor understanding of ongoing processes, except when these are 
deliberately pursued. Ambiguity does not necessarily represent a rational response based on 
the objective analysis of the causes of certain outcomes. It is deeply embedded in contextual 
factors that often contribute to confusion, conflicts and antagonisms.
Ambiguity was one of the characteristics of all the reform attempts studied in this thesis, 
although it was less visible than one might expect im some cases. In the 1937 case, the 
solution given to the problem of personnel was marked by hybridism because it bundled 
together a position system, a career system, and an expediency system. It also brought 
together a number of aspects into the same policy solution (DASP), including political 
processes, and personnel, procurement, planning and budgeting policies. The multiple and 
inconsistent roles accumulated by DASP proved unsustainable over time. It should be 
recalled that the Brownlow report had proposed three dlistinct departments in the Presidency, 
but this proposal was vetoed by the U.S. Congress om the grounds that it gave Roosevelt 
potentially dictatorial powers (Karl, 1963).
There were several evidences of ambiguity in the 1967 case in Brazil. Some examples were 
the Beltrao rhetoric and the regime realpolitik, the direct and indirect administration 
conundrum, rivalry between the civil and military forces regarding managerial roles, and the 
difficulties of implementing merit systems in the indirect administration. The initial 
delegation and decentralisation provisions of Decree-law 200 could not have been more 
inconsistent with the political centralisation and power concentration in the processes
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involved. The missing link responsible for bridging the direct and indirect administrations408 
was the Senior Corps, an idea aborted by Castelo Branco’s main advisors and Beltrao’s lack 
of interest.
The ambiguities in 1988 were embodied in the figure of the political leader of the process, 
Aluizio Alves. He had indeed been a moderniser as governor of his state in the early 1960s 
but his personal modus operandi could not have been more inconsistent with a merit-based 
public management reform agenda. Even if he sometimes favoured Marcelino’s proposals 
and negotiated Samey’s support for the enhancement of SEDAP-PR, his political style and 
the behaviour of the entourage that surrounded him conveyed very negative messages to 
those involved in the policy process. Regarding policy issues, ambiguities also abounded 
with respect to juridical status of foundations (private versus private), the merit system 
(praised but demoralised), the career system (desirable but inconsistent), and general 
attitudes towards public expenditures (populist versus austere). Steering ambiguities and 
manoeuvring in such a complex environment was an impressive achievement by Marcelino, 
and, later on, by Santiago, but at a price.
The ambiguities in the 1998 case were more serious because they were publicly exposed and 
contributed to the gradual reduction of credibility in the ministry. First, there was the 
suspicion, or even the certainty, that Bresser Pereira was an economic alternative in waiting 
or, at least, someone with privileged access to the ears of the President. Second, the policy 
proposal aspired to creative and constructive co-existence of elements derived from a 
progressive public-administration sort of project with new managerial aspects to be
408 Guerzoni and Santos criticized the reformers because the legislation regarding the indirect administration 
made no explicit reference to merit. The critique is formally correct, but they did not know about Dias's aborted 
efforts to mitigate the problem via performance agreements and the supervision of enforcers. The interface 
solution originally conceived for linking direct and indirect administration was a combination o f personnel- 
related (the Senior Corps) and financial instruments (performance agreements).
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introduced. Third, aspects of the emphases embodied in his policy proposal409 ended up 
weakening the Ministry.
73.3 The occurrence of chance
Garbage-can decision-making models attribute an important role to chance and luck. All four 
cases suggested that chance played a role especially with respect to the circumstances that 
brought the entrepreneurs to a position of command. But only in the third case was chance 
really decisive in explaining some of the events. The first and second cases provided no 
evidence of the occurrence of chance. Lopes, Beltrao and Dias had had prior experience in 
the field and were natural choices for the positions they occupied. Alves and Bresser Pereira, 
however, became ministers responsible for the public management area by accident and for 
reasons of building coalitions.
Alves wanted to be the Minister of Mines and Energy or of Transportation, but both these 
ministries were targeted by many other politicians, due to their economic and infra-structural 
importance. Coincidentally, Beltrao had no interest in resuming his de-bureaucratisation 
crusade. Alves was invited by Neves to become DASP's president because his political and 
regional importance did not allow him to aspire to a more coveted post. At the time (1984), 
DASP served as a consolation prize. Alves accepted the appointment provided DASP be 
transformed into a Ministry without Portfolio of Administration. Neves's death pushed his 
close friend and old comrade Jose Samey to the Presidency, who confirmed Alves in this
409 One good example was Bresser Pereira’s negligence regarding the strategic nucleus, a question that, 
symptomatically, was never clearly specified. His positions regarding issues like agencification and labour 
regimes in the public sector were traditionally criticized by his opponents, but confusingly defended by the 
Ministry (E3M/Br/27, E3L/RJ/34).
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position and brought him closer to the inner circle of the Administration. The setting up of 
SEDAP-PR -  which meant the transformation of the Ministry into an office of the Presidency 
with the same status as the Department of Planning -  would hardly have happened if Neves 
had not died. Samey approved the upgrading of the ministry because he wanted to keep 
Alves close to him on the strength of his strategic skills as a political operator with positive 
relationships with Congress and the press.
Bresser Pereira wanted to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but resistance from the 
diplomatic corps and traditional allies blocked this appointment.410 He was prepared to 
accept a second alternative provided he could participate in the Cardoso Administration. The 
Secretary of Administration was not a very highly coveted position by politicians and 
therefore gave room for manoeuvring to accommodate names on the President’s list. There 
were other low-profile alternatives to the position, but Bresser Pereira was better qualified 
than any other candidate 411 On Christmas Eve he was invited to be Secretary of Federal 
Administration, subordinated to the Presidency. After discussing the matter with Carvalho 
and the President they concluded that a ministry was a better organisational solution because 
it provided a more appropriate platform for carrying out the mission that was incorporated in 
its name: State Reform.
Therefore, chance was involved only regarding Neves’s death and the rise of Samey, a 
politician even closer to Alves, who decided to empower him. But chance, understood as 
seizing an opportunity provided by other people's choices, was present in both Alves’s and 
Bresser Pereira’s cases.
410 E1H/SP/8, A3L/RJ/31.
411 In fact the position was turned down by at least one other name before being offered to Bresser Pereira 
(E1H/Br/14, E1H/Br/17).
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7.4. Steering in turbulent waters: comparing the unfolding of the political streams in 
the four cases
7.4.1. A view from the top: the Presidents’ interest in public management 
reforms
Presidential politics played a different role in each case. Only in the first and second cases 
did the incumbent presidents show continual412 interest in public management reforms. In the 
first case, the reform gradually became an essential part of Vargas’s political project. This 
was the only case where policy explicitly contributed to the generation of political 
alternatives in the sense suggested by Lowi (1964). Vargas had the benefit of long executive 
experience, as Governor, Finance Minister, and President of the Provisional Government. By 
maintaining the problem in the executive area, he had kept the policy issue close by. Both the 
executive commission in charge of dealing with the career plan and the Federal Civil Service 
Commission worked at the Presidential Palace. Lopes made no moves without first 
submitting his ideas to Vargas, and all negotiations with Congress were personally 
supervised by the President. At the end of his second presidential term Vargas placed the 
government machinery reform at the centre of his dictatorship project. His authoritarian, 
personal and pragmatic style fitted the configuration of the reform because it was largely 
designed for him.
In the second case, Castelo Branco intended to update and modernise the public sector’s 
structures and processes. His strategist’s mind as well as his intellectual interest in the topic
4,2 E1H/RJ/33, A3M/Br/19, E1M/RJ/7.
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contributed to his personal involvement in all aspects of the reform design. He had focused 
his attention on the reforms since the beginning of his term of office. In fact he had been 
involved in the issue since the Peixoto Report. Campos, Dias and Beltrao convinced him that 
a better project was possible and necessary. He appointed the best talents available to 
establish a debate on the issue with COMESTRA. Later, he retrieved the issue from 
ostracism when COMESTRA came to an impasse, and worked closely with Dias at 
ASESTRA on all final details of the project. He also personally decided on controversial 
questions at the final stage of the decision-making process.
In the third case, Samey did not get involved in this issue, nor in most of the National 
Constituent Assembly’s decisions. He owed his term of office to several other people, 
notably the president of PMDB, Ulysses Guimaraes, and had suddenly become the chief of a 
cabinet organised by Neves. Finally, his term of office was to an extent held hostage by the 
National Constituent Assembly's decisions.413 Samey had no political or personal interest in 
public management matters. Presidents are constrained by a well-known set of factors: 
Congress, their party, the cabinet, schedules, the press, their staff and others (Neustadt, 
1975). But things were even worse for Samey. The weakness of the very origins of his 
Presidency, plus his political profile, did not favour his engagement in public management 
reforms. In addition, the Constituent Assembly and, especially, the deterioration of the 
macro-economic situation dramatically reduced Samey’s ability to give any attention to 
issues beyond his political radar range. A populist and political understanding of the problem 
-  closer to Alves's perception -  prevailed, with no special attention to their long-term 
implications.
4,3 ElH/Br/55.
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In the fourth case, Cardoso perceived the relevance and complexity of the reform to a certain 
point but he did not want to get involved in what he considered were the details of the 
question, nor in the probable ensuing conflicts.414 Initially he did not even see the need for a 
reform because he felt that the governmental machine needed only minor adjustments to 
operate according to his priorities 4,5 Nor did he intend to champion a reform of the State. 
Later he positioned himself above the discussion, although he provided an initial stimulus to 
Bresser’s efforts. During one reserved meeting with his cabinet, Cardoso stated that Bresser 
Pereira had three challenges to face: to convince Brazilian society, to convince Congress, and 
to convince the Executive of the importance and pertinence of the public management reform 
proposal416 In other words, he distanced himself from the difficult task of committing the 
entire government to the project. Two of the main opponents to the reform were the Secretary 
of the Presidency and the Chief of Staff, who controlled the President’s political priorities 
and the scheduling of the Executive’s bills on the congressional agenda. The President kept 
himself at a comfortable distance from the internal conflicts over the issue despite his 
positive personal relationships with Bresser Pereira. The final result was a mitigated and 
innocuous policy outcome as Cardoso was heading for his second term of office. Ironically, 
when the final text was approved, the President began to pay closer attention to other sorts of 
managerial reforms put forward by his planning team -  more process-oriented and based on 
results -  in order to set up a platform for his second term.
4,4 ElH/Br/2 and E1H/SP/8.
415 E1H/Br/17
4,6 E2M/Br/9.
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7.4.2. Contrasting presidential styles
The President’s personal style417 also influenced the policy processes. Their managerial 
approaches to the problem were a mixture of the typologies described by Johnson (1975: 
263-266): formalistic, competitive, and collegial418 Vargas’s style was a typical example of a 
competitive approach, but he adopted a more formalistic style with respect to public 
management reforms. He also recurrently seized and centralised the power to make it 
happen. Castelo Branco's approach evolved from a competitive approach -  evidenced by the 
composition of COMESTRA -  to a more collegial one, in spite of his formal personal 
character. He also had the power to impose his will over the recalcitrant or reluctant as he did 
with respect to the Supreme Audit Agency. Samey aspired to adopting a mixture of a 
formalistic and collegial style but his weak leadership was aggravated by turnover and 
competition amongst his ministers. He had the power to influence the reforms in Congress 
but preferred not to risk his limited political capital on this topic. His wait-and-see attitude 
towards the Constituent Assembly resulted in the paralysis of the Executive. Cardoso 
apparently favoured a collegial approach -  expressed in his setting up of the State Reform 
Chamber to analyse MARE’s proposal -  but in fact he adopted an ad hoc competitive 
approach to solve policy stalemates regarding the reform of the State apparatus. He delegated 
to Bresser Pereira the power to negotiate the reform with Congress but he also undermined 
him by delegating similar key functions to other close ministers, including the scheduling of 
executive priorities and having the final word when dealing with Congress. In short, Vargas 
and Castelo Branco delegated functions but monitored the issue career closely. Samey and
417 We understand style as “[A] collection of habitual action patterns in meeting role demands” (Barber, 1969: 
95).
418 Johnson listed three types o f approaches in his analysis o f the American Presidency. The formalistic 
approach looks for “the best” solution in a rational and hierarchical way, based on the merits o f the argument. 
The competitive approach emphasizes involvement, controversy and conflict in order to stimulate stronger and 
“do-able” solutions. The collegial approach values teamwork and treats different perspectives as a resource.
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Cardoso delegated functions to their ministers but distanced themselves from the final policy 
outcome.
The flow of events in the political streams was also marked by the political competition 
among key actors -  usually including the entrepreneurs -  over power, jurisdiction, resources, 
access and the role of the main protagonists. The motives were not easily discernible and 
frequently the antagonisms were not visible at first glance, but they were there in all cases.
In 1937 Lopes won the fights that Nabuco had lost against the Finance Minister by using 
arguments that did not include demands for resources. Lopes established a positive agenda 
for Vargas, anchored in his reform proposals in the episode of the Re-Adjustment Law. 
Regarding the setting up of DASP, Lopes persuaded Vargas to take it as a personal political 
project and managed to succeed because it magnified the power of the dictator-to-be. It took 
two years to set up a Budgeting Commission, and involved an intermediate compromising 
solution: putting Lopes in charge of it while Lopes was still working in the Finance Ministry. 
It took seven years for the Budget Area to be implemented at DASP.
One of the main difficulties Dias encountered in 1964-1965 to reconcile his positions with 
Beltrao’s demands were related to other questions, mainly the search for political space that 
motivated Beltrao at the time. He had been set aside as a candidate for the governorship of 
the State of Guanabara (the former Federal District, consisting basically of the city Rio de 
Janeiro), he had political ambitions, and he challenged Dias regarding the latter’s style and 
format. But he especially challenged the role of Roberto Campos as primus inter pares, as 
well as Campo’s macro-economic policy, on personal grounds. Later on, when Beltrao 
replaced Campos as Minister of Planning and Coordination, Beltrao’s critics became explicit
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regarding style, priorities and modus operandi. But they referred mainly to his struggle for 
political projection and ideas.
In 1985-1988 Alves had attained a surprising position after SEDAP-PR was set up thanks to 
his personal and political affinities with President Samey. The cabinet reshuffles -  Chief of 
Staff, Minister of Finance and SEPLAN-PR -  changed the balance of power within the 
cabinet against him, and this shift was aggravated by the swiftly rising inflation rate and 
higher concentration of power in the hands of the two economic ministries. In this case, 
however, it is plausible to argue that if Alves had aligned his political powers with the 
economic team he might have survived the last cabinet reshuffle. But this was not the case.
The 1995-1998 case is more intriguing because it apparently started off very well. The 
setting up of MARE -  instead of maintaining SAF -  was decided by Cardoso, Bresser Pereira 
and Carvalho -  in a constructive environment. Bresser preferred ministerial status at the 
expense of his the seat at the Presidency because access to the President was no problem for 
him. However, he faced an uphill battle against Carvalho because of personal rivalries 
regarding jurisdiction issues from the past (they had both worked under Franco Montoro as 
Governor of Sao Paulo). There were also recurrent confrontations in the meetings of the State 
Reform Chamber because, although the theme was state reform, the meeting was coordinated 
by the Chief of Staff in the President’s name. The public sector pension reform and the 
setting up of regulatory agencies were examples of issues taken out of Bresser Pereira’s 
hands thanks to Carvalho’s interference. The incubation and implementation of “Brazil in 
Action” and the reforms that led to Avanga Brazil were carried out independently of MARE 
despite the explicit use of the managerial label, thanks in part to Carvalho’s support. The 
Ministers of Planning and of Finance were also wary of Bresser Pereira’s ideas because he
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was always seen as an alternative name for their positions, given his personal background 
and his personal relationships with Cardoso. Bresser Pereira “suggested”419 that the MARE 
and the Ministry of Planning be merged because he gave up a political battle. He recognised 
he had lost because of the lack of support from key ministers and from the President himself.
A final word regarding Congress and the Judiciary is also in order. The role of Congress and 
the Judiciary in the reforms was more relevant in the last two episodes than in the first two. 
The reason is possibly because while the 1937 and 1967 episodes took place during 
transitions to authoritarian regimes, those of 1988 and 1998 were carried out under 
democratic rules. Congress played a role at the beginning of the first two episodes but not at 
the end of them. The Judiciary was an important player in the aftermath of the 1988 reform 
when it ruled out Collor’s attempt to economize by placing public sector functionaries on 
forced leave. In 1998 the judiciary lobby defeated Bresser Pereira’s proposals to set a limit to 
the wages in the three branches. Later on it also refused to accept the arguments favouring 
the “public job” proposal.
7.4.3 Comparing the key events in the political stream
Contemporaneous events in the political stream were decisive to enable, trigger, dislodge, 
and ensure the public management reforms in all four cases, but in different ways. The 
political stream was stable only in the last case but the political turbulence of the periods 
analysed was not an impediment to the issue career, even though it affected the career’s 
direction in different ways. In 1937 the starting point was a spillover from the 1934 National
419 The evidence is mixed. Bresser Pereira did in fact suggest this (E1H/SP/8, E2M/Br/9, ElH/Br/2) but some 
participants expressed the impression that he knew that the idea was not new (E2M/Br/11, E1H/Br/14).
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Constituent Assembly. The 1936 Re-Adjustment Law and the setting up of the Federal Civil 
Service Commission resulted from the President’s personal commitment to the proposal. The 
establishment of DASP, however, involved different dynamics. It belonged to a carefully 
crafted coup d’etat carried out by the President himself. The policy specification process 
resulted in a political solution destined to empower Vargas with dictatorial powers and thus 
allow him to handle the turbulent political situation of the country.
The 1967 reform was first pushed ahead by the President’s will, given his experience in the 
efforts in 1963. But after COMESTRA’s impasses the policy process could only be resumed 
after the political crisis triggered by the reaction of the hardliners against the results of the 
elections for governors had been resolved. Once the succession for leadership had been 
defined -  via AI-2, AI-3, and AI-4 -  the President and the Minister of Planning were free to 
return to their priorities, including the public management reform process via ASESTRA.
The 1988 episode was deeply influenced by events that occurred in the political stream from 
its very first moment, especially the death of Tancredo Neves. Samey began his term of 
office as a lame duck because he did not belong to the opposition to the authoritarian regime 
but he was involved in the dissidence that supported Neves. The convocation of the National 
Constituent Assembly accelerated the drain on his presidential powers. He was forced to 
carry out successive cabinet reshuffles to deal simultaneously with his lack of political 
support in Congress and the gradual collapse of the macro-economic situation. When a 
cabinet reshuffle placed austere economists in key ministerial positions and Alves was unable 
to align himself with them, the reform’s fate was sealed. Paradoxically, Congress grabbed the 
torch of the Single Juridical Regime and lead it to a final outcome despite the new 
President’s disastrous approach to the issue.
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The political stream was relatively calm until the end of Cardoso’s first term of office, in late 
1998. The policy proposal was amended in Congress, but as a part of an ordinary process of 
negotiation. The international crisis that forced the devaluation of the currency -  the Real -  
and the irruption of political scandals that affected close collaborators resulted in an 
improvised cabinet reshuffle, during which MARE was phased out. But merging MARE with 
Planning had already been given some thought because the President’s inner circle evaluated 
that another approach was needed to implement a managerial reform.
7.4.4. Mapping other political actors
7.4.4.1 The frequently under-estimated role of the economic team
Economic pressure is a usual suspect when we investigate the motivations for public 
management reforms. Comparing the four cases, it can be seen that the economic team was 
responsible for supporting and pushing only the 1967 reform. Vargas’s reform was 
essentially politically and administratively motivated, the Finance Minister supporting 
neither the 1936 legislation nor the proposal for setting up DASP. Lopes fought hard to 
secure his jurisdiction over the budgetary process, and this was one of the main reasons for 
establishing a broad public-management policy monopoly at DASP. He realised the 
importance of centralising the budgeting process in a department of the Presidency. But those 
in charge of the economic area did not share his ideas. They saw no connection between the 
reforms and the economic challenges of the moment. Lopes envisioned the connections 
between planning, budgeting and management that would guide Dias’s and Campos’s efforts 
in 1964-1967, Santiago’s and Cintra’s efforts in 1989, and Bresser Pereira’s final proposals 
in 1998.
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The story of Decree-law 200 was completely different. First, Campos was in charge of 
planning and economics, given his close relationship with the Finance Minister. Second, Dias 
was summoned to pilot the policy process as a close advisor to Campos. Third, Campos was 
particularly interested in many aspects of the problem related to economic issues, such as 
PPBS, cash flow, and financial control. Fourth, Campos had a global perspective of the 
reform and the clear conviction that it would impact the systemic performance of public 
expenditures in terms of economic rationalisation. Fifth, it is hard to imagine how the reform 
could have been carried out without support from the strongest civil minister in the Castelo 
Branco Administration, and even he took his entire period in office to make it happen.
The economic team of the period 1985-1990 was involved in an asymmetric way. On the one 
hand, certain important institutional reforms were pursued with partial success, such as the 
setting up and re-structuring of the budgetary system, the establishment of a Treasury and a 
Budget Office, and the implanting of budgeting, financial and control careers. On the other 
hand, the economic team -  notably after the cabinet reshuffle in late 1987 -  put up strong 
opposition to SEDAP-PR’s attempts to promote and implement a traditional administrative 
reform that coupled populist ingredients and progressive ideas on public administration. 
During 1989 the domain was briefly unified under the Ministry of Planning, who tried to play 
an enabling role through capacity-building efforts. Collor de Mello’s election threw federal 
bureaucracy into such disarray that it attracted strong opposition from the outgoing Congress 
because his downsizing initiative was motivated exclusively by the determination to cut 
costs.
The role played by the economic team during the period from 1995 to 1998 served more as a 
constraint. Bresser Pereira and his team designed a proposal that was compatible and aligned 
with the macro-economic fundamentals required to consolidate fiscal adjustment. MARE
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also implemented important cost-saving measures especially with respect to payroll control 
and improvements in information technology. However, there was no commitment from the 
economic team to the public management reforms in the areas where their strategic support 
was required, such as the performance agreements with the new type of public organisations 
set up during the reform process.420 Moreover, the economic team constantly suspected that 
Bresser Pereira had other plans because of his potential chance to take the place of economic 
ministers (planning and finance), given his previous background and persistence in 
discussing macro-economic issues with the President that were out of his jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the economic team played a passive role in pushing the reform design and 
negotiation ahead and an active role in resisting its implementation in areas that demanded a 
new approach towards public spending and organisational structuring.
In short, the economic team was involved in all reforms, as either ally or antagonist. When 
there was an understanding on how public management and political-economic issues were 
articulated, the results of the alliance were successful, as was the case in 1964-1967 and in 
the brief period in 1989. But when there was a poor match, which happened in the other two 
cases, the reforms suffered the consequences. Politics and public management clearly took 
priority over economics in the 1930s, contrary to the 1990s. In both these periods, the 
weaknesses of the links impoverished the reforms, in spite of their partial success.
7.4.4.2 The participation of interest groups
Public management reforms are rarely appealing to public opinion. Therefore, it was no 
surprise that they failed to constitute an active force in any one of the four cases. The issues
420 ElH/Br/2, E3M/Br/25, E1H/SP/8, E3M/Br/27, E3L/RJ/34.
328
were not easily understandable to the media because they did not spur on the sense of 
urgency required for a subject to be on the news. In the first case Lopes and a small group of 
collaborators prepared and implemented the main proposals. In addition, Lopes was at the 
head of the negotiations with Congress to get the 1936 Career Law passed. Later Vargas 
imposed the creation of DASP as part of his coup d’etat. The 1967 reform was the result of 
the work of a small number of individuals (Oliveira, 1984). Later, Beltrao421 organised a 
nationwide crusade to implement it, but the political polarisation of 1967-1968 -  a historical 
turning point -  aborted his attempt to establish an alliance with the population to force de- 
bureaucratising reforms.
The 1967 reform was initially discussed by a group of experts and ended as a piece of 
institutional engineering handled basically by one man, who coordinated several bi-lateral 
discussions. It could not have been more technocratic despite its exceptional quality. Public 
opinion and interest groups played a more active role during the third case. Alves’s strategy 
during his first year of work was advocacy through mobilisation. He appointed a large State 
Reform Commission that met in Brasilia from time to time to suggest and propose elements 
for an administrative reform project. The participants were representative of all possible 
interested actors: policy community, academics, civil-servant labour unions, experts, 
politicians, and others. But the efforts of the Commission did not produce any conclusive or 
objective proposal. The Commission slowly disbanded after being unable to arrive at a
421 The issue took on importance in public opinion only in a case that was not the object of this thesis, the period 
when Beltrao occupied the Ministry without Portfolio o f De-bureaucratisation, between 1979 and 1982. 
Tackling red tape became one of the hottest issues in the first years of the Figueiredo Administration. Beltrao’s 
national crusade helped make the Administration popular at the time, but Beltrao’s discourse and proposals 
were not enabling in spite of the remarkable performance of his de-bureaucratisation task force. The ministry’s 
small office was in the Presidency’s building -  as was the Federal Civil Service Commission’s, championed by 
Lopes between 1936-1938. Thanks to Beltrao’s charisma and media charm, he successfully mobilized public 
opinion and individuals who became decisively involved in de-bureaucratisation efforts. Beltrao did not 
champion a relevant public management reform at the time, but his success in cutting red tape led him to a more 
relevant Ministry -  Social Security -  and later to the position of a potential presidential candidate.
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consensus on a project, but it had indicated the minister’s intention to promote a broad 
reform. Later on, during the National Constituent Assembly (from February 1987 to October 
1988), civil servants’ associations played an important role in convincing congressmen that 
the organisational design and employment arrangements proposed by the administration, by 
the Notables Commission, and by the associations themselves, were the best possible 
outcomes to be incorporated into the Constitution. Finally, in the first year of the Collor 
Administration the same groups supported more detailed employment legislation, which was 
the last act of the 1987-1990 Congress and the law most wished for by the federal 
bureaucracy in decades.
Bresser Pereira tried to win over public support for his reform proposals as soon as he had a 
clear project. In fact he persuaded some dispersed allies but they were not significant enough 
to count as important players. Politicians such as state governors were more relevant, for 
instance, to push the reforms to Congress for consideration. They ran risks in the process 
because of their interest in removing tenure in order to be able to fire public employees. 
Some journalists, businessmen, and academics gave support to his project but he did not gain 
any substantial public support in spite of his (and his team’s) amazing advocacy efforts 
during the period he spent in office. Only a few qualified observers publicly supported the
reform, while most intellectuals opted to keep a safe distance from the controversial
. . 422minister.
So it is fair to say that the comparative analysis of the participation of interest groups in the 
politics of public management reform suggests that they were not a driving force in pushing 
through the reforms. They played a more relevant role only when the Constituent Assembly 
had to make decisions on the civil service and social security reforms and in the aftermath of
422 E3M/Br/4 and ElH/Br/2.
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the 1988 Constitution, when their pressure to detail the new civil servants’ legislation was 
important to approve the Single Juridical Regime.
7.4.43 The players: political parties, academics, career bureaucrats, and
international institutions
Political parties played a minor role in all the reform processes. The 1934 episode was not 
considered a party problem. The conflicts took place within the Executive Branch -  notably 
between the Ministry of Finance and the reformers. In 1964 the party leaders in charge of the 
issue -  Capanema and Peixoto -  were cardinals of the largest party in Congress and were 
keen to facilitate the retreat of the proposal Peixoto had sent to Congress the previous year. 
The congress that voted the 1967 reform was intimidated and raised no objections. The 1988 
reform was carried out in the legislature track with impressive tenacity, and the issue traffic 
within specialised commissions in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate took place with 
unusual speed, given the political circumstances of the confrontations between the 
Presidency and Congress. Bresser Pereira faced political opposition from the Workers’ Party 
in Congress but his proposal was watered down mainly by the coalition that supported the 
Administration, but also by the other ministers.
The academic policy community did not play a major role in any of the four reforms despite 
the academic credentials of some entrepreneurs. In 1937 there was no established academic 
community and Lopes in fact founded a few in Brazil in subsequent years, first within the 
Administration and later through the Getulio Vargas Foundation. Some mavericks from 
COMESTRA -  Lopes, Arantes, and Flores -  had academic connections with the Getulio
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Vargas Foundation, but they neither prevailed nor could they themselves be considered 
academic in the strict sense of the word. In 1988 Alves tried to co-opt academics into his 
efforts, but with modest success. The opposition of the policy community, led by the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation, was palpable and explicit. The intellectuals who ended up supporting the 
reform came from other policy domains, mainly administrative law.423 Bresser Pereira played 
an important role in revamping the public management policy, community given his personal 
relationships with the academic environment. Most of his team had studied at the Sao Paulo 
branch of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, but they came from different areas and their role 
was restricted basically to diffusion and dissemination 424
With one caveat and a minor exception career bureaucrats played no major role in any of the 
four cases. Lopes, Campos, Dias, Beltrao, Holanda, and Santiago came from the bureaucracy 
but they were hardly considered classical bureaucrats. With the exception of Lopes, all the 
others would more correctly be described as technocrats, a popular designation in the 1970s 
and 1980s for highly professional officials who participated in important commanding 
positions in military Tegimes 425 The minor exception refers to the public managers at the 
very beginning of the 1995 reform when they presented Bresser Pereira with some initial 
thoughts regarding the need for a strategic core bureaucracy,426 an idea that was quickly 
appropriated and incorporated into the reform proposal.
International institutions are frequently regarded as responsible for pushing travelling ideas 
in developing countries. This was not the case with the Brazilian experience regarding public
423 Vicente de Paula Mendes, a reputed professor of business administration at the University o f Minas Gerais, 
was responsible for drafting some o f the legislation later pushed through.
424 The exceptions were Angela Santana and Caio Marini who played major roles in designing the proposal 
when it was further packaged in the white paper entitled ‘The Director Plan o f the Reform o f the State 
Apparatus”.
42 See O’Donnell, Stepan, and Bresser Pereira.
426 E2M/Br/41 and ElH/Br/47.
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management reforms. Neither the World Bank nor the Inter-American Development Bank 
played active roles in any of the four cases. The Inter-American Bank supported investments 
for setting up the Latin-American School of Public Administration at the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation in the early sixties -  a program that lasted almost two decades. It also provided 
an international loan for State Modernisation that began in 1998 -  but with the intention of 
making resources available for implementing Bresser Pereira’s proposal, without exerting 
any sort of influence.427 The international institutions that played truly active roles in the 
policy transfer and policy dialogue processes were the usual organisations in the United 
Kingdom, the U.S.A., and France that provided technical cooperation for developing 
countries. Traditional programs of technical visits -  for Brazilians abroad and for foreigners 
in Brazil -  were important in shaping the minds of high officials involved in the reformist 
efforts since the 1930s.
7.5. Comparing the ways issue definitions were processed
7.5.1. Defining problems and their scopes
Problems were initially defined in different ways in the four cases. Sometimes the problem 
definitions also showed variations within specific episodes, as was the case in 1988. Table 3 
provides a summary of the way the problems were defined in each case study, the solutions 
attached to each problem, and the connection with the political steam of the moment.
427 Unfortunately MARE was phased out when the program actually began. Since then, the program has gone 
through several major revisions.
333
Table 3 -  Problem definition and its links with the other streams
Problem Definition Policy Solutions Political linkages
1937 Lack o f a professional national civi 
service
Fragmented and disempowered Federa 
Executive
Improvised budgetary execution
A Career Legislation
Federal Civil Service Commission
DASP
Civil Servants’ Statute 
Budgeting Reform
President Vargas’s personal interest
Convergence o f  policy solutions anc 
political aspirations
1967 Inexistence and inadequacy o 
planning, budgeting, and financial 
control structures.
Obsolete forms o f  a priori control
Hollow core o f  the direct
administration
Over-centralization in the direct 
administration ot the Presidency, in the 
direct administration and in the federal 
Executive
Excessive bureaucratization o f  lint 
organizations
Institutionalization o f PPBS type o 
procedures
Institutionalization o f  planning, 
budgeting and control systems 
De-congestioning the Presidency
Creation o f  Senior Corps (failed) 
Creation o f  ERA
Removal o f  traditional public controls 
over the indirect administration
President Castelo Branco’s personal 
interest
Direct involvement o f  the Ministry ol 
Planning and Coordination 
Convergence o f  policy solutions within 
the policy sub-areas o f the public 
management policy domain
1988 Unaccountability o f the Federal
Administration
Residual authoritarian and
undemocratic legislation
Absence o f  a classical professional
bureaucracy
Fragmentation o f the federal 
administration, especially regarding tht 
indirect administration
Empowerment and institutionalization 
o f  the primacy o f  the direct 
administration
Contraction o f  the indirect 
administration
Approval o f  the Single Juridical 
Regime for Civil Servants 
Career system
New strategic careers
Coalition building circumstances
Personal connections beween Alves 
and Samey
Convergence o f  policy solutions anc
aspirations o f  the National Constituent 
Assembly
1998 Rigidity o t employment arrangements 
in the public sector
Inadequacy o f  direct administration 
structures in delivering public services
blew forms o t public sectoi 
organization and delivery o f  public 
services
Formal flexibOization o f  tenure
mechanisms
Statistics
Resumption o f selections for strategic 
careers
(Coalition building circumstances
Persona] connections between Bressei
Pereira and Cardoso
Initial support from state governors
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In the 1937 case, Vargas attached the problem of military wages to the need to organise the 
civil service. He also made sure that Congress was committed to the problem. Later he 
separated the pay-rise problem from the organisation of the civil service and the law 
regarding a career system. The implementation of a national civil service was not the initial 
purpose of the reformers until Lopes entered the circuit. Later on, Lopes attached the funding 
problems for civil service reforms to budgeting and executive coordination. Initially, the tone 
of the issue was technical, but the political dimensions were unavoidable. When the military 
forged an attention-grabbing event -  a false attempt to trigger off a communist coup -  to 
enable Vargas’s own coup d’etat via the dramatisation of totalitarian threat, Vargas already 
had all the rhetorical justification necessary for a new problem definition: the dictatorial 
powers were needed in order to consolidate a Brazilian version of the American 
“Administrative State”. The vision of a “New State” emerged as a new issue definition that 
was magnified for political purposes. The issue tone at that stage became epic and 
authoritarian. By placing personnel, budgeting, procurement, organisational design, and 
procurement all in DASP, Vargas took a step towards centralisation that was consistent with 
the way the problem definition was engendered.
The 1967 case started with a given problem definition. There was an administrative reform 
bill in Congress aimed at revising the organisation of the federal administrative structures. 
The problem was administrative reorganisation. Campos and Dias were mainly concerned 
with other sorts of problems: planning, programming, budgeting, finance, and control. 
Beltrao had other concerns: delegation, decentralisation, and simplification. Lopes wanted to 
revamp DASP. COMESTRA came to an impasse because there was no agreement as to what 
problems the reform was expected to tackle. The alternative specification was resumed only 
when the dispute over ownership definition came to an end and the definition offered by
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Campos and Dias prevailed. The issue image was enabling, oriented by instrumental and 
infra-structural concerns. The institutional arrangements were sophisticated and intertwined 
and there were substantial innovations in practically all public management dimensions. 
When Beltrao became Minister of Planning the process was disrupted and the problem had to 
be redefined once again. Emphasis was shifted to de-bureaucratisation because bureaucratic 
pathologies were his main concern.
In 1988 the problem definition took shape gradually. At first, state reform was everything:
4 ? o
the State had to be “redesigned” from scratch. Only when Marcelino assumed a pro-active 
role in the process were the problems to be tackled effectively clarified and dimensioned. 
Several concerns modelled the process: re-establishment of the rule of law, strengthening of 
the direct administration, greater government accountability, establishment of a merit-based 
civil service, structuring of a career system, and defining of a modus operandi for the federal 
administration. The re-establishment of political accountability and the implementation of the 
merit system were two key issue images. Two main problems were identified in this area: the 
lack of a professional merit-based bureaucracy in the direct administration and the 
understaffing of the direct administration. The Single Juridical Regime and the career project 
were the targets in the first problem. The establishment of a classical bureaucratic structure 
of the state was the focus of the second problem. The transitional mechanism adopted by and 
after the 1988 Constitution resulted in distorted outcomes, but that was another matter, 
although inevitably related to the first steps in the issue career.
In 1998 an issue image was forged at the beginning of the process: the establishment of a 
managerial state. The issue image was clear but not exempt from problems because the state 
apparatus was completely detached from the reformers' aspirations. The corresponding
428 ElH/Br/23.
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problem was the rigidity of bureaucratic institutions including organisational structures and 
labour relationships. The prescribed solution was to make the organisational design more 
pluralistic and the employment legislation more flexible. Paradoxically, the issue tone was 
positive regarding the managerial dimensions of the discourse but negative with respect to 
the aspects related to the public choice of the rhetoric (Aucoin, 1990 and Gaetani, 1998). 
Also, other issue images -  beyond the reformers’ jurisdiction -  were competing for attention 
at the same time: a regulatory state, a minimalist state, and other views of a managerial 
state.429 All this occurred despite a constitutional provision that enabled the new forms of 
public organisations to be set up, the Single Juridical Regime to be phased out, and tenure 
formally removed from civil service. At the end of the process the feeling was that somehow 
Bresser Pereira had missed something as to the way the problems were initially defined.
Problems were defined in different ways, but in all four cases the processes took place within 
the Executive Branch. Congress played a minor role in 1937 and 1967 but was an important 
actor in 1988 and in 1998. It was not a matter of focusing on events or setting off fire alarms, 
but merely of policy processes. Problems were not defined at a single moment but through 
processes of framing them successively in all four cases. Likewise, decisions were not taken 
at any given moment in time. Choices were continuously made, reiterated, adjusted, and 
renewed (Jones, 1994).
In at least one case, that of 1937, there were successive metamorphoses of the way the 
problem was initially defined. In 1967 the replacement of Campos with Beltrao recovered a 
perspective that was not present in the new laws. In the 1988 case there were confusing and 
overlapping views but it should be recalled that Santiago and Cintra changed and improved 
Marcelino’s vague proposal while Congress moved in the opposite direction because it 
429 World Bank (2002), Martins (2003), Barzelay (2004).
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wanted to broaden it for political reasons. Collor’s downsizing initiatives did not belong to 
the episode, but they also changed the Administration’s view of the problem considerably. In 
the 1998 case the disappointing end of MARE’s saga suggested that the way the problems 
were defined could probably have been changed during the process.
7.5.2 Revealing implicit issues concerning the problem definition processes
In all four cases the way the problems were defined was decisive for the establishment of the 
causal understandings of the situations the reformers were trying to change. Problem 
definition shaped the purpose of the processes, identified sets of causes and filtered the 
subsequent policy specification processes. But there were special types of problems that were 
present all the time, albeit implicitly: a) the inertial practices of populism, clientelism, and 
patronage in detriment to the public interest and b) the accountability problems related to the 
organisational design pf public organisations that did not belong to the direct administration.
Continuity of personnel is usually considered an innovative supporting condition (Katz, 
1982) because it favours cumulative interactive learning (Quinn, 1985). As Kanter (2000: 
194) wrote, “[IJronically, creating change requires stability -  continuity of people especially 
during the information-rich, knowledge intensive development stage”. One might agree that 
if the historical claims that patronage and the ever-present Brazilian “clever way out” 
(jeitinho) -  were traditionally used, correct cumulative learning should have taken place with 
the gradual incorporation of functionaries into the bureaucratic civil service apparatus. 
However, it was exactly the continuity of these practices and the extension of tenure to these 
people that disabled the reformist initiatives that would have introduced different kinds of
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values, beliefs, and know-how. The presence of public employees who had acquired the 
status of civil servants by legal means rather than through merit ensured the blockage of 
innovations regarding personnel. The definition of these practices as a problem related to 
public management reform is controversial and it will be taken up again in the conclusion.430
All the reformers were engaged in problemistic searches431 as will be seen in the next section. 
But they made different diagnoses regarding the two areas that were the object of action in all 
four cases. Lopes and Marcelino were primarily concerned with limitations in 
bureaucratisation. Bresser Pereira focused on managerial deficits. Beltrao was obsessed with 
the problem of over-bureaucratisation. Dias tried to solve both problems at the same time, but 
the final outcome favoured a pro-managerial view because the idea of a Senior Corps had not 
been assimilated. Lopes and Dias engaged in more isomorphic -  and more popular -  
solutions for personnel, as well as for organisational design. Dias and Bresser Pereira 
formulated pluralistic organisational arrangements for personnel and for organisations but the 
personnel solutions engendered by Dias and the organisation solution proposed by Bresser 
Pereira were never put in place.
Building a successful hybrid arrangement was the real challenge for both Dias and Bresser 
Pereira. But the challenge of hybridism was also faced by Lopes and Marcelino, as was the 
confusing problem of defining personnel in 1937 and 1988, and the schizophrenic432 
organisational attempt to deal with indirect administration problems in 1987. It is as if
430 In most cases these practices were not even seen as problems by many political forces that participated in the 
cases. In all four cases the reformers faced political pressures to accommodate partisans on a broad basis, 
opening up new political positions, turning public employees into civil servants, allowing institutions to be 
founded on exceptional bases, and so on. The continuous pressure against the reforms and the reformers 
undermined and demoralized the reform proposals in all four episodes.
431 As previously mentioned, problemistic search has a sense of purpose. Cyert and March (1963: 121), show 
that this attitude is not to be confused with curiosity or search for understanding.
432 E1H/MG/52.
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hybridism were a sort of solution forged to deal with ambiguities via confusing strategies.433 
Table 4 highlights some nuances of the problem definition questions regarding personnel and 
organisational design.
433 See Evans (2003).
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Table 4 -  Problems and Solutions for Personnel and Organisational Arrangements
Organizational Design 
Problem
Organizational Design  
Solution
Personnel Problem Personnel solution
1937 How to create a classical 
public bureaucracy?
Creation o f  a unified 
national state structure with 
a super-central agency at the 
top o f  the system
How to conciliate a career 
system, a positions system, 
and the stock o f  
supernumeraries
Accommodation o f  political 
appointees, civil servants, and 
supernumeraries in a hybrid 
system
1967 How to free public 
organizations from the 
formalistic and inefficient 
controls o f  the direct 
administration?
Enable the expansion o f  the 
indirect organisation for 
special delivery purposes via 
PPBS coordination and 
control mechanisms
How to deal with DASP’S 
impossible job o f  creating a 
career plan for a unified civil 
service in a patronage 
environment?
Creation o f a Senior Corps 
proposal for the direct 
administration and 
decentralisation o f  
employment arrangements in 
the indirect administration
1988 How to strengthen the direct 
administration, empower it, 
and make it politically 
accountable?
How to handle the indirect 
administration?
Place organizations like 
public autarchies and 
private foundations under 
public control in public 
types o f  institutions subject 
to  formal controls o f  the 
direct administration
How to establish a unified 
career system and deal with 
the migration o f  employees
from the indirect 
administration and o f  
functionaries hired on 
provisional bases in a 
clientelist environment?
Reclassification o f  employee:
hired under private types of
legislations and on expediency
bases as civil servants with full
pension and tenure rights. 
Creation o f  new careers 
within the public management 
domain
1998 How to structure the
pluralistic administration 
needed to  deal with various 
sorts o f  public demands?
Creation o f new 
organisational forms to 
perform roles exclusive to  the 
state (executive agencies) and 
roles on behalf o f the public 
but that do not necessarily 
require state ownership 
(Social Organisations)
How to redefine employment 
relationships in th e ' public 
sector in order to make 
job markets m ore flexible, and 
how to regenerate the 
strategic core o f  the State 
apparatus?
Creation o f a third form o f 
employment relationships and 
resumption o f  public 
selections for a few strategic 
careers.
Universal solutions had not been successfully built for Brazilian reforms despite the 1937 
and 1988 attempts at reshaping the state apparatus to bring it closer to a classic public 
bureaucracy. Nor did pluralistic types of organisational and personnel arrangements have any 
better luck. The move towards a unified state failed to include the new organisational forms 
that had emerged over the decades, and it became virtually impossible to implement a merit- 
based system, with the minor exception of a few careers. In the move towards a
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multidimensional institutional arrangement, the dualist solution proposed by Dias failed to 
take root, nor did the insightful design by Bresser Pereira catch on.434 Neither arrangement 
acquired sustainability.
Regarding personnel, Haggard (1995: 12) suggests that, within the context of the balance of 
power between the Executive and the Legislature, administrative reform is "a process of re­
writing the contract between elected politicians and bureaucratic officials".435 Enduring 
equilibrium can be taken as a synonym for “consolidation”,436 in the sense described by 
Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 2): “Processes through which acceptance of a given set of 
constitutional rules becomes increasingly widespread, valued”, and embedded in routines. 
The reform437 of the civil service and the setting up of economic decision-making agencies 
resistant to particular demands have been a problematic historical imperative, regardless of 
the developmental strategies pursued.
Brazil is clearly still trapped in an indeterminate situation with respect to the problem. The 
reasons will be elaborated on in the final chapter, but for now it is enough to say that political. 
appointees play a major role in this process, as recognised in the literature. In the case of 
Brazil their historical quantitative and political weight requires analytical frameworks
434 Regarding 1967, it is hard to speculate whether, due to the authoritarian regime, things would have been 
different with the creation of the Senior Corps. The results were slightly mixed in 1988 with the social- 
organisations type o f solution being accepted by some while the executive agencies did not seem to be the least 
convincing.
435 Peters and Pierre (2001) provide a state-of-the-art version of this debate in Western industrialized 
democracies.
436 “If both economic reforms and democracies are to be consolidated, executive authority must eventually be 
depersonalised and integrated into a broader framework of contestation and accountability” (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995: 9).
437 An important concept in this debate is the “orthodox paradox” of reform developed by Kahler (1990). It 
means that pro-market reforms require more capable states. In other words, reducing state interventionism 
requires increasingly technical and bureaucratic capacity that cannot be taken for granted as a secondary 
product o f structural adjustment reforms.
438 Two exceptions -  although for different reasons -  are Light’s investigations about political appointees in the 
U.S.A. and Hood’s framework related to public bargains that, although they do not incorporate them, 
nevertheless provide room for such development.
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different from those traditionally used when dealing with the issue of high officials in 
modem bureaucracies.439
Regarding the problem of the variety of organisational models -  a presumable requirement of 
modem states -  it is worth noting that this is not Brazil’s only difficulty. Most continental 
European countries strongly influenced by Roman legal traditions, for example have 
struggled to give an operational dimension to concepts such as public, but not state-owned, 
agencies, but with varying degrees of success. The legal traditions of these countries were 
forged over centuries and now they have had to deal with these new challenges440 in the 
space of months and years, not decades or centuries.
As the 1988 case revealed, the arrangements that were frequently pursued included the best 
of two worlds.441 This sort of solution applied well to generations of employees who had 
successfully managed to guarantee above-average retirement benefits within the context of 
organisational cycles. However, it also encouraged political responses like Collor de Mello's 
devastating downsizing initiatives, exacerbated by his incapacity to deal with complex 
institutional intergenerational transitions. He failed to recognise that organisations also have 
their life cycles.
The evidence of the four cases suggested that both questions are far from having been 
reasonably processed by Brazilian society. As the 1988 and 1998 reforms evidenced, not 
even the approval of a constitutional provision within a democratic context necessarily meant 
that: a) the country was conscious of executive and legislative decisions regarding issues in
439 Aberbach’s and Rockman’s classical study on the role of politicians and bureaucrats, for instance, did not 
take this situation into account.
440 Bresser Pereira, a lawyer by profession, explicitly stated that he intended to change the juridical culture of  
the country. He perceived his role as a challenge and argued publicly that this was the way to promote 
institutional change, given the conservative nature of Brazilian juridical structures and professional community 
(E1H/SP/8).
441 The case of the Brazilian Central Bank is paramount but it is far from exceptional.
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the public interest, b) governments -  regardless of their political colour -  had a full 
understanding of public management policies related to personnel and organisational design, 
and c) the Executive and Legislative had a clear sense of purpose as to what they wanted 
from these two sub-policies beyond particular solutions for specific problems of selected
442constituencies.
7.6. Comparing the alternative specification processes
7.6.1. Clarifying the policy clashes
The policy specification process matched the problem definition process in most of the cases, 
although each case had different corresponding dynamics. In 1937 there were two policy 
cycles, each policy solution (1936 and 1937) addressing a different sort of problem. In 1967 
the policy specification process took off only after ASESTRA was set up and Dias became 
solely responsible for the task. In 1988 there were several periods during which the dynamics 
had different bases. Multiple commissions characterized the first cycle, between July 1985 
and March 1986. The Inter-ministerial Group actually began its work in April 1986, before it 
was formally instituted in September 1986. The installation of the Constituent Assembly, on 
the one hand, disrupted the policy specification process, which soon lost momentum. On the 
other, it created a second route for the alternative generation process, albeit in broader terms. 
The cabinet reshuffle of January 1988 provided another problem definition -  based on 
macro-economic concerns -  that placed Alves in an antagonistic position. The reversal
442 Bresser Pereira left the government without having succeeded in delimiting the borders of the strategic core 
o f the state apparatus, i.e., the group o f institutions and careers that should be considered as operating directly in 
the name of the State. This does not mean that he was responsible for the lack o f  definition, but that the 
advocacy, negotiation, and implementation of his reform were severely jeopardized by the vagueness of the 
discussion, which was cause for suspicion and resistance by potential losers and winners.
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introduced by Santiago and Cintra in 1989 -  more focused on strengthening the links 
between planning, budgeting and administration from a public policy perspective -  did not 
have time to mature because of the rise of Collor. Collor completely destroyed the ongoing 
policy efforts to favour an improvised downsizing strategy.
Their behaviour suggested that the “primeval policy soup” available on the shelves was not 
so diversified as one might have expected. The number and range of policy solutions 
available did not seem significant in the cases. The number of routes to be taken was small, 
as were the alternative courses of action. Policy was engendered rapidly only in the fourth 
case (1998), whereas it took a gradual (1988), or scheduled (1937 and 1967), pace in all other 
cases.
Regarding policy alternatives the clashes assumed different shapes depending on the episode. 
In 1937 Nabuco intended to draw a line to delimit the space allotted to political appointees. 
His efforts failed, but because of another sort of opposition -  the financial costs of adopting a 
career system. Lopes indeed entered into conflict with the Ministry of Finance, but because 
of the control over the budget. He won, but it took years before the transition was processed.
In 1967 the clashes were between Lopes, Dias, and Beltrao. Lopes intended to revive the 
1937 model but was quickly defeated. The conflict between Dias and Beltrao could possibly 
be described as a personality clash, or even political competition (between Beltrao and 
Campos, as the replacement of the latter by the former suggested). But as events developed it 
became evident that the conflicts between Dias and Beltrao were not limited to emphasis or 
form. This was a plausible explanation given the fact that the former intended to solve format 
disagreements via a conciliatory text in the final constitutional provisions and of decree-laws. 
They were pursuing different policy strategies motivated by different problem perceptions.
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The confrontation between Dias and the Supreme Audit Agency was also significant, as it 
brought about an important policy change within the control area, that used auditing 
procedures to ex-post the facts. In fact the reforms enabled internal control structures to be 
set up by the Executive, while it attributed to the National Audit Body the responsibility of 
external but post facto control.
In 1988 Marcelino’s (and Holanda’s) views were not in accord with Alves’s pragmatic 
political practices. They were a mismatch that weakened the reformers' initiatives. The 
novelty of Santiago’s and Cintra's view was the change of the central venue to planning, a 
step that resembled Campos’s and Dias's moves twenty years before.443 Alves, Marcelino and 
Holanda aspired to set up a unified direct administration organised around a career system 
inspired on the French model, but they failed to define the necessary details. Santiago and 
Cintra shifted the emphasis from the public policy approach to planning, budgeting and 
administration, closer to the American view of federal administration. They expected the core 
careers of the state to perform a technical and specialist role, not a generalized political one. 
This was a key difference between their views and that projected by Marcelino and Holanda.
In 1998 Bresser Pereira wasted no time on the progressive-public-administration sort of 
proposal that was presented in Cardoso’s party manifesto. Initially he faced the possibility of 
adopting another alternative, offered by public managers444 who intended to revamp
443 Neither Santiago nor Cintra was aware of the similarity between their efforts and the experience of the 
1960s, nor had Bresser Pereira heard about it when he proposed that MARE be merged with the Ministry of 
Planning.
444 Bresser Pereira initially appointed survivors o f the 1988 Public Managers’ sole promotion to key positions in 
human resources policies. This group immediately tried to evidence the lack of a professional bureaucracy in 
the ministries and resume public competitive selection processes for careers. At the same time they fought for 
wages corresponding to the respective heavy responsibilities. The idea was to revamp the 1988 initiative with 
their career at the top o f the system. It did not work and these persons were replaced, although many o f them 
continued to work in intermediate managerial positions. Despite Bresser Pereira's sympathy for the public 
managers’ commitment to the interests o f the public sector, he saw things differently. He was less persuaded by 
“the best and brightest” approach, and less sanguine about the bureaucratisation deficit o f the Federal
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Marcelino’s proposal. But quickly, perhaps too quickly,445 he abandoned the idea. His fast- 
moving approach positioned him, MARE, and his proposal at die top of the executive 
agenda, together with reforms that never took place -  such as the fiscal reform -  or that failed 
-  like Social Security. The President’s General Secretary, Eduardo Jorge, championed the 
considerable conflict regarding the nature of the policy proposals. Jorge did not consider it 
necessary to change the Constitution to promote reforms. Bresser Pereira finally had his 
reform approved -  although watered down. But Eduardo Jorge's view was vindicated by the 
terms of the Constitution -  although to a certain extent innocuous -  and by the events that 
followed the approval of the Constitutional Amendment in 1998.
7.6.2. The difference modes of policy transfer
Policy transfer and policy learning indeed took place but in different ways and with distinct 
intensities in all four cases. Rose (1993) argued convincingly that the lesson-drawing 
processes were meant to bridge time and space. Brazilian reformers indeed searched for 
sources of lessons -  and from sources that go beyond Brazilian history -  in all four cases. 
Experience is a rear-view mirror that can orient decision-making processes, but Brazilians 
searched for inputs for their reforms more often in other countries than in their own country’s 
past experience.
Administration. He had already made up his mind that the country needed a managerial reform to catch up with 
developed Western democracies.
445 This nuance derives from the fact that at the end o f his period as Minister of MARE, Bresser Pereira’s main 
achievements were closer to the progressive public administration ideas of 1988 than to the managerial ideas 
that he himself had propounded in 1995-1998.
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Policy learning processes took place by learning from direct experience as well as from the 
experiences of others446 (Levitt and March, 1990). The capacity, willingness and desire to 
learn varied among the four cases.447 Other factors regarding the reformers’ participation in 
the processes were not present, such as near misses, long-tenure, disasters, resource 
availability, perception of threats and opportunities, transfer mechanisms, and others (Hood, 
1996). Table 5 shows how the lesson drawing and policy transfer process occurred in each of 
the four cases.
446 “Vicarious experience acquired from the past, even the remote past, gives guidance to the present” 
(Neusdadt and May, 232: 1986).
447 Hood (1996:48) identified two circumstances where determination and capacity converge to generate effects 
at the top level o f political decision-making systems that provide learning opportunities: second-chance and 
long-tenure. Second-chance effects are generated by second opportunities provided by vicarious experiences, 
near-miss occasions, and survival o f recent disasters. Both phenomena appeared in the actions o f public 
entrepreneurs during the Brazilian administrative reforms. The underlying assumption in Hood’s classification, 
however, is that learning potentially derives more from failure than from success.
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Table 5 -  Lesson-Drawing and Policy Transfer in Constitutional Public Management
Changes448
D iffe r e n t  w ays
d ra w in g
le s s o n s
P o lic y  O u tc o m e s P o licy  lea rn in g  m o d e R e la ted  lea rn in g  factors  
th a t a ffec ted  th e  lea rn in g  
p r o c e s s
1937 C opy
A daptation
Synthe sis
FCSC
D A SP  (Budgeting  
bit)
D irect Learning 
(FCSC)
Vicarious Learning  
{Borrowing from  the 
US)
Long-Tenure Perception o f  
opportunity
Availability o f  resource s 
N ear M iss 
Trust & R espect 
Institutional M echanism s
1967 Synthesis D L  200 (PPBS bit) 
D L  199 (Change to 
ex-p ost control) 
Senior C orps 
(rejected)
D irect Learning 
Vicarious Learning 
(borrowing from  the 
U S, U K  and France)
Long-Tenure 
Lived disaster 
N ear M iss
Availability o f  resource s 
Perception o f  opportunity  
Institutional M echanism s
1988 A daptation E N A P
Careers Proposal
Vicarious Learning 
(borrowing from  
France and Argentina)
Availability o f  resources 
Perception o f  opportunity  
Long-Tenure  
Institutional M echanism s
1998 Hybrid E xecutive A gencies  
Social
O rganixations
D irect Learning (other 
policy dom ain) 
Vicarious Learning 
(borrowing from  U K )
L ived  disaster 
Availability o f  resources 
Institutional M echanism s 
Perception  o f  opportunity  
Trust & Re spect
In 1937 Lopes was deeply influenced by three American experiences: the civil service 
reforms of the late 19th century, the Budgeting Reform of 1921, and the Brownlow Report of 
1937. The Re-Adjustment Law of 1936 was an initiative meant to catch up with the US 
experience. The Federal Civil Service Commission was inspired (Rose) on the American 
Commission. The 1937 reforms included placing DASP directly under the Presidency and a
448 The column in the table entitled “Different ways of drawing lessons” is based on Rose (1993: 30-31). 
Differentiation among the five ways is not always simple. The distinction between hybridisation and synthesis, 
for example, can be found in the recognition o f identifiable parts of distinct sources, while synthesis involves a 
fresh re-(combination) of familiar elements.
The “Policy learning mode” column is based on Levitt and March (1990: 16-21).
In regard to the column entitled “Related learning factors that affected the learning process”, it is important to 
remember that Hood (1996: 43) pointed out three aspects of learning that should be taken into account in public 
policy specification processes: propensity to experiment, willingness to adapt in the light of experience, and 
capacity to transfer “ideas and experience from one policy or organisational context to another”. Hood (1996: 
44) lists several factors that affect the capacity to learn and the desire to learn. These factors include case 
resource availability, political second chances, long tenure, and mechanisms for transferring experience, in 
terms of capacity; and level o f shock or perceived shock (or opportunity), type of shock, party electoral 
rationales, and patterns of trust, in terms of desire to learn. While capacity to learn usually depends on the 
existence o f the requirements, desire to learn is a function of a more complex set o f factors dependent on both 
“shock effects” and past experiences.
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Budgeting Directory within its structure. The Budgeting Section of the new legislation 
faithfully reproduced provisions of the 1921 Budgeting Act, but the striking feature of the 
proposal for setting up DASP was its leapfrogging ambition. First Lopes introduced 
department functions that had not been linked in the American debate -  personnel, 
budgeting, and procurement -  although they were intended to be located under the 
Presidency. Second, Lopes obtained approval for ideas -  some of them from the Brownlow 
Report -  that were under discussion in the U.S. Congress. But Congress refused the 
proposals on the grounds of risking investing the Presidency with dictatorial powers -  
exactly the direction in which Vargas was heading. Roosevelt managed to have some of the 
proposals approved, but only two years later via the adoption of a piecemeal strategy.
Lopes combined direct learning -  he had participated in the Executive Commission and he 
chaired the CFSPC during its existence -  with vicarious learning -  in a way that would allow 
him to copy, adapt and reinvent a new synthesis based on the U.S. experiences. He had been 
at the Presidential Office regularly since 1930 and participated in the critical years of the 
Provisional Government. He witnessed the missing of an opportunity with the Nabuco 
Report, and later on had another chance with the CFSPC -  an outstanding but insufficient 
achievement by his standards. The availability of resources coupled with the trust 
relationship he had with Vargas paved the way for a fast -  although inevitably politically 
biased -  learning process.
The 1967 case provided a more sophisticated policy transfer process because Campos and 
Dias were already familiar with PPBS practices through their experiences abroad (in the 
U.S.A., in Campos’s case, and with UNESCO, in Dias’s case). Beltrao had built on his 
successful experience with the Industrial Social Fund and the Planning Department of the
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State of Guanabara. Fortunately Congress had just approved modem legislation for the states 
and municipalities in February 1964 and it was easily assimilated by new Brazilian 
authorities. The changes introduced in the control area -  which Dias had waited a decade to 
see -  were also inspired on the U.S. experience, where the shift to ex-post practices had 
occurred a long time before. Regarding the enabling conditions for expanding the indirect 
administration, Dias had been involved in the founding of Petrobras, and in 1966 he was in 
touch with British experts who were about to engage in the debates later addressed by the 
Fulton Report. Another potentially interesting experience of policy transfer in Brazil -  the 
setting up of the Senior Corps -  did not take off because of opposition from Sorbonne 
intellectuals and Beltrao’s lack of interest. The Senior Corps was designed to link the top 
echelons of the direct and indirect administrations. They were to carry out the functions of 
policy advisors, controllers and monitors of the indirect administration -  in charge of policy 
delivery. The model combined elements of the British (the small core), the French (the elitist 
view), and the American (the profile of experts) experiences in an original synthesis (Rose, 
1993).
The combination of the direct learning experiences of Campos, Beltrao, and Dias was clearly 
impressive. They had been working in and dealing with the country’s most important 
institutions since the early 1940s -  Campos as an economist and diplomat, Beltrao as a 
maverick bureaucrat, and Dias as a public executive. Campos had survived the disastrous 
experience with macro-economic policies in two previous administrations and made this 
point clear to Castelo Branco when invited to be Minister of Planning. During the 1965 
political crisis Campos and Dias were almost ousted by the hardliners. An outstanding reform 
opportunity had been missed with the impasses of COMESTRA, and neither Campos nor 
Dias was willing to miss another chance. The relationship between Castelo Branco, Roberto
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Campos and Teixeira Dias was based on trust and mutual respect. But beyond their personal 
affinities they also developed a shared understanding of problems, causal connections, policy 
solutions, trade-offs, political sensitivities, and other aspects that were unmatched in the 
other cases, with the exception of the intimate relationship between Vargas and Lopes, which 
transformed them into a single entity.
In 1988 Alves, Marcelino and Holanda were influenced by the French role model and by the 
Argentinean adaptation effort. However, it should be recalled that the final proposals 
regarding personnel and careers were put forward by two consultants who had been strongly 
influenced, respectively, by administrative law principles (Vicente Paula Mendes) and by 
DASP’s traditions (Jose Arantes). Both these men had participated in one way or another in 
long-tenure tracks related to administrative reforms. Both had participated in the process ever 
since the sub-commissions that supported the General Commission were set up. Geraldo 
Campos, the deputy who became one of the leading figures in the battle to approve Law 5132 
of 1990 and had a similar experience in 1963 when he successfully participated in an 
organisational action that led to similar solutions in a similar situation. Therefore, there were 
ongoing processes of direct and vicarious learning despite their dispersion.
Marcelino's and Holanda’s previous high-office experiences were relatively limited in 
contrast to Alves's long-standing political career. Until 1986 they successfully managed to 
take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the political circumstances. But the 
launching of the National Constituent Assembly and the divergences between Alves and the 
economic team brought about changes in the policy situation, that they were not capable of 
assimilating. Santiago and Cintra quickly seized the opportunity to introduce a new policy 
direction in the infant State regeneration process. Santiago particularly had been engaged in
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important direct learning processes although in another policy domain. He had been in 
Brasilia a long time before the re-democratisation process began. Cintra invested 
immediately in learning from other experiences, especially those of the Americans who had 
been involved in establishing government policy schools. Santiago invited Marcelino to be 
his deputy in order to keep him in charge of the endless administrative reorganisation tasks 
following the conclusion of the National Constituent Assembly. The conditions for a learning 
loop appeared in early 1990, when Collor de Mello became President and adopted a tabula 
rasa approach to public management reforms.
In 1998 Bresser Pereira was an outsider to the public management domain but he had had 
important direct learning experiences in several positions in the Sao Paulo State Government 
(1983-1986) and as Minister of Finance (1987). He also made intense use of British technical 
cooperation via the British Council and DFID449 after he had designed the guidelines of his 
proposal. The dialogue with high British officials who had participated actively in the Next- 
Steps agencies process served as a training program for the team of reformers, but failed to 
produce the expected results. Bresser Pereira explicitly refused to adopt a linear policy 
sequence path, which would first involve strengthening the bureaucratic core, and then move 
towards managerial processes. Despite his convictions and his team’s efforts, only one 
executive agency and five social organisations had been set up by the end of 1998. The 
President, the economic team, the social ministries and the leading cadres of the bureaucracy 
establishment remained indifferent to his proposals and arguments.
449 An interesting contrast that deserves further investigation was the extremely successful policy transfer 
program involving the Supreme Audit Agency in the area of performance management. The results were 
striking, and explanations why things worked well in an inhospitable area but failed to take off in a core policy 
venue deserve analysis and comment.
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Bresser Pereira was personally trusted and respected by Cardoso, but the President’s support 
for the reform proposal only went so far. The hybrid arrangements faced difficulties related 
to the importing of British organisational configurations for executive agencies for the 
Brazilian context -  a novelty that received with suspicion by the judicial establishment.450 
The direct learning process that occurred within the process was not sufficient to persuade 
key actors -  especially the economic team and the social ministries -  of the advantages of the 
proposal. Some essential elements of the reform, such as drawing a line to delimit the so- 
called strategic core of the State organisations and personnel were kept vague until MARE 
was phased out, an indeterminacy that had serious side effects on the implementation of the 
reform proposal. The change in course implied that the merging of MARE with the Ministry 
of Planning was a consequence of a certain type of learning process: the recognition that the 
unification of the instruments of the two ministries would open the door to the 
implementation of the reform. Bresser Pereira later regretted this option because it entailed a 
loss of status of public management policies on the executive agenda.451 They ceased to be 
located in a specialised policy venue and were lost in the congestion of issues under the 
Ministry of Planning's responsibility.
All the reformers chose their interlocutors and sources of inspiration and all received support 
from the countries from which they borrowed formulas, ideas or inspiration. They were all 
informed by the zeitgest of their times (Peters, 2004) although the 1988 reforms were caught 
in the middle of a transition period that preceded the codification of new public management 
ideas and the Washington consensus.452 Fungibility (Rose, 1993: 35) was presumed
450 JlH/Br/29
45‘ E1H/SP/8.
452 Both processes were ongoing but they had not received the academic attention they attracted a few months 
later.
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regarding the CFSPC in 1936, ENAP in 1988, and executive agencies in 1998.453 But the 
desirability of policy transfer should be contrasted with the practicability of the respective 
operations. The cases of ENAP and the executive agencies suggested that in spite of their 
apparent desirability, there was little practical likelihood that a policy transfer process could 
take place (Rose, 1993: 46). The conditions of the policy dialogue varied, as well as its 
degree of institutionalisation. The form and pattern of the incorporation of lessons drawn 
from other contexts and time periods also varied, but they were all affected by what was 
happening abroad and by the reformers’ different learning paths.
The fifth column on Table 5 shows that the presence of three factors -  perception of an 
opportunity, availability of resources, and presence of institutional mechanisms for policy 
transfer -  were no obstacle to learning processes. Opportunities were seized in all four cases. 
Resources were mobilised thanks to the political importance of the ministries in charge of the 
processes. Transfer mechanisms were provided not by the Brazilian government but by the 
technical cooperation mechanisms of other countries, such as the UK, the U.S.A. and France, 
which had always adopted positive and cooperative approaches to reform efforts.
Roberto Campos and Bresser Pereira had survived policy disasters before, but within the 
economic and finance policy domain. Lopes had survived and took over in the wake of a 
wave of political and policy successes. Dias combined narrow-miss and long-tenure elements 
because he had always moved about in both novelty institutional experiments (Petrobras, 
BNDES and Light) and structured institutional venues (Ministry of Infrastructure and 
DASP). Beltrao had worked in similar tracks, such as Petrobras, but also in a social security 
institute (the IAPI) and in the Guanabara State Government. An experimental approach was
453 The Senior Corps proposal did not take off in 1967, even though it looked more like an original synthesis at 
that time than a copycat procedure. It was adopted in the U.S.A. in the 1978.
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particularly explored by Dias454 although always anchored in vectors of change that had 
either been adopted elsewhere or were floating around at the time.
Lesson drawing is a practical matter that presumably generates tools for action (Rose, 1993, 
ix), and the ensuing lessons can be positive or negative. Reformers looked for lessons in the 
past, in other contexts and in the situations they were embedded in. Their capacity to adapt 
their behaviour depended, to a certain extent, on their exposure to similar situations or to 
long periods working with the government. In all four cases reformers were forced to 
redefine courses of actions and to review their strategies regarding alternative specifications 
and, especially, decision-making processes. It is an exaggeration to state that the reforms 
moved beyond the decisional level because of built-in learning processes within each episode 
(in fact, some reforms changed or were watered down). However, faced by complex 
circumstances, the reformers were forced to adapt their behaviour in different ways: in 
Lopes’s case, engineering-based in Dias’s, cautions in Marcelino’s and daring in Bresser 
Pereira’s.
7.7. Comparing how entrepreneurs455 carried out their functions
7.7.1. Comparing how entrepreneurs coupled the streams
Entrepreneurs truly coupled the streams in 1937, 1967 and 1998. In 1988 the streams were 
coupled by different entrepreneurs and by the National Constituent Assembly. In all four
454 The term “tinker” capacity (Hood, 1996:44) in especially suited to him, but it also applied well to Lopes and 
Bresser Pereira.
455 The four main entrepreneurs of the reforms were Lopes, Dias, Marcelino, and Bresser Pereira. Briggs, 
Campos, Alves, Santiago, Holanda and, especially, Beltrao are also referred to because they performed 
important political and policy entrepreneurial functions at certain moments.
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cases they pushed their proposals through windows of opportunity they had helped to open. 
They successfully linked their definition of problems to solutions that they themselves had 
formulated, although with varying degrees of sophistication and consistency. And, they 
engaged in political negotiations with their respective Presidents and with ministers.
Contrary to Kingdon’s premises,456 the entrepreneurs were able to couple the streams for 
long periods. They were persistent -  amazingly persistent -  in all four cases, even though the 
central issue they were dealing with were not as urgent as other policies frequently did. They 
were capable of somehow becoming active protagonists in what happened in all three 
streams in a way that allowed them to synchronise the streams. Political windows were 
opened because of political turnovers that culminated in the rotation of key actors that 
brought them to power positions. And the windows generally closed because of problems 
regarding the basic policy proposal, even when it was approved. These problems included 
adequacy, feasibility, credibility, and sustainability (Kingdon, 1994: 169-170).
Coupling the streams did not mean that the entrepreneurs controlled them -  as the cases 
proved. It meant they had to seize opportunities, cope with the contexts, and couple the 
streams in congruent ways so that they simultaneously kept themselves on board the political 
and decision-making processes even while disruptive and centrifugal forces were pulling in 
the opposite direction, tending to break the streams. Lopes and Dias’s efforts to couple the 
streams were more successful than Marcelino’s and Bresser Pereira’s. The insertion of the 
former in the Presidents’ inner circle was one reason. The fitness of their proposals to the 
context was another. A third reason for their success was the attachment of their proposals to 
an atmosphere of crisis at the time they were generated (although in 1988 there was also 
intense turbulence). Salami tactics were adopted in three cases but not in the fourth, when 
456 According to Kingdon (1994: 169) the window does not usually stay open for very long.
357
Bresser Pereira quickly designed a comprehensive policy proposal at the start of the agenda- 
setting process, hi fact the specification of the alternative enabled him to push it to the 
decisional agenda in a very few months.
Entrepreneurs had to deal constantly with the three properties usually associated with the 
concept of “organised anarchy”: fluid participation, unclear preferences, and unclear 
technology. Participation was always unstable given the characteristics of the Brazilian 
political processes. But as the cases showed, this is a story about relatively few people who 
had, for over sixty years, jumped into and out of reformist processes as if some invisible 
revolving door let them come and go. The problem of clarifying preferences was even more 
complex because in two cases the decisions were made at the end of the process by a single 
man -  Vargas and Castelo Branco, respectively -  while in the two other cases the issue was 
confusingly treated by the Executive and by the Legislative. The awareness concerning the 
policy choices included in each policy proposal is highly controversial at public, political and 
governmental levels.
Entrepreneurs are expected to have a broad understanding of the reality they want to see 
transformed and of the personalities involved in the processes they are leading ahead. This 
statement was valid for all four reformers studied here. But while the former managed to 
come to terms with Vargas and Campos and Castelo Branco the latter did not find enough 
common ground with Alves and Samey and Cardoso. Friendship did not necessarily mean 
mutual political and policy understanding, as the latter painfully found out.
Kanter (2000: 185) stated that resources (“funds, data, space, time”) are among the three 
basic commodities that are mobilised in entrepreneurial processes. The other two are 
information (“data, technical knowledge, political intelligence and expertise”) and support
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(“endorsement, backing, approval and legitimacy”). The movements of the entrepreneurs in 
different arenas bring about the circulation of these three power tools thanks to their 
legitimacy for crosscutting processes (Kanter, 2000: 189). Resources were apparently 
mobilised without any insurmountable difficulties in any of the four cases. Information was a 
problem for all of them but Bresser Pereira succeeded in producing a breakthrough thanks in 
part to the state of technological possibilities in his time. Regarding support, Marcelino did 
not have effective backing after Alves opted for a confrontational line toward the economic 
team, and Bresser Pereira received Cardoso’s support only until the proposal was sent to 
Congress.
None of the reforms studied would have been plausible without the participation of 
entrepreneurs, a conclusion that challenges Brunsson and Olsen’s (1993) argument regarding 
impersonal reforms, and March’ and Olsen’s (1989) incidental treatment of this matter. The 
entrepreneurs played decisive roles within each of the streams. The fact that the issue was 
taken off the agendas as soon as they left the scenes is an indirect indicator of how important 
their presence was, although one might surmise that their presence could have been 
dispensed with during implementation processes.
Lopes was responsible for successive processes of problem definition (and, later, re­
definition), alternative specification (and re-specification), and political negotiation of the 
President’s support for the reform proposals in 1936 and 1937. Dias and Campos played 
similar roles in 1967 although they operated within a special ministerial environment and 
within the context of a broader policy formulation process. Marcelino made his way to 
Alves’s Ministry -  an institutional location and a ministerial team in which he was always a 
stranger -  and had to limit himself to more generic problem definition and policy formulation
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roles while the political negotiations were being carried out by Alves. Bresser Pereira also 
performed the functions of problem definer, policy formulator, and political negotiator, 
although Congress took his place in this function at the end of the negotiations. The scope of 
the reforms obeyed personal and jurisdictional requirements, although there was a successful 
issue expansion in 1937 and 1967 in contrast with an interrupted expansion in 1988 and a 
restrained one in 1988.
All entrepreneurs were involved in problem characterisation processes, hypothesis 
formulation exercises, momentum building, platforming, institutional design, advocacy 
functions, strategising, coalition building, and decision-making processes. Only Dias was 
free from having to accumulate entrepreneurial functions with executive functions, because 
of his advisory role in Campos’s Ministry -  a plausible reason that helps to explain the 
sophistication and quality of the proposals that led to the 1967 Reform.
7.7.2. Revising entrepreneurs’ values and beliefs
Individual entrepreneurs act within the context of their life stories. They use history and 
comparisons elicited from their personal first-hand or second-hand repertoires of experience 
to make “comparisons of present with past and future” (Neusdadt and May, 256). It is 
virtually impossible to compare people’s career paths and profiles, but looking more closely 
at the lives of the main entrepreneurs in the cases studied here, clues leading to the origins of 
their positions and actions can nevertheless be seen. They all accumulated characteristics as 
practitioners, academics, and political activists, and none was a classical bureaucrat or typical 
politician.
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Belief formation was an important mechanism activated in all four cases. Lopes’s convictions 
regarding public management reforms were shaped by his contact in the United States 
experience and by his unquestionable political affinity with Vargas’s personal political 
project. The result was an explosive combination of scientific managerial ideas, lessons from 
the American civil service and budgeting reforms, a bias in favour of controlling public 
management policies and an authoritarian view of public affairs. Lopes acquired experience 
in the field by developing it. In one interview he was referred to as “the man who created 
bureaucracy in Brazil”457 but his ideas and trajectory could not be dissociated from DASP 
and Vargas or from all the reform attempts made until the 1960s, when his shadow over 
Brazilian public administration began to fade out.
Campos was the unmistakable maestro of the Castelo Branco Administration. His passage 
through the Ministry of Planning and Coordination was marked by an impressive number of 
reforms that reflected a combination of his impressive formulation capacity with the domain 
over the country’s agenda since the 1940s. His wide experience in events such as Breton 
Woods, the setting up of BNDE, the negotiations with IMF, and the negotiation of Brazilian 
positions in Washington had made him an experienced economist with unusual political 
sensitivity. His belief in reasoning and argumentation dated from his youth, when he had 
studied to be a priest before opting for a diplomatic career. His technical approach to political 
and economic problems did not help him make political friends, except with President 
Castelo Branco, with whom he developed a symbiotic relationship.
Dias belonged to one of the first groups sent to the U.S.A. by DASP and later on he made his 
career in several high positions of the federal administration (including the head of Human 
Resources at DASP). But his passage through BNDE with Campos, UNESCO in Paris, and
457 Interview E1M/RJ/7.
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LIGHT in the early 1960s transformed him into a pragmatic and highly qualified technocrat. 
His performance at both COMESTRA and ASESTRA proved him to be a detailed and 
meticulous policy formulator and a careful negotiator. His main concerns included cross 
fertilisation of private corporations with modem techniques used in public administration -  
thus his push towards unleashing the indirect administration -  combined with an elitist merit- 
based approach to the civil service, which resulted in his pessimistic view of DASP and his 
expectations regarding the setting up of a Senior Corps.
Beltrao had not believed in structures and mles since his career at IAPI during the New State. 
He was a severe critique of the pathologies of a successful bureaucracy -  a bias that stayed 
with him throughout his life. He believed in behavioural change and, to a certain extent and 
anticipated a customer-oriented approach in Brazil regarding organisational design. 
However, his vision of administrative reform as a campaign did not help consolidate the 
1967 Public Management Reform. Moreover, Beltrao had always been on the brink of 
becoming a politician -  a plausible explanation for the misplacement of some of his main 
ideas and attitudes. As a political communicator and a champion of the people Beltrao never 
distanced himself from the image of a de-bureaucratising crusader, even though he lived and 
worked in a country where a number of areas were characterised by bureaucratic deficits.
Marcelino's trajectory was more low-profile. He had been a successful journalist who 
participated in the modernisation of the government of the small state of Rio Grande do 
Norte as Alves’s Secretary of Planning. Later on he followed an academic career at the 
University of Sao Paulo, where he combined his journalistic background with a more 
technical approach to administrative matters. His close advisor, Holanda, had studied at the 
Kennedy School of Government and he had followed a classical technocratic career during
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the authoritarian regime, notably at Banco do Brasil, where he made a name for himself as an 
exceptional executive. Both shared a professional ethos, i.e. they believed in the traditional 
progressive public administration values and were committed to facing the historical 
challenges of Brazilian public administration. The development of the events suggested that 
they shared the view that culminated in the approval of Law 5132 in 1990, but their views 
regarding the need to strengthen the direct administration were spurred on after they 
distanced themselves from the decision-making and implementation processes. Santiago's 
transitional role as Vice-minister of Planning was important for two reasons: he avoided any 
interruption in the ongoing reforms and he introduced a twist by relating public 
administration with planning and budgeting reforms within a broader public policy scope. 
His views were influenced by his training as an economist in the U.S.A. and by his broad 
experience in the Brazilian technocracy during the authoritarian regime. He took the baton 
and then passed it on to his successor one year later, although unsuccessfully.
Bresser Pereira was a jack-of-all trades: a lawyer by education, an economist by vocation, a 
political activist, an academic, a private executive, a public cadre, a publisher, a polemist, 
and a lover of the arts. The way he embraced the new public management credo was 
surprising and somehow more revealing of his ideals than of his capacity for diagnosing the 
Brazilian public sector. His personal style allowed him, on the one hand, to build on his early 
victories after becoming minister. On the other hand it allowed his opponents to label him as 
a recurrently precocious policy maker -  a epithet that stuck. Bresser’s belief in reasoning 
and his concerns for matching his actions with his thoughts led him to move with surprising 
speed in the political and bureaucratic environment, even though he was neither a politician 
nor a bureaucrat. His changes of opinions -  valuable attitudes in a collegial academic
458 E3L/Br/10.
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environment -  were seen by his opponents as problems and they provided alibis for 
disqualifying his ideas and efforts. His intellectual dominance over his team -  mostly women 
without much governmental executive experience -  also made it more difficult for important 
critical feedbacks to reach his ears. As an intellectual usually thinking ahead of his time he 
believed firmly that the new public management ideas he had been trying to implement were 
not only the best course of action for Brazil at that moment, but that they also represented a 
worldwide trend towards convergence459 (MARE, 1995).
It might also be noted that all of these entrepreneurs were committed to their views, even 
when the views failed to prove sustainable, as in Marcelino’s and Bresser Pereira’s cases. 
The way they defined the problems, and the subsequent policy formulation processes, obeyed 
their views, their experiences, and their aspirations. They are not easily compared because 
the criteria used here are based on different grouping procedures.
In political terms, i.e. in terms of the degree of politicisation of their actions, Lopes and 
Bresser Pereira occupied positions at one extreme and Marcelino, Holanda and Santiago at 
the other. Campos and Beltrao are closer to Lopes and to Bresser Pereira, whereas Dias is 
more aligned with Campos and Beltrao. In technical terms Santiago, Dias and Campos were 
at one extreme and Beltrao at the other, while all others were closer to Dias and Campos. 
Only Beltrao and Bresser Pereira had a genuine orientation towards the public debate, 
although Lopes and Campos had also developed important rhetorical skills in their public 
careers. In terms of Light’s typology of administrative reforms, Lopes, Marcelino, and 
Holanda were closer to the scientific management type of initiative while the ideas of Dias, 
Campos, Beltrao, Santiago and Bresser Pereira were closer to the liberation management 
proposals. Most of them served authoritarian regimes, which does not mean that they failed 
459 See Pollitt Ferlie and Hood for broader discussions regarding new public management variations.
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to espouse democratic values. Beltrao was the most dramatic case: he once gave an interview 
justifying his signing of the AI-5. None of them became rich after their passage through 
office, or faced corruption charges.
They all persisted in the face of setbacks (Caiden, 1982: 223). Their beliefs were linked to 
their actions regarding all three streams (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 28). They all saw 
the opportunities that new governments provided, and held onto them. They were all 
protagonists of values that transcend them -  and they were aware of it. They addressed 
broader constituencies, and they were all politically committed to the public interest within 
the context of the governments they served.460 And they all kept close watch over the issue 
careers, even when they did not control them.
Regarding their motivations (Kingdon, 1995: 122-124), it is clear that the promotion of the 
values they embodied and their passion for policy were much stronger than the advance of 
their personal interests. They benefited from their passages through government but they 
indeed had had better opportunities -  a narrow proxy of interest -  in other positions.
Finally, mechanisms of remembering and forgetting (Douglas, 1986; Hood, 1998) influenced 
policy choices as well as the entrepreneurs’ courses of action. Individual and organisational 
forgetfulness461 operated as a mechanism to try out and accept reforms (Brunsson, 1993: 41).
460 E1M/RJ/7, E1H/RJ/33, A3M/Br/19, ElH/Br/23, RS, E1H/SP/8, E3L/Br/10.
461 Brunsson (1993: 42) argues that forgetfulness is as important as problems and solutions in administering 
reforms, and points out three particular mechanisms that promote forgetfulness: personnel turnover, top 
management turnover, and the use of management consultants.
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7.73. Entrepreneurs and their entrepreneurial functions
“Entrepreneurial functions were performed by individuals but also by 
organisations since what matters is the behaviour, not the actors” (Swedberg, 
2000: 17 and Blau, 2000: 83).
This dissertation has treated entrepreneurship as a matter of individual actions and roles, but 
it also about organisations and movements. Individual entrepreneurs operated through 
organisational platforms that amplified their individual capacities (Bardach, 1998). The 
Executive Commission, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Ministry of Planning and 
Coordination, COMESTRA, ASESTRA, the Ministry of Administration, SEDAP, and 
MARE performed entrepreneurial functions because, in these cases, they were performed by 
institutions via their activities (Roberts and King, 1996; 10-11). Authors like Chapman and 
Greenway (1980), and March and Olsen (1983) recognised the importance of provisional or 
established organisations as an important source of entrepreneurial functions, usually 
dependent for success on other ingredients such as mandate, quality of the members, and 
leader’s attributes. The creation of a “knowledge driven spiral (...) driven by organisational 
intention” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 74) in the field of public management occurred only 
during the short periods of institutions like DASP, SEDAP, and MARE. The production of 
organisational knowledge462 did not flow cumulatively during these decades, with the partial 
exception of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, a private organisation not under State control. 
As a result, tacit knowledge463 did not take root in public sector organisations.
462 Boisot, M. (1998) conceptualises knowledge as “a property o f agents, predisposing them to act in particular 
circumstances”, activated by information. Administrative reforms in Brazil have been characterised by forms of 
knowledge expressed discursively but not systematically codified.
463 Boisot (1998: 57) pointed out three ways by which tacit knowledge can occur: “things that are not said 
because everybody understands them and takes them for granted [e.g. the fait accomplit about patronage
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The long decline of DASP and the brief life of SEDAP-PR and MARE suggest that there are 
points to be clarified regarding the organisational sustainability of these three institutions.
Issues regarding policy monopolies and jurisdictions are intrinsically important in all four 
cases because of the way policy sub-systems were recurrently set up, destroyed and recreated 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 6). But as Ioannou (1992: 163) observed, “the absence of 
effective central political control and coordination -  leading to fragmentation and significant 
departmental autonomy and discretion -  not only made public entrepreneurship possible but 
to some extent necessary”. The four cases strengthened Ioannou’s assumption that “public 
sector entrepreneurship may be a functional need in fragmented political systems”. This is 
yet another complementary explanation for the administrative reform processes in the 
segmented Brazilian public sector (Barzelay, 1986).
7.8. Comparing the decision-making processes among the four episodes..
7.8.1. The long-term decision-making processes
Kingdon’s model suggests that decisional opportunities rise due to changes in political or 
problem streams (Van Gestel, 1999: 158). This is what happened in the four episodes, but 
primacy belonged to the political stream, since the decision-making process began there in all 
reforms. In 1937 the risk of a military crisis at a delicate moment forced Vargas to take 
measures regarding their wages. The letter sent by Minister of War Goes Monteiro was
practices], things that are not said because nobody fully understands them [e.g. the trade offs involved in 
administrative reforms and their corresponding consequences], and things that are not said because while some 
people can understand them, they cannot articulate them without cost [e.g. the difficulties in dealing with 
accountability issues].”
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indeed a heavy blow. In 1967 Castelo Branco embraced the policy debate a few weeks after 
becoming President. Administrative reform was a political challenge for him from the time 
he took office. In 1988 and 1998, as soon as Alves and Bresser Pereira became ministers, 
they initiated decisional sequences regarding the reforms. But they were invited to be 
ministers for reasons not related to public management policies.
There were no close similarities among the paces of the decision-making processes in the 
four episodes. The timing and sequencing in the four cases were different, although, over 
time, the decision-making process was a common fact. Several inter-linked and intermediate 
decision-making processes at distinct levels formed a long-term decision-making process. 
Only in 1937 was the direction of the policy changes kept during the entire episode as well as 
after it. In 1967 partial policy changes were made when Beltrao took over from Campos as 
Minister of Planning and Coordination. In 1988 there were discontinuities after the new 
Constitution was promulgated, and the reforms took a different direction after Collor de 
Mello was elected. In 1998 the reform lost momentum after Bresser Pereira left the 
government, and when the reforms derailed in the transition between Cardoso’s first and 
second terms of office.
There were different policy cycles in three episodes: 1937, 1967, and 1988. In 1937 there 
were two policy cycles -  1935-1936 and 1936-1937 -  and the second was built over the first. 
In the first cycle the decision-making process was incubated within the Executive with the 
participation of Vargas, with the final decision being shared with Congress but under control 
of the President. The second cycle ended with the coup d’etat. Vargas had commissioned a 
Constitutional text in line with his political project and based on Lopes’s suggestions. The 
default implementation model was consistent with the constitutional provisions because
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Lopes was in charge of the implementation of initiatives such as the setting up of DASP, the 
elaboration of the first Civil Servants’ Statute, and the implementation of the Budgeting 
Directory at DASP.
In 1967 there were also two policy cycles, the first during the work of COMESTRA and the 
second during the work of ASESTRA. During the first cycle the decision-making process 
was paralysed by the differences between Beltrao and Dias. The fifth version of the proposal 
-  formulated under the auspices of Beltrao -  failed to receive executive support. In the 
second cycle Dias commanded the decision-making process with Campos’s support. At the 
final stages President Castelo Branco mediated the final decisions regarding audit and control 
(against the Supreme Audit Agency’s position) and the setting up of the Senior Corps (in 
opposition to Geisel’s and Costa e Silva’s view). The default implementation model -  
established by Beltrao -  meant a partial shift in direction with respect to personnel and 
organisational design. The link between the direct and indirect administration was not fully 
established because the finance inspection units were created but not put in place by senior 
bureaucrats.
In the 1988 case there was only one policy cycle until the constitutional text was approved, in 
October. After that the process went in another direction, first during the final year of the 
Samey Administration and then at the beginning of the Collor Administration. Two changes 
of direction took place, in 1989 and in 1990. Cintra and Santiago tried to introduce a change 
in the direction determined by Marcelino and Alves. They intended to anchor the reforms in 
the economic ministries: Planning, and Finance. But Congress became the main protagonist 
of the reforms in 1989 and 1990 because of the weakness of Samey and, later, due to the 
election of Fernando Collor. Collor’s first year coincided with the last year of the legislature
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that drew up the new Constitution. Paradoxically, the attempt to downsize the federal 
administration co-existed with the approval of the ordinary legislation. The bandwagon effect 
was the main social mechanism in operation during the Constituent Assembly with respect to 
public management reforms. Once the proposal sent by SEDAP-PR coincided with the 
Congressmen's view and after an opportunity to generate political gains became clear, the 
reform career became relentless. Three interconnected decision-making processes then took 
place: the approval of the Constitutional text, its transitory provisions and, finally, Law 8152, 
in December 1990.
In 1998 the decision-making process took place simultaneously in the Executive and in the 
Legislature, and unfolded in an intertwined way. Bresser Pereira fought the reforms on both 
fronts for three years. The policy proposal was watered down in negotiations with Congress. 
Within the Executive, neither the core ministries (Planning, Finance, Chief of Staff, and 
Secretary of the Presidency) nor the line ministries seriously supported the proposal. The 
approval of the Constitutional amendment in Congress coincided with the decision to merge 
MARE with the Ministry of Planning. A managerial approach was taken by other actors, who 
abandoned Bresser Pereira’s proposal in spite of the possibilities embodied in the 
Constitutional Amendment that had been approved shortly before that. In three cases 
entrepreneurs departed from the decision-making process immediately after a new 
Constitution was promulgated. The turnover of entrepreneurial champions helps to explain 
why the default model of implementation was quite different from the original proposal. In 
the latter phases of the decision-making process, the reforms of 1967, 1988 and 1998 gave 
signs of policy deviation with respect to their original spirit. Public management policy 
change occurred but not in a way that was consistent with the initial formulations.
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In all the reforms the decision-making processes involved a surprisingly limited number of 
people within the Executive. Lopes and his young team were the founders of Brazilian 
bureaucracy. Dias and Campos were active at a very peculiar moment in Brazilian history. 
Marcelino and Alves plus Cintra and Santiago were the leading actors in the 1988 case. In 
1998 Bresser Pereira’s presence was overwhelming and dispensed other actors in the 
executive decision-making process.
The difference of the entrepreneurs’ successes in different stages deserves attention. While 
they were decisive in the pre-decisional processes, they were not equally effective in the 
decisional stages, and even less so in the establishment of the default implementation model. 
Neither the arena of implementation nor the issue of sustainability of the reforms are areas 
where entrepreneurs can make a difference, as they were able to in pre-decisional processes, 
as evidenced by these cases.
7.8.2. Comparing the social mechanism of actor certification activated in the 
decision-making processes
Certification is a social mechanism that relies on the explicit transfer of powers conferred on 
specific actors by a higher authority (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 121). Actor 
certification took place in different forms in all four cases although political certification, 
personal certification and policy certification must be distinguished. Political certification 
was functional within the context of the political stream. Policy certification referred to the 
alternative specification process. Personal certification referred to the trust and credibility 
that one individual transfers to another on the basis of experience they shared in the past.
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Lopes “was” Vargas. He acted as an extension of Vargas's will at the same time as he 
expanded it. The close relationship between the two men did not prevent Lopes's clashes with 
the Ministry of Finance, Souza Dantas, but that sort of problem was also typical of Vargas's 
political skills and modus operandi. Lopes was certified on political, personal, and policy 
terms.
Roberto Campos was fully empowered by Castelo Branco but the President had to operate in 
a severely constrained environment, given the pressure of hardliners at the top of his Ministry 
of Planning. Certification did not take place a priori. It was renewed daily, in a crescendo, 
because the two men shared mutual understanding on a multitude of themes. Campos was 
also certified in all three ways. Dias was an extension of Campos for public management 
matters. Dias's credentials had been built up in the past when he worked with Campos at 
BNDE. He was certified by Campos in personal terms and regarding policy issues. Beltrao’s 
credentials came from his public reputation and, later on, from his alliance with Costa e 
Silva. He was thus certified in both forms.
Alves had built up a strong political relationship with Samey before the authoritarian regime 
(when they belonged to the same political party), as well as with Neves in his battle for 
redemocratisation. Alves was personally and politically certified by Samey. Marcelino was 
respected by Alves because of their connections in the past, when the former served the latter 
as Secretary of Planning, but their relationship was basically technical. Marcelino had come 
to Brasilia via Joao Sayad -  Samey’s first Minister of Planning -  not via Alves. Thus, 
although Marcelino was certified by Alves in terms of policy he was not politically certified 
by Samey. Santiago had strong professional qualifications and he was reputed as a serious 
trouble-shooter, for which reason the last Minister of Planning of the Samey Administration,
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Joao Batista Abreu, delegated to him the responsibility for the details in merging SEDAP-PR 
and SEPLAN-PR. Thus, while Santiago was politically certified by the Presidency, Cintra 
was certified regarding policy matters by Santiago.
Bresser Pereira was certified by Cardoso because of the political and personal ties that had 
united them since Cardoso’s first moment in government, but he did not enjoy the same 
respect and credibility from the President as did other key ministers who had worked with 
Cardoso before. Bresser Pereira gradually became de-certified in political and policy terms, 
although his relationship with Cardoso never lost its personal character.
7.83. Focus events in the political stream
Previous and contemporaneous events in the political stream were decisive in enabling, 
triggering, dislodging, and ensuring public management reforms in all four cases, but in 
different ways. The political stream was stable only in the last case but the political 
turbulence during the other periods analysed was not an impediment to the issue career 
although it affected its direction in different ways. In 1937 the starting point was a spillover 
from the 1934 National Constituent Assembly. When General Goes Monteiro resigned he set 
off a policy dynamics that led to the subsequent cascade of events. The setting up of DASP 
was feasible in the context of the coup d’etat of 1937, the focusing event that marked the end 
of the episode.
The 1967 reform was initially insisted on by Castelo Branco, partially due to his having 
participated in the 1963 effort. But after the impasses of COMESTRA the policy process 
could only be resumed after the political crisis triggered off by the reaction of the hardliners
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against the results of the gubernatorial elections was resolved. Once the succession for 
leadership was defined -  via AI-2, AI-3, and AI-4 -  the President and the Minister of 
Planning were free to return to their priorities, including the public management reform 
process via ASESTRA.
The 1988 episode was deeply influenced by events in the political stream from moment the 
Neves died. Samey began his term of office as a lame duck because he had not participated 
in the opposition to the authoritarian regime, but to the dissidence that supported Neves. The 
convocation of the National Constituent Assembly accelerated the lessening of his 
presidential powers. He was forced to reshuffle the cabinet numerous times in order to deal 
simultaneously with the lack of political support in Congress and the gradual collapse of the 
macro-economic situation. When a cabinet reshuffle placed austere economists in key 
ministerial positions and Alves was unable to align himself with them, the fate of the reform 
was sealed. Paradoxically, Congress grabbed the torch of the Single Juridical Regime and 
carried it to its final outcome despite the disastrous approach to the new President’s issue.
In 1998 the political stream was relatively calm until the end of Cardoso’s first term. The 
focus event -  the launching of Cardoso’s Real Plan that led to the election -  took place 
before the episode. Later the policy proposal underwent amendments in Congress but as part 
of an ordinary process of negotiation. The international crisis that forced the devaluation of 
the currency -  the Real -  and the irruption of political scandals that affected close 
collaborators brought about an improvised cabinet reshuffle during which MARE was phased 
out. But the merging of MARE with Planning had already been given some thought because 
the President’s inner circle felt that another approach was needed to implement a managerial 
reform.
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Therefore, spillover effects of focusing events out of the policy stream were decisive in 
activating political and policy processes that were decisive in the public management policy­
making processes in all four cases.
7.9. Comparing the policy outcomes
7.9.1. The variable geometry of the public management policy outcomes
The first thing that calls an analyst's attention to the public management policy outcomes of 
the four cases is their varied scope. Table 6 provides a general overview of the scope of each 
public management reform regarding each sub-policy.
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Table 6 - The scope of the public management policy reforms in the four cases
1937 1967 1988 1998
Civil Service and
Em ploym ent
Relationships
Re-adjustment
Federal Civil Service 
Commission
First Civil Servants’ 
Statute
Proposal to create 
a Senior Corps
Law 8152 (a de 
facto new Civil 
Servants’ Statute)
Career Plan
Creation o f the 
Dublic
Management, 
3udgeting and 
finance Careers
Extinguishing the
Single Juridical
Regime
Flexibilizing
Resuming public 
selections for 
strategic careers
Organizational
D esign
Creation o f a 
unified state 
structure under the 
command o f  
DASP
Unbundling the 
Presidency
Enabling the 
expansion o f the 
indirect
Reunifying the 
Dublic sector under 
he command o f  
he direct 
idministration
Creating new 
organizational form
o f public
organization
(executive agencies
and social
organizations)
Planning and 
Budgeting
Budgeting 
reform under the
command o f  DASP
Institutionalizing
planning,
programming and
budgeting at
constitutional
Creation o f the
Mational 
3udgeting and 
Treasury Offices
Auditing and 
Control
Setting up o f  the
Efficiency
Commission
Structuring the 
financialinspecting 
sections in all 
ministries
Converting the 
external control
(TCU) into an
ex-post activity
Procurement
Creating 
Procurement 
Department in 
DASP
Updating
procurement
There are three possible explanations for the broader scope of the reforms of 1937 and 1967: 
the quality and intensity of the effort, the Administration’s commitment (facilitated by the 
authoritarian circumstances), and the complexity of the reforms being planned at the time. 
Efforts made by Lopes and Dias not only had the President’s support, they were prompted by
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him. The President’s awareness regarding public management problems help explain the 
degree of liberty given to the reformers. While Vargas always saw himself as a beneficiary of 
the reform, Castelo Branco saw public interest as its main objective.
What is particularly surprising in 1937 and in 1967 is the fact that the occurrence of multiple 
simultaneous reforms is traditionally considered a problem (Elster, 1993).464 In 1936-1937 
and in 1967 the congested agenda helped the reformers, but this was not the case in 1988, 
possibly because of the authoritarian context of the other periods. The democratic context of 
1988 and 1998 as well as the more specific mandates of Alves and Bresser partially explain 
the scope of their initiatives, and surely both contributed to reducing the areas in which these 
two reforms occurred.
Four types of innovation processes465 deserve attention: creation, origination, adaptation, and 
borrowing (Roberts, 1992: 57). Creation marks the emergence of an innovative idea coupled 
with some need or problem. Origination occurs when a solution is formulated for the first 
time, without precedents. Adaptation implies modifying a solution reached in other contexts 
to the present context. Borrowing involves copying solutions to the problem from other 
contexts, with little change. All forms of innovations occurred, but in different ways in the 
four cases.466 However, as Roberts (1992, 57) warns “The newness or innovativeness of the 
idea is defined by the context in which the entrepreneur is embedded. (...) A new idea is 
innovative to the extent that individuals involved in the context perceive it to be ” In other
464 See Elster, J., 1993.
465 Kanter (2000: 170-171) provided an alternative list o f innovative tasks which include: “idea generation and 
activation of the drivers o f the innovation”, “coalition building and acquisition of the power necessary to move 
an idea into reality”, “idea realisation”, and “transfer or diffusion”. Although the latter go beyond to the scope 
of this analysis, a comment is nonetheless in order. First, although none of the four administrative reforms was 
necessarily innovative, it is interesting to map the source of their initial impetus, especially as derived from 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Second, no entrepreneur acts alone. Even if  he “orchestrates”, he needs a what 
Galbraith (1982) called a “sponsor”.
466 Adaptation and borrowing were already analysed in the discussion o f policy transfer processes.
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words, it is the context and the way people are embedded in this reality, perceived as the 
arrival of new proposals, that counts.
Lopes's ideas were particularly original even by the international standards of the time when 
they were generated. In the first case, the setting up of Efficiency Commissions and, 
especially, the establishment of DASP, captured international attention as the studies by 
Reinning and Siegel later confirmed. In the second case the push for delegation and 
decentralisation in the indirect administration -  an anticipation of the agencification 
processes that were carried out as of the 1980s in the international arena -  was eclipsed by 
the authoritarian regime although mapped within the context of other academic literature 
(Evans, Ross-Schneider, Barzelay, 1986). The Senior Corps -  if approved at that time -  
would also have been an original innovation. The Federal Civil Service Commission in 1937, 
the PPBS467 and Control policy outcomes in 1968, and the new organisational figures created 
in 1998 also constituted innovations, but in their respective contexts, given the international 
knowledge available about them.
7.9.2. Public management reforms as policy reversals
The zigzag patterning of the reforms regarding civil service and organisational design 
deserve special analysis. One plausible hypothesis to explain the original sequence can be 
found in Hood’s policy reversal framework. Hood (1994: 3-18) pointed out four distinct 
causal explanations for policy reversals: one internal (self-destruction) and three external
467 The significance of the introduction of PPBS reforms in the Brazilian political system should not be 
underestimated. Despite their technical appearance “they are complex social system transformations” (Caiden, 
1991:265).
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(change of mind, interests, and environments). “Reforms are self-referential” (Brunsson, 
1993: 42). In these two areas each policy outcome is explained as a reaction against the 
perceived consequences of the previous attempt to solve public management problems, and 
melts into the previous solution itself. A closer look was given to the problem of design, 
defined as the problem of “drawing causal linkages between a problem and its solutions so as 
to shape a policy outcome” (Roberts and King, 1996: 3). Table 7, below, provides a general 
view of the reversal configuration of the four episodes.
A useful starting point for analysing the recurrent attempts to solve civil service and design 
problems is dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction is a key activator in the search for policy 
solutions. A more detailed framework based on theories of attention and search in decision­
making processes was developed by March (1994), who centred his analysis on the problem 
of allocation of attention in a context where alternatives, consequences and preferences are 
imperfectly known. According to March (1994: 24) an “ecology of attention”469 must be 
incorporated into decision-making analyses because of problems related to time, attention, 
and information management (as well as overload), in order to deal with recurrent problems 
of intermittent attention-satisfying search rules. Satisfying rules establish conditions to 
activate search behaviour, timing, and limits. Dissatisfaction, however, is a negative motive 
for action because it does not provide positive guidance but only rejection of certain solutions
468 Brunsson (1993: 42) argues that reforms tend to generate further reforms because they tend to increase the 
supply of solutions, problems and forgetfulness. Despite the importance of the concepts this dissertation does 
not share this thesis. In fact, the analysis o f the four cases reveal that both problems and solutions are relatively 
rare over time, in spite of their apparent proliferation.
469 By ecology o f attention March (1994: 24) refers basically to questions related to “who attends to what, and 
when”.
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(Rose, 1993: 51). The searching process470 has a limited scope because, as a starting point, it 
does not go far beyond the rejection of the previous reform attempt.
470 Search parameters are the expectations derived from a comparison between performance and targets. When 
performance falls below the expected targets, search increases; when performance goes beyond expectation 
search decreases (March, 1994: 27). March’s search model is complemented by three premises: aspirations 
change over time, search is affected by success and failure, and search depends on the market of “supply o f ’ 
and “demand for” information.
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Table 7 -  Comparing public management policy reversals
Self-destruction
dynamics
The influence of 
ideas
Environmental
changes Agency and interests
1937
Collapse of the old 
Republic’s patronage 
system and 
fragmented state
American progressive 
public administration 
initiatives, Civil 
Service Reform and 
Classic Public 
Bureaucracy
N ationalization, 
Urbanization, 
Industrialization and 
increased complexity
New urban middle 
classes, military 
professionals and 
political personal 
projects
Strong entrepreneurial 
presence
1967
Collapse of the 
Populist State, 
obsolescence of 
federal bureaucracy 
and ossification of 
the DASP model
PPBS, American in 
the case of control, 
British in the case of 
delegation, and 
French and British in 
the case of the Senior 
Corps
Acceleration of the 
urbanization and 
industrialization 
processes, increase in 
complexity, move of 
the federal capital do 
Brasilia
Emergence of a 
military&business 
political alliance and 
o f military 
managerialism
Strong entrepreneurial 
presence
1988
Collapse of the big 
government model 
engineered by the 
military
Exarcebation of a
unaccountable
practices
Civil Service Reform 
Progressive Public 
Administration, 
French and 
Argentinean career 
model
Re-democratization
process,
hyperinflationary 
process, National 
Constituent Assembly 
process
Bureaucracy and 
politicians
corporativist alliance 
Public
entrepreneurship
1998
Paralysis of the 
federal administration 
due to juridical 
straitjackets
New ideas on Public 
Management, 
especially inspired on 
the British experience
Macro-economic 
stabilization, 
technological change
Strong entrepreneurial 
presence
7.9.3. Comparing self-destructive dynamics in the four cases
All four cases show elements that triggered off self-destructive dynamics. The seeds of 
failure could be seen in the solutions themselves (Wildavsky, 1980) as well as in the control
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dynamics (Dunsire, 1990) and spillover effects (Sieber, 1981) intrinsically contained in each 
policy outcome. The inertial accumulation of intended and unintended effects of each reform 
over time contributed to increased dissatisfaction and the search for alternative solutions. 
Self-destructive dynamics played an important role in problem definition discussions. The 
issue image is particularly sensitive to contrasts between the new policy proposal and the 
previous perception of the problem.
In the late 1920s the clientelist system was deeply entrenched in the political dynamics of the 
Old Republic. The political system was stagnated and blocked by decentralised institutional 
arrangements based on patronage. The setting up of a national State structure demanded the 
creation of a national civil service, a budgeting process, and a unified bureaucratic structure 
to become a counterforce to the previously existing arrangements. Between the 1940s and 
1960s the perverse effects of DASP’s over-centralisation and its political role in a dictatorial 
context rose to the surface. The reform attempts of 1952-53, 1956 (COSB and CEP A), and 
1963 were aimed at reviewing the rigid and centralised structure of the Brazilian State, but 
they failed to take off. Two of Dias's and Campos's main concerns were to release the 
indirect administration from overwhelming controls and to transfer powers from the 
Presidency to other strategic ministries,471 such as Planning and Coordination. The situation 
faced by the democratic government in 1985 was shocking. The Executive had progressively 
decided to govern through the indirect administration since the late 1960s, thanks to the 1967 
Constitution and Decree-law 200. The direct administration was bypassed on the grounds of 
the inadequacy of its control instruments, especially in the areas of personnel, procurement, 
and transparency. The escapist strategy (Marcelino, 1987) was intensively adopted by the 
Executive within the context of a non-democratically accountable military dictatorship. The
471 The proposal to set up a Ministry o f  Administration was presented to Costa e Silva and Beltrao but they 
opted for concentrating both functions in the same Ministry o f Planning and Coordination
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legal framework of the period was responsible for the emergence of collaborative and often 
collusive relationships between business and the State472 and for the (re-)configuration of the 
Brazilian developmental State in the 1960s and 1970s. The State apparatus bom from the 
1988 Constitution had become a “monument to old problems” (Schon, 1971). Bresser Pereira 
(MARE, 1995: 28) classified the provisions of the Constitution as an “unprecedented retreat” 
because they straitjacketed the state apparatus by extending the same rigid bureaucratic mles 
adopted in the direct administration to the public service agencies and SOEs. Rigidity 
regarding organisations and personnel was the key target of the managerial reform initiated 
in 1995.
7.9.4. Comparing the influence of ideas during the reform periods
New and revamped ideas also played important roles in explaining policy change in all four 
cases. Either as weapons or as “road maps”, ideas do not “occur” in an ideological vacuum 
(Sikkink, 1991). Previous ideas are embedded in organisations as well as in social norms. 
The power and politics of ideas were evidenced in the rhetoric, packaging, and persuasion 
strategies of the reforms (Hood and Jackson, 991). Both spinning and theoretical 
developments helped explain variety in the four cases. Changes in ideas are also rooted in 
patterns of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with belief structures and behavioural patterns 
(Berman, 2001: 234).
472 As Schneider and Maxfield (1997: 5) observe, "A relationship that enhances economic performance is 
probably not in equilibrium because it is subject to strong corruption temptations." In the absence o f gatekeeper 
meritocratic bureaucracy capable of working as an obstacle against corruption the frontiers between benign 
collaboration and collusion began to blur. Even the military who claimed this role as a justification for the coup 
d’etat in 1964 were affected because many o f them became a part of the technocracy in charge o f the State.
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The overwhelming influence of ideas from the U.S.A. in 1937 was made evident through 
different routes: the setting up of the CFSPC, the Budgeting Reform, and the appropriation of 
ideas from the Brownlow Report that led to the creation of DASP. The impetus towards 
centralisation that influenced the 1937 reform can also be traced to the rise of fascist regimes 
in the European inter-war period. Dias and Campos were subject to a great number of 
different influences -  although predominantly American -  that decisively affected the scope 
of the 1967 reform. They were also aware of how the private sector at that time was a fast 
learner of government policy innovations and intended to create the ideal conditions for cross 
fertilisation between private and public administration without neglecting the importance of 
modem control mechanisms. The Brazilian public sector debate in the late 1980s followed 
the “elite corps approach, patterned after France’s ENA model” (Oslak, 1994: 143), which 
was also tried in Mexico, Bolivia, and Argentina, with limited repercussion. The 1988 
Constitutional Reform was in fact a reaction against the perceived consequences of the 1967 
Reform. The Executive and Congress blamed the previous institute for the situation of the 
State in transition to democracy. They thus failed to differentiate between political and public 
management problems and attacked the former in detriment to the latter. The Washington 
Consensus473 -  on course in the 1980s but formulated as such in the transition to the 1990s -  
should also be taken into account in the events that preceded Cardoso’s rise to power. Bresser 
Pereira’s first meeting with David Osborne and his further contact with protagonists of the 
Next Steps Agencies process in the UK put him on the new public management track. His 
further contact with Croizier -  a severe critic of French bureaucracy pathologies -  convinced 
him that his proposal should catch up with the trend towards convergence.
473 Williamson (1990: 8-17) formulated this expression to designate a set o f  ten market-friendly reforms that 
Latin-American countries should carry out in order to stabilize their economies: fiscal discipline, elimination of 
subsidies, tax reform and higher taxes, realistic interest rates, realistic exchange rates, trade liberalisation, 
stimulation o f international investments, privatisation o f state utilities companies and protection o f property 
rights.
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7.9.5. Comparing the weight of habitat changes in bringing about policy 
reversals
Environmental changes are contextual explanations that relate public policy change to 
transformations in the social, economic, political, and technological habitat (Hood, 1994: 12- 
13). Policy changes are to a certain extent context-driven. Public management reforms are 
not single issues, nor can they be easily isolated.
“The essential feature, then, of administrative reform is the relationship of 
administrative changes to characteristics or pressures from the broader social and 
political environment ” (Greenway and Chapman, 1980: 183).
Given the number and intensity of the changes that took place in Brazil, it was reasonable to 
expect that variations in government structures might to some extent be explained by 
variations in broader areas, such as society itself, the economy, technology, and culture. Such 
structural transformations are affected by environmental and contextual changes that 
undoubtedly influence the nature of policy change.
In the 1930s Brazil was a rural country with a weak central government, ruled by an alliance 
of fragmented provinces in their early stages of urbanisation and industrialisation. The 
military were important political actors and the appeal of authoritarian solutions was both 
strong and popular. The influences of the 1960s were similar, but more intense -  especially 
the urbanisation and industrialisation processes. The political turbulence was exacerbated by 
the democratic government’s incapacity to deal with the country’s challenges and by the 
political polarisation typical of the apex of the Cold War in Latin America. There was a
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juncture of political re-democratisation and a worsening economic crisis during the second 
half of the 1980s that created a very turbulent governmental environment. The period was 
also characterised by the nuances of the transition marked by the death of the pivotal 
provisional President Tancredo Neves. After the Real Plan, inflation returned to manageable 
levels. Brazil became a different country, where it was again possible to calculate economic 
realities and carry out more realistic planning. The development of information technologies 
-  unthinkable in the past -  also enabled new policy solutions for old problems.
7.9.6. Comparing the roles of agency in the four episodes
The clash of interests inside and outside the public management policy domain was 
inevitably present in all policy junctures discussed here. Class-conflicts, rent-seeking 
practices, coalition-building elements, and national and international political dynamics all 
played important intervening roles in the cases in question. Policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 
1984; Roberts and King, 1996) constituted another source of dynamism. Their presence is 
often used to explain policy reversals but they are examined separately here, due to the 
central role attributed to Kingdon’s model.
The model presented by Skowronek (1982: 10) seems particularly pertinent to the reforms of 
1937 and 1967 because it combines the impact of crises (political and economic), class 
conflict and increasing complexity (development of the country’s production capacity and 
the scale of its national problems). This scheme is therefore useful in explaining the erosion 
of the dominant public sector organisational system. Later, the legal framework generated by 
1967 reform was responsible for allowing collaborative and even collusive relationships
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between business and the State to emerge. Thus, it was regarded as responsible for (re­
configuring the Brazilian developmental State in the 1960s and 1970s. As Schneider and 
Maxfield (1997: 5) observed, "a relationship that enhances economic performance is 
probably not in equilibrium because it is subject to strong corruption temptations”. More 
recently, institutional analyses by Geddes (1994) and Haggard (1995, 1997) have highlighted 
neglected political dimensions of state reform studies. Geddes (1994) relied on the nexus 
between bureaucrats and the party system to argue that the absence of political competition 
favours the prevalence of clientelism. The disappointing performance of the merit-based 
reforms between 1946-1964 and 1985-1995 raises doubts as to this premise. In the 1980s the 
political economy of inflation produced a de facto situation of “institutional precariousness” 
that failed to guarantee any continuous attention to policy problems that transcended “short- 
termism”, which was the major reason for “Operation Dismantle” of 1989 and the disastrous 
downsizing attempt in 1990. Agency explanations for the 1998 case were based mostly on 
the alignment of the reform proposals with macro-economic priorities.
7.10. Conclusion
The framework for policy reversals helped characterize the zigzag pattern of changes in 
organisational design and civil service reform. The framework supports the understanding of 
what sorts of reversals took place and how they occurred. But the clues provided by the 
framework still seem too faint to explain why the reaction took the form it did. This theme 
will be taken up in the conclusion.
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Nascimento (1966: 446) made a comment almost forty years ago that is still remarkably 
pertinent today.
“The Brazilian bureaucracy has developed a great deal of rigidity. These ossified 
areas need to become more flexible, more adaptive, and less bureaucratised. In 
other respects, however, the problem is the opposite: there is a need for 
bureaucratisation ”,
None of the reforms was able to distinguish one group of sectors from another. They all 
failed to provide legal frameworks capable of dealing adequately with different sectors, and 
none offered a offer coordinated and consistent basis. Dias and Bresser Pereira were pursuing 
this aim but neither actually attained it.
The analysis of the four cases shows that the efforts to create support for progressive 
reformist policies in the issue of bureaucratic autonomy and for managerial types of 
arrangements were also limited by events beyond the control of the actors. The public 
philosophies (Hood and Jackson, 1991) and the programmatic ideas (Weir, 1992) that should 
have influenced and guided policies, did not take root. This problem occurred with 
“progressive public administration” and “managerialism”. In both cases these ideas should 
have been linked to dominant cultural values and tied to administrative means. Weir (1992: 
207) warned that if public philosophies and programmatic ideas become disjointed, a 
widening gap appears between them, and if they are not crystallised in the institutional 
structures they tend to be dropped into.
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Chapter eight 
CONCLUSION
8.1. Introduction
This thesis has explained public management policy change in modem Brazil in four case 
studies between the years 1930-1998. In this period there were eight reform initiatives. Those 
retained for study were the ones that went beyond the decisional process and were translated 
into constitutional provisions. These were the cases of 1937, 1967, 1988, and 1998 which 
resulted in constitutional reforms that reshaped Brazilian public administration.
The first aim of the thesis was to gain a better historical understanding of the cases in terms 
relevant to public management. To this end a conceptualization was adopted which makes it 
possible to explain the issue career of reform through the process of agenda setting, 
alternative specification, and choice a conceptualization derived from Kingdon’s (1995) 
framework.
The main research questions were: why did the reform occur? what was the issue career up to 
the decisional agenda? what was the role of public entrepreneurs in making them feasible? 
and what variation was there between the policy proposals? All four reforms were responses 
to previous impasses regarding public management policies required to support political- 
economic challenges. Sclerosis and entropy of pre-existent administrative structures took 
place in all four pre-existent situations. Public entrepreneurs were fundamental catalysts of 
policy change if all four episodes, involved in different sort of initiatives -  policy 
formulation, advocacy, political negotiation, decision-making, and others -  in order to push 
their proposals until the decisional stages. The issue career up to a final decision was
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turbulent until the approval of constitutional amendments that enacted new legal frameworks 
regarding public management policies. A variety of policy solutions was observed in all four 
cases, especially with respect to sub public management policies such as those related to civil 
service reform and organizational design.
A secondary group of research questions -  related to the content rather than the process of 
reform -  included the occurrence of policy transference, the path and the frequency of the 
reforms. Policy dialogue with other countries took place in 1934-1937 (USA), 1964-1967 
(USA, UK, and France), 1985-1990 (France), and 1995-1998 (UK). The reforms presented 
an irregular pace in all four cases -  marked by a strong start, a loss of momentum, a 
resumption of the scaling up process, late decisions, and a final outcome. The frequency of 
the reforms that achieved the stage of constitutional change is rising, not to mention the 
occurrence of other attempts of reforms that did not go beyond the initial stages of policy 
change.
The investigation does not evaluate reforms’ outcomes -  how successful they were. In order 
to answer this sort of question a deeper historical understanding of the four episodes -  as 
investigated and explained in this thesis -  is a pre-requisite. Also, another theoretical 
approach would be required as well as another research design.
The thesis aimed to make contributions to the research field regarding three dimensions: 
theoretical, investigative, and prescriptive. To the theoretical end the contributions and 
shortcomings of the multiple streams model were analyzed in light of the results of the thesis 
investigation.
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The investigation revealed the suitability of Kindgon’s framework to explain the processes of 
public management policy change in four episodes. Five points were made regarding 
Kingdon’s framework. First, the issue trajectory did not begin in the systemic agenda. 
Second, the windows of opportunity remained opened for long periods. Third, decisions are 
not taken at one point in time but through a process of continuous attempts, reformulations 
and validations. Fourth, the framework is adequate to analyze complex policies such as 
public management as well as to sectoral policies. Fifth, Kingdon’s processual approach is 
contextual but not sufficiently historical to explain in depth the origins of some problems and 
their correspondent issue-images.
The use of a processual approach combined with analytic narrative as a research strategy is 
evaluated. With the benefit of the research done a potential agenda for future research is 
examined. Finally, some tentative comments of prescriptive nature are added later.
Three other contributions were: the historical understanding of the four cases, the 
methodological approach adopted and the role of individual entrepreneurs in policy change. 
The story of the reforms was relatively unknown given the circumstances in which they took 
place, with the exception of the last one. Authoritarian regimes did not favor balanced 
approaches to public management reforms and the third reform took place within an agenda 
congestion period because of the Constitutional Assembly. Analytic narratives were 
particularly useful in order to provide explanations of what happened via modeled narratives. 
Public entrepreneurs were essential in many ways, especially in a context marked by the 
absence of institutions such as political parties, civil service, and academic policy 
communities.
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It will be argued that a research agenda might fork out into a delta at that point in three 
different directions: policy processes, theoretical issues, and thematic or problem-driven 
topics. Regarding policy process the challenge is the investigation of the other reforms and 
implementation processes of public management reforms. With respect to theoretical 
frameworks the challenge is to use other models to improve this line of investigation in order 
to answer related research questions regarding policy outcomes. A plausible alternative 
would be to test other frameworks such as historical institutionalism and punctuated 
equilibrium. A consequence of examining Brazil is that the following themes might be 
pursued: employment relationships in the public sector, state capacities, and organizational 
hybridism.
Finally, there are some final remarks by the author regarding the unit of analysis adopted: the 
processes of public management policy reforms in the Brazilian context. The observations 
express lessons drawn from the investigation process and from the main findings, highlighted 
throughout the thesis. Policy entrepreneurs revealed to be decisive in the four cases. National 
state building processes in infant nations are not trivial tasks given the centrifuge forces that 
operate within political systems characterized by clientelism and patrimonialism. Policy 
change took place according to patterns shaped by the convergence of the problem, policy 
and political streams catalyzed by public entrepreneurs. The fragility of the policy 
community, the weakness of a national merit based civil service, and the absence of a 
national political discussion marked the episodes. The need of a broader cumulative 
perspective -  in historical institutional terms -  may complement gaps and shortcomings of 
the approach adopted.
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The chapter is organized in five parts, including this introduction. The second section revisits 
the research questions that provided guidance to the thesis. The third part explores the 
contributions of the thesis and its implications. The fourth section focuses on a potential 
research agenda which emerges as a result of the thesis. The last part closes the investigation 
with some personal comments by the author.
8.2. Reviewing the research questions
This thesis has been able to address the main research question - why did reform occur -  via 
the utilization of historical narratives. This systematized the evidence. The description and 
analysis of all cases explained what happened, how the reforms occurred, and why they 
occurred as ‘case* processes. The issue-career has been clearly identified by untangling the 
linkages between the political context, the agenda setting and the policy specification 
processes, using the processual theoretical model. It shows that entrepreneurs played an 
essential role in catalyzing and synchronizing the reform in four cases, although only 
partially in 1988, as it was evidenced in the previous chapter.
The question regarding the variation of the policy proposals was answered by incorporating 
other contributions to the analysis, notably Hood’s (1994) policy reversal framework and 
Rose’s (1993) lesson-drawing and policy transference categories. But a proper answer to the 
question about variation proved difficult because it was not possible to stretch the theoretical 
framework or the methodological design of policy cycles to this purpose. For example, 
although the reversal framework linked the contiguous reforms - “the old public policy 
dictum that today’s solutions are merely tomorrow’s problem” (Wright, 1997: 12), it could
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not connect more than two cases on a longitudinal basis. The issue of comparison of 
disconnected policy outcomes and their variation is discussed bellow.
Comparisons with other country contexts could be made through the processual approach. 
But since the Kingdon framework does not focus on the nature of public management 
reform policies, these comparisons were limited. The major objectives of the thesis were not 
related to policy content, which means that the analysis of deeper causes -  and consequences 
- of the reforms were not explored using a policy oriented approach but a process oriented 
one.
Questions related to frequency and the path of the reforms could be not properly answered 
either since the thesis did not address the issue of cumulativeness. This would demand a 
long-term perspective with respect to public management reforms. There were intervals of 
thirty, twenty, and ten years between the cases. There is a sense of acceleration regarding the 
reforms but what it means is another subject. The accelerated pace of reform attempts 
derived from reasons that go beyond the scope of the thesis. One might argue that the 
frequency -  which should take into account other five major reform attempts - is associated 
with a perception of general dissatisfaction with state performance. But they cannot be 
characterized as routines (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993) despite their recurrence. I conclude that 
Hood’s framework was helpful in understanding a policy reversal in contrast with the 
direction of the previous reform but in no way this model can be stretched in order to make it 
fit a chain of policy reversals over a long period of time.
The underlying issue related to the questions of cumulativeness is institutional layering 
(Orren and Skowroneck, 2000: 20). New institutional arrangements did not replace pre­
existent ones. They were juxtaposed to the old ones as the continuous incorporation of public
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functionaries in the civil service and the creation of new forms of public sector organizations 
-  without suppressing the previous -  took place. The Brazilian case showed how a country 
can operate with organizational structures of different historical periods, each one within the 
context of distinct legal frameworks. The intriguing question is how the legal system 
provided conditions for the coexistence of different public institutions that belonged to 
distinct policy cycles. Because the content and the direction of the public management 
reforms were not the major focus of the thesis the aforementioned shortcomings are 
understandable. But they need to be registered and explored.
It might be asked how successful the four reforms were, why they failed, to what extent they 
achieved success and so on474. But that would be to misunderstand the aim of the thesis. The 
research questions did not include any sort of demand for evaluation of the four reforms in 
quest475. The investigation framework that was adopted did not deliberately encompass this 
analysis. Per consequence comparisons between to what extent they failed or succeeded are 
not feasible, within the limits of this thesis Moreover, if these were the objectives of the 
investigation they needed to be pursued through different models, notably those that favor the 
analysis of implementation processes and evaluation techniques.
474 Evidence-based policies attribute an increasing role to the evaluation o f reformist efforts. The need for 
deeper analysis o f the lessons drawn from the implementation o f Brazilian public management reforms is self- 
explanatory. The frequency o f recurrent elements in the four reforms is impressive. It suggests not only 
difficulties in policy learning processes but also lack o f systematic evaluations o f previous reform processes. 
The evaluation dimension of the policy making process has been object of IPEA’s attention since the 1960s but 
public management reforms do not belong to their research agenda.. For a more detailed analysis o f the 
discussion of the attempts to institutionalize the evaluation dimension in the policy process with a special 
concern with public management reforms see Brans and Vancoppenolle (2005: 175-179).
475 Evaluations require a detailed discussion regarding by which criteria success and failure are attributed to the 
policy process in quest. It is not a matter of personal or political judgment but a methodological formal 
requirement. Definitions o f success or failure depend on assumptions about what is “unexpected or foreseeable, 
and uncontrollable or controllable” (Bovens and Hart, 1996: 74-84). The implementation literature is 
particularly thin with respect to these definitions (John, 200X). The effort would demand an exercise of  
classification that goes beyond the limits of the current investigation, not to mention the utilization o f different 
theoretical lenses.
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The fact is that the present text paves the way for complementary analysis. It would be 
unthinkable or at least reckless, for instance, to pretend to evaluate Brazilian public 
management reforms -  eventually in comparative terms -  without producing robust evidence 
about the agenda setting, policy specification, and decision making processes involved in 
their implementation. Straightforward attempts to produce implementation analysis are -  to a 
certain extent - conditioned by the availability of previous research regarding antecedent 
phases of the policy-making process The more they are available the easier to focus on 
implementation and evaluation analysis. The study of the four cases enables further 
investigation of implementation and evaluation aspects of the reforms.
We may therefore infer that many evaluative elements of the reforms are already contained in 
the way the cases were narrated and modeled. It is also evident that some of the ingredients 
of the success and failure of some reforms were already anticipated in the “stages” analyzed. 
It is tempting to suggest that the design of some proposals were self-defeating while others 
did not succeed because of implementation problems. But this would be superficial and 
innocuous. The existence of such evidence did not support evaluative analysis of the reforms 
-  either isolated or in comparative terms. The research questions would differ as well as the 
required theoretical framework.
83. Checking possible contributions
8.3.1 Theoretical contributions
The main theoretical contributions of the thesis refer to the uses of Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework. As the analysis of the cases revealed, the theoretical approach performed
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well regarding its quality parameters: explaining the process of public management policy 
change. But the thesis also evidenced some shortcomings of the model when applied to 
objects of the analysis like Brazilian public management constitutional reforms.
First, in all four cases the agenda setting process did not begin in the systemic agenda476, 
followed by a move to the governmental agenda as suggested in the original formulation of 
both concepts (Cobb and Elder, 1992). The agenda setting process was initiated in the 
government by high level political appointees in close contact with the Presidents, through a 
variety of processes -  a plausible path that Kingdon had emphasized in the revised version of 
his book (Kingdon, 1995: 230). Governmental responsiveness did not explain the agenda- 
setting processes. Governmental actors -  not governmental structures -  were the agenda 
setters in the four cases. The thesis described (and explained) the specific conditions by 
which the policy-making processes -  typically from the top - occurred.
Second, the windows of opportunity had a surprisingly long duration. Contrary to Kingdon's 
analyzes, in only one of the cases the issue acquired a sense of urgency. It was at the end of 
1990 when the NCA approved the unique juridical regime, when the Congress bypassed all 
legislative stages in order to ensure the voting of the law. Furthermore the analysis of all four 
cases demonstrated clearly that the window remained open for a long period, measurable in 
years. It appears that the presidential mandates were equivalent to the duration of the 
window. The observation did not invalidate Kingdon’s framework, on the contrary. It 
suggested that it can be used in more expanded contexts of policy change. This suggests the 
importance of the political window represented by a President’s mandate, as opposed to a 
policy window within the competitive decision making process.
476 One might argue that there was a proposal in Congress in 1964 but the issue had disappeared from the 
political scene given the political polarization that culminated in coup d ’etat that enabled the ascendance of the 
military.
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Third, there was no such a thing as a ‘single overridingly important decision’ within the 
decision making process. In the cases considered here decisions did not occur at a single 
moment in time. Choices were continuously made, remade, adjusted, and renewed or not 
(Jones, 1994). A decision never took place at a single moment in any of the cases. Not even 
the decisions translated into constitutional provisions enabled the automatic start of the 
implementation process. Transitional measures, subsequent ordinary legislation, and 
controversial interpretations followed constitutional changes. As such, they contributed to 
shape an environment marked by continuous modifications regarding issues like employment 
relationships in the public sector and organizational forms of public sector institutions.
Fourth, the original empirical work of Kingdon was centered on transport and health policies- 
two discrete sectoral policies with well defined borders, strong policy communities, and 
incontestable technical components. This is not the case of public management policies: 
systemic, borderless, implicit, without a natural locus, and without a structured policy 
community in the Brazilian context. Public management policies are viewed as composites in 
the four cases. They were usually presented as packages because they were part of broader 
public management reform efforts. The application of Kingdon’s framework in a policy 
package revealed to be considerably more complex than single sectors’ policies. Kingdon 
claimed that his model also worked in more complicated policy change cases as those he 
mentioned in his additional chapter of the more recent version of his book, the budgetary 
process of Reagan’s first year in office and Clinton’s health care reform attempt -  not 
surprisingly both episodes took place in the beginning of both presidencies (Kingdon, 1995). 
The thesis suggested that the formulation may indeed explain public management policy 
change even in the case of public management policies. But the fact that the content 
encompasses more than one sub-policy -  usually intertwined with others like civil service
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policies and organizational modeling -  generates some sort of “diffraction” in the 
explanation effectiveness -  the 1988 case is a good example. Different sub-policies evolved 
in the distinct way in the four episodes although they fit in the streams’ structure, despite 
their discrepancies in terms of sophistication, consistency, pertinence and adherence.
Fifth, even if it looks like a paradoxical critique for a processual approach, Weir’s objection 
to the a-historical character of the multiple streams seems pertinent477, especially if a long­
term view is taken. Understanding of the context was not necessarily sufficiently historical in 
certain circumstances, as in the cases analyzed. The problem definition processes were 
embedded in their contexts but they frequently presented shortcomings -  notably in 1988 and 
1998 - because they were not grounded in a broad enough comprehension of the historical 
processes of the problems they aimed to specify. Contexts are time-bound in ways that 
frequently disguise the roots and origins of problems that current actors and institutions are 
dealing with. It was not a coincidence that the reforms coincided with the time of presidential 
mandates, a clue for further analysis.
In reviewing the possible contributions of the thesis we can conclude that there are strengths 
and limits to Kindgon’s framework. The first and second caveats -  the origin of the issue 
career and the duration of the window of opportunity - did not invalidate the application of 
the model. They in fact enrich the possibility of its application in processes with a broader 
duration. The third one -  decisions are processes, not instants - is a more serious critique 
because it restrains the possibilities of the application of the framework. The fourth caveat -  
sectoral policies versus composite of policies -  reveals a new potential of the framework.
477 Weir criticizes Kingdom’s formulation to explain policy change on the grounds of its a-historical character. 
She suggests that these streams have a previous story and can have been linked over time, as in the cases o f  
earlier policies, structured balances of power, and problems, perceptions. Patterns of bounded innovation favour 
some ideas at expense o f others in a pre-existent reality. Bendor et alii (2002) pursued a similar argument also 
but from a different angle.
399
The fifth caveat points out the adequacy of Kingdon's framework to address processes of 
public management policy change within the context of limited time boundaries, but not in 
long term historical terms.
8.3.2 The contributions to the investigative field
The historical understanding of the four cases is an original investigative contribution of the 
thesis. Only the last case (1998) had been object of a more systematic theoretical treatment 
(Rezende, 2001; and Melo, 2002). The 1937 case was extensively described and quoted but 
usually through the lenses of protagonists. The exceptions are the works by Nascimento 
(1966) and Siegel (1966), who scrutinized DASP’s reforms with distanced analytical tools. 
The 1967 reform was eclipsed by the ascendance of more appealing issues in the political 
science research agenda related to authoritarian regime and its economic development model. 
The analysis here provides some unheard-of ingredients of the reform that enable improved 
understanding of the reform process. The 1988 case has not been the object of systematic 
research yet, as well as the National Constituency Process. The re-democratization years 
remain one of the least studied periods in Brazilian politics despite its significance, maybe 
because it is still too recent. The analysis provided a plausible account of the public 
management reform process in the period of intense turbulence that marked the transition to 
democracy.
A second contribution of the thesis is its methodological approach regarding the reform 
processes. The organization of the analytic narratives around nested events that belonged to a 
single process is an example of the development of a tool within the context of a broader
research program that has enabled the investigation and comparison of public management 
policy processes in different countries in different moments in time. The methodological 
developments of the narrative and processual analytical tools applied in this thesis are part of 
an ongoing process of methodological research exemplified by the works of Barzelay et al. 
(2002), Barzelay (2003), Cortazar (2004), Corbett (2005), Barzelay and Gallego (2006), 
Barzelay and Calderon (2004), and Malee (2004). Some of these comparisons have been 
reported in a symposium issue of the International Public Management Journal478. The choice 
of an analytic framework that has been used by scholars from different research 
institutionalist traditions suggests that the ground for methodological dialogue continues to 
be established (Mahoney, 2003) in a promising way.
A further contribution of the thesis arising from the Brazilian experience is the analysis of 
the importance of entrepreneurs in developing countries in which the public sector is not 
constituted by strong institutions providing scope for the hypothesis that a context 
characterized by weak institutions is prone to the emergence of strong public entrepreneurs. 
“Institutions matter” provided they are there!479 Institutions are supposed to “serve as chief- 
interface between state and society” (Painter, 2005: 9). In their absence or in contexts where 
they are not consolidated the policy making processes may be particularly susceptible to 
other sorts of influences).
478 The symposium articles were Barzelay (2003), Gallego (2003), Cejudo (2003), Gaetani (2003), Malee 
(2003) and Moynihan (2003).
479 The observation echoes Bendor et al (2002) critique o f  garbage can frameworks. Their point is the absence 
of institutions in the process. As we argued in chapter two institutions can be accommodated in the analysis 
according to March and Olsen and Kingdon analysis. In the Brazilian cases, they were either not there because 
they were submitted to ascendant political power -  like in 1937 and in 1967 -  or they performed a limited as 
Congress and Courts -  in 1988 and 1998.
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The role attributed to entrepreneur480s by Kindgon is one of the distinctive features of his 
model in contrast of the original garbage can formulation. Kingdon pictured them as “surfers 
waiting for the big wave” but subordinates their contributions in the streams’ processes to 
events and structures out of individuals’ control -  and the evidences of his work supported 
these statements (Kingdon, 1995: 224-225). But their performance in the four Brazilian cases 
went beyond Kingdon’s formulation. It is virtually impossible to explain the occurrence of at 
least three of the four episodes without resorting to the role played by Simoes Lopes, 
Teixeira Dias, and Bresser Pereira.
However, concentration on individuals’ performance is dangerously idiosyncratic if the 
argument takes place at the expense of structured patterns and events -  which is not the case, 
given the methodology adopted. One plausible explanation to the emphasis attributed to their 
disproportional role is the weakness of Brazilian institutional structures like the civil service, 
the political parties, and the checks and balances between the three branches. In the absence 
of institutional capital, entrepreneurs have to multiply their efforts through the three streams 
in distinctive fronts but simultaneously. In Brazil they exercised a degree of control of the 
events in a way that Kingdon’s formulation did not encompass. On the one hand the thesis 
implies that Kingdon’s framework may be expanded in order to accommodate a more 
prominent role for entrepreneurs. On the other hand the investigation suggests that the 
excessive importance of these individuals may be explained because countries such as Brazil 
are deprived from institutions capable of watering down the importance of individuals in the 
policy-making process. In sum, entrepreneurs accumulate individual and institutional roles 
because of the country’s institutional deficits.
480 Peters (1999, 56-61) pointed out that ‘constitutional entrepreneurs’ can be decisive in processes of 
institutional building although the focus of his analysis was not the policy change process.
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8.3.3 The challenge of a normative perspective
This thesis has sought to avoid the self-defeating normative approaches to public 
management reforms based on a literature that focuses the analysis on patronage elements of 
Brazilian political culture. On the grounds that most of this literature cannot depict some 
important attempts to overcome and circumvent the problem. Most of the literature based on 
cultural theory (Martins, 1985), and derived from historiography (Carvalho, 2000), old 
institutionalism (Santos, 1997a, 2000), and new institutionalist (Santos, 1997b) approaches 
have focused on the persistence of clientelism and patronage in Brazilian administrative 
practices that they missed some important attempts to overcome and circumvent the problem. 
These approaches were conducive to fatalist perspectives regarding public management 
reforms, sometimes at the expense of potentially rich policy dialogue within the contexts of 
windows of opportunity.
Nunes (1987, 105) emphasized that the original characteristic of Brazilian “bureaucracy is 
not the pervasiveness o f clientelism, but the effectiveness o f attempts to insulate481 a few  
techno-bureaucratic agencies in the economy from clientelism.” The so-called “pockets of
A Q J
efficiency” are still around in the Brazilian administrative landscape but their presence no
481 By insulation he did not mean out of political pressure achievement but the capability of maintaining a 
certain level o f organisation integrity and policy delivery capacities. Insulation meant an enabling condition for 
mobilising resources in response to top executive command. These insulated organizations and SOEs who 
acquired reputation as policy and economic performers were piloted by appointed officials politically 
connected. Some o f them became known as “pockets o f  efficiency” or “islands o f excellence”. One o f the most 
revealing characteristics of these institutions was that “their economic success tended to legitimate the notion 
that government actors need not, and perhaps even should not, he publicly accountable” (Nunes, 1987: 105), a 
perception still frequent in enclaves of Brazilian techno-bureaucracy.
482 Nevertheless, the pocket strategy was condemned to fail in the long term because these clusters -  
characterized by meritocratic proxies o f the Weberian ideal type - were surrounded by a “sea o f  traditional 
clientelistic norms” (Evans, 1992: 167) and were extremely dependent on continuous support o f the top 
executive protection from politics pressures.
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longer has the same meaning as in the past, just as their reputation has changed. However, 
they populate the imagination of the general public in a confusing -  perhaps even misguided 
-  nostalgia, in which blurred memories of DASP and the authoritarian regime merge. The 
linkages of the so-called pockets or islands of efficiency with the political establishment were 
not publicly visible and they were characterized by opaque appointment mechanisms.
At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the distinctions between insulated 
respectable competent bureaucracies and clientelistic agencies blurred. The privatisation of 
public resources in order to generate political support affected them all. Given the common 
formal and institutional features -  basically private personnel and accountancy legislation 
and absence of accountability mechanisms - shared by almost all public sector the 
differentiation became a matter of reputation. Hybridism affected the direct as well as the 
indirect administration.
The investigation also attempted to avoid jumping at the rhetoric appeals of siren-calls 
represented by convergence myths (OECD, 2003), modernity claims (MARE, 1995), and 
economists’ reductive views of public management reforms. The cases evidenced the 
perverse effects that unfold the sponsoring of these perspectives. Despite their dominance in 
the Brazilian policy debate in the last decade their capacity to persuade did not overcome 
reality tests, a promising outcome for the policy community engaged in academic research 
and for the practitioners driven by problem-solving motivations.
Typical questions potentially raised by political scientists concerning this thesis would be: 
What difference did it make? What is this investigation good for? A prudent answer should 
downplay the expectations of this sort of investigation regarding normative and prescriptive 
aspirations. There are no prescriptive claims deriving straightforward from this investigation.
Kingdon’s model as well as garbage can models for explaining policy change are not really 
supposed to be prescriptive. The literature in the field is already overloaded with advice and 
warnings related to public management reforms (Caiden, 1982). But there are implicit 
prescriptions in the way the thesis unfolded that are worth recapping. They refer to the role of 
individuals, to the importance of politics, to the importance of memory, the problem of 
critical mass, the meaning of ambiguity, and the potential for comparisons.
Public management reforms did not happen without the engagement of entrepreneurs to 
make them feasible. But the overwhelming problems and complexities faced by them suggest 
that the reforms demand more political capital than policy entrepreneurs might mobilize. 
Public management reforms can be fought on a politicized or a more technical basis but the 
choices embodied in this dilemma should be carefully considered.
The case for public management reform is to be built within Brazilian society but the 
political appeal of the theme has never been so low, despite the persistence of the problems 
that demand old and new policy solutions. Back to Heclo’s (1974) observation quoted in the 
first chapter regarding policy-making as a society’s puzzling choice, public management 
reforms demand clarity and consistency if they are to enable understanding of their effective 
trade-offs. “Public administration merely reflects the many contradictions and dilemmas 
which are inevitable by the interactions o f market, state, and society.” (Wright, 1997: 12). 
No reforms will be sustainable without a political support capable of transcending the 
impetus provided by their champions. Paradoxically, the importance of public entrepreneurs 
in the four cases was an evidence of the problematic sustainability of the reform proposals.
The reforms’ saga suggested that Brazil has not come to terms yet with the issue. 
Unfortunately the country’s memory is short and selective and the issues that society’s
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imagination retains are not necessarily enabling of bold initiatives. What people remember 
did not necessarily happen -  like DASP’s merit based epic trajectory. What people like did 
not necessarily function -  like Beltrao de-bureaucratization campaigns in 1967 and 1979. 
What people reject was not necessarily senseless -  like Bresser Pereira’s attempt to engage in 
a substantive policy dialogue with the academic community. At least a good part of the 
explanation lies in the absence of a robust policy community and in the lack of critical mass 
(Gaetani, 2000).
The literature on the Brazilian reforms is extremely poor in contrast with the importance of 
the theme. Without reference to the past the discussion about the future becomes harder. That 
is perhaps one of the reasons why ambiguity showed up recurrently in the proposals for the 
reforms. Ambiguity was usually pointed out as a problem, as a flaw in the policy proposals. 
But ambiguity was actively sought in most of the cases as a tactical move to enable the 
advance of policy change. On establishing ambiguities, entrepreneurs introduced their ideas 
and expanded the scope of policy spillovers and unfoldments. Finally, in the context of a 
comparative boom regarding public management reforms (Peters 2001, Kickert, 1997) there 
is an increasing need to incorporate country cases that provide variation in the pool of cases. 
The incorporation of the Brazilian cases can help other countries’ experts to understand their 
cases and -  especially -  to help Brazilians develop a better understanding of their own cases.
The prescriptive bias of the thesis lies in the way it treated all the aforementioned elements. 
Experience is the rear-view mirror which provides guidance to decision-making processes. 
First, the importance attributed to individual entrepreneurs implicitly presumes that they will 
strike again in the future, especially if the institutional building process of the country did not 
present significant changes. The more they know about their predecessors the better. Second,
406
democratic consolidation suggests that public management reforms will have to be dealt with 
through democratic rules, no matter if in high profile terms -  like Bresser Pereira tried -  or in 
low profile ways -  like Marcelino and Santiago attempted to . Thus, public management 
reforms will not take place out of the political arena. Third, this thesis aimed to make a 
contribution to the memory of the selected public management reforms. Traditionally the 
story has been told by the reform champions (like Dias, Beltrao, Marcelino, and Bresser 
Pereira) or by their collaborators (like Wahrlich in 1937). These accounts are worthy but they 
are not enough to enable a balanced understanding of the complexities and shortcomings of 
the reforms. Fourth, by the same token the thesis intended to be incorporated to the atrophied 
critical mass available regarding the topic. Fifth, perhaps a closer look at ambiguity issues 
may improve the understanding of its shortcomings and potentialities. Finally, regarding the 
international literature, the thesis provided an overall vision of Brazil’s most important public 
management reforms in order to enable comparisons.
8.4. Suggestions for a research agenda
8.4.1 More cases and more stages.
There were other reforms -  the cases not selected -  that deserve special analysis for different 
reasons. In 1952, 1956, and 1963 the reforms were championed by Lopes and his close 
collaborators in an attempt to improve and reform his own project. The De-Bureaucratization
483 Heredia and Gaetani (2002) revealed for instance how a low profile entrepreneur was capable of resuming 
some significant parts o f Bresser Pereira legacy -  resumption o f public selections, control o f the pay-roll, and 
statistics - in order to organize a consistent human resources policy at the end o f Cardoso’s second mandate.
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Crusade championed by Beltrao between 1979 and 1982 was an intriguing case of a public 
management reform becoming part of a positive agenda and a popular mass phenomenon. 
The literature about them is even less developed than with respect to the cases in question. 
Historical understanding about them is required. In all excluded cases there are lessons to be 
drawn from and puzzles to be explored.
Analyzing the period between 1937 and 1964, Nascimento (1966: 420) made criticisms 
which are still valid, to the predominantly instrumental perspective of the reform attempts, 
not included in this investigation. The strategy’s ideology required executive behaviour to be 
functional and position-oriented. The strategy’s content was characterized by a holistic, 
prescriptive, and cognitive approach -  instead of a gradualist, suggestive and value oriented 
one. The strategy’s behaviour was marked by formal concerns instead of focusing on 
informal elements. The experience of the Ministry of De-Bureaucratization was an answer to 
this sort of critique. Nascimento (1978: 413) questioned if the strategy upon which the 
reforms were based had been adequate to the needs and possibilities of the Brazilian federal 
bureaucracy. The problem with holistic or comprehensive approaches to reforms like the one 
in 1998 lies in the potential empowerment of additional resistances (Nascimento, 1966: 11). 
But piecemeal approaches also got involved in engendering obstructions along their 
processes like in 1988. The question of pre-requirements to change484 has been much 
explored in development economics, particularly in regard to the issue of balanced versus 
unbalanced economic growth. That is still a current debate.
The demand for an analytical treatment of the implementation processes of public 
management policies is the natural implication of this investigation. The way the cases were
484 Hirschman (1958) for instance was a leading figure in a different policy domain -  development economics - 
among those who sponsor an unbalanced strategy o f growth, although he put it in terms o f comprehensive or 
piecemeal styles o f policymaking.
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-  deliberately and necessarily - treated made them look like unfinished business despite the 
day-after taste. But the aftermath is not the same thing as the implementation of a policy, no 
matter how confusing its launching or its constitutional translation into ordinary law was.
The analysis of the other cases complemented by the analysis of the implementation 
processes of all Brazilian public management reforms are not a trivial task. But it is 
something that the country owes to itself. Regarding processes a final clue refers to policy 
sequence. As the investigation by Rezende (2002) suggested, policy sequence and policy 
failure may have been intimately connected in some cases, as in 1998. The crucial linkage to 
be recovered “is the notion that individual innovations are part o f a policy sequence in which 
institutional development renders some interpretations o f problems more persuasive and 
makes some prospective policies more politically viable than others” (Weir, 1992: 192) The 
comprehension of the sequence, its structuring bottlenecks, its institutional crossroads and its 
proper comparison with other historical similar contexts are essential for evaluation of 
possibilities of policy innovation. As Weir (1992: 192) emphasized, “Decisions at one point 
in time can restrict future possibilities by sending policy o ff onto particular tracks, along 
which ideas and interests develop and institutions and strategies adapt ”
8.4.2. Mapping a research agenda: complementary approaches and connected
themes
The Brazilian case suggests that future research on public management policy change might 
fruitfully use other frameworks to supplement the multiple streams. If the objective is to 
complement the analysis so far carried out, other approaches emerge as promising
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candidates: historical institutionalism, punctuated equilibrium, and institutional
processualism.
Cumulative outcomes can stem from long-term incremental changes. Some “slow-moving” 
causal processes can generate cumulative effects that may enable change or make it harder 
(Pierson, 2003: 181-2). Each reform meant “a new layering o f institutional arrangements on 
top o f pre-existing structures” (Schickler, 2001: 199). The analysis of the more recent 
situations demand a broader long-term analysis of the consequences of the accumulation of 
layers and of their mutually interfering effects derived from their co-existence. Historical 
institutionalism is particularly useful if the angle of the investigation is to be redefined in 
terms of what persists over all these decades485. Punctuated equilibrium is positioned to 
analyze a long-term process characterized by turning points in different moments that 
transform the direction of policy change. The framework combines the analysis of the change 
processes with the moments of “policy stability”. The problem in the Brazilian case is to 
associate the idea of stability with the intervals of policy change. A better comprehension of 
implementation and intervals is required. There were too many attempts to promote change. 
Stability was to a certain extent just the result of a failed or partial implementation process, 
more than an expression of an equilibrium situation.
A third approach is take up institutional processualism (Barzelay and Calderon, 2004) but 
with a deeper look at the “institutions'” side of the expression. The approach shares Orren
485 The answer is apparently straightforward but not exactly true: patronage and clientelism. The patchy format 
o f the federal administration revealed that there is a mix of patterns in different areas. There are some structured 
careers, there are several low rank cadres grouped in low rank categories, and there is a vast number of 
appointed positions fulfilled according to a variety o f criteria (including merit). Gaetani (2002) explored the 
logic that motivates the different sorts o f strategies regarding the fulfilment of appointed positions. There is a 
variety o f possibilities according to the institutional and political context.
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and Skowroneck's (1994: 313) concern with “institutional construction of change in time” in 
a way that is “less random than the garbage can models of James March and others”.
This dissertation also developed connected themes related to the original research questions: 
civil service reform, state capacities, policy capacities, administrative capacities, and 
hybridism. The first theme that emerges from this thesis is the issue of civil service reform. 
As Horn (1995: 97) argues, “the distinguishing feature o f the merit system is that it restricts 
the ability o f legislators to hire, fire, pay, and promote their administrative systems.” These 
statutes and norms in Brazil had never been consolidated in a merit based way. Instead of 
that, patronage systematically came back through a variety of forms that were not properly 
identified or taken into account. The Brazilian mainstream political science literature 
regarding the theme is thin and marginal. Linz and Stepan (1996: 17) stated that a “usable” 
professional bureaucracy is one of the “interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions” 
required for a consolidated bureaucracy and for a functioning state486. Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993: 56) argued that the key explanation to the superior performance of Asian 
“tigers” in contrast with Brazil is “state autonomy”, conceived as “the capacity o f the state to 
pursue developmentalist policies with its insulation form particularist pressures.” But, 
symptomatically, Brazil and other countries in Latin America have not been the object of
A Q Hsystematic analytical research like other regions in the world . The exception is the 
literature on bureaucratic autonomy and embeddedness (Evans, 1992, 1993, 1995: Ross- 
Schneider, 1991, 1997, and 2003).
486 The authors sharply pointed out that “the question o f  the usability o f  the state bureaucracy by the new 
democratic regime also emerges in countries such as Chile, where the outgoing nondemocratic regime was able 
to give tenure to many key members o f  the state bureaucracy in politically sensitive areas such as justice and 
education.” The only difference to the Brazilian case was that the National Constituency Assembly that 
followed the authoritarian regimes o f Vargas and the military granted “entrenched rights” to the previous high 
officials.
487 See for instance the research program derived from Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996) that led to the 
publications o f titles regarding Central and Easter Europe (Verheijen, 1999), Western Europe (Bekke and Meer, 
2000), Asia (Bums and Bowomwathana), and Anglo-American (Halligan) countries.
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Brazil is a country conditioned by diverse historical patterns and configurations, not fully 
framed by the Weberian framework in the sense that patronage and clientelist relationships 
have been persistent and dominant in spite of its capitalist development.. CLAD’s efforts in 
the past were spasmodic. It was only in recent years that the Inter-American Development 
Bank took the initiative of commissioning a series of country studies but without a 
common theoretical approach such as the one adopted in the investigation of structures of 
rewards in Western Industrialized Democracies (Hood and Peters, 1994) and Asian countries 
(Hood and Peters 2003). Maybe it is time to integrate the Brazilian case in broader 
comparative efforts. The advantages of the approach of top echelons seem promising as 
Nuremberg and Welcoltt (2003, xiii) suggested because they are more focused, more policy 
promising and less politically risky (as in the case of dealing with the whole civil service). 
Not entirely surprising, the same approach was intuitively pursued by Dias in 1967 and more 
recently by Farias in 2000 (Heredia and Gaetani, 2002).
The second theme that this investigation raises refers to the seductive but elusive debate 
about state capacities, always returning to the international academic literature of public 
management (Schick, 2002; Peters, 2004) and development studies (Fukuda-Paar, Lopes, and 
Malik, 2002; Lopes and Theison, 2003). Brazilian international indicators are usually 
presented as completely independent from issues related to state capacity. After more than a 
decade of structural adjustment Evans’ propositions489 are still disturbing as well as 
neglected. The predictable consequence is a tendency to what Luhmann (1982: xxvii) calls 
“institutionalization of precariousness”. Public management reforms can be analyzed, for 
instance, according to three key capacities as suggested by Weaver and Rockman (1993a: 6):
488 http://www.iadb.Org/int/DRP/esp/Red5/transparenciadocs.htm#ReformaServicio
489 Mi-Qap aciiy impUes organizations capable o f  sustained collective action. (...) Enhanced state capacity 
remains a requirement o f  effective economic policy, including sustained structural adjustment” (Evans, 1992: 
176 and 181),
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“to innovate when old policies have fa iled ’, “to be able to impose losses on powerful groups” 
and “to ensure policy stability so that policies have time to work”. While Weaver and 
Rockman concentrate their analysis on the first- and second-tier490 influences on 
governmental capabilities and policies an alternative possibility is to focus on the third-tier 
influences, the public management domain: bureaucratic strength and autonomy. It is a more 
pertinent approach to the discussion of reform capabilities in Brazil than the one recently 
adopted by Knill (1998, 1999, and 2001) to analyze Britain's and Germany's administrative 
reform capacities in the European context491.
Knill (1999, 116-119) attributed contrasted high reform capacities to countries dominated by 
instrumental bureaucracies and low reform capacities to countries where autonomous 
bureaucracies prevail. The starting point of his analysis, however, is the comparability of the 
British and German bureaucracies492 -  both professional merit based but with important 
differentiations. The public management reforms in Brazil -  usually from the outside of the 
governmental machine, which suggested the presence of an instrumental bureaucracy -  did 
not start from the same position and did not present similar patterned results. The comment 
obviously does not invalidate Knill’s analysis but exemplifies the difficulties of comparing 
countries with very different development parameters, institutional settings, and political 
cultures. Brazil had circumscribed a phenomenon of bureaucratic autonomy represented by
490 The first tier consists o f the potential influences derived from the distinction between parliamentary and the 
US presidential system. The second tier includes electoral rules and party’s systems that respond to different 
government configurations. The third tier is constituted by institutional (federalims, judicial review and 
bureaucracy autonomy) and non-institutional factors (civic culture and political cleavages). (Weaver and 
Rockman, 1993b: 445-6).
491 According to Knill (1999, 116) “ The capacity fo r  fundamental administrative reforms can be expected to 
increase with the extent to which the political and administrative spheres reflect separate areas which are 
characterized by distinctive interests and rationalities. I f  the distinction between both spheres is less 
pronounced, given a broad overlap o f  both areas, it seems rather unlikely that political leaders will either be 
motivated or able to push through fundamental administrative reforms against the bureaucracy.”
492 Bureaucracy in the sense applied in this dissertation or as in Evans (1979, 1992, and 1995) terminology that 
assumed as a Weberian type of public bureaucracy those based on public selections, promotion by merit (not 
seniority), career system, competitive remuneration, and public respect and prestige.
413
organizations that were a combination of: successful insulation from party politics, human 
resources merit based policy, entrepreneurial leadership, and the features of the sector493.
Evans (1992 and 1995) pointed out that "embedded autonomy" was a key explanation for the 
emergence of the developmental state. The authoritarian structure in which autonomy and 
embeddedness combined in certain sectors in Brazil was founded on the unaccountable 
indirect administration, a useless concern in a military dictatorship. The embedded features 
of sectors of Brazilian technocracy provided "institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation and re-negotiation o f goals and polices" (Evans 1992: 164) between the state and 
its private partners. It provided a different solution to the shortage of capacities. However, 
the concentration of expertise in the state elite did not occur through a merit-based 
bureaucratic structure but via career patterns based on an appointee system of fulfilling 
executive positions. Accordingly to Evans (1995: 179) "embeddedness is assumed to have 
value only in the context o f autonomy. In the absence o f a coherent self-orienting, Weberian 
sort o f administrative structure494, embeddedness will almost certainly have deleterious 
effects. (....) It is the combination o f embeddedness and autonomy that works, not either on 
its own." Evans's argument is plausible regarding Brazil because when the economic crisis 
effectively hit the country at the beginning of the 1980s, collusion as well as rent-seeking
493 "In the absence o f  widespread administrative reform, authority to interact with capitalists can be delegated 
to the most Weberian agencies in the economic bureaucracy." (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 31).
494 The absence o f a Weberian bureaucracy explains also the lack of sustainability of the business-state pattern 
of relationship. "Promotion by merit criteria is the key feature that insulates bureaucrats from pressures and 
hence allows them to exact reciprocity and make credible long term commitments. (...) I f  procedures fo r  
promotion insulate bureaucracies from lobbying, then the probabilities fall, and rent-seeking ceases to be a 
profitable alternative to productive investments." (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997: 16-17). In the Brazilian case 
the appointee phenomena provoked an opposite behaviour: migration to private positions and capture of public 
profits for corporatist purposes via differential package of benefits without corresponding alignment with the 
private market (Wemeck, 1983). Business-govemment relationships were close and based on a variety o f  
arrangements due to the features o f the indirect administration. Political appointments coined the informal 
coalitions that operated among the direct and indirect administration. The dense network o f collaborative and 
collusive relationships was built on a facilitating basis o f discretion, flexibility, lack o f accountability, and 
impunity. “Bureaucratic rings” (Cardoso, 1975) around key appointed officials became the dominant form o f  
interest articulation in the absence of the exclusion of interest groups o f party politics (Schneider, 1987).
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behavior began to spread. The 1998 reform did not transform this situation despite the timid 
start of the establishment of a merit-based bureaucracy within the strategic core of state 
functions.
The third theme - a spillover of the previous one -  refers to the investigation of the 
connections between state capacity, administrative capacity, and policy capacity. The thesis 
situates itself in a statecentric analytic tradition. The underlying assumption is that the 
Brazilian administrative state has an important role to play in the country’s national affairs. 
Public management policies affect all public policy495 capacities because of the former 
systemic and pervasive character. But public management policies depend themselves on 
state, policy and administrative capacities496 to be improved and empowered. The thesis 
evidenced how hard was the promotion of policy change at the core of central agencies in a 
context characterised by problematic administrative capacities.
The concept of capacity is an elusive one but it is useful to draw attention to the complicate 
structural characteristics and stock resources of the Brazilian state with respect to 
administrative capacities. Cumulative capacities were not developed over time in the public 
management domain. If something was accumulated over time were problems, layers of 
legislations, and clientelist practices. Each reform made tabula rasa of the previous because 
there were not significant institutional capacities in central agencies497 Capacities in the 
central agencies mean -  in organizational terms -  staff, technology, financial resources,
495 “Policy capacity is the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices about 
and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends” (Painter, 2002)
496 State capacity depends on the balance of power and attributions between state and society while 
administrative capacity refers to the efficient management of governmental resources - human resources, 
technology, finance, physical assets (Painter and Pierre, 2005: 2).
497 The contrast with the pockets of excellences is revealing. There were not islands of efficiency in the central 
agencies but on line SOEs and sectoral agencies.
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expertise498, careers, nodality, and authority. The choreography of the planning and public 
management institutional domains over time was revealing of their instability. The structural 
characteristics and the resource stocks of the Brazilian governing system did not help 
reformers.
Policy capacities depend on two vectors: internal and external. The endogenous included 
policy expertise, professional cadres, and financial availability of resources. The external 
refers to the capacity to resist to particular interests and micro political pressures. The four 
cases evidenced how difficult the construction of these capacities was in Brazil. The 
requirements to build administrative and policy capacities for public management policies 
are more demanding than specific sectoral policies because the former are cross-sectoral 
policies that affect all the others. Neither insulation nor embeddedness were achieved. 
Moreover, the political pressures derived from clientelism and patronage functioned as a 
permanent disestablishing force of public management reforms. Administrative reforms are 
power-driven but they may or may not improve governmental effectiveness499.If policy 
capacities mean the creation of institutional integrity to enable policy implementation -  at 
least in the public management domain -  (Painter, and Pierre, 2005: 11) further investigation 
is required in order to provide evidence destined to support policy and institutional design 
initiatives less vulnerable to political turbulence.
The fourth theme that this thesis examined was hybridism, especially regarding employment 
relationships. Brazilian bureaucracy developed simultaneously under-bureaucratization and
498 Aucoin and Bakvis (2005: 191) argued convincingly about the importance o f the intellectual dimension of 
public policy capacities. In their vision policy knowledge is decisive to enable a proper understanding o f a 
cause-effect analysis. In the absence of an intellectual policy debate policy-making processes tend to be 
politicized and impoverished at the expense o f the public interest (Podger, 2002: 5)
499 The 1988 case for instance produced a gridlock in the public sector, part because of implementation 
problems, part because o f design shortcomings
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over-bureaucratization pathologies both in direct and indirect administrations. In the direct 
administration the same law that regulated the merit system in the federal service determined 
its demise -  via provisional contracts - as well because of political pressure, the fear of 
unemployment, and also because the Executive himself needed greater flexibility in the 
elimination and creation of public jobs. The hybrid500 arrangements, originated in the Re- 
Adjustment Law, combined with poor data made the interpretation of the problems and 
history -  and the corresponding causality chain - a difficult task in subsequent years.
Brazil never had a perfect “spoil system” because each new government replaced some of the 
appointed positions -  usually the top -  while it “fattened” the public administration with a 
new wave of political appointees and extranumerarios501. And from time to time - from 
constitution to constitution -  they were all transformed into civil servants. Therefore, there 
was a paradox in all reform attempts that took place until the 1990s. They occurred at the 
same time as contradictory practices demoralized reform efforts, especially in the area of
5ft?civil service employment relations. From time to time constitutional or ordinary legislation 
transformed public sector employees recruited in a number of ways503 into permanent civil 
servants. While the reformist efforts were typical of the first months of the presidential 
mandates, the accommodation legislation was approved near their ends.
500 Since the 1930s the law created a new juridical figure, the “function”. “Positions were created by the 
Legislation, while “functions” might be created by Executive decree. In consequence, occupants of “functions” 
(called “extranumerarios” or supranumerarios) were not subject to the same set of rules applicable to occupants 
o f “positions” (called “functionaries”). In short, “extranumerarios” were not subject to entry examinations by 
the constitution. An entirely different terminology was then invented for the new category, so as to create a 
parallel, independent group of employees.” (Nascimento, 1966: 429-30).
501 “Extranumerarios” were not subject to entry examinations by the constitution. An entirely different 
terminology was then invented for the new category, so as to create a parallel, independent group of 
employees.” (Nascimento, 1966: 429-30).
502 Medeiros (1970: 47) list o f legislation included the 1946 Constitution (as well as the Constitutions of 1934, 
1937, and 1967), the 1952 Statute o f Civil Servants, and the Laws 2284 from 1954, 3483 from 1958, 3966 and 
3967 from 1961,4054 from 1962,4069 from 1962, and 4242 from 1963.
503 The hiring mechanisms included appointed positions, contracts for a certain period, or contracts via SOEs or 
private firms to do civil servants functions.
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Estimates of the number of public functionaries that had been recruited on the basis of merit 
never went above 10% in the period between the 1930s and the 1960s. (Medeiros, 1970: 46). 
Collective business actions, developmental associations, or hard budget constraints can 
eventually mitigate the risks of collaboration, degenerating into collusion in the absence of an 
insulated Weberian bureaucracy. However, none of them were present in Brazil at that time. 
Geddes (1990) argued that authoritarian regimes can play a decisive role in building 
Weberian bureaucracies and that competitive clientelism could also eventually play an 
important role also in building benign state business collaboration. In the first case not even 
Vargas implemented successful and enduring PPA reforms. In respect of the second 
argument, Hagopian (1996) argued convincingly that instead of competitive clientelism 
Brazil is a case of elite “transformism504” of the traditional political elite.
In the indirect administration the problem of hybridism took place with respect to the theme 
of human resources and, specially, agencification. Regarding human resources some 
autarchies and foundations used their discretionary powers to enhance merit based 
procedures that transformed them in islands of excellence until 1988. But the majority of the 
indirect administration used the same discretionary mechanisms to promote patronage and 
clientelism. Regarding agencification it is worthy to recap that despite its novelty in the 
Western Developed Countries (Pollitt, 2004) this debate did not produce the same impact in 
Brazil -  as well as in the in US (Peters, 1997: 256) - because of the familiarity the country 
had with indirect administration structures.
The terms of relationship between the direct and indirect administrations had never been 
regulated in the past -  for instance between 1967 and 1988. But discussions like performance
504 By transformism I mean the process of metamorphosis required to the maintenance of the existing structure 
of power relationships.
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agreements took place in the 1980s with respect to SOEs. The layer added by the legal 
framework o f the 1998 reform did not undo the previously existent. Under the current status 
quo the government has an impressive range of alternatives to deal with the delivery of a new 
public service that begins in a ministry and ends in the private sector. But between both 
extremes there is myriad of possibilities that include autarchies, executive agencies, public 
foundations, social organizations, private foundations, and social organizations of public 
interest505. The watchdogs have increasingly reiterated their concerns with accountability and 
corruption problems referred to this situation but without effective resonance506. Hybridism 
helps create a fluid environment that allows short term particular policy solutions without 
necessarily being the most suitable in the long term or as a whole.
However, the Brazilian story perhaps may not be as unique as the ‘natives’ tend to consider. 
In the case of the US, for instance, the implementation of the 1883 Pendleton Act in the US 
took decades to achieve a meaningful proportion (Roberts) and residues of the spoils system 
survived beyond the Progressive Era (Pfiffer nad Brook, 2000: 15). The Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 was an evidence of how difficult the implementation of a merit-based 
civil service can be, even for the wealthiest country in the world (Pfiffer and Brook, 2000). It 
is time for Brazilians to resume the policy dialogue with the US, prematurely interrupted in 
the 1960s regarding public management a term, by the way, very American, while new 
public management is unequivocally British (Kickert, 1997: 31).
505 This later arrangement was created in 1999. It is not a public sector type o f institution and clearly belongs to 
the third sector. For a detailed analysis see Ferrarezi (2000). But it has been employed as a public alternative in 
some controversial cases.
506 E3L/Br/58, E1H/MG/52, and JlH/Br/29
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8.5. Final Remarks
In an insightful analysis concerning paradoxes of administrative reform Wright (1997: 8-10) 
made several points related to the policy phenomenon of administrative reform in Western 
industrialized countries . Two of them deserve a special comment: policy linkage and 
policy slippage. Public management reforms are embedded in context and linked to broader 
configurations of interests. Reforms are not “politically agnostic” (Wright: 1997-9) as the 
cases revealed. The 1937 reform was magnified because of its political significance. The 
1967 reform was deeply affected by the political oscillations within the infant military 
regime until its denouement. The 1988 reform occurred in the middle of a country long 
storm. And the 1998 one was not immune to the political rhetoric of its time.
Public management reforms are not neutral regarding interests and resources as the four 
cases demonstrated. No matter if in an implicit or explicit way their political dimensions and 
nuances are unavoidable. Policy slippage was evidenced in all four cases despite the 
difficulties of the entrepreneurs that championed the reforms to recognize it -  with the 
possible exception of Dias in 1967 because he was more aware of the difficulties with an 
“essentially prerequisites-based strategies o f change” (Nascimento, 1966: 425). There were 
disproportional mismatches between ambitions and programmatic actions, between programs 
and outcomes, between the results supposed to be achieved and the means required to 
support their pursuit. In the absence of an active policy community the alternative 
specification processes of the reforms were rarely marked by acrimony and personal
507 Wright’s list included policy panacea, policy fashion and policy diffusion, policy linkage, policy slippage, 
policy reversal (Hood, 1994), policy dilemma, policy contradiction, and policy perversity.
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antagonisms provoked by reductionism and lack of constructive policy criticism . Policy 
flaws identified by critics in the early stages of the policy processes -  as in 1988 and 1998 - 
faced attitudes of denial by their main protagonists, sometimes because of the weakness of 
their positions, sometimes because of the ambition of their aspirations509.
It is possible that the time for ambitious public management reform attempts is over. Some 
recent evidence points in this direction510. Possibly the recurrent combination of high 
expectations and disappointing results has produced reform fatigue fuelled by skeptical 
behavior, the attitudes of the cynic, and the perception of fatalists. Although administrative 
reforms were politically appealing in the past they do not enjoy the same prestige in current 
Brazilian politics. However most of the problems which spurred reform are still with us. The 
author of this thesis would not be surprised if they made a comeback soon.
Another observation derivable from this investigation refers to the core of the executive. All 
reforms were deeply dependent on presidential powers, including the last one because 
Bresser pushed for the approval of “medidas provisorias ” in order to provide institutional 
conditions for the agencies and social organizations taking off before the approval of 
constitutional amendment. The problem is that “where presidents' lack organized 
congressional backing (...) attempts to rely on decree powers may only increase the political 
isolation o f the executive. Where congressional support is relatively strong, however,
508 Even in the 1998 case -  in the context of a consolidated democracy - special administrative procedures were 
designed in order to neutralize and to block actors that were involved in the politicization o f the discussion of 
the reform in Congress (ElH/Br/47).
509 The lack of embeddedness of ENAP’s project in 1988 and the lack of governmental effective support to 
MARE’s proposal in 1998 were typical examples.
510 Public management reform initiatives in Cardoso’s second mandate obeyed another profile, lower and more 
focused (Heredia and Gaetani, 2002). The lack o f political support for a social mobilization process around a 
public management reform -  Public Management for All People (2003) - aborted an ambitious initiative at the 
beginning o f President’s Lula mandate.
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presidential use o f legislative authority has at times contributed to successful economic 
management.” (Hagard and Kaufman, 1994: 73)
In other words: the executive coordination capacities -  decisive for an issue like public 
management reform to be tackled -  are also affected by broader spillovers of the political 
system that did not derive from the endogenous debate within the policies in question. And 
here we are back to the problem that Dias tried to solve with the Senior Corps, Marcelino 
with the career of public managers, and Bresser Pereira with his concept of “strategic 
nucleon”. Who is supposed to live and work in the summit and under what basis? The 
Brazilian public “adhocracy’’ was also enhanced by the high circulation of cadres across the 
institutions, usually following presidential change in the context of the authoritarian regime. 
“Personalism, circulation, and the lack o f strong organisational loyalties explain how 
policies and institutions can flip-flop form one moment or government to the next” 
(Schneider, 1991: 34).
When we take the four cases into account we observe that that policy failure was not caused 
by anti-political technical and rational orientations, unlike the conventional wisdom would 
suggest. First the policy processes were politicised - even if in some cases on the restricted 
terms of an authoritarian regime that is very different from de-politicised. Second, there was 
not just one rationality in operation but a combination of all of them, anchored to informal 
coalitions sustained by top-down political support and bottom-up traditional political 
practices. Third, co-ordination was provided by the symbiosis between the behavioural 
under-bureaucratisation (personalism) and structural and asymmetric over-bureaucratisation 
(fragmentation), which mutually reinforced each other511 (Schmitter, 1971: 34). Centrifuge
5,1 The more fragmented the system the more the need of personalism. The more personalism spreads the more 
fragmented the system becomes.
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forces blocked the policies avenues that could lead to the emergence and consolidation of a 
leading merit-based bureaucracy at the core of the executive. The consequences of the 
institutional configuration of powers within the state apparatus and in its relationship with the 
political system and interest groups are a privileged target for further investigation.
A final point to be made refers to the role played by ignorance. “There is ignorance (...) 
about the true nature o f public bureaucracies which rarely function according to the 
premises o f a priori theorizing.” (Wright, 1997: 12). Maybe it is the moment to pay a tribute 
to old institutionalists despite their propensity to abuse legislation awareness, detailed 
descriptions and idiographic historical approaches excessively concerned with how a chain of 
events produced an outcome (Hall, 2003: 376). Some of the grey areas through which the 
reformers navigated were legislation fringes that are not easily grasped in a general overview.
C I O
Brazilian most experienced practitioners have always demonstrated great respect for 
“neglected foundation o f public law” (Moe and Gilmour, 1995). They are conscious that 
most reforms got stuck -  as in 1988 -  or got detached -  as in 1998 -  because, among other 
things, the emerging legal framework was confusing, incoherent, and inconsistent with the 
reality they aimed to transform. The law is supposed to provide a solid foundation for the 
governmental structures and a framework for managerial accountability. The Executive and 
the Legislative branches have modified the legal framework regarding personnel and 
organizational design so frequently that presumably comprehensive reviews and integrative 
updating should be on their way. Wrong. The patchy legislation with its ambiguities and 
complex nuances is perceived by actors of the political system and of the federal 
administration as a solution to their particular demands. They all found their way to the 
currently existing marshy constitutional and administrative legislation. In these
512 ElH/Br/47, E2M/Br/50 and E1H/MG/52.
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circumstances it was not surprising that policy changes hardly take place if left to any 
endogenous motivation.
There is something of Sisyphean in public management reforms as some authors recognized. 
The observation does not serve as consolation for developing countries that have not as yet 
come to terms with their public management institutional arrangements. And public 
management reforms are just one of many unfinished business in an agenda marked by 
congestion and permanent issues competition. Authors like Rocherfor and Cobb (1994: 15) 
suggested that sometimes “the availability o f solutions precedes the questions o f 
acceptability and affordability”. In a similar tone, Rose (1993) once mentioned that “policy is 
about waiting”.
To conclude: Brazilian’s institutions need to be analyzed in enabling, constraining but also 
constitutive513 terms (200?: 11-12). Most of the country’s institutions are in their infancy and 
maybe in order to address issues related to institutional building it is important to disentangle 
the way institutions function in order to understand their collective as well as individualistic 
roots (Hodgson, 2000) -  another reason to pay attention to the entrepreneurs that are 
championing policy change processes. As Naim (1995: 30) pointed out “public sector 
institutional building (...) has been either neglected or impaired by lack of interest, money 
and administrative capacity. Such neglect has now reached levels that, unless corrected, will 
threaten both democracy and economic stability”, a point similar to the recent UNDP (2004) 
report about Latin America.
513 As Evans and Rauch (2000: 10-11) argued “as we continue to behave under a certain set o f institutions, we 
begin to internalize the values embodied in those institutions” an interesting clue for policy change and for the 
lack o f policy change as well.
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The argument regarding the importance of a Weberian elite bureaucracy in order to enable 
developing countries to achieve economic development514 has recently been advanced by 
Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000). Olsen (2004) had also recently tipped 
in the same line regarding the risk of premature disposability of bureaucracy within the 
context of a bandwagon movement of ideas sponsored by global webs (Reich, 1992). 
Brazil515 is a country that demands public management reforms in order to tackle inequality 
and poverty. This thesis did not focus on this challenge but it aligns itself with the views that 
the before mentioned authors sympathise: without paying more attention to the bureaucratic 
necessities of a developing country the equity and sustainable growth may be harder to 
achieve. Merit based bureaucracies performed the role of scaffolding in Western developed 
democracies and also in the successful developmental states where the institution is 
embedded in the countries political culture. It is not likely that Brazil can avoid a similar 
path, even if subject to the country particularities.
514 Both authors developed a comparative quantitative analysis with a significant number o f countries in order to 
demonstrate the correlation between “Weberianness” and development (Evans and Rauch, 1999).
515 Brazil international indicators are suggestive. 64th GDP per capita and 65th HDI (in a group o f 175 countries) 
and 120th in terms of inequality (in a group of 124 countries). About 9,9% of the population lives bellow the 
poverty line (23rd position in a group o f 70 developing countries) -  all data from UNDP (2003).
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTER VIE WEES
Name Position Case Code
1 Aluisio Loureiro Pinto SEMOR -  Secretary 1967 E2M/RJ/1
2 Angela Santana Secretary of State Reform 1998 ElH/Br/2
3 Antonio F. Pimentel* DASP-President 1967 ElL/Br/3
4 Antonio Octavio Cintra ENAP -  President 1988 E3M/Br/4
5 Antonio Umbelino de-bureaucratisation manager 1988 E3L/Br/5
6 Aureliano Chaves Vice-President 1988 E1M/BZ/6
7 Benedito Silva DASP President 1937 E1M/RJ/7
8 Luis Carlos Bresser 
Pereira
Minister of State 1998 E1H/SP/8
9 Caio Marini MARE -  Manager 1998 E2M/Br/9
10 Carlos Christo MARE -  Manager 1998 E3L/Br/10
11 Carlos Pimenta MARE -  Secretary of Special 
Projects
1998 E2M/Br/11
12 Celio Franca* Director of Modernisation 1988 E2H/Br/12
13 Ceres Prates Secretary of Management 1998 E2H/Br/13
14 Clovis Carvalho Home Office Minister 1998 E1H/Br/14
15 Diogo Lordelo de Mello IBAM -  President 1988 OlL/RJ/15
16 Eduardo Graef Advisor to President Cardoso 1998 E1M/Br/16
17 Eduardo Jorge* General Secretary of Presidency 1998 E1H/Br/17
18 Eli Diniz Academic at IUPERJ 1998 A3L/RJ/18
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19 Embaixador Oscar Advisor to Roberto Campos 1967 A3M/Br/19
20 Evelyn Levy ENAP -  Director 1998 E3M/SP/20
21 Flavio Faria SEMOR -  Secretary 1988 E2M/Br/21
22 Gersina Alves de 
Oliveira*
DASP -  Manager 1967 E3H/RJ/22
23 Gileno Marcelino Executive Secretary 1988 ElH/Br/23
24 Heitor Chagas Oliveira SEMOR -  Secretary 1988 E2H/RJ/24
25 Helena Pinheiro MARE -  Manager 1998 E3M/Br/25
26 Hindemburgo Diniz FJP -  President 1988 E2L/BZ/26
27 Humberto Falcao MARE -  Manager 1998 E3M/Br/27
28 J.G.Piquet Cameiro* Secretary of De-bureaucratisation 1988 ElH/Br/28
29 J.P. Sepulveda 
Pertence*
Supreme Court Justice 1998 JlH/Br/29
30 Jamil Reston IB AM -  Director 1988 O2L/RJ/30
31 Jorge Gustavo Costa FGV Academic 1967 A3L/RJ/31
32 Jose Eloy Corazza SRH -  Secretary 1988 E2H/Br/32
33 Jose Nazare Teixeira 
Dias
DASP -  Director of Personal 
Department
1967 E1H/RJ/33
34 Luis Amaldo MARE -  Manager 1998 E3L/RJ/34
35 Marcio Brey SEMOR -  Director 1988 E3L/Br/35
36 Marcondes Mundim SRH -  Director 1988 E2H/Br/36
37 Maria Helana C.Santos ENAP -  Director 1988 E3L/Br/37
38 Nelson Teixeira Advisor to Roberto Campos 1967 E2M/RJ/38
39 Nilson Hollanda ENAP -  President 1988 E3L/Br/39
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40 Paulo Mota FGV Academic 1988 A2L/RJ/40
41 Pedro Faria MARE -  Director of Modernisation 1998 E2M/Br/41
42 Regina Faria Home Office Consultant 1998 C2L/SP/42
43 Rondon Pacheco Home Office Minister to pres. Costa 
e Silva.
1967 E1H/RJ/43
44 Thereza Lobo Home Office Consultant 1998 C2M/RJ/44
45 Vicente Paula Mendes Advisor to Aluisio Alves 1988 A1H/BZ/45
46 Wilson Calvo* SAF -  Secretary 1988 ElH/Br/46
46 Luiz Alberto dos Santos Workers’ Party Consultant 1998 ElH/Br/47
48 Gilberto Guerzoni MARE -  Secretary of Human 
Resources
1998 ElH/Br/48
49 Aldino Graef MARE -  Director of Human 
Resources
1998 E2M/Br/49
50 Luciano Oliva Patricio Executive Secretary -  Minist. 
Education
1998 E2M/Br/50
51 Bianor Cavalcanti FGV Academic 1988 A3L/RJ/51
5 2 Antonio Augusto 
Anastasia
Ministry of Labour -  Secretary 
Executive
1998 E1H/MG/52
53 Ricardo Santiago Minister of Planning -  Secretary 
Executive
1988 ElH/Br/53
54 Geraldo Campos Congressmen 1987-1990 1988 PlH/Br/54
55 Ronaldo Costa Couto Chief of Staff 1988 ElH/Br/55
56 Jose Silveira Secretary of Plans and Investments 1998 ElH/Br/56
57 Ariel Pares Director of Plans and Investments 1998 E2L/Br/57
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58 Marcelo Barros Gomes TCU Analyst 1998 E3L/Br/58
* Important in two or more reforms
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1.1. Number of Interviews Per Case
Reform (period) Number of interviews
1934-1938 1
1963-1969 5 (+ 1 *)
1985-1990 19 (+ 4*)
1995-1998 18 (+2*)
1.2. Code Building:
First Letter: Insertion
• E = Executive
• A = Academic
• J = Judge
• O = NGO
• C = Consultant
• P = Politician
Number (“Hierarchical importance”)
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
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Second letter: Importance as source of information
• H = High
• M = Medium
• L = Low
Current address
• RJ = Rio de Janerio
• Br = Brasilia
• SP = Sao Paulo
• BZ = Belo Horizonte
Last two numbers: Numbers related to the number of each name provided in the 
“Interview Directory”
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1.3. Position Acronyms:
DASP* Departamento de Administrate) e do Servigo Publico
ENAP Escola Nacional de Administragao Publica
FGV Fundagao Getulio Vargas
FJP Fundagao Joao Pinheiro
IB AM Instituto Brasileiro de Administragao Municipal
IUPERJ Instituto Universitario de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro
MARE* Ministerio da Administragao e Reforma do Estado
SAF* Secretaria de Administragao Federal
SRH Secretaria de Recursos Humanos
SEMOR Secretaria de Modemizagao
*Ministerial Status
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ANNEX 2: SCHEMA TICS
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Narrative Diagram of 1936-1937 Administrative Reform Episode
Periodisation
PI 1(1931-1934)
P2 II (1934 - Re-adjustment Law)
P3 III (1937 -  Re-adjustment Law)
P4 IV (1937-1940)
Prior Events
PEI Governing Brazil
PE 1.1 1930 Revolution and installing the Provisional Government
PE 1.2 1932 Revolution
PE 1.3 Re-profiling the Military Forces
PE 1.4 Installing the National Constituent Assembly
PEI .5 Choosing a new President
PE2 Launching a National State Building Process 
PE2.1 Creating new Ministries 
PE2.2 Creating new federal organisations 
PE2.3 Creating a Corporatist State 
PE2.4 Creating the Purchase Commission
Contemporaneous Events
CE1 Governing Brazil
CE1.1 Repressing Coup attempts
CE1.2 Declaring State of Siege
CE1.3 Consolidating the military power
CE2 Governing Brazil 
CE2 1 Preparing the coup
CE2.2 Establishing an administrative dictatorship: the New State 
CE2.3 Declaring moratorium
Central Events
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El Putting the civil service problem on the political agenda 
E l.l Creating a bi-branch commission
E2 Specifying a policy proposal
E2.1 Drafting the Nabuco Report
E2.2 Drafting the Bernardino Report
E2.3 Submitting both reports to the Presidency
E.2.4 Creating a new commission within the Executive Branch
E2.5 Drafting a new policy proposal
E3 Decision-making process
E3.1 Separating the original problem from the new the policy proposal 
E3.2 Providing a pay rise for all functionaries 
E3.3 Approving the Re-Adjustment Law
E3.4 Creating the Federal Civil Service Commission and the Efficiency Commissions
E4 Implementing the reforms
E4.1 Installing the CSFC
E4.2 Installing the Efficiency Commissions
E4.3 Enforcing the Re-Adjustment Law
E5 Identifying causes of implementation problems 
E5.1 Identifying jurisdiction and terms of office problems 
E5.2 Identifying budgeting problems
E6 Formulating a new policy solution 
E6.1 Searching for a new policy model 
E6.2Borrowing an alternative from the American debate 
E6.3 Adapting the policy proposal to Brazil
E7 Decision-making Process 
E7.1 Promoting Reform at DASP
Related Events
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RE1 PE2.2 Creating new federal organisations
RE2 PE2.2.Creating new federal organisations 
Later Events
LEI Consolidating the new regime
LE2 Implementing the new reforms 
LE2.1 Installing DASP
LE2.2 Drafting the first Civil Servants’ Statute
LE2.3 Transferring and installing the budgeting sector at DASP
LE2.4 Creating new federal organisations
LE3 Implementing the authoritarian administrative State 
LE3.1 Replacing Congress, Courts, States and Local Governments
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Narrative Diagram of the 1967 Episode
Periodisation
PI 1(1963-1964)
P2 11(1964-1965)
P3 111(1965-1967)
P4IV (1967-1969)
Prior Events
PEL Governing Brazil
PE2. Generating the military project
PE3. Attempting to institutionalise planning
PE4. Generating an Administrative Reform Proposal
Contemporary Events 
CE1 Governing Brazil 
C E l.l. Organising a new government 
CEL2 Consolidating military control 
CE1.3 Preparing a new Constitution
CE2 Consolidating planning
CE2.1 Creating the Ministry of Planning
CE2.2 Launching PAEG
Consolidating planning 
CE2.3 Launching the 10Y Plan
Central Events
E l . Assembling the reform machinery 
ELI Opting for a new proposal 
Creating a policy venue 
E1.2 Creating a policy venue 
Defining modus operandi and participants
E1.3 Defining modus operandi and participants
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Assembling the reform machinery
E2. Generating policy alternatives 
E2.1 Making preliminary choices 
E2.2 Specification of policy proposals 
E2.3 Selecting policy proposals
E3. Decision making
E3.1 Establishing an impasse
E3.3. (Ill) Finalising the proposal
Related Events
RE1 Creating a technical planning platform
RE2 Discussing proposal and connections with international experts 
Later Events
LEI. Consolidating the regime change 
LEI. 1. Polarising politics 
LEI.2. Closing the regime 
L E U . Institutionalising the military regime
LE2. Consolidating a planning-policy sub-system 
LE2.1. Formulating governmental plans 
LE2.2. Planning advisory unit at the Presidency
LE3. Implementing public management policies 
LE3.1. Creating a Public Management Policy Platform 
LE3.2. Campaigning (Operation Clean Slate)
LE3.3. Institutionalising Financial Control 
LE3.4. Focusing on ordinary citizens 
LE3.6. Transfereing the bureaucracy to Brasilia
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Narrative Diagram of the 1988 Episode
Periodisation
PI 1(1982-1985)
P2 11(1985-1986)
P3 III (1986-1988)
P4 IV (1989-1990)
Prior Events
PI Governing Brazil 
Strengthening the opposition 
Failing to generate a continuity candidate 
Making a democratic transition
P2 Economic policy making 
Attempting to stabilise the economy 
Dealing with international crisis 
Attempting to control the SOEs
P3 Implementing public management policies 
De-bureaucratising the state 
Pursuing a merit-based civil service (Rouanet)
Contemporary Events 
CE1 Governing Brazil
CE1.1 Redemocratising Brazil (inauguration, debris, elections, dualism, succession) 
CE1.2 Reorganising the governmental coalition (creating ministries, reshuffles)
CE2 Economic Policy Making 
CE2. 2. 1 Drawing up development plans 
CE2.2.2 Changing economic policy orientation 
CE2.2. 3 Attempting to stabilise the economy
CE3 Drafting new Constitution
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CE3. 1 Providing a starting point
CE3. 2 Making critical decisions (MedPro, MinPub, Par, Mand, Revision)
Central Events
CE1 Assembling the reform machinery
CE1.1 Searching for the suitable platform (Beltrao, Vicente, Arantes, Piquete, Celio)
CE1.2 Creating the Ministry of Administration
CE1.3 Creating the Administrative Reform Commission (composition)
CE1.4 Creating the Executive Inter-ministries (composition)
CE2 Generating policy proposals
CE2.1 Contributing to the transition
CE2.2 Formulating a proposal through participation
CE2.3 Reformulating the original proposal within the Executive
CE2.4 Introducing a public policy twist
CE3 Implementing the policy proposal 
CE3.1 Reorganising the Executive Core 
CE3.2 Creating the Senior Corps
CE4 Decision Making
CE4 1 II and III Decision making within the Executive 
CE4 2 III Decision making within Congress 
CE4 3 III Negotiating policy proposals
Related Events
RE1 Creating the Treasury Department
RE2 Creating public foundations
RE3 Negotiating international support for the project
RE4 Implementing organisational changes within the Executive
Later Events
LEI Redefining the Senior Corps policy proposal 
LE2 Downsizing the State
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LE3 Approving the Single Juridical gegime
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Narrative Structure of the 1998 Episode
Periodisation
PI 1(1992-1994)
P2 II (Jan-Aug.1995)
P3 III (1995-1998)
P4 IV (Jan-Jun.1999)
Prior Events
PEI. Governing Brazil
PEI. 1. Impeaching a president
PEI.2. Stabilising economic policymaking
PE 1.3. Attempting to promote a scheduled Constitutional Revision 
PE 1.4. Organising the leadership succession
PE2. Implementing a macro-economic stabilisation plan
Contemporaneous Events
CE1. Attempting to approve constitutional reforms 
CE2. Consolidating macro-economic stabilisation 
CE3. Ensuring re-election
Central Events
E l. Creating and operating the reform machinery 
E l. 1. Creating MARE 
E l.2. Generating data
El .3. Campaigning for public management policy change 
E l.4. Resuming public competitive selection processes
E2. Specifying the policy proposal
E2.1. Drafting the white paper
E2.2. Drafting the Constitutional Amendment
E3 Decision making
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E3.1. Decision making within the Executive 
E3.2. Decision making within the Legislative
E3.3. Redefining the relationship between the planning and administration sub-systems 
Related Events
RE Implementing quangos and agencies 
Later Events
LEI Dealing with the financial crisis
LE2 Reorganising the governmental coalition
LE3 Reformulating the issue image 
LE3.1. Redistributing MARE’s attributions 
LE3.2. Revamping planning
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ANNEX 3:
TABLE OF MAIN POINTS OF CIVIL SERVICE LEGISLATION SINCE 1934
Date and 
Legislation
Main points Comment
July 1934 
Constitution
Contained provisions on public functionaries, 
transitory provisions, extension of civil service 
rights to provisional functionaries and guarantee 
of rights for functionaries who have taken a 
public exam.
Building of state 
apparatus
October 1936. 
Law 284.
Rearranged federal civil servants’ careers and set 
up the Federal Civil Service Council, whose 
responsibilities were to study, suggest, and (if the 
suggestion was accepted by the administration) 
implement and prepare exams for entrance of 
civil servants.
July 1938. 
Decree-law 579.
Created Department of Administration and Public 
Service (DASP) directly suordinated to the 
Presidency. DASP had the mandate to carry out 
changes in the Federal Public Service to improve 
efficiency and economy, and to advise regarding 
the working relationships of all federal public 
organs.
This law also phased out the Federal Civil 
Service Council and set up an Efficiency 
Comission for each ministry, to organise the 
services related to tha ministry.
September 1946 
Constitution
Extended civil service rights to provisional 
functionaries and regulated the rights of public 
functionaries.
Re-democratisation
effect
October 1952 
Statute of Federal 
Public
Functionaries
Regulated all persons entering public careers, 
with time and merit being the bases for 
promotions. The law also guaranteed and 
regulated the rights of public functionaries and 
punishments for crimes against the public 
administration.
PPA failed term of 
office
July 1960 
Law 3780
Provided for the possibility for promotions via 
internal selection processes, by setting up 
functions that constituted advantages rather than 
positions.
Distortion of 
bureaucratic ethos 
and internal 
clientelism
June 1962 
Law 4069
Also known as the Law of Favours, this law 
extended the civil service rights of those who had 
worked in the public sector for over five years.
Effect of the 
construction of 
Brasilia 
Joao Goulart’s 
populist measures 
to recover the 
Presidency.
January 1967 
Constitution
Among many other issues related to civil public 
functionaries, the Constitution determines that the
Exclusion of 
legislative control.
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only way for a citizen to enter a career as a civil 
servant is through a competitive federal selection 
process (concurso publico);516 barred public 
functionaries from holding more than one public 
function at any given time, except in certain 
defined situations; and extended these regulations 
to functionaries of the Legislative and Judicial 
Branches of government.____________________
516 It should be noted that the term public career, as used here, does not refer to any existing political 
governmental career.
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Date and 
Legislation
Main points Comment
February 1967 
Decree-1 aw 200
This decree law re-named DASP from 
Administrative Department of Public Service to 
Adminitrative Department of Civil Personnel. 
With this law, DASP’s jurisdiction was narrowed 
to civil personnel. A Civil Servants’ Personnnel 
Department was set up in each ministry, to work 
closely with DASP. A Federal Public 
Administration Council was also set up and 
subordinated to DASP, with the duty to advise 
civil servants on personnel policies whenever 
requested by the President or by the directors of 
DASP.
October 1969 
Constitutional 
Amendment.
The amendment allowed vertical and horizontal 
internal promotion mechanisms and established 
exceptions for the entrance of public 
functionaries, thus reducing the number of 
positions that required the competitive selection 
processes.
State based 
clientelism + 
mobility 
requirements
December 1970 
Law 5645
Re-establishment of internal promotion 
mechanisms.
Mobility
requirements
December 1974 
Law 6185
Public sector employees should be contracted 
according to private legislation, except in the core 
inspection offices, police and judicial careers, 
which the law considered careers intrinsic to the 
State.
Erosion of the 
direct
administration
October 1976 
Supplementary 
Law 36
Allowed voluntary retirement within one year.
October 1979 
Suppelmentary 
Law 36
Allowed voluntary retirement with proportional 
wage.
September 1986 
Decree 93.277
Setting up of the National School of Public 
Administration (ENAP) and the Centre for Public 
Administration Development. ENAP has the 
purpose of promoting and administering courses 
for developing human resources in of the public 
administration.
July 1987 
Decree 94664 
Classification of 
positions and 
wages of public 
careers
The decree enforced public competitive selection 
processes only in cases of exaustion of internal 
selections in public universities, and guaranteed 
extension of civil servants’ rights to employees 
then working in the Treasury and in the Budget.
Re-democratisation 
effects and 
compromise with 
clientelist pressures
1988
Constitution
The Constituion re-enforced public competitive 
selection processes by considering them 
compulsory for civil servants.
Policy reversal
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October 1989 
Law 7834
Setting up of the careers of Public Manager. In 
order to become a Public Manager the candidate 
must be approved in a federal public competitive 
selection process and then be approved in a 
specific course currently at ENAP.
Bureaucratic 
spasmodic product 
of the re- 
democratisation 
cycle
December 1990 
Law 8112 -  
Setting up of the 
Single Juridical 
Regime
Among many other issues, this law extended civil 
servants’ rights to public sector employees 
contracted under private labour legislation, 
retained mechanisms for internal promotiona and 
increased social guarantees for civil servants.
Rigidity became 
complete.
January 1995 
Provisional 
Measure 815
Extinguishes wage advantages for civil servants 
who work as Director, Manager or Director 
advicer and regulated the possibility of nominal 
advange.
Supplementary 
Law 82 (or Camata 
Law)
1995
It limits the expenditure with Civil servants.
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Date and 
Legislation
Main points Comment
July 1996. 
Provisional 
Measure 1480
Guaranteed a wage bonus to civil servants 
working as directors, managers or director- 
advisers, and also guaranteed wage bonuswa for 
all civil servants, considering the number of years 
worked as a public servant.
June 1997. 
Provisional 
Measure 1530-7
Set up the Voluntary Lay-off Program51' for civil 
servants in order to improve human resource 
allocations, allow modernisation of the public 
administration and help adjust federal accounts.
June 1998 
Constitutional 
Amendment 19.
Plurality of regimes and tenure flexibilisation in 
specific cases of proven redundancy or 
inadequate performance.
Unfinished attempt 
to build a pluralist 
state apparatus.
Source: Based on Guerzoni (1996) and on the legislation mentioned.
517 Programa de Desligamento Voluntario (PDV).
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EVOLUTION OF PLANNING AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
PUBLIC VENUES
Name of 
Public 
Office 
Or Ministry
Date and 
Law
Superior Ministry (in case of Departments, Councils or 
Commissions) or M atter of Responsability (in case of 
Ministry).
Presidency Planning Administra 
tion and 
Public 
Affairs
Finance
Ministry of 
Finance.
October 
1891. 
Law 23.
Ministry 
of Finance
Federal Civil
Service
Council518.
October 
1936. 
Law 284.
The Council was 
directly related to 
the Presidency 
and was set up 
and headed by 
Simoes Lopes.
Administrati
ve
Department 
of Public 
Service519 
(DASP).
July 1938. 
Decree-law 
579, which 
also phased 
out CFSPC.
Department 
directly related to 
the President. Its 
design was 
proposed in the 
text of the 1937 
Constitution.
Council of 
Development
520
February
1956.
Decree
38744.
Council directly 
subordinated to 
the President. 
This council was 
responsible for 
tasks of
coordenation and 
planning of 
political 
economy.
National
Planning
Commission
521
August
1961.
Decree
51152.
Commission
directly
subordinated to 
the President.
Setting up of 
two functions 
of ministers
September
1962.
Delegated
According to Article 2 of Decree 1422, until the proposal of 
an institutional arrangement for the govemamental offices 
concerned with planning, by the Extraordinary Ministry, the
5,8 Conselho Federal do Serviso Publico Civil (CFSPC).
519 Departamento Administrativo do Servi^o Publico (DASP).
520 Conselho do Desenvolvimento.
521 Comissao de Planejamento Nacional.
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of
Extraordinar 
y Ministry of 
Planning522.
Law 1 and following offices were subordinated to the later: 1. From
Decree COPLAN (National Planning Commission): Technical
1422. Department and the Commission’s Working Groups; 2. The
Department of COCAP (Commission for the Coordination of 
"Alian^a para o Progresso"; 3. General Department of 
Development Council.
The Minister of the Extraordinary Ministry had the status of 
an ordinary Minister, which was later transform into 
Extraordinary Ministry of Planning in a Ministry concerned 
with planning matters.________________________________
522 Setting up o f the Servants of Extraordinary Ministry o f Planning. It was created two working places as 
Extraordinary Ministry, which should also be a part o f the Ministers’ Council. According to the 2 article of 
delegate-law 1, in 1962, the Minister’s Council should have an important role in administrative tasks, help on 
the political works of the Council’s President; and work, in the name of the Minister Council’s President, as the 
leader of Government in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.
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Name of 
Public 
Office 
Or Ministry
Date and 
Law
Superior Ministry (in case of Departments, Councils or 
Commissions) or M atter of Responsability (in case of 
Ministry).
Presidency Planning Administra 
tion and 
Public 
Affairs
Finance
National
Planning
Coordenation
523
July 1963.
Decree
52256.
Coordination 
related to and 
coordinated by 
the President.
Special
Commissions
for Studies of
Administrati
ve Reform
(COMESTR
A)524.
October
1964.
Decree
54501.
Commission 
constituted by 
twelve high 
profile members 
directly selected 
by the president 
that should work 
under Campos 
supervision.
Advisory
Planning
Council525
(Consplan).
February
1965.
Decree
55722.
Subordinate 
d to the 
Extraordinar 
y Ministry 
of Planning.
Ministry of 
Planning and 
Coordination 
de facto526.
February
1967.
Decree-law
200.
Ministry of
Planning
and
Coordinatio
n.
Ministry of
Planning
and
Coordinatio
n.
Personal 
Development 
Center .
February
1967.
Decree-law 
200, which 
also
changed the 
acronym of 
DASP.
DASP is now 
named
Admisnitrative 
Department of 
Civil Servants 
Personnel528.
523 Coordenagao do Planejamento Nacional.
524 Comissao Especial de Estudos de Reforma Administrativa (COMESTRA).
525 Conselho Consultivo do Planejamento (CONSPLAN).
526 Ministerio do Planejamento e Coordenagao Geral: when set up, this Ministry was composed by the 
departments and other public offices connected to the Extraordinary Ministry for Planning and Economic 
Coordination.
527 Centro de Aperfeigoamento.
528 DASP had its jurisdiction narrowed to civil servants and remained legally subordinated to the Presidency, 
but administratively to the Ministry of Planning and Coordination.
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Economic
Develoment
Council529
May 1974. 
Law 6036.
This council was 
a Presidency 
office, which had 
the task of 
immediate 
advicing the 
President on 
economic issues.
529 Conselho de Desenvolvimento Economico.
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Name of 
Public 
Office 
or Ministry
Date and 
Law
Superior Ministry (in case of Departments, Councils or 
Commissions) or M atter of Responsability (in case of 
Ministry).
Presidency Planning Administra 
tion and 
Public 
Affairs
Finance
Department
of
Planning530
May 1974. 
Law 6036.
The Ministry of 
Planning and 
Coordination was 
transformed into 
Department of 
Planning, as a 
Presidency’s 
office.
Administrati
ve
Department 
of Public 
Service 
(DASP).
July 1975. 
Law 
6228.531
DASP is re­
named
Administrative 
Department of 
Public Service.
Center for
Personnel
Training
Foundation
(FUNCEP)532
December
1980.
Law 6871.
FUNCEP -  
Center for 
Personnel 
Training
Foundation Set up 
, subordinated to 
DASP.
Presidency
Public
Administrati
on
Department
(SEDAP)533.
September 
1986. 
Decree 
93211.534
Special 
Department 
directly 
subordinated to 
the Presidency.
National 
School of
September
1986.
ENAP and 
CEDAM became
530 Secretaria de Planejamento.
531 The mentioned law also extinguished the “Centro de Aperfeigoamento”, at DASP and passed to the later the 
budgeting and extra-budgeting resources from the Coordination of Brasilia Development (CODEBRAS) and 
from the Grupo Executivo da Complementagdo da Mudanga dos Orgaos da Administration Federal para 
Brasilia (GEMUD).
532 The legislation mentioned here did not set up FUNCEP (Fundagao Centro de Formagao de Servidor 
Publico), but authorized the Executive to do so.
533 Secretaria de Administragao Publica da Presidencia da Republica (SEDAP)
534 This same decree extinguished the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP) and transferred to 
the Presidency Public Administration Department the responsibilities and financial and budgeting resources of 
the later. The Presidency Public Administration Department became, also, responsible for the National Program 
o f De-bureaucratisation (Programa Nacional de Desburocratizagao); Department of Administrative 
Modernisation; and, Superintendencia de Construgao e Administragao Imobiliaria (SUCAD).
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Public
Administrati
o n -E N A P -
and Center
for Public
Administrati
on
Development
535
Decree
93277.
members of 
FUNCEP, related 
to the Department 
of Administration 
at the Presidency.
Department
of
Administrati
ve
Modemisatio 
n - SEMOR.
March 1989. 
Law 7739.
SEMOR became 
the Department 
for
Administrative
Modernisation.
535 Escola National de Administrate Publica -  ENAP -  e Centro de Desenvolvimento da Administrate 
Publica.
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Name of 
Public 
Office 
Or Ministry
Date and 
Law
Superior Ministry (in case of Departments, Councils or 
Commissions) or Matter of Responsability (in case of 
Ministry).
Presidency Planning Administra 
tion and 
Public 
Affairs
Finance
Department 
of Federal 
Administrati 
on -S A F 536.
March 1990.
Decree
99180.
The Department 
of Federal 
Administration -  
SAF -  is set up as 
an office of 
immediate 
advisory for 
administration 
matters for the 
Presidency.
ENAP
Foundation.
December
1990.
Law 8140.
FUNCEP is re­
named as 
Foundation 
ENAP, related to 
the Department of 
Federal
Administration-
SAF.
Ministry of 
Labour and 
Planning537
April 1992. 
Provisional 
Measure 
302.
Ministry of 
Labour and 
Planning, 
which
incorporeted
the
Department 
of Federal 
Administrati 
on
Setting up of 
the Ministry 
of Finance; 
re-setting up 
of SAF, and 
setting up of 
Department 
of Planning, 
Bugetting 
and
November
1992.
Law 8490, 
which also 
phased out 
the Ministry 
of
Economics, 
Finance and 
Administrati
Re-setting up of 
the Department of 
Federal
Administration at 
the Presidency 
and setting up of 
SEPLAN - 
Department of 
Planning, 
Bugetting and
Setting up 
of the 
Ministry 
of Finance
536 Secretaria de Administragao Federal -  SAF.
537 Ministerio do Trabalho e Planejamento.
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Coordenation
538
on Coordenation.
Setting up of 
the
Ministry of 
Administrati 
on and State 
Reform 
(MARE); and 
Ministry of 
Planning and 
Budgeting539.
January
1995
Provisional 
Measure 
8 1 3540.
Ministry of
Planning
and
Budgeting
(it
substituted
SEPLAN).
Ministry of 
Administrati 
on and State 
Reform.
538 Secretaria de Planejamento, Orgamento e Coordena$ao - SEPLAN.
539 Ministerio de Administragao Federal e Reforma do Estado -  MARE -  and Ministerio de Planejamento e 
Orsamento.
540 This Provisional Measure also extinguished Law n° 8.490, from 19/11/1992. In 1998, SAF was incorporated 
by MARE.
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Name of 
Public 
Office 
Or Ministry
Date and 
Law
Superior Ministry (in case of Departments, Councils or 
Commissions) or M atter of Responsability (in case of 
Ministry).
Presidency Planning Administra 
tion and 
Public 
Affairs
Finance
Ministry of
Budgeting
and
Management
541
May 1998. 
Provisional 
Measure 
1.911.
The Ministry of Budgeting and Management is 
set up, and gets the responsibility to work with 
the tasks of the Department of Administration 
and Patrimony -  SEAP. The later was abolished 
by the same Provisional Measure.
Setting up of 
the
Department
of
Administrati 
on and 
Patrimony -  
SEA P-at 
the Ministry 
of Planning 
and
Budgetting.
542
January
1999.
Provisional 
Measure 
1795, which 
also phased 
out MARE.
Ministry of Planning and 
Budgetting (MOG).
Ministry of 
Planning, 
Budgeting 
and
Management
(MPOG).
July 1999. 
Provisional 
Measure 
1911-8.
Ministry of Planning and Budgetting (MOG) is 
transformed into Ministry of Planning, 
Budgeting and Management (MPOG).
541 Ministerio de Planejamento, Orgamento e Gestao — MPOG.
542 Secretaria de Estado da Administragao e do Patrimonio — SEA P.
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ANNEX 4: CHRONOLOGIES OF EACH ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM  
CHRONOLOGY: 1937 CASE
1930
March 1 Presidential election
October 3 It begins a Revolution in Rio Grande do Sul, MinasGerais, Paraiba and 
Pernambuco.
October 24 Junta Govemativa put down President Washington Luis and got the 
comand of the government.
November 3 Getulio Vargas is put, by Junta Govemativa, as chief of the Provisional 
Government.
November 5 Osvaldo Aranha is named the minister of the Ministry of Justice.
November 6 Recognition of the new government by many foreign countries.
November 12 The Provisional Government and the dissolution of Congress, States 
Assemblies and Local Councils are institutionalised by decrees.
November 15 Decrees institutionalised the Provisional Government and established 
an intervenor in each state.
November 25 The Interventors Code was institutionalised; the Civil, Commercial, 
Criminal, Electoral, Prison, Administrative, Agricultural, Air, and 
Water Codes were revised; and the Supreme Court was reorganised.
November 28 Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce543 is set up by decree.
December 20 Parameters for Purchasing Commission in the Ministry of Finance, 
were set down by Decree 19512.
1931
January 14 Central Purchasing Commission set up at the Finance Ministry.
February 3 Supreme Court Reform.
February 4 Decree 19667 organised the Ministry of Labour, Industry and 
Commerce.
March 19 Decree 19770 regulated corporativism, specially labour unions.
April 28 Decree 19.926 Organised Foreign Affairs on merit bases
October 3rd In his annual address, Getulio Vargas explicitly mentioned issues 
related to merit-based careers, efficiency gains through rational 
administrative procedures and economic gains from the improvement 
of procurement procedures.
543 Ministerio do Trabalho, Industria e Comercio.
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1932
Febuary 24 New electoral code.
May 14 Decree 20402 set up a commission draw up a first to draft of a
Constitution and established 3 May 1933 as the date for the elections.
Getulio Vargas again publicly mentioned issues related to merit-based 
careers, efficiency gains through rational administrative procedures 
and economic gains from the improvement of procurement procedures.
July 9 Revolution breaks out in Sao Paulo.
September 27 Commander Hercolino de Carvalho e Silva signs the armistice in name
of the Sao Paulo State Army.
1933
May 3 Elections for the National Constituent Assembly.544
September 15 Decree 23150 established a Budgeting Commission at the Ministry of
Finance and sub-budgeting commissions in each ministry.
December 7 The constituint General Cristovao Barcelos suggests transfering the
federal capital to the interior of Brazil, for strategic reasons.
1934
January 1 Getulio Vargas approved the Forest Code (Decree 23793).
February 22 The constitutional commissions meet.
June 28 Decree 24486 institutionalised capacity programs for diplomatic cadres
June 30 The final text for the Constitution is ready for voting.
July 10 Getulio Vargas approved the Mines and Water Codes.
July 16 The new Constitution is institutionalised, including a chapter on public
functionaries.
July 17 Getulio Domeles Vargas is elected the first Constitutional President.
1935
March 23 National Liberation Alliance (Alianca Nacional Libertadora -  ANL) is
founded, in order to fight against fascism.
544 Assembleia Nacional Constituinte.
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May 1 st 
May 14
July 13 
September
1936
March 20
March 30 
June 1
October, 28 
December 16
1937
September 18 
October 1 
November 10
November 24 
December 30
Gois Monteiro sends a letter of resignation to Getulio Vargas, was 
related to conflicts over military wages.
A comission of ten members is set up -  five appointed by Congress 
and five by the Executive Branch -  to deal with four themes: taxes, 
public expenditures, national finances and payroll of military and civil 
public functionaries (Law 51).
The Federal Police Department of the Federal District closes the 
headquarter of ANL.
The sub-commission dealing with federal payrolls diagnosed a chaotic 
situation and suggested a clear course of action to rationalise the 
situation. They presented a proposal containing three cadres of 
personnel -  special nature, federal and regional -  to be analysed by the 
entire commission. Payrolls should be realigned according to 
personnel, not organisations.
The Administration sent a message to the Legislature requesting 
authorisation to withdraw state of siege.
Senate approved state of siege constitutional.
Decrees 871 and 872 established parameters for hiring and paying 
functionaries on a provisional basis.
Law creating the Federal Civil Service Council and rearranging the 
Federal Civil Servants’ Careers. It was the first general classification of 
positions and salaries of Brazilian federal civil service.
State of war extended for another 90 days.
Getulio Vargas declares to the Minister of War his plans to continue as 
head of government.
The state of war is approved by the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate. The President signs the respective decree.
New Constitution institutionalised and Estado Novo (New State) 
implemented. The President made a speech to the nation in which he 
explained the fundamentals of the “New State”. General Deschamps 
Cavalcanti is the new executor in the State of Sao Paulo.
All states except Minas Gerais under federal intervention.
Getulio Vargas institutionalised a decree converting political parties 
into cultural organisations.
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Brazil declared moratorium at the end of 1937.
1938
January 3 
May
July 2 
July 30th
1939
October 28
1940
February 21
April 27 
February 5 
June 5
July 10th
1941
January 30 
March 7
Date settled by the Constitution for presidential elections.
Predominantly “fascist” insurrection led by right wing military groups 
that resented the demobilisation of their political movement with all 
the others.
Setting up of the National Oil Council.
Setting up of DASP do Administrative Department of Public Service) 
by Decree-law 579, with the absorption of the CFSPC and the 
Permanent Standardisation Council.
Institutionalisation of the Civil Servants’ Statute
The Budgeting Commission set up in the Ministry of Finance under 
DASP’s Presidency.
Setting up of Executive Commission of the Port of Para
Setting up of Rio de Janeiro Port Administration
Ministerial meeting governed by Getulio Vargas approves 
colabouration with the U.S.A.
Setting up of the Executive Commission of the National Steel Plan.
Setting up of the National Steel Company.
Setting up of the National Fuel Commission.
Setting up of the Merchant Marine Commission
Setting up of Agriculture and Industrial Sections at Banco do Brasil as 
Export and Import Departments
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1942
March 7 Setting up of the National secutity Commission.
June 1 Setting up of Vale do Rio Doce Company
September 28 Setting up of the National Economic Mobilisation.
December 4 Setting up of the Executive Commission of Fishing, Fruits and Manioc.
August 31 Government declares nationwide state of war.
1945
February 28 Constitutional Law 9 modified the 1937 Constitution.
March 15 Getulio Vargas set up a Commission of Judges and experts to draft the
electoral legislation.
March 26 The Budgeting Commission was set up in the Ministry of Finance
subordinated to DASP.
May 28 Decree-law is signed establishing the national election for 2 December
1945 and state elections 6 for May 1946.
October 3 Setting up of Sao Francisco Hydroelectric Company.
October 29 Getulio Vargas outsted from the Presidency by army command Jose
Linhares becomes new President.
December 2 Elections for the Presidency and some states governors.
1946
January 31 General Eurico Gaspar Dutra becomes President of Brazil.
September 18 New Constitution institutionlaised, extending civil service rights to
provisional functionaries.
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CHRONOLOGY: 1967 CASE
1961
January 31 
August 5 
September 8
1962
September 27 
September 28
1963
June 17
July 11
1964
March 17
March 31 
April 1
April 9 
April 15
Janio Quadros inaugurated as President of Brazil with Joao Goulart as 
Vice-Presidency.
Decree 51152 institutionalised the National Planning Commission, 
directly subordinated to the President.
Joao Goulart takes over as President.
Setting up of two functions of Ministers of Extraordinary Ministry of 
Planning.
Celso Furtado is named the Minister of Extraordinary Ministry of 
Planning.
Law established the wages of civil and military servants of the 
Executive.
Decree 52256 institutionalised the National Planning Coordenation 
subordinated to and coordinated by the President.
In late 1963, the Amaral Peixoto Commission sent an extensive 
diagnosis and to Congress.
Implementation of Law No. 4320, related to budgeting and financial 
execution, cash flow techniques and other minor issues, explicitly 
ignored by TCU.
Military coup detat the Government.
Castelo Branco became President of Brazil.
Roberto de Oliveira Campos became Minister of the Extraordinary 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination.
The military promulgated A to Institucional (Institutional Act) I that 
gave the Executive exceptional powers in order to break the political 
deadlock.
Castelo Branco became president.
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August 21 
August 31 
October 9
November 6
November 17 
December 31
1965
February 2
August
October 3 
October 20 
October 27
November 18
1966
February 5 
February 2
Setting up of the National Housing Bank.
Setting up of the education wage.
Decree 54501 institutionalised the Special Commissions for Studies on 
Administrative Reform (COMESTRA), constituted by twelve high- 
profile members directly selected by the President to work under 
Campo’s supervision.
Setting up of the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de 
Habitagdo -  BNH).
Land Statute, to stimulate land reform.
Setting up of the Central Bank, replacing SUMOC.
New payment schedules re-negotiated with the US Treasury, the IMF, 
the Eximbank, and European creditors.
Implementation of the Advisory Planning Council (CONSPLAN) 
subordinated to the Extraordinary Ministry of Planning. CONSPLAN 
was organised on a corporatist basis.
Fifth draft of a reform proposal, under Beltrao’s command. However, 
many participants did not see it as an improvement over previous 
negotiations.
Elections for state governors.
Launching PAJEG
Institutional Act 2 (AI-2) forced a realignment of the party system, 
creating only two parties: ARENA and MDB.
USAID, IMF, WB, and IADB granted loans to restablish the capital 
needed to guarantee the country’s payment and importation capacity, 
two essential requirements for resumption of growth.
Setting up of an advisory unit directly subordinated to Roberto 
Campos, named Technical Studies Advisory for Administrative 
Reform (ASESTRA). Campos delegated Dias to be responsible for 
resuming coordination and conclusion of the process.
AI-3 determined indirect elections for state governors and defined 
deadlines for the resignation of prospective candidates from executive 
positions.
Approval of the first census of civil servants.
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October 25
1967
January 24 
February 25
March 
March 15
July
December 21
1968
October
October 31
December 13 
December 30
1969
April 9
Costa e Silva named Helio Beltrao as member of the transition team, a 
government in waiting.
Approval of a new Tax Code to modernise Brazil’s financial structures.
Implementation of the new Constitution, which sanctioned the military 
regime and incorporated four institutional acts set down by the military 
command
Decree-law 199 organised the Supreme Audit Agency.
Decree-law 200: set up the Ministry of Planning and Coordination de 
facto -  set up the Personnel Development Center, changed DASP into 
Administrative Department of Civil Personnel. DASP became 
responsible for personnel in the direct administration.
Launching of the Ten-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development.
Costa e Silva, elected President of Brazil by Congress.
Helio Beltrao became Minister of Ministry of Planning and 
Coordination de facto.
The priorities of Costa e Silva’s government presented for public 
discussion.
DASP was placed under Beltrao’s supervision in respect to all issues 
concerning administrative reform.
National workshop in Rio de Janeiro to mobilise public opinion around 
the public administration issue.
Decree 63.500 set up an executive structure -  Administrative Reform 
Office (ERA) -  to implement the reform.
Institutional Act No. 5.
Complementary Act 40/68 which reduced the share of the states and 
municipalities from ten to five per cent of the funds from industrial and 
income taxes.
Setting up of the Civil Servants’ Administrative Reform Commission.
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October 17 A Constitutional amendment allowed vertical and horizontal internal
promotion mechanisms and determined exceptions for selection of 
public functionaries.
October 30 Emilio Garrastazu Medici was named President of Brazil.
Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso substitued Minister Helio Marcus Penna 
Beltrao at the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, de facto.
1970
December 10 Implementation of a new career law, re-creating internal promotion
mechanisms.
1974
Brazil goes through a period of economic growth known as the 
“economic miracle” (Milagre Brasileiro).
March 15 Ernesto Geisel became President of Brazil.
May 1 The Economic Development Council was set up.
The Ministry of Planning and Coordination became the Department of 
Planning, directly subordinated to the Presidency.
May 2 Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso becomes Minister of the Department of
Planning.
December 11 Public sector employees must be contracted via private labour
legislation, except for the core inspectors, police and judicial careers.
1975
July 15 DASP is re-named Administrative Department of Public Service.
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CHRONOLOGY: 1988 CASE
1985
March 15
April 21 
July 1 
July 3
November 27
1986
January
February 2
February 27 
February 
March 10
March 
September 3
Beginning of Jose Samey’s term of office as President of Brazil.
Setting up of the Extraordinary Ministry of Admnistration.
DASP became subordinated to the Extraordinary Ministry of 
Admnistration.
Joao Sayad is named Ministry of the Department of Planning. 
Tancredo Neves died.
Implementation of the norms for the 1985 elections.
Setting up of the Commission of Coordination of the Federal 
Administration Reform Plan, consisting of the Minister of 
Extraordinary Ministry of Administration, as president; a member of 
DASP as vice-president; one member from the National De- 
bureaucratisation Program; and one member from the Department of 
Administration.
Setting up of norms for the National Constituent Assembly.
Sub-groups of the General Commission, by theme, presented their 
conclusions for a Reform the Federal Administration.
The issues related to the National De-bureaucratisatiori Program 
became the responsibility of the Extraordinary Ministry of 
Administration.
The Cruzado Plan is launched.
Dissolution of the General Commission.
Setting up of the Secretary of Treasury at the Ministry of Finance and 
the Central Office of Internal Control was phased out. The Office of 
the Treasury was considered one of the central offices of planning, 
coordination and internal control.
Alves invited Marcelino -  representative of the Ministry of Planning in 
the Commission -  to be his vice-minister, as part of a broader 
jurisdictional redefinition.
Setting up of the National School for Public Administration (ENAP); 
Centre for Public Administration Development; the national personnel 
database; a payroll management system; setting up of the auditing of 
personnel procedures; setting up of new mechanisms to monitor the 
SOEs; and setting up of administrative routines of the national 
attorney.
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1987
February 1
March 24 
April 
April 10
April 19 
June 12th 
July 23
November 
December 21
1988
January 6
January 22 
February
April 
October 5
The Ministry of Administration was converted into the Public 
Administration Department (SEDAP-PR), directly subordinated to the 
Presidency.
Setting up of the Executive Group for Administrative Reform 
(GERAP). The Commission for Coordination of the Federal 
Administration Reform is subordinated to GERAP.
The Congress that had been elected into November 1986 was 
transformed in a National Constituent Assembly.
Anibal Teixeira de Souza replaced Minister Joao Sayad.
Minister Gilson Funaro was replaced by Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira.
The offices of the Indirect Administration must be subordinated to the 
ministry that deals with its respective public activity. Law No. 7.596 
outlined the features required for an arganisation to be considered a 
public foundation. The law also established a single career and job plan 
for teachers and other functionaries of public universities.
Luiz Carlos Bresser Gon9alves Pereira became Minister of Finance.
Implementation of the Bresser Economic Plan.
Classification of positions and wages of public careers.
Setting up of the careers of Finance and Budget Analyst and Audit 
Analyst.
Holanda’s resignation.
Minister Bresser Pereira lift the Ministry of Finance.
Mailson da Nobrega became Minister of Finance and adopted orthodox 
measures.
Joao Batista de Abreu was named Minister of the Planning Office.
Aluizio Alves aligned himself with the Ministries of Labour and the 
Military Forces to curb an attempt to freeze the wages of the public 
functionaries.
Alves was forced to agree with a two-month freeze of salary.
Promulgation of the new Constitution. The Transitory Provisions 
included a reference to an urgent need for an administrative reform to 
be carried out eighteen months after the promulgation of the 
Constitution. The checks and balances among the three branches of 
government were re-established.
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October 
November 15
1989
January 15 
March 16
October 25
October 6 
November 15
1990
March 15
April 12 
June
June 15
June 18
SEPLAN-PR sent two proposals -  the new Civil Servants’ Statute and 
a new career plan -  to Congress (Bills 4058 and 4059).
Elections for mayors and local councils.
President Samey announced a new economic plan named the summer 
plan.
Setting up of the Department of Administrative Modernisation -  
(SEMOR.) SEPLAN took over the responsibilities handled by SEDAP, 
after this latter was phased out.
Alves sent Samey his reform proposal, which called for the 
establishment of a Single Juridical Regime for all functionaries in the 
direct administration, reclassification of civil servants as functionaries 
hired on the basis of private autonomous government agencies and 
public foundations, a draft of a civil servants’ statute, extension of 
tenure, retirement, a careers plan and other benefits usually guaranteed 
to civil servants.
Setting up of the career of Public Manager.
Elections for Presient and Vice-president of Brazil.
Inauguration of Fernando Collor de Mello as President of Brazil.
Department of Federal Administration (SAF) was established as an 
immediate advisory office for administrative matters for the 
Presidency, with ministerial status.
President Collor merged SEPLAN-PR with the Ministry of Finance 
and set up the Ministry of Economy.
Implementation of the Collor Economic Plan I.
The Executive tried to avoid the approval of the bill for the Single 
Juridical Regime, belonged to Congress, by suggesting new legislation 
(Proposal 5504/1990), re-instating the validity of the 1952 Civil 
Servants’ Statute.
Presidential Deere 99300 allowed the government to put public sector 
functionaries on compulsory leave while receiving salaries 
proportional to their time on the job (neither the Legislative nor the 
Supreme Court approved this measure.)
Deadline established by SAF for all ministries to cut 30% of personnel 
across the board.
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August 
December 11
The Chamber of Deputies rejected Proposal 5504/1990 sent by the 
Executive.
Setting up of the Single Juridical Regime, detailing the constitutional 
provisions regarding the new civil service statute and, particularly, the 
reclassification of public sector employees into civil servants.
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CHRONOLOGY: 1998 CASE
1992
October 5
October 19 
November 19
December 29
1993
April 21
1994
March 3
March 29
1995
January 1
March 27
1996
Minister of Finance Marcilio Marques Moreira was substituted by 
Gustavo Krause Gongalves Sobrinho.
Fernando Henrique Cradoso becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Paulo Robert Haddad is named Minister of SEPLAN-PR.
Setting up of the Ministry of Finance; re-setting up of SAF and setting 
up of the Department of Planning, Buget and Coordination.
Vice-president, Itamar Franco, takes over the presidency from 
Fernando Collor de Melo.
Plebiscite to define the country’s system of government.
Benedito Clayton Veras Alcantara substituted Minister Alexis 
Stepanenko substitued at SEPLAN-PR.
The Finance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, implemented the 
macro-economic stabilisation plan, the Real Plan.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso began his first term of office as President 
of Brazil.
Pedro Sampaio Malan became the new Minister of Finance.
Jose Serra was named the Minister of Planning and Budgeting.
Setting up of the Ministry of Administration and State Reform 
(MARE) and the Ministry of Planning and Budgeting (replacing 
SEPLAN).
Camata Law institutionalised the limits for expenditures on Civil 
servants payroll.
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October 6 Elections for mayors and city councils.
1997
June 4
July 10 
September 9
1998
March 30
April 7 
May 15
May 27
June 4
October 4 
December 15
1999
January 1
Constitutional Amendment 16 allowed the President, governors and 
mayors to be re-elected for a second term of office.
Setting up of the Program of Volunteer Resignation for Civil Servants 
{Programa de Desligamento Voluntario -  PDV) to guarantee better 
management of public finances and availability of state reform.
Setting up of the program that determined the conditions to begin the 
process of privatisation in Brazil {Programa Nacional de 
Desestatizagao).
Paulo Paiva replaced Antonio Kandir as Minister of Planning and 
Budgeting.
Setting up of bonuses for merit for the careers of Finance, Audit, 
Budgeting and Planning Analyst.
Setting up and institutionalisation of the caracteristics for companies to 
become social organisations and setting up of the National Publicity 
Program {Programa Nacional de Publicizagdo).
Re-organisation of the ministries and setting up of institutional 
conditions for the implmentation of executive agencies for autonomous 
government agencies and foundations.
Setting up of the careers at the Central Bank.
Constitutional Amendment No. 19. Civil servants lost their full tenure 
rights, for the norm established conditions for the civil servants to 
remain in the careers.
Elections for President and Vice-president of Brazil, state governors 
and vice-governors, state and federal deputies and senators.
Alterations of the Social Security system, by Constitutional 
Amendment 20. This amendment was later modified in December 
2003 by a further constitutional amendment, presented by the Da Silva 
Administration since the reform of the system was not complete with 
Amendment 20.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso began his second term as President of 
Brazil.
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May 6 
May 31
July 19 
July 30
2000
February 22 
May 5
Setting up of the Department of Administration and Property -  (SEAP) 
- of the Ministry of Planning and Budgetting.
Pedro Pullen Parente is named Minister of Planning, Budgeting and 
Management.
Regulation of the maximum expenditures on payroll, considering the 
current net revenue of the Federal Government, the states and the 
municipalities respectively.
Martus Tavares was named Minister of Planning, Budgeting and 
Management.
Ministry of Planning and Budgeting (MOG) became the Ministry of 
Planning, Budgeting and Management (MPOG).
Regulation of legal conditions for employees to be hired by the Public 
sector by CLT. Employees hired under the CLT may not be considered 
public servants for they are public employees.
Supplementary Law 101 provided regarding public finances 
concerning responsibility for fiscal management of municipalities, the 
state, and the Federal Government. The law emphasised the importance 
of planning and budgeting.
502
ANNEX 5: BRAZIL: A N  OVERVIEW
Introduction
Brazil is an intriguing country that triggers curiosity around the world because of its unique 
features: the 5th largest nation in population and the 5th largest in geographical size, the 
largest tropical forests, the most variety of fauna and flora in earth, the biggest reservoirs of 
freshwater in the planet.
Brazilian potential is legendary as well as doubts about the country’s capacity to achieve its 
alleged destiny. The country’s biggest social wound is by far its inequality rates -  
approximately 0.6 in terms of the Gini coefficient, one of the highest of world. Brazil had 
one of the highest economic growth rates in the 20th century, together with Japan and Korea. 
But in the last two decades of the century stagnation and poor growth rates became the norm. 
Sustainable growth became an apparently insurmountable challenge given the incapacity of 
the country ensuring requisites for long term growth: quality of human capital formation, 
investment climate, innovative capacities, and macroeconomic stability (Thomas, 2006).
The approached adopted here favored the political dimension of the country five hundreds 
history. It is probably the most useful one for a reader that is not familiarized with Brazil. 
The thesis did not explore possible potential connections between inequality rates and of 
sustainable growth rates with the quality of public sector institutions despite its focus on 
public management reforms. But the author firmly believes that they are plausible and need 
further investigation.
The appendix is useful because the four cases refer to four slices of the country’s history in 
the last century. The background of Brazilian history helps readers to understand the reality 
of the country until the 1930s -  that is why more space is dedicated to Brazilian history until 
1930 - and to fill the gaps between each historical period analyzed. The broader context in 
which the episodes occurred is important to understand long term tendencies as well as 
Brazilian political culture. The events in the intervals provide an idea of the background 
political context in which public management reforms were incubated. Figure 1 shows a map 
of Brazil today.
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Janeiro and Maranhao), Holland (in Pernambuco), and Spain (in Sao Paulo and Santa 
Catarina) to ensure control over Brazilian territory.
Wood was the most important export product until its replacement by sugar cane in the end 
of the sixteenth century. Brazil became the biggest world exporter of sugar in the seventeenth 
century. The country was transformed in a single-crop plantation economy thanks to an 
export-oriented regime that combined large landowners’ properties with slavery workforce. 
The international trade was a triangulation transaction involving the Portuguese Crown and 
the Brazilian and African colonies. At the end of the seventeenth century two combined 
phenomena took place: the decline of the price of sugar because of increasing competition 
derived from Antilles production and the discovery of gold and diamonds in the region of 
Minas Gerais. Although a new colonial cycle began, it was based on the same social structure 
than the previous one
The Portuguese colonial state resembled its Iberian matrixes: centralist, formalist, and 
commanded by appointees recruited by the Crown within the ascendant nobility. Two 
differences deserve mention, however. Portuguese administrative controls were looser than 
those practiced by the Spanish neighbours and a crescent Creole population -  descent of 
Portuguese but Brazilians by birth -  began to be formed and to act as a distinctive political 
player in the colonial game. Church dominance was absolute until the transition to the 
nineteenth century when it became a threat to the Crown economic interests.
The second part of the eighteenth century was marked by the combination of different sort of 
processes that reshaped the status of the relationships between Portugal and its colony. First, 
Spain recognized Portuguese property of lands occupied beyond the limits established in the 
Tordesilhas Treaty - including large Amazon, Center-West and South pieces of the Brazilian 
Territory (see Figure 2) - in exchange of a clear delimitation of the South borders in the 
Missions Region. Second, Portugal’s economy faced serious problems caused by the 
previous wars, against Spain in the Plata region, by the demand for resources to rebuild 
Lisbon - devastated by an earthquake in 1755 - and by the gradual exhaustion of Brazilian 
mines. Third, Portugal decided to embark on industrialization processes at the same time that 
confined Brazil to a colonial exports function, in a moment that Brazilian exports were 
answering for more than sixty per cent of Portugal’s trade surplus (Skidmore, 30-31). Finally, 
the Brazilian colonial elite began to develop their own interests which were distinct of those 
sponsored by the Portuguese Crown. Not surprisingly the conflict of interests around taxes, 
the influence of the Enlightenment ideas, and the example from the United States favored the 
occurrence of insurgences against the Portuguese rule.
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An unprecedented event in terms o f colonial history took place in the early 1800s: the whole
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The transplant o f state structures that replaced colonial simple administrative facilities 
influenced deeply the shape of Brazilian public institutions. It did not change however the 
social-economic political structure: landlords preserved their power and their interests -  
including the maintenance of slavery - were not hurt by the independence.
3. Empire (1822-1889)
Pedro I government was marked by a sequence of turbulent events: the war against the 
Portuguese forces, the National Constituency Assembly that was dissolved by the Emperor 
who was unhappy with the secondary role attributed to himself, the “granted” constitution 
marked by administrative centralization, the civil wars against separatist forces, notably 
republicans in Pernambuco, the loss of a south part of Brazilian territory to a new country -  
Uruguay -  after military defeat, the tensions between the Brazilians and the originally 
Portuguese elite, and finally, the dramatic events involving the Royal Family in Portugal. 
Weakened and surrounded by political enemies Pedro I returned to Portugal in 1831 to 
assume his position in the throne after the death of Dom Joao VI and left the country under a 
caretaker regent because his son was just a child at that time.
In international terms Brazil aligned itself with Great Britain, in part of Portuguese 
inheritance in part because of the way new arrangements were established such as the 
recognition of the independence in exchange of Britain free access to Brazilian ports. This 
alliance had a price. The country assumed Portuguese debts -  contracted to fund the war 
against Brazilian independence. Britain had special tariffs -  even better than those granted to 
Portugal -  regarding international trade. The traffic of slaves should be banned according to 
treaty signed by the Brazilian government and the British Crown545. British affairs should be 
judged by British courts in Brazil. Thanks to British incomparable advantages in banking, 
shipping, communications, and insurance -  not to mention the military power of its navy -  
Brazil became part of Britain sphere of influence, a manifestation of the so-called “informal 
imperialism” (Skidmore, 42).
The Regency period (1831-1840) was marked by a succession of regents, a symptom of the 
political instability that dominated the country after Pedro I departure. The Regency 
consolidated national institutions and tried to promote some degree of power decentralization 
to the national provinces through the adoption of a federalist legislation in 1834. The 
consequences were disastrous with the eruption of a sequence of provincial revolts in 
Pemambuco(l 832-1835), Para (1835-1840), Bahia (1837-1838), Maranhao (1838-1841) and 
Rio Grande do Sul (1835-1845), usually fuelled by a mix of separatist aspirations, social 
tensions, republican ideals, and political conflicts. The sequence of regencies ended with the 
declaration of the majority of Pedro II, then a fourteen years old teenager, that coincided with 
the revocation of the decentralization experiment attempted by the Additional Act of 1834.
545 The expression “to be seen by the English” (“para ingles ver”) dates from this episode. The Brazilian 
government never intended to enforce the new legislation. But in the eyes o f the British the enactment of a new 
legislation specifically oriented to ban the traffic o f slaves was an unequivocal sign of serious a serious 
commitment.
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The period that followed the wars of Brazilian independence from Portugal was marked by 
military demoralization546. The liberals of the Regency period who forced the resignation of 
Pedro I in 1831 were anti-military and dismantled the army (Schulz, 1994: 25). The 
government coercive force was the National Guard, the group of regional forces and militias 
that obeyed the state governors. The political rural basis was controlled by the “colonels”547. 
However, the persistence of regional conflicts during the 1830s forced the national 
government to reorganize the army and precipitated Pedro II inauguration.
The recentralization move was facilitated by the death of Pedro I in 1834. Three regional 
uprisings in Sao Paulo (1842), Minas Gerais (1842) and Pernambuco (1848-1850) were 
crushed by the imperial forces. At the end of the 1840s the monarchy was consolidated, as 
well as Brazilian unity. The period of stability was marked by political stability, thanks to a 
rotation between Conservatives and Liberals in power, under Pedro II auspices. The Emperor 
became a symbol of national unity and country instability in contrast with the recently 
independent unstable Spanish-American Republics.
Coffee replaced gold and diamonds as the main Brazilian exports. It was cultivated in Rio de 
Janeiro in the beginning but later it began a march to the west, especially to the more suitable 
lands of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. Slavery was crucial to the exploitation although the 
traffic had been banned since 1826. At that time Brazil had the largest slave population in the 
world but their reproduction conditions were not enough to ensure the growth of the stock 
given their terrible life conditions and low life expectancy (Skidmore, 52-53).
The approval of the 1850 ban took place for several reasons but the British pressure was the 
decisive one, evidenced by the arrest of hundreds of ships in the years that preceded the 
approval of the new legislation by the Brazilian cabinet. The shortage of labor in the 
Southeast took place at the same time that abolitionism gained ground in the public debate. 
Paradoxically, coffee had become an important source of revenues for the Empire. The 
economic prosperity attracted international investments, notably British, to the country, 
especially to the infrastructure sector. The main solution adopted by businessmen was to 
import immigrants from Italy, Portugal, Spain, German, and Japan to work on the coffee 
plantations.
The system of landownership in Brazil remained the same: with a strong concentration of the 
property of land. In 1850 the approval of the “Land Law” produced enduring consequences 
to Brazilian economic history. After the approval of the new legislation land could be 
obtained exclusively by purchase or payment of taxes to accommodate previous 
arrangements, but not via de fact physical possession. In doing so the legal recognition of the 
ownership of the land became a matter of power politics and formal landowners’ patronage, 
not social occupation or small farmers’ exploitation -  as the U.S. march to the west 
encouraged
546 The army succeed in the Independence War but lost pieces of the national territory in the South with the 
Independence of Uruguay, supported by Argentina and by Britain.
547 The term “coronelismo” express “the political dominance of the landowners and their allies, so called 
because major landowners had historically been granted the rank in National Guard. Coronelismo express a 
distinctive pact” (Cammack, 1985: 55) in which local bosses support state or national candidates in exchange 
for nominations and resources allocation in that region. They were the local caciques who controlled rural 
politics since the Empire until the decline of the rural economy.
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The eruption of the Paraguay War in 1864/1865 interrupted the stability period. Fractious 
politics in Uruguay dragged Paraguay on the one side and Argentina and Brazil on the other 
side in an unexpected war. Despite the small country size, the Paraguayan army was well 
trained and equipped while Brazilian army was not a professional force, deprived from 
logistics capacities required to a war period. The war was won after six year of combats -  
mainly between Brazil and Paraguay - but at enormous costs to both countries.
The episode changed the country. Slaves that fought during the war gained their freedom. 
Pedro II abolished slavery in Paraguay, a clear sign of the inevitable outcome to be faced by 
Brazil later on. The military -  humiliated by the initial setbacks and amateurism of the armed 
forces - developed a huge suspicion regarding civil politics given the occurrence of several 
events in which war objectives were subordinated to parochial interests. The Emperor lost its 
respectability and aura because of two events: a) his personal involvement in the war 
endgame, marked by atrocities that had their necessity contested, and b) a political coup that 
enabled the Conservatives to form a subservient government despite being in minority in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Not surprisingly, one important sub-product of the war was the 
creation of the Republicans Party in 1871, thanks to the loss of the Emperor’s charisma and 
neutrality.
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The military organization changed in order to follow European standards on the XIX 
Century, based on merit and seniority. The introduction of the principle of merit transformed 
the representation of the military in favor of the gifted and talented middle class and poor 
officials. These young military were abolitionists, republicans, industrialists, protectionists, 
and politically liberal. They attributed the responsibility for inequality, injustice, and 
underdevelopment to the corrupted political system of the empire. The war against Paraguay 
fed the resentments and suspicions of the officialdom that the elite interests did not coincide 
with the country needs. The war was fought by the military, ex-slaves, and ex-prisoners, not 
by the members of the rural elite549. The war also revealed that the National Guard550 was not 
prepared to provide qualified men for military aims, which strengthen the argument pro a 
professional army551. The so-called “military question”552 irrupted in the 1880s through a
548 In 1850 a new law defined a new promotion system. The aristocratic system allowed promotions on basis o f 
personal relationships. The provincial governors were responsible for the nominations. The old system was 
replaced by merit and seniority principles but kept some room of manoeuvre for clientelism and favoritism.
54 The Anglo-Brazilian Times (Schulz, 1994: 59) echoed military critics to the political elite who replaced their 
sons with slaves or resorted to bribery to evade recruitment.
550 The National Guard was increasingly constituted through compulsory recruitment -  “the patria volunteers” -  
and ex-convicted. It failed in reproducing its French model because it did not attract emergent middle classes 
but militias on service of rural landlords. It was not National except in its name because in fact it was 
commanded by the provincial “presidents”, a title revealing of the status attributed to the regional governors 
during the Empire and Old Republic.
551 Further important reforms occurred in the military forces during the 1870s. The wages were raised. The 
Military Academy was empowered. The first national school of engineer was created by military. Some career 
mechanisms were introduced. The government created the compulsory military service, an important measure 
that solved the size problem at the same time that replaced discretionary corrupted practices by random 
lotteries. The military. Meanwhile positivism became increasingly influential within the military. In the 1850s, 
almost one fifth of the teachers of the Military Academy were positivists, deeply influenced by Comte’s ideas, 
which were beginning to decline in France. The Republican ideals were also boosted by Napoleon III defeat by 
the Prussians and the emergence of the French Third Republic
552 The hierarchy was hurt by a increasingly politicised number o f promotions, nominations, and transferences. 
Incidents involving military forces occurred around the country because of different reasons like abolitionists 
acts, pamphlets campaigns, in disciplinary acts, arbitrary attitudes, low wages, personal clashes, and military 
policy conflicts. The later reflected an increasing sympathy for the Prussian, North-American, and British
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sequence of clashes between the military and the civil authorities. The military demands were 
basically the end of the corruption practices that marked the Empire bi-party system, 
modernization of the bureaucracy, progress via industrialization and end of slavery, and 
better working conditions which included wages and equipment. Stimulated by the 
abolitionists and the republicans the military jumped decisively into politics.
In 1887 Dom Pedro II fell seriously ill and practically transferred his governance powers to 
his daughter. The progressive rural elite, especially from Sao Paulo, the most important 
economic region of the country gave up from slavery in practice. Slaves did not represent 
more than six per cent of the population accordingly to the Census of 1887 (Schulz, 1994: 
113). Immigration was the solution found by the landlords to solve their economic problems. 
Abolitionists as well as civil republicans asked the military for interfering in politics. The 
politicization was inevitable in face of the refusal of the army officials in repressing slaves’
r o
rebellions. The coalition formed by the landlords’ producers of coffee from Sao Paulo , the 
press of Rio de Janeiro -  the federal capital at that time -  and the military was decisive and in 
13th May slavery was finally extinguished.
The return of Pedro II from health treatment in Paris, a last attempt to change the cabinet and 
a governmental electoral victory did not stop the tide. In September 1989 the government 
decided to expand the National Guard cadres to counter balance the military importance, but 
it was too late. Deodoro da Fonseca554 led a military coup d'etat in November 1889. The time 
of the republic had come thanks to the political atmosphere fed by the press and by the new 
civil and economic elite555. The transition from the Monarchy to the Republic was a re­
alignment of the elite, an accommodation within peers that occurred in the context of a 
military coup d ’etat (Schulz, 1994).
4. The oligarchic “Old Republic” (1889-1930)
The passage from a parliamentary monarchy to a presidential federal republic under military . 
rule was marked by instability on the political, economic, and military fronts. International 
observers described it as a period of “military government combined with nepotism”
models of organizing the military forces in opposition to the French way, which included the National Guard. 
The recruitment policy was the core of the divergences. Interestingly, a Tocquevillean argument was quoted in 
the Army debates about the problem of representation o f the military: the elite did not join the army because the 
army was demoralized, but the army was demoralized precisely because the elite did not join it (Schulz, 1994: 
104).
553 The increasing importance of Sao Paulo entrepreneurial elite poised new problems for the Monarchy like the 
religious question. In order to accelerate immigration from white peasants from protestant European countries 
issues like religion freedom and civil marriages were at the top of their agenda. Another demand was financial. 
Sao Paulo expected the government to pay for the immigration costs until that moment funded by the regional 
elite. In contrast, Rio de Janeiro elite demanded financial compensation for losses provoked by the end of 
slavery.
554 Deodoro was one o f the most popular and senior officials of the military. His leadership was articulated 
specially by Benjamin Constant, the most important republican of the army (Castro, 2000).
555 The initial measures o f the provisional government attended the coalition of interests that supported the new 
government. They included the separation of the Church from the state, the nationalization o f all foreigner 
immigrants, special credit and financial facilities for the farmers and a package of measures for the military 
(expansion of the number, rise of wages, retirement generous schemes, and compulsory retirement of the 
majority o f officials committed with the previous regime).
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(Graham, 1977: 368). There were not national projects or ideologies556. The National 
Constituency Assembly (1890) was dominated by the Republican Party of Sao Paulo (PRP) 
federalist agenda, incorporated at the 1891 Constitution557. At that time inflation 
disestablished the economic situation in a sensitive political moment558. The military were 
still identified with the national unity of the country and had historically been the 
representative of the centralist tradition of Brazilian politics. The state elections of 1892 were 
won by the political forces aligned with the incumbent government. Military officials were 
elected governors and many states. 559 The economic crisis was controlled thanks to a tough 
macroeconomic policy560. From that period on, the PRP commanded the economy. Prudente 
de Moraes561 presidency (1895-1898) marked the end of the military cycle562.
The “old republic” was defined by the combination of an ultra provincial’s “presidentialism” 
-  state governors were called president of provinces - with a federalist provincialism 
(Abrucio, 1998: 36-7). There was a clear hierarchy between the states and an informal -  but 
effective -  agreement about the internal control of states politics by their own regional elite 
without national intrusion. As a result of these institutional arrangements politics was 
dominated by state parties of the most populated states that rarely lost any election.
Federalism meant primarily autonomy of the states, not its coalition around a national project 
and its subordination to a national instance of supra-states government. Federalism meant 
also financial autonomy and respect to the political control that the regional elite exercised 
over their states. The state Republican parties were in fact political monopolies (Lamounier, 
1999). There were no national parties. Coalitions in Congress were built on basis of regional
556 The “positivism” influence expressed by the national flag slogan “Order and Progress” did not go much 
beyond some sectors o f the military.
557 The main decentralization decisions included a major share of taxes for the states, state capacity of  
contracting external debts, “estadualizacao” of the national government lands, and attribution to organize 
municipalities and nominate appointees. Moreover, the National Guard was also declared a state jurisdiction 
and the legislation of compulsory recruitment for the universal military service was abolished. The volunteer 
and forced recruitment was reintroduced against the will o f military elected to be Congress representatives.
558 The trigger was the creation of private banks with the capacity of producing currency detached from gold 
reserves but based on public papers. An explosive combination o f easy credit and patronage practices eroded 
the political capital o f the government.
559 The National Constituency Assembly had already elected an expressive number of military for the Congress, 
most of them young reformers who succeed in bringing their agenda to party politics. In the executive, however, 
they adjusted themselves to oligarchic politics. Those who would remain in politics for decades were those who 
gave up from their reformist ideals and played politics as “business as usual”.
560 Rodrigues Alves, the finance minister, adopted a tougher economic policy and restrained credit at the same 
time that re-established external credibility. The Congress attempted timid economic reforms but was paralysed 
by conflicts between industrialists x importers, landlords x industrialists, bankers x landlords / industrialists. On 
17 December 1892 Floriano Peixoto decreed the merger of the banks with issuing power and created the Bank 
of Republic of Brazil whose board was nominated by the President. This measure stabilized the market and 
calmed the international bankers.
561 The new president, Prudente de Moraes faced several difficulties to consolidate himself as President -  
specially the Canudos irredentism conflict and his vice-president conspiracies -  but at the end of his mandate 
the country was solidly under civil control, shared by a president that controlled the Congress and governors 
that elected the president.
562 The cycle of military intervention ended because of four reasons: the discredit provoked by the economic 
crisis, the increasing dependence o f the Executive o f the PRP to raise funds for the Rio Grande do Sul 
regionalist civil war, the politicisation o f the military which eroded hierarchical and merit based principles, and, 
finally, the emergence o f  civil consensus against the authoritarian tendencies demonstrated by Deodoro as well 
as Floriano. The seriousness o f the conflict in the South and Floriano incapacity o f solving it combined with his 
decision of supporting a problematic ally undermined his political continuity ambitions.
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alliances. The governors were the key linkage in the national level through the policy of 
governors and majority coalitions in the Congress, and in the regional and local level through 
the relationship with the “colonels” and urban local caciques.
The oligarchies won the military on economic and political grounds thanks to their 
cohesiveness and strong control of the Congress. The regional political oligarchies took over, 
based on their command of local politics of rural areas, “political localism”564, 
intergovernmental patronage, and tight political control of the voters’ basis. The period was 
known as “politics of governors” or “coffee with milk”565 because of the effectiveness of the 
alliance forged by Sao Paulo (coffee) and Minas Gerais (milk), practically sufficient to 
control the Congress566.
Clientelism continued to be the key political task during the republic as well as it was during 
the monarchy, creating roots in the new urban centres as well as in rural areas. Finally it 
penetrated even the military as well as the new economic elite who did not prescient the 
power resources involved in this practice. Not surprisingly, even the so-called reformers such 
as the military or civil leaders could not resist to its appeal given its embeddedness and 
effectiveness as governance mechanism (Carvalho, 2000). Given that they did not develop 
alternative forms of consolidating an impersonal state and were forced to play according to 
the dominant rules, they sanctioned the perception that the “real and persistent function of the 
state was to provide jobs and distribute positions”. (Graham, 1968: 347-8)
In the 1920s the political centralisation need against the imbalanced, dominant federalism 
emerged. The basis of the Old Republic institutional arrangements eroded with the 
emergence of urban classes, secret vote campaign, infant industrialization during the period 
of the First World War, macro economic policy centralisation, and army modernisation. At 
the end of the decade the national government was undermined by four forces: the increasing 
pressures of the military forces -  specially middle rank officials - against corruption , the
563 The state governors had two instruments to strength their power: the regional security forces and the 
appointed positions. In fact, all the public sector was constituted by appointed positions except the army.
564 Page (1991) defined political localism as “as the influence that political elite have in national decision­
making arenas so far as these affect the locality”.
565 The republican rupture in 1889 empowered the states with almost dictatorial executive powers. The 
incumbent governors were named “president of states”. In Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais the incumbent majority 
parties stayed in power for decades.
566 The national and regional governments emerged as solutions negotiated with these local leaders who had 
practically full control over their constituencies. The political power of the local leaders was tested by elections 
from time to time but rotation was practically impossible given the asymmetry of power resources. The parties 
were traders of favours, without ideological consistency as their regionalist character revealed.
567 As in the Skowronek (1982: 10) model, the combined impact of crisis, both political and economic, class 
conflict (urban classes -  workers, middle classes and entrepreneurs) and increasing complexity (development o f  
productive forces and scale o f the national problems) provoked the erosion of the dominant oligarchy system.
568 A rebellion irrupted on 5 July 1922 against the use of military troops to intervene in the Northeast regional 
politics. The young rebels from the Fort of Copacabana, basically lieutenants, commanded an insurrection 
which intended to refuse the army’s honour. The revolt did not take off. The government successfully repressed 
it but the episode marked the birth o f “tenentismo” (“lieutenantism”) the influential movement that would take 
over the army in the follow years. In 1924 a new lieutenant insurrection irrupted in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande 
do Sul. After being defeated in the state capitals they merged in Parana in 1925, where the legendary Prestes 
Column was bom. They -  never more than 1500 people - marched 24.000 km through Brazil’s backlands until 
its dissolution some years later. Lieutenantism was a vague movement. Fausto (2000: 187) identified the young 
officialdom as heirs of the “Salvationists”, an interest group constituted by civilians and military who 
surrounded Hermes da Fonseca presidency that was concerned with the preservation o f the republican
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liberal constitutionalists and the new classes linked to the urban and industrialisation 
processes569, the external shock of 1929570, and the impact of the new alliances forged 
between the governors of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraiba and Sao Paulo liberal 
dissidents571. When the rebels upraised the military high officials forced Washington Luis 
resignation in face of the risk of a civil war. As in the proclamation of the Republic and in 
many subsequent critical crossroads of Brazilian history, the military performed “the role of 
final arbiter in domestic politics.” (Skidmore, 1967: 7). Thanks to Vargas572 political skills he
institutions. They perceived themselves as the only force organised that was capable of moralising politics, 
representing the entire nation, and, most o f all, defending the public interest. Their anti-corruption claims were 
continually repeated until taking over public opinion and political sectors. At the same time, the military were 
going through slow but substantial changes at that time. Groups o f  officials were sent to German before the I 
World War and other groups to France ten year later. They represented the renewal o f the old military ethos, 
deeply influence by positivism. The emphasis shifted from military officers as engaged citizens to professional 
soldiers. The military rebels of the 1920s did not have a political project, however. But they channelled their 
discontentment to some specific concerns. Career rigidity, for instance, was the main military source of 
dissatisfaction. Nationalism and anti-corruption claims were two other main flags that guaranteed middle class 
wide spread support. “Their world view was primarily shaped by their socialization within the armed forces” 
(Fausto, 188). Nevertheless, they were not capable of commanding an alliance against the national government 
because they were a minority within the army, straight jacketed by the hierarchy, and could not galvanize the 
public opinion.
569 New social groups were emerging at that time: the middle classes (liberal professions, employees, military 
officials, urban commercial owners), urban employees, industrial workers and industrial entrepreneurs. The new 
urban classes claimed clean elections and more respect for liberal rights. They were the group “which felt most 
deeply the obsolescence of the elitist politics in Brazil before 1930.” (Skidmore, 1967: 12) At the same time 
social movements flourished and their interests included elements o f foreign ideologies like fascism, anarchism, 
and socialism (Faoro, 1958:247), none o f which were contemplated in the dominant rural coalition o f power.
570 The external shocks, which affected the economy o f the country dramatically, were based decisively on the 
export of coffee. The prices fell sharply after the Wall Street crash and the retreat o f the international trade 
market. The impact on the public finances was dramatic, specially because the costs of maintaining costly 
political alliances had already exhausted the scarce national resources o f the Treasury. The crack o f the world’s 
financial market in October 1929 occurred in the middle o f the presidential campaign and threw the country -  a 
mono international producer - in an unprecedented crisis. The coffee growers and the coffee planters were 
ruined and the president refused to make concessions.
571 A new political party -  Democratic Party -  was created at 1926 but with no chances o f gaining power. The 
new party manifesto included topics related with political reform like secret and compulsory voting, “minority 
representation, independence of the three branches of government; and judicial power to oversee elections.” 
(Fausto, 190). In 1929, Washington Luis nominated Julio Prestes, Sao Paulo governor, to succeed him, a move 
that united Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul in the Liberal Alliance, in opposition to the national 
government that championed a coalition o f the state Republican parties as usual. The patchwork o f political 
support for the alliance included the Democratic Party in Sao Paulo and dissidents o f the Republican parties 
around the country, notably in Minas Gerais. The opposition candidate was Getulio Vargas, the governor o f Rio 
Grande do Sul who had been Washington Luis finance until 1927. The Liberal Alliance manifesto 
contemplated issues keen to the middle class like political reform in order to provide “electoral truth” and 
amnesty to all involved in political contests like the lieutenants, as well as to the new urban worker classes. 
Minas Gerais broke the stability prevalent until that time in terms of leadership succession and supported first 
Vargas as candidate and later the 1930 rupture. Julio Prestes, was elected president but the results were not 
assimilated by the defeated opposition who, nevertheless, did not have enough support to seize power. A 
surprise event changed the course of facts: Joao Pessoa, vice-president candidate of Vargas was assassinated on 
26 July by a political adversary in a public incident. The fact provided a martyr to the conspirers constituted 
until that time by young officials and the oligarch dissentions. and culminated with a coup o f state that put 
Getulio Vargas, the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, in the Presidency, supported by the military
572 Vargas was at that time a caudilho gaucho but with previous national experience in the Congress (1922- 
1926) and on the Executive (1926-1927). He was a product of the political culture of his region, marked by 
frontier conflicts, attachment to the land, authoritarian and paternalist practices. But he was destined to be one 
of the most politically gifted talents o f generations and the most important political figure o f Brazilian twentieth 
century politics.
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managed to reunite under his leadership the distinct groups of the military unified by their
e j ' i
dissatisfaction with the previous regime. Military support was achieved in exchanged of a 
“tutorial interventionism” (Carvalho, 1999, 61-2) based on three wide formulations: the 
selection of the State to be the dominant force of national politics, the agreement about the 
need of formulation and implementation of a national project, and the persuasiveness of the 
need of elite professionalisation in order to provide state guidance.
5. The Vargas era (1930-1964)
Vargas’ charisma was developed while he managed to overcome successive political crisis 
during a period of social instability and institutional “creative destruction”. A nationalized 
centralist state replaced the regionalism as the main dynamic force of Brazil political 
organization (Camargo, 1999). The centralization of governmental activities574 occurred 
through administrative empowerment in two different ways. First many functions previously
f ' T f
exercised by state and local government were federalized, i.e. transferred to federal 
competence . Second, national government activity was expanded towards new social and 
economic areas, notably economic infrastructure, social welfare, and labor union 
organization (1967: Skidmore 33-4). Both movements enabled the federal executive with 
unprecedented patronage powers in terms of jobs’ provision and policy favoritism given the 
administrative powers centralized in the president hands.
On the economic front government interventionism occurred through two combined forms: 
a) managing of incentives and “stimulants” demanded by national businessmen and b) direct 
intervention, pushed by the higher military officialdom. The first group included the 
definition of the minimum wage combined with the establishment of government-controlled 
unions, the creation of the pensions’ institutes for each economic sector, and creation of 
foreign exchange financial authorities. The second strategy included the creation of state 
owned enterprises, especially in the steel and utilities sectors, and regional developmental 
agencies. State sponsored industrialization was based on the concept of national security, 
coined by the military in order to justify. governmental control over sectors considered 
strategic.
573 The military were particularly concerned with their poor capacity (if compared with the states security 
forces), bad career conditions (low wages combined with lack of tenure and social security), and a weak merit 
system. The military were split in three groups (Carvalho, 1999): professionals influenced by German and 
French army, the reformist interventionists typical o f countries in which the military were not identified with 
the dominant elite and were convoked to interfere in internal politics from time to time, and radicals with 
communist sympathies. Vargas chief collaborator was Goes Monteiro who was a colonel. The rank was a 
problem for the revolutionary government because in order to implement reforms they need to control the 
military forces. If they tried to take over the top positions they would break the hierarchy. If they destroyed the 
hierarchy they would damage the military cohesiveness and effectiveness capabilities o f interfering in politics.
574 Skidmore (1967: 35) pointed out that “the increased centralisation under Vargas a reaction to the 
decentralisation imposed by the Republican constitution-writers o f 1889-1891 who had wished to undo what 
they regarded as the harmful overcentralisation o f the empire.”
575 The important national symbolic dimension o f  the New State was emphasized by a ceremony presided by 
Vargas in which the states’ flags were burned as sign o f the new times (Skidmore, 1967: 37)
576 The nationalization of tributes, especially those related with exports, was a key change in tax jurisdictions 
revised by the 1937 constitution.
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Brazilian entry in the war577 triggered a new dynamics because it exhibited the contradictions 
derived from the support to the Western democracies and the internal semi-fascist 
dictatorship. The first to be influenced by the democracy ideas were the members of the 
liberal opposition to the regime like the students’ movement and intellectuals. More 
important, however, was how the war affected the military engaged in combat and in 
international relationships with the allies, notably the US.
The re-democratization process was influenced by Vargas’ attempts to keep in charge of the 
process. His supporters were distributed in two parties: the social democrats (PSD) and the 
labour (PTB). The established political forces of the New State578 chose the previous 
Ministry of War, Dutra as presidential candidate, forcing a reluctant Vargas to give room for 
his succession. Vargas was deposed without resistance by the military who left their previous 
role of a State vanguard579 to become “custodians of presidential power” (Skidmore, 1967: 
53)”.
The political landscape defined in 1947580 was marked by the emergence of Vargas as an 
opposition leader. On October 1950 presidential elections Vargas (PTB) conquered 48,7% of 
the votes. His rhetoric, however, had changed in favour of a combination of national- 
developmentism which appealed to businessmen, industrialists, middle classes and to the 
military, and labour movements, which seduced the growing urban worker class. The long 
standing ambivalent arrangements between Vargas and the military worked for a while until 
Vargas adopted a mixed of populism and paternalist style. The more facts led him to find in 
the unions and popular movements his main support the more his increasing left wing 
nationalism antagonized his ex-allies581 (Carvalho, 1999: 80).
On the economic front, the tensions between liberal orthodoxy and nationalism in economic 
policy matters dominated Vargas government since the beginning of his term. Inflation was a 
new economic problem that did not allow his conciliation tactics like tackling structural 
development bottlenecks and balance of payments deficits. At that time another policy sub­
system - planning - had begin to be generated. The third of a succession of USA missions to 
Brazil had evolved towards a more precise diagnosis of the country bottlenecks.
577 More than 20000 men were sent to the Italy campaign on June 1944, as members of the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force. The death in combat o f454 recruitments as well as the contact with higher military 
officials from the Western democracies marked deeply officials that would play a leading role in the 
subsequent Brazilian politics.
578 PSD was a party known as to be destined to power, no matter the circumstances, “represented by old-style 
politicians form whom politics was less a matter of policy and principle than o f power and patronage” 
(Skidmore, 1967: 77).
579 The military forged under Gois Monteiro leadership and Dutra administration had become a powerful and 
equipped political actor in the fifteen years between 1930-1945. The budget military accounted for 19,6% of the 
national budget in 1930, 25% in 1937, and 36,5% in 1942. The military presence was also observed by 
increasing presence in economic affairs (SOEs and national economic councils) and their proportion as 
interventores: forty under eighty seven in the two waves of intervention in 1930-1934 and 1937-1945 
(Carvalho, 1999). Moreover, they were now a more cohesive force, after successive purges of dissidents at 
1930, 1932, 1935, and 1937.
580 At the same time that a populist regional party emerged in Sao Paulo under Ademar de Barros (an ex-state 
interventor during the New State) and the communists were banned from politics.
581 Vargas old friends lieutenants were now his enemies generals grouped in the anti-communist wing of the 
military.
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The USA emphasized the need to overcome infrastructure bottlenecks in order to promote 
industrialization. The Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC)'s 
manifesto582 provided a convergent formulation that strengthened the emergent claim: 
planning was the requirement for a developmental policy based on industrialization. The 
creation of the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE)583 in 1952 was the first 
step towards planning institutionalization. State guidance became a national consensus 
although the unstable political environment, characterized by populist leaders, did not 
provide conditions for its immediate institutionalization.
The state was supposed to promote development as a direct supplier, as market generator and 
protector (via credit, subsidies, and import barriers), and as promoter of investment capital 
attraction. Industrialization would be achieved via a combination of industrial capital 
internationalization and state support. Planning was focused on "germinal points"584 in the 
developing countries case (Perez, 1999: 98). Infra-structural bottlenecks should be object of 
public investment given the lack of interest or capabilities of the private sector in doing so.
At the same time, the aggressive nationalist oil policy that culminated with the creation of the 
SOE PETROBRAS (an oil company) contributed to antagonizing the relationships with the 
Americans who had practically ended the on going co-operation programs led by the Joint- 
Commission United States-Brazil Commission585. In a series of speeches at the end of 1953 
Vargas adopted an explicit nationalist attitude in blaming foreign companies for being 
responsible for the country economic problems. Vargas suicide in 1954 blocked his enemies 
politically and guaranteed his legacy survival. A caretaker government led by his vice 
president oversight the October Congress elections and promoted a stabilization economic 
plan.
Juscelino Kubitcheck (JK) -  from PSD - became a minority elected president having Joao 
Goulart (PTB) as vice, in October 1955586. “The studies of ECLA, the BNDE, and the Joint 
USA-Brazil Economic Development Commission laid the groundwork for the 
industrialization drive that produced successful results in JK presidency.” (Skidmore, 1967: 
315). The launching of the “Goals Plan” signalled a clear set of priorities oriented to 
accelerate industrialization through substantial investments in infrastructure and consumption 
industries. State and international capital were the two main vectors supported in order to 
transform into reality his slogan "fifty years in five”. It was a period marked by extraordinary
582 Celso Furtado and Raul Prebisch were the main formulators of the structural developmental thesis that the 
industrialization should be based in the substitution of imports by developing countries. Structuralism 
performed in the Latin American a similar intellectual role that was played by Keynesianism in developed 
countries at that time (Campos, 1994: 242).
583 Investments in infrastructure were the main bottleneck mapped by the Brazil-US Commission and CEPAL. 
BNDE was created in order to provide long term funding conditions for investments in strategic areas, notably 
transport and power.
584 These ideas, as well as the main principles that subsidized the Plan of Goals, came from suggestions o f the 
Brazil-US Parity Commission
585 The Eisenhower administration did not share the Truman approach to Latin America. Moreover, US decided 
to import coffee from other suppliers given Brazil insistence in keeping coffee prices high. A US Senate 
Committee was established exclusively to investigate the problem, a move that contributed to worse the 
nationalist tensions (Skidmore, 1967: 123).
586 Kubitschek got 36% of the votes, against 30% from Tavora (UDN), and 26% Ademar de Barros (PSP).
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economic growth, thanks to a combination of factors that allowed his government to take 
another step in the process of import substitution. The nationalist developmental strategy was 
complemented by a powerful symbolic decision: transferring the capital from Rio de Janeiro 
to Brasilia, a city to be built in the middle of the country, a wake up call for Brazilians 
nationalist ambitions.
Parallelism, fragmentation, and autonomy were the typical features of the public 
organizations that begin to multiply in this period. They were not accountable to the 
Congress. Their competencies and budgets were frequently much more important than those 
of their parental ministries. They were functional because of the lack of political control and 
interference, justified in terms of the need of flexibility for decision-making processes that 
should not be carried out by rigid old-fashioned bureaucracies. This mechanism provided 
means of channelling and catalyzing demands of entrepreneurial industrialist groups, 
guaranteeing a quick decision-making process with the participation of the president (but not 
of the Congress), and an effective implementation through means other than the transmission 
belt of the conventional governmental hierarchy. A parallel administration was established 
and it by-passed hierarchical structures and process-oriented behaviours.
The presidential election of 1960 poised Lott (PSD) and Goulart (PTB) as candidates of the 
“ins” camp. The “outs” aligned themselves in a coalition supported by the UDN who 
provided the vice candidate of a tickets led by the a meteoric populist outsider Janio Quadros, 
consecutively elected Sao Paulo Mayor (53-54), Sao Paulo governor (55-58), and at last 
president in the 1960 presidential election. In an attempt to strength his position against the 
Congress in search of a De Gaulle type of solution Quadros presented his resignation to the 
Congress on August 25 (Skidmore, 1967: 201). Suddenly the country was thrown in a serious 
political crisis because the military refused to support the vice president Joao Goulart. An 
urgent Parliamentary formula was negotiated, thanks to political, military, and popular
coo
mobilization support pro-legality . The recourse to a Parliamentary regime emerged as an 
. essential condition to allow Goulart becoming president in September 1961.
Goulart worked successfully to re-establish his executive authorities since his inauguration in 
September 1961 until the return of the presidential system in January 1963, in spite of the 
military opposition. He made use and sacrificed three cabinets in his route thanks to 
destabilizing manoeuvres which the president promoted in a paradoxical alliance with his 
worst adversaries. Celso Furtado assumed the Ministry of Planning at 1962 and launched the 
Tri-Annual Plan. Goulart’s campaign for re-establishing plenty powers resulted in Furtado's
COQ
fall. Furtado's formula was not popular enough for the President political needs in spite of 
its consistency with the principles of the Progressive Alliance launched by Kennedy and its 
anti-monetarist rhetoric (Campos 1994: 512).
587 These factors included a policy to attract direct investment, easy credit, and a successful combination of pro 
private and public investments. Moreover, they were all integrated in general guidance framework provided by 
the Goals Plan, deeply influenced by studies published by ECLA..
588 The Third Army located at Rio Grande do Sul, where Goulart (and Vargas) came from, was well as the state 
governor Leonel Brizola attitudes were decisive for the resistance.
589 A Parliamentary regime was improvised to allow Goulart to take office. His actions were mainly oriented to 
remove this constrain which would happen at the end of 1962 via Popular Referendum given his low Congress 
support.
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The march of political events led to an aggravation of the political crisis. Goulart tried to 
conquer direct support from social sectors via by-passing the political establishment. When 
he encouraged the rupture of the hierarchy in the military forces he triggered the 1964 coup 
d'etat. The military rebelled cohesively against the constitutional government on the grounds 
of anti-communism, anti-corruption, and anti-populist practices. There was no room for a 
civil solution. The Congress efforts to keep constitutional legality were destroyed by the 
Institutional Act, issued by the Supreme Revolutionary Command, constituted by the three 
military chiefs. The Institutional Act granted the executive with exceptional powers590 
destined to bread the political deadlock. The military were now an autonomy force whose 
time had come.
6. The Military Cycle (1964-1984)
Castelo Branco’s (1964-1967)591 government was marked by a successful macro economic 
adjustment and prolific economic developmental and social welfare initiatives. Castelo 
Branco was one of the brightest officials of his generation, one leading representative of the 
“Sorbonne” intellectualized group. Castelo Branco perceived the military intervention as 
temporary and was prepared to take the most from it in terms of the hard choices that the 
moment required. In his view, if his government could absorb the political costs of unpopular 
policies, the chances of economic and democratic normalization would improve.
The Extraordinary Ministry of Planning was the government policy platform created to tackle 
multiple challengers in the economic, administrative, and social sphere. At the end of 1964 
the government launched the Economic Plan of Governmental Action (PAEG) with the 
guidelines of the economic adjustment to be implemented and a general view of the ongoing 
social reforms that Castelo Branco intended to promote. A gradual anti-inflation approach 
combined with tight monetary policy and severe wage contention constituted the main pieces 
of Roberto Campos’ strategy (Lara Rezende, 1990: 214-216). Market discipline was the 
target that should be pursued but preceded by public discipline.
Power was fragmented and divided between the military forces represented by the 
Revolutionary Command , the presidency and the Congress. The costs of the economic
590 These powers included: initiative to amend the Constitutional legislation in case of the Congress lack of 
manifestation in thirty days, requirement o f the majority vote (not two thirds) to change the constitution, right 
to declare state-of-siege without Congress approval for thirty days, exclusive initiative in bills that imply in 
increase of expenditure, and legal rights to suspend the political rights of regime enemies for ten years.
591 Castelo was the natural leader of the military given his leadership skills, widespread recognition within the 
military, and professional reputation. He had studied at France’s Ecole Superieure de Guerre and at Fort 
Leavenworth in US. He had also fought in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy. At that time he was 
already considered the leader of the “Sorbonne” military fraction, a group of officials who gravitated around the 
Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG - Higher War College). Stepan (1971: 237-240) identified some common 
features shared by all generals that integrated the Sorbonne group: studies abroad, teachers at the ESG, combat 
at II World War in Italy, and members o f the leading technology sectors of the military forces. The Sorbonne 
reference came because o f Castelo Branco passage by the Superior School of War Studies in France at the 
1930s. He was the leader o f the professional strategist group of the military which include Golbery do Couto e 
Silva — one o f the main 1964 coup d’etat architects -  and Emesto Geisel, future Brazilian president 1974-1979), 
Cordeiro de Farias, the creator of ESG and nationalist old “lieutenant”, and Bizarria Mamede, another historical 
prestigious lieutenant.
92 The Revolutionary Command was constituted by the top officials o f the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. 
A key circumstantial event at the day after the coup was Costa e Silva self nomination as the Army
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adjustment implemented by Roberto Campos did not contribute to make the government any 
more popular. Castelo Branco and Roberto Campos development strategy modified national 
policies in two ways: emphasizing macro-stabilization economic policy as a requisite to 
recover international credibility593 and modernising the public sector executive machinery594. 
Fishlow (1974: 8) pointed out that for the first time an unpopular economic policy based on 
demand retraction got continuous presidential support for a period that was long enough to 
generate results. The government’s closure act was the 1967 Constitution595 which 
sanctioned the new regime.
Establishing a contrast with his predecessor was a matter of honour for the new president and 
his group. Costa e Silva did not retain any minister from Castelo Branco’s team. The 
economic tone of the Costa e Silva government was given by Delfim Neto who opted for a 
dirigiste approach to the economy in order to collect the benefits of Campos and Bulhoes 
policies. Delfim and his economic team based on IPEA correctly diagnosed that rapid 
development growth without inflationary pressures was a real possibility because of existent 
excess capacity in the industry. The government adopted also a more permanent 
interventionist approach to macro economic variables like prices and wages that became 
subject to government definition and control.
The political turbulence of the period provoked aggravating circumstances for executive 
action. The government faced a gradual escalation of challenges from social movements like 
students, labour unions and an increasingly active guerrilla movement. The protesters gained 
the streets and the clashes culminated with a speech by an opposition congressman who was 
considered unacceptable by the hardliners. In spite of Costa e Silva’s appeals, even ARENA, 
the government party, was split and joined the opposition in refusing license to prosecute the 
until then obscure Congressman. This incident was the final pretext for the hardliner’s 
ultimatum. Costa e Silva signed the (Institutional Act number 5 - AI-5) in December 1968. 
AI-5 was another coup inside a coup. The AI-5 marked the consolidation of the victory of the 
National Security Doctrine which defined that “the nation, and ultimately the military, had as 
great a duty to protect itself form internal enemies as from external enemies.” (Skidmore, 
1988:84)
The follow semester was marked by Costa e Silva’s attempts to re-establish a compromise 
with the hardliners and the political establishment through a new Constitution. The draft 
prepared by his civil vice president Pedro Aleixo was ready on August 1969 when the 
president suffered a stroke. The military blocked Costa e Silva replacement by the vice-
representative on seniority grounds. From the very beginning o f the new regime he poised himself successfully 
as Castelo Branco natural successor, supported by the hardliners and guarantee o f the military forces unit.
593 Thanks to Roberto Campos experience as Ambassador in Washington and the government liberalism new 
payment schedules were re-negotiated with the US Treasury, the IMF, the Eximbank, and European creditors in 
1964. In the next year USAID grants plus IMF, WB, and IADB loans restablished the capital flux essential to 
keep the payment and imports capacity of the country, two essential requirements to resume growth.
594 The main reform o f the public sector was on the Finance Ministry, with the assistance o f Getulio Vargas 
Foundation. The Tax reform was followed by a modernisation of the tax collection apparatus that enabled the 
executive to improve the federal revenues in an unprecedented way.
595 Accordingly to Ronning and Keith (1976:231) “he (the President) is given exclusive power in the initiation 
of laws relating (1) financial matters, (2) the creation of public offices, functions and employment, (3) 
establishment or modification of the size of the armed forces, (4) administration and judicial organisation, 
taxation and budgetary matters relating to the Federal District and the territories, and (5) federal public 
employees, including their tenure and the recruitment of military personnel ( ...)”..
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president and nominated themselves as the country rulers via the constitution of a Military 
Junta. A National Security Law was issued immediately after the kidnapping of the US 
Ambassador by a guerrilla group on the beginning of September. The armed forces 
triumvirate commanded the presidential succession within the military. Medici596 was the 
candidate nominated by the college of generals to command the succession to compete as 
would-be-winner of the Congress indirect presidential election. Congress re-opened to elect 
the president on October 1969.
Medici ministerial team was shaped on the context of a technocratic-military alliance, formed 
mainly by carryovers from Costa e Silva. The symbiosis between both groups was 
legitimized by the performance of the economy. The “Brazilian miracle” was the driving
CQ7
force for the national rhetoric . The military depended on the technocrats to make the 
economy work while the technocrats depended on the military to occupy power positions.
Even at height of the authoritarian period the military perceived elections as an essential 
legitimizing process, even if at expense of arbitrary rules and scheming actions. Governors 
and legislative elections were scheduled to 1970, 1974, and 1978 while local elections were 
supposed to occur on 1972, 1976, and 1980.
The regime was at a crossroads between authoritarian institutionalization, which was the 
obvious scenario, and re-democratisation, an apparently remote possibility at that stage. 
Accordingly to Linz (1978) Brazil did not present the stabilizing features required to 
consolidate an authoritarian regime like Franco in Spain. Linz expressed a perception of the 
Brazilian polity closer to the Sorbonne group, who were at that stage smoothly preparing its 
return to power. At the beginning of 1973 Ernesto Geisel emerged as presidential candidate, 
an ascendance facilitated by the presence of his brother in the Army Minister.
CQO
Geisel (1974-1979) shared Castelo Branco vision about the desirable transient character of 
military intervention in politics, in contrast to the hardliners. The Home Office Minister, 
Golbery do Couto e Silva was a Sorbonne group intellectual, a military who had been 
director of ESG and updated with the political debate and possibilities of a transition led by 
the top599. The steps to be taken towards re-democratization included: the establishment of an 
independence of the judiciary, freedom of speech, re-establishment of civil and political 
rights, freedom to political organisation, coherent rules of electoral disputes, and legal limits 
for the use of coercion (Santos, 1978).
596 Medici was at that time the commander of the Third Army based and a former director of the National 
Information Services, the intelligence agency o f the government.
597 The economy grew 10,9% per year between 1968 and 1974 while inflation stabilized around 16% over the 
period.
598 Geisel curriculum had an impressive personal trajectory as most of the Sorbonne group members. He studied 
in US Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth and worked in Dutra’s government 
before moving to PETROBRAS where developed close linkages with the emergent national technocracy.
599 The Brazilian transition debate began earlier, in October 1972, when Samuel Huntington participated in 
some talks with academics and top ministers. His paper “Approaches to Political Decompression” triggered a 
debate led by Santos’s text “Strategies o f Political Decompression” (September 1973) in which he listed the six 
principles required to pursue a piecemeal strategy to promote redemocratization.
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The 1974 elections redefined the political landscape with MDB outstanding performance600. 
Meanwhile, during the first and second year of his mandate Geisel faced hardliners diluted 
but effective opposition, expressed by the action of paramilitary rightwing forces with 
official connivance. The decisive confront with the hardliners occurred when Geisel replaced 
the Army Minister in October 1977. Geisel successfully outmanoeuvred him and ensured 
backward military support for the presidential command, always on hierarchical disciplinary 
grounds. At that stage Geisel and Golbery also already had their candidate for presidential 
succession: Joao Batista Figueiredo, Director of the National Intelligence Services Agency 
(SNI). At the end of his mandate Geisel extinguished many of the authoritarian instruments 
of the regime, including the AI-5, the press censorship, and some parts of the national 
security legislation.
On the economic front the country grew 7% per year in contrast with 10,8% during 1968- 
1973. The average inflation rate was 37,9%, almost the double of the 19,3% of the miracle 
period. Given the debt-led growth strategy adopted by the government, the balance of 
payments reached a debt of 43,5 US $ billion dollars at the end of 1978. Geisel’s government 
was marked by huge investments in infrastructure and energy projects contained in the II 
National Development Plan, led by SOEs. However, Geisel’s resort to SOEs had been so 
vigorous that he generated a new kind of opposition to the government: businessmen that 
demanded privatization and restraint to the big government unlimited expansion ambitions. 
In the beginning of 1979 some of the most prestigious industrialists from Sao Paulo launched 
a manifesto calling for re-democratization, but also from de-nationalization of the industrial 
park.
Figueiredo took office committed with the abertura but deprived from authoritarian 
instruments to enforce his decisions. Civil society pressures were also escalating and the new 
president had to face immediate challenges to the government authority in a context of 
increasing economic crisis. An unprecedented strike occurred in Sao Paulo industrial core in 
March 1979, parallel to the Figueiredo inauguration. The strikers resisted for two months 
thanks to the Catholic Church and social movements solidarity, in spite of the government 
intervention on the metalworkers union. The strike marked the metalworkers’ leader -  Lula -  
debut in politics, an important novelty on the political scenario. A new party legislation was 
approved at November 1979 and enabled the emergence of multi-party system, although still 
dominated by ARENA’S successor: PDS. The MDB was succeeded by PMDB. The main 
novelties were the PT, PDT, and PTB. PT was formed by the workers’ party led by authentic 
union members601 , intellectuals, and ecclesial Catholic social movement leaderships.
The economic situation was an object of governmental concern because of the second oil 
shock and the international interest rates escalate. Important changes also occurred at 
ministerial level when Delfim Neto replaced Simonsen, a carryover from Geisel cabinet, as 
Minister of Planning. Figueiredo opted for the minister who was supported by the business 
community and who promised a comeback of the miracle days. The combination of 
accelerating inflation with foreign exchange squeeze forced Delfim Neto to review his 
developmental approach and opt for a recession. 1981 was the worse year in economic terms 
in decades. After a timid recovery on 1982 the country economy faced the consequences of
600 MDB leapt from 87 to 165 seats in the Lower House and 7 to 20 in the Senate (where the party won the 
majority o f national votes at stake: 14,4 million against 10 million o f ARENA).
601 The word authentic was used to contrast with the union leaders of structures directly subordinated to the 
Ministry of Labour, who joined mainly PTB.
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the Mexico crisis of August 1982. Brazil was forced to resort to IMF in the beginning of 
1983. GDP fell 5% in that year and the inflation rate achieved 221%.
The 1982 elections for Congress and governors’ offices provided a decisive push towards the 
re-establishment of democracy and reshaped completely the political landscape. The 
opposition won the majority (59%) of the popular vote. PDS lost the majority in the Chamber 
of Deputies but kept it on the Senate thanks to the indirect senators elected in 1978.603 The 
opposition also won nine governorships, including some key states like Sao Paulo (PMDB), 
Rio de Janeiro (PDT), and Minas Gerais (PMDB). PDS, however, retained the formal 
majority of votes of the presidential college that would elect the next president.
At that time the military had already lost the control of his succession. The president 
indecisiveness and power inaptitude favoured the ascendance of PDS deputy Paulo Maluf, an 
aggressive outsider within the system who had been Sao Paulo governor604. At that stage 
important public figures of the regime anticipated Maluf s victory in PDS and opened 
dissidence. The presidential succession became unpredictable. The split of the establishment 
bridged the gap required to Tancredo Neves to pave his way within the military. Neves 
overwhelming victory in January 1985 was already prepared to be absorbed by Figueiredo 
and the military, ready to return power to politicians.
7. Conclusion: Democratic Brazil (1985-1998)
Neves inauguration was an anticlimax because the elected president was hospitalized 
moments before the ceremony and died five weeks later. He personified the national re­
conciliation spirit of the transition as well as the hopes that democracy could bring a solution 
for all sort of country problems. In a contested but mature decision Ulysses Guimaraes, the 
PMDB and Congress President, convinced Samey to sworn as acting president, a decision 
that helped to process the transition given Samey’s trajectory as a reliable man of the 
agonizing authoritarian regime.
Samey became de facto president after Neves’ death in April but he inherited Neves’ cabinet 
constituted by PMDB and PFL high profile politicians. Samey’s first acts involved the 
approval of legislations destined to remove the “authoritarian debris” and some timid 
economic contention measures. Mayoral elections were scheduled to November 1985 and the 
general elections of 1986 would elect a Constituency Congress.
The economic situation was made worse by the popular pressures that converged with the 
turbulent regime transition, in spite of the favoured legacy in terms of balance of payments 
and economic growth. However, the tax revenues had fallen “by approximately 2% of GDP 
from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s605” (Weyland, 1998: 52). Brazilian developmental
602 Six “intention letters” were signed between early 1983 and late 1984 in order to keep the flow o f loans in 
spite o f the government failure in achieving the targets o f all o f them.
603 The senators mandate lasts eight years. 1982 renewed only one third o f the Senate. The other two thirds were 
elected on 1978. One third of them were chosen indirectly which means that ARENA got 21 of the 22 seats 
under this category.
604 Maluf had been elected governor indirectly at 1978 against the military candidate but was immediately 
absorbed by the system.
605 Weyland (1998: 61) demonstrated convincingly how the fragmentation and segmentation (Barzelay, 1986) 
of Brazilian state apparatus contributed to the establishment o f direct symbiotic linkages between businessmen
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state had become “its own gravedigger606” (Evans, 1992: 165). At the end of 1985 the
f \ ( Y 7country had grown 8.3% at expense of wages devaluation and inflation had exploded .
Pressured by the economic situation and in face of increasing coalition tensions, Samey 
opted for an economic heterodox shock, a la Alfonsin in Argentina608 The Cruzado Plan was 
launched on February 28th 1986 and introduced a radical monetary reform that replaced the 
currency and froze prices at the same time that the government extinguished indexation 
mechanisms.
The immediate success was astonishing and generated an unprecedented wave of popularity 
of the government. Consumption exploded. Inflation was reduced to practically zero. 
However new problems immediately emerged, notably demand induced inflation provoked 
by the shortage of supply of products. The government did not have instruments and 
structures to enforce the “freeze” of prices and the consequent illegal premiums for products 
that otherwise would not be made available. A timid adjustment occurred in July but it was 
clearly insufficient. At the same time the balance of payments situation quickly deteriorated 
because of the economic boom. The government opted for not jeopardizing its electoral 
chances in November at expense of the hard choices that at that stage the economic team was 
already aware.
November marked a turning point on the country mood. Thanks to Cruzado euphoria, PMDB 
won a landslide victory on the first general elections under democratic rules. However, the 
economic situation was quickly getting worse with a comeback of inflation and governmental 
loss of control of macroeconomic instruments. On the external front the foreign debt crisis 
forced a moratorium in February 1987. The ministers of planning and finance resigned in 
March and April respectively.
The new economic team was championed by Bresser Pereira, a well known Keynesian 
economist that had contributed to the development of the concept of inertial inflation. A 
second macro stabilization plan labelled Bresser Plan was launched in June. Bresser tried to 
tackle the problem of the fiscal crisis of the Brazilian state but failed because of lack of 
political support.
Moreover, the installation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) created a de facto 
duality of power: the executive under Samey leadership and the legislative under Ulysses 
Guimaraes presidency. At that stage, politics in Brazil became a synonym of a “permanent 
constitutional convention” (Power, 2000). Even issues like the presidential mandate and the 
type of political regime were pendent on the National Constitutional Assembly deliberations. 
At the end of the year Bresser Pereira resigned and was replaced by Mailson da Nobrega, a 
Bank of Brazil career reputed technocrat. After fractious negotiations aggravated by the 
simultaneous work of the National Constitutional Assembly that practically paralyzed the
and public bureaucrats. The main result was a multiple attack on tax revenues that resulted in financial disable 
o f state fiscal capacity.
606 Weyland (1998: 52) pointed out the paradoxical effects of a strong state that undermined its strengths 
through a combination of “divide and rule” interventionism and pervasive clientelism.
607 The annual projected rates achieved 454%.
608 Brazilian economists’ advisors of Sayad and Funaro had studied in US as well as members of the Alfonsin 
team. Therefore, there were cross countries lesson drawing and policy transfer processes going on since the 
previous year.
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country as well as the international banks, the IMF agreed with an emergent loan of $1.4 
billion that allowed the suspension of the moratorium.
The NCA was a defining institutional moment of Brazilian history. It was detailed and
innovative, a mixture of three vectors: the need to come to terms with the past, the
consolidation of demands and expectations about the future, and the expression of a
fragmented Congress where all organized interest groups mobilized the available resources to
incorporated their claims. Samey 9 decided to adopt a wait-and-see position in practically all
matters, except in respect to two issues: the duration of his mandate and the type of 
610regime .
The result of twenty months of a national catharsis of institutional design was a paradox: a 
semi-parliamentary constitution for a presidential regime that striped the federal executive 
from many of its powers in favor of the Congress, the Legislative, the States, and 
Municipalities. The NCA shift from an initially dominant parliamentary system to 
presidentialism thanks to Samey costly and decisive interference in this issue (as well as in 
terms of the duration of his mandate). Mainwaring (1999) referred to the “democratic 
libertarianism61 of Brazilian transition, a spirit incorporated in the new constitutional text.
The 1989 single presidential elections -  the first since 1960 - marked the end of the “slow, 
gradual, and secure” transition from the authoritarian to the democratic regime. Collor de 
Mello, an outsider young Northeastern politician ran as an independent candidate from the 
parties’ establishment and defeated the left wing candidate Lula in the second round. Once 
again, the country deposited its hopes in a Messiah612 who should be capable of lead the 
country towards its imagined destiny.
“The state-engineered fragmented society” (Weyland, 1998: 63) had arrived at its maximum: 
the new president was elected outmanoeuvring the political system, thanks to idiosyncratic 
rules of a unique election . Collor inauguration in March 1990 was marked by an 
unprecedented radical macro-economic stabilization plan that froze bank accounts and once 
again broke previous contracts in order to contain inflation that had achieved a monthly rate 
of 80% in February.
609 Samey was an isolated president. He was not a PMDB historical cadre. He had enormous personal political 
debts to Aureliano Chaves (PFL) and Ulysses Guimaraes (PMDB), the main responsible for him being 
president. He did not have legislative support enough to try to influence the National Constitutional Assembly, 
except in extreme cases when he made use of the presidential patronage powers to ensure his positions. Finally, 
he did not have the elite or the civil society interest groups support given the overall perception that he was a 
transient weak president.
610 The former was defined in five years for himself and four years from 1990 on. The presidential regime was 
kept until the 1993 when a plebiscite would provide another opportunity for choice between a parliamentary and 
a presidential regime.
6,1 Democratization was identified with a form of institutional permissiveness demanding the removal of any 
and all barriers to the personal latitude of individual politicians. (Power, 2000: 21)
612 The “messianism” complex was a recurrent feature of Brazilian politics that penetrated also the military, 
since the lieutenants (Coelho, 2000: 154-166).
613 Collor was elected in a single presidential election, detached from state, congress, and local elections. 
Therefore the party machines role was undermined. It was also the first presidential election in which TV 
played a role, in fact a decisive role. Collor campaign was hugely and successful media-driven which allowed 
him to arrive to the second round in a polarised election against a left-wing candidate unacceptable to many 
voters. Moreover, when his victory was threatened media direct interference produced a decisive blow to Lula 
in the days that preceded the polls.
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The plan provided the government with some time but it was not enough to break the vicious 
cycle previously established: public deficit fuelled inflation that eroded tax revenues what 
made the deficit worse, a problem magnified by the debt crisis. Furthermore, Collor thought 
that he could govern alone, without party support from the Congress. His ministries did not 
have political weigh and the improvisation in sensitive areas like economics, public 
management, health, and education soon revealed how detached the new president was from 
the executive challenges. As a result, Collor opted for governing by decrees -  provisional 
measures - which made things worse. Collor was dealing with the National Constituency 
Assembly Congress, although in the sunset of its mandate. They were politicians who piloted 
the transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy on the Legislative branch and who 
did not accept an authoritarian president.
The 1990 elections for governor, senator, and deputies (federal and state) did not change the 
president isolation status, but even made it worse. Meanwhile, inflation was back -  17% per 
month in December - while the economic performance was a disaster. The GDP shrunk 4% 
in 1990. A new stabilization attempt, that included another wage and price freeze, was 
carried out at February 1991 but the results were not different from the previous shocks, and 
inflation quickly returned. At the end of the year the first charges of corruption began to 
populate the press. Surprisingly the responsible for the charges were businessmen entities, 
scared by the bribing methods of the president entourage. Moreover, the president’s brother 
gave a devastating interview to the most popular Brazilian magazine in April 1992 that 
provided a disclosure of governmental practices.
Collor’s impeachment in September 1992 was a first symptom of the maturity of Brazilian 
democracy and, moreover, “the first political crisis in the history of the republic in which the 
military was not an active participant” (Bethel, 1993: 17). The military614 kept out of the 
executive of the power struggle, although they had been also historically object of the 
clientele politics that pervaded the relationships between State and society overall Brazilian 
history (Coelho,. 2000: 173). In contrast to the fears of authors like Karl (1990), Stepan 
(1988) and O’Donnel (1988) feared, the “birth defect” of Brazilian democracy did not 
produce a return of the military to power in its first serious political crisis.
Itamar Franco -  Collor’s vice-president - was an obscure independent senator from Minas 
Gerais with no chances of being re-elected when he was invited to be Collor vice-president. 
His lack of national projection was counter-balanced by his reputation of honesty, a critical 
liability. A caretaker cabinet was improvised but the new president did not succeed in 
promoting political stability and economic stabilization in the beginning of his mandate. In 
April 1993 there was a plebiscite on the system of government, as mandated by the 
constitutional transient provisions. The predictable result was a clear win of the presidential 
regime against a parliamentary alternative (55% x 25%), thanks to the massive support of the 
media groups, party machines (with the exception of PSDB) and presidential candidates.
The plebiscite was part of a mandatory constitutional revision that was to occur five year 
after its promulgation. The executive under Franco was politically fragile to push for the 
review. Even so the country was intensively mobilized during 1993 to interfere in the
614 The military did not bargain their instrumentality to serve neither the incumbent president nor the opposition 
(Coelho, 2000: 174). They remained loyal to their constitutional role, a symptom of their new professional non 
interventionist status.
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political process in spite of media and political scepticism. The Reviewer Congress -  in fact 
the Congress that was elected at 1990 - was installed in March 1994. Around thirty thousand 
proposals were presented but only five were in fact enacted (Power, 2000: 21). Then, a 
corruption scandal located at the Budgeting Congress Committee exploded and dominated 
the national agenda (Fleischer, 1994). The shift of media attention contributed decisively to 
demoralize the legislative and to abort the initiative. At that stage the 1994 presidential 
campaign was at the horizon and eclipsed the further efforts to promote the revision.
After few months in office Franco had had four finance ministers. In a last move the 
president invited Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a Sao Paulo senator that was then the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry to be the finance minister. Franco agreed to provide a blank check to 
Cardoso in order to allow him to try anything to contain inflation. Cardoso was an well 
acclaimed sociologist with international academic recognition who had had his political 
rights suspended during the authoritarian regime. Cardoso invited a group of young 
economists who had championed the first stabilization attempts in the mid-1980s to provide 
another economic plan to suppress inflation. After almost ten years of economic policy 
learning and now with effective political support, the economic team designed an economic 
plan that did not break any market principles for the first time in Brazilian history.
Against all odds Cardoso got Franco’s support to launch a new program at the end of 1993 
but with several differences in contrast with the predecessors. There were no shocks. There 
were not freezes. Meanwhile the government seriously attacked the fiscal deficit via a tough 
budget for 1994. Thanks to the outstanding success of the Real Plan, Cardoso became the 
presidential candidate in a coalition formed mainly by his party PSDB, and the PFL. In few 
weeks he overcame his competitors in the public opinion polls and won the presidential race 
at October 1994 in the first round (with more than fifty per cent of the valid votes).
The new government initiated by proposing a package of constitutional reforms that included 
ending state monopolies, promoting a state reform, reviewing the social security system, 
attracting foreign investment, and privatization. The pace of the reforms was variable and 
hesitant but the government muddling through strategy worked in spite of periodical defeats 
because of the fluidity of the governmental coalition majority. These reforms were approved 
although some of them included mitigating changes required to ensure a governmental 
majority of two thirds of the Congress (which means two thirds in both houses). Cardoso not 
only introduced changes at the interventionist 1988 Constitution but pushed the country 
beyond the Vargas era, in spite of the survival of some traces of the corporatist state, 
especially in the labour market.
The 1996 local elections were won mainly by PT and Cardoso allies but they did not change 
the relationships between the government and the Congress substantively. Cardoso continued 
to negotiate permanently with Congress -  at expense of plentiful patronage - to approve each 
voting on his market friendly reforms that demanded the qualified quorum for constitutional 
reform. Cardoso government realized that “shrinking the state [was] necessary for recovering 
its developmental capacity” (Weyland, 1998: 66).
The devaluation of the Thailand bath on July 1997 did not produce immediate reactions by 
the Brazilian government. The delay would be costly. In October the government launched a 
preventive package to protect the Brazilian currency. The interest rates were substantively 
increased in order to avoid evasion of foreign currency. A concerned Congress approved the
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tough measures proposed to contain public expenditure and to improve federal finances like 
Fiscal Stabilization Plan. It also pushed some of the constitutional reforms that were on the 
legislative agenda, such as civil service reforms, to further steps. The government 
successfully overcome the first impact of the Asian crisis but at expense of jeopardizing 
public deficit targets (5.9% instead of 5.0% of the GDP) and an increase of the jobless rate 
(from 4.8% in December to 7.3% in January). The successful privatisation of TELEBRAS at 
July was a breakthrough that represented a substantial inflow of foreign capital in a crucial 
moment of the political presidential campaign for the October election.
A constitutional amendment that allowed re-election was approved in the first semester of 
1998. The governmental coalition successfully managed to persuade the Congress that 
Cardoso had the right to dispute another mandate, crucial for consolidating the stabilization 
plan, a move similar to ongoing changes in Argentina, Chile and other Latin America 
countries. With his re-election at stake Cardoso delayed some corrective measures that the 
country needed to take in order to face the contagious effects of the international crisis that 
had already engulfed Russia at that stage. Cardoso was easily re-elected again in the first 
round while the IMF and the international financial community championed by the US 
Treasury provided a “safety net” loan of $ 41.5 billion. Paradoxically, Cardoso ended his first 
mandate in a position that was more vulnerable than when he was elected president for the 
first time.
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